Meghalaya High Court
Smti. Salina Rahman & Ors. vs . State Of Meghalaya & Ors. on 29 November, 2022
Author: W. Diengdoh
Bench: W. Diengdoh
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 317 of 2018
Date of Decision: 29.11.2022
Smti. Salina Rahman & Ors. Vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. P. K. Borah, Adv. with
Ms. S. Begum, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. N. D. Chullai, AAG with
Ms. R. Colney, GA (For R 1 & 2)
Mr. P. Yobin, Adv. (For R 3)
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press: Yes/No
JUDGMENT
1. This petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India comes with a prayer for direction by this Court for issue of a writ of mandamus or order of such nature directing the respondents-authority to make payment of gratuity along with interest to the petitioners herein.
2. The petitioners are employees at various posts under the Meghalaya 1 State Co-operative Marketing & Consumer's Federation Limited (hereinafter referred to as MECOFED) Lumdiengjri, Shillong-02, East Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya during various tenures till retirement on the due date.
3. The crux of the challenge in this writ petition has its genesis in a retirement package, termed as the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) which is also referred as the "Golden Handshake Scheme" offered by the respondent authority during the year 2001-2002 which was accepted by some of the employees, about 95 of them, but was declined by the petitioners who had chosen to continue in service, after which having completed their due tenure of service, the petitioners' services came to be terminated by their reaching the retirement age in the usual course.
4. It is the case of the petitioners that since the inception of MECOFED, the subject of 'payment of gratuity' has been a long pending demand of the employees and to that effect several representations have been made by the employees. However, it was when the matter on the issue reached the Supreme Court wherein in its order dated 02.04.2018 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 35923/2017 it was directed that the respondent No. 3 herein is to pay 'Gratuity' to the employees who had accepted the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, that the respondent paid the gratuity to the employees who had accepted the VRS (Voluntary Retirement Scheme).
5. On coming to know of the decision of the respondent to pay gratuity 2 to only those employees who had accepted the VRS, several employees, including the petitioners approached the respondent-authority with an application dated 19.06.2018 to also demand payment of gratuity to them, but to no response, prompting the petitioners to approach this Court. Hence this petition.
6. The respondent No. 3 is the only one who has filed the affidavit-in- opposition as the respondents No. 1 & 2 respectively have submitted that the main contender in this lis is the respondent No. 3 and as such, no affidavit was filed on their behalf.
7. The respondent No. 3 in the affidavit-in-opposition has, at the outset stated that the petitioners have come before this Court with unclean hands inasmuch as they have suppressed material facts and have given misleading statements. The petition is also hit by inordinate delay and laches, acquiescence and waiver as the petitioners approached this Court only after more than 10 years after they have retired from service without any complaint or otherwise about their alleged entitlement to gratuity knowing fully well that the service rules does not provide for the same.
8. It is also averred that the MECOFED being a Co-operative Society registered under the Meghalaya Cooperative Societies Act, 2015, does not come under the purview of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the service conditions of the employees are governed by the 'Classification, Appointment, 3 Control and Appeal Rules, 1980' (CACA Rules) wherein under these rules, there is no provision for payment of gratuity to its employees since the inception of the Society.
9. It is also stated that the Society has been incurring loss since 1982-83 with a huge debt liability towards the Meghalaya Co-Operative Apex Bank for which even the regular salary to the employees could not be paid. Accordingly, a scheme was devised to work out a better retirement package to the employees which is in the form of the Golden Handshake/Voluntary Retirement Scheme calling upon those employees who wanted to opt for this scheme to be retired from service on payment of certain benefits.
10. That the 95 employees who has opted for the VRS then made enquiries as to whether gratuity, leave encashment, duty salary and arrears of pay would be included in the said VRS but was informed by respondent No. 3 that the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act vide communication dated 30.05.2012 has declared that gratuity and leave encashment is not included in the said scheme as the CACA Rules does not provides for the same.
11. Those employees who has opted for the VRS then challenged the order dated 30.05.2012 by approaching this Court with a writ petition and vide order dated 10.07.2013 in WP(C) No. 154 (SH) of 2012, the learned Single Judge directed inter alia, that gratuity be paid to the petitioners therein. The 4 respondent No. 3 then went on appeal before the Division Bench of this Court which confirmed the order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge. Eventually, the matter reached the Hon'ble Supreme Court and on the issue of payment of gratuity to those employees who have opted for the VRS, the order dated 02.04.2018 whereby the respondent No. 3 as petitioner therein agreed to pay the gratuity to them, brought a quietus to this issue.
12. Mr. P. K. Borah, learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that the petitioners herein have admittedly not opted for the VRS when the Scheme was offered to them. They are however, aware that those employees of respondent No. 3 who have opted for VRS have eventually approached the High Court and have finally knocked on the doors of the Supreme Court demanding payment of gratuity to them which was not part of the package offered to them when they have accepted the VRS. It is also submitted that it was only when the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 02.04.2018 directed the respondent No. 3 to pay gratuity to the petitioners who are before the said Court, that the petitioners herein have filed representation before the respondent No. 3 praying for payment of gratuity to them and on no response received from the respondent No. 3 till September 2018, the petitioners have therefore filed this writ petition.
13. The learned counsel has submitted that notwithstanding the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as far as direction for payment of gratuity to the 5 95 petitioners therein is concerned, the stand of the petitioners in this case is that payment of gratuity is a legal requirement and a bounden duty is cast upon the respondent No. 3/employer under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 for payment of the same which has to be fulfilled.
14. Referring to Section 7 of the said Payment of Gratuity Act, (hereinafter called the Act), the learned counsel has submitted that it is not necessary for the employees to make any written application as was done in this case, for the employer to determine the amount and to make payment of the same to the employees, which was not done so in the case of the petitioners and as such, the provision of Section 9 being attracted, the respondent No. 3 is liable to be penalised, more so, as the MECOFED is not exempted under Section 5 of the Act which section has provided for power to the Government to exempt an establishment from payment of gratuity, albeit under certain conditions.
15. Again, the learned counsel has submitted that the relevant Rules of the MECOFED, that is, the Classification, Appointment, Control and Appeal (CACA) Rules, 1980 or any instruments or contract having effect by virtue of any enactments cannot override the provisions of the Act of 1972 as provided under Section 14.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioners have again submitted that under the said Act, there is no provision which distinguishes payment of the same to those employees who have opted for voluntary retirement as opposed to those 6 who have not.
17. As to the prayer of the petitioners for gratuity, the learned counsel has categorically submitted that no reliance is made on the related order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 02.04.2018 and no parity is sought with those petitioners who have been directed to be paid gratuity, but the stand of the petitioners herein is only on the strength of the applicability of the said Act in the case of the petitioners.
18. In support of the petitioners' case, the following judgments were cited:
(i) Allahabad Bank & Anr. v. All India Allahabad Bank Retired Employees Association: (2010) 2 SCC 44 para 8, 9, 11, 13, 14 & 21;
(ii) BCH Electric Limited v. Pradeep Mehra, Civil Appeal No. 2379 of 2020 para 23;
(iii) Y.K. Singla v. Punjab National Bank & Ors: (2013) 3 SCC 472, para 20 & 21.
19. Per contra, Mr. P. Yobin, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 countering the submission and contention of the petitioners through their counsel has, at the outset, raised the issue of locus of the petitioner inasmuch as it is submitted that the petitioners have approached this Court not with clean hands but have concealed material facts and have also stated contrary facts in their petition.
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20. The petitioners have raised the issue of payment of gratuity to the employees of MECOFED being a vexed issue for a very long time. The fact being that the petitioners at the time of their recruitment varying from 1970 to about 1988 have never raised the issue of payment of gratuity or that they are entitled to the same. This issue was also not agitated by the petitioners during the course of their tenure of service or even after they were retired on superannuation.
21. The learned counsel has also submitted that the claim of the petitioners is hit by inordinate delay, laches, acquiescence and waiver since most of them have retired almost ten years ago and no claim was made as far as gratuity is concerned. It was only when the petitioners came to know of the order dated 02.04.2018 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 35923/2017 wherein those employees of the MECOFED who have opted for the Voluntary Retirement Scheme/Golden Handshake Scheme were directed to be paid gratuity, that a representation was made before the respondent No. 3 and on being rejected, this writ petition was accordingly preferred.
22. In support of his argument the learned counsel has referred to the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors.: (2015) 1 SCC 347 at para 22 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the issue of laches, delay and acquiescence has held as under: 8
"22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under:
22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-
sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like [(see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India) (1997) 6 SCC 721]. On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence."
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23. The case of Shiba Shankar Mohapatra & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors.: (2010) 12 SCC 471 para 29 was also referred to by the learned counsel which reads as follows:
"29. It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the order after its conclusion. No party can claim the relief as a matter of right as one of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the Court is guilty of delay and the laches. The court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties crystallises in the interregnum. (Vide Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi (AIR 1974 SC 2077); State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan (AIR 1975 SC 2190); Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig (AIR 2000 SC 671); Inder Jit Gupta v. Union of India & Ors.: (2001) 6 SCC
637); Shiv Dass v. Union of India: (2007) 9 SCC 274; A.P. SRTC v.
N. Satyanarayana and City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala: (2009) 1 SCC 168)."
24. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 has also submitted that the concession by the MECOFED before the Hon'ble Supreme Court resulting in the order dated 02.04.2018 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 35923/2017 was only to the extent that gratuity will be paid to those persons who have sought voluntary retirement under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) and as such, the said order is a judgment in personam and not in rem. The case of State of J&K & Ors. v. Rajesh Anand: 2017 SCC Online J&K 685 at para 18 was cited to bring home this point. The said paragraph reads as follows:
"18. On the basis of this legal position, we find that the writ petition filed by the respondent was hit by delay and laches as well as acquiescence. As already stated, and is reiterated once again, the 10 judgment passed in Sanjeev Khajuria's case was not a judgment in rem rendered by this Court with an intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons nor the relief granted to Sanjeev Khajuria could be said to be declaratory, intended to apply to all similarly circumstanced persons, irrespective of whether they were parties to the litigation or not. There is inordinate delay of 18 years in approaching the Court, which has not been explained by the respondent by placing any material on record. The only plea taken by the respondent that he being similarly situated with Sanjev Khajuria cannot be deprived of the benefit which has been granted to him, may be due to the intervention of this Court, cannot be accepted for the reasons given herein above. The contention of the appellants that the respondent was a fence sitter and therefore, is not entitled to any relief whatsoever, deserves to be accepted."
25. The other contention of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 is that admittedly, the service conditions of the employees of MECOFED are governed by the CACA Rules, 1980 and under these rules, there is no provision for payment of gratuity to the employees and as such, the petitioners knowing this fact, could not have approached this Court demanding payment of gratuity.
26. The argument advanced by the learned counsels for the rival parties have been carefully considered by this Court. It is to be noted that the main contenders herein are the petitioners and the respondent No. 3 on behalf of the MECOFED. Mr. N. D. Chullai, learned AAG has submitted that the State respondent is only a formal party but would not be particularly involved in the controversy between the aforesaid parties and as such, no effective argument can be advanced on behalf of the State respondent.
27. There are two main issues to be answered in this lis, that is, (i) whether 11 the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is applicable to the MECOFED and (ii) whether the case of the petitioners is hit by the principle of delay, laches, acquiescence and estoppel.
28. On the first issue, the respondent No. 3 has contended that the MECOFED being a cooperative society, the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act are not applicable. Sub-section 3 of Section 1 of the Act has been quoted to canvass this contention, the said section provides as follows:
"1. Short title, extent, application and commencement. -
(1) ...
(2) ...
(3) It shall apply to-
(a) every factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port and railway company;
(b) every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishments in a State, in which ten or more persons are employed, or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelve months;
(c) such other establishments or class of establishments, in which ten or more employees are employed, or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelve months, as the Central Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf."
29. In this regard, this Court have noticed that in the affidavit-in- opposition filed by the respondent No. 3, reference has been made to the order dated 10.07.2013 passed by a Single Bench of this Court in WP(C) No. 154 (SH) of 2012 wherein at para 17 of the same it was held thus:
"17. Therefore, relying on the provision of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, more particularly, section 1 (3) section 2 (e) and (f) and section 2 (c) and 2 (g) of "the Meghalaya Shop and Establishment Act 2004", this court is of the considered view that Payment of Gratuity Act, gratuity shall be payable to an employs on the termination of his 12 employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than 5 (five) years. It is admitted by the parties that MECOFED had more than 100 (one hundred) employees and the petitioner had rendered continuous service for more than 5 (five) years before taking voluntary retirement. The State has the power to exempt any establishment from operation of the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. If in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the employees in such establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, railway company or shop are in receipt of gratuity or pensionary benefits not less favourable than the benefits conferred under the Act. In the present case in hand, admittedly the respondent has not issued any order under section 5 of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 for exemption of the MECOFED from operation of the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972."
30. The order dated 10.07.2013 was assailed by the respondent No. 3 herein before the Division Bench of this Court in WA No. 34 of 2013 which was rejected vide order dated 11.06.2015, prompting the respondent No. 3 to move the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition, but as averred by the respondent No. 3, the same was withdrawn with leave granted to approach the High Court by way of a review petition, which was accordingly done so.
31. The review petition being Review Petition No. 9 of 2016 was heard by a Division Bench of this Court wherein an appeal being WA No. 37 of 2012 preferred against an order dated 01.11.2012 passed in WP(C) No. 320 (SH) of 2010, relating to the same subject matter was also heard together. By a common judgment dated 04.08.2017, the review as well as the appeal filed by the respondent No. 3 herein was rejected.
32. As stated above, the respondent No. 3 then went up before the Hon'ble 13 Supreme Court against the order dated 04.08.2017 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 35923/2017, wherein vide order dated 02.04.2018, the respondent No. 3 has conceded that payment of gratuity will be made to those persons who have sought Voluntary Retirement under the VRS/Golden Handshake Scheme.
33. What could be understood from the above is that as far as the issue of payment of gratuity is concerned, the same has been accepted by the respondent No. 3 for which those employees who have opted for the VRS have been given this benefit. This would also mean that, notwithstanding the fact that the issue of gratuity or the entitlement thereto have not gone through a detailed hearing before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that there was a concession in this regard would mean that the relevant orders of the Single Bench as well as those of the Division Bench of this Court as far as the issue of gratuity is concerned have attained finality.
34. On this premise, it can now be ascertained that the MECOFED is an 'Establishment' as understood under clause (b) of Sub-section 3 of Section 1 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and is therefore liable to provide for payment of gratuity to its employees as provided under Section 4, irrespective of whether they are those who have opted for the VRS or those who was in regular service till their retirement on superannuation.
35. Of the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the 14 only relevant authority is that of Allahabad Bank (supra), particularly para 8, 9, 13 and 14 which is reproduced herein below as:
"8. We may at this stage notice that the appellate Bank did not succeed in its attempt to get the Bank exempted from the operation of the provisions of the Act.
9. Before adverting to the question as to whether the retired employees of the Bank are entitled to payment of any gratuity, it may be just and necessary to notice the objects and reasons and the scheme of the Act. It was realised that there was no Central Act to regulate the payment of gratuity to industrial workers, except the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955. The Government of Kerala enacted legislation for payment of gratuity to workers employed in factories, plantations, shops and establishments. West Bengal enacted an Ordinance on 3-6-1971 prescribing a similar scheme of gratuity. Gratuity was also being paid by some employers to their workers under awards and agreements. Since the enactment of the Kerala and the West Bengal Acts, some other State Governments have also voiced their intention of enacting similar measures in their respective States.
13. Section 5 confers power upon the appropriate Government to exempt any establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, etc. from the operation of the provisions of the Act, if, in its opinion, the employees in such establishment, factory, etc. are in receipt of gratuity or pensionary benefits not less favourable than the benefits conferred under the Act. The power to exempt conferred upon the appropriate Government is not an unconditional power. The appropriate Government is required to hear all the persons concerned who are likely to be affected by the decision to be taken and the exemption itself is subject to the conditions mentioned in the provisions of the Act, namely, that the employee or the class of employees in the opinion of the Government are in receipt of gratuity or pensionary benefits not less favourable than the benefits conferred under the Act.
14. A plain reading of the provisions referred to herein above makes it abundantly clear that there is no escape from payment of gratuity under the provisions of the Act unless the establishment is granted exemption from the operation of the provisions of the Act by the appropriate Government."
36. As to the contention of the respondent No. 3 that there is no provision 15 for payment of gratuity to the employees of MECOFED, the same not being made available under the relevant CACA Rules, 1980, the counter to this is found at para 20 of the case of Y.K. Singla (supra) referred to by the petitioners which reads as follows:
"20. Our determination of the first ingredient is as follows. We are of the considered view that consequent upon the acquittal of the appellant by the Special Judge, CBI Court, Chandigarh, it would be erroneous to conclude that the gratuity payable to the appellant on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. on 31-10-1996 was withheld on account of some fault of the appellant himself. We may hasten to add, if the appellant had been convicted by the Special Judge, CBI Court, Chandigarh, then the first ingredient would also be deemed to have been satisfied. Conversely, because the appellant has been acquitted, he cannot be held to be at fault. Accordingly, it emerges that the "fault" ingredient of the employee himself, for denial of gratuity when it became due, remains unsubstantiated. Since one of the two salient ingredients of the proviso under sub-section (3-A) of Section 7 of the Gratuity Act is clearly not satisfied in the present case, we are of the view that the appellant cannot be denied interest under the proviso to Section 7(3-A) of the Gratuity Act. Accordingly, the appellant has to be awarded interest under Section 7(3-A) of the Gratuity Act. Therefore, if the provisions of the Gratuity Act are applicable to the appellant, he would most definitely be entitled to interest under sub- section (3-A) of Section 7 of the Gratuity Act, on account of delayed payment of gratuity."
37. Coming to the next issue, that is, whether the case of the petitioner is hit by laches, delay, acquiescence and estoppel, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 has contended that the petitioners herein are fence sitters as they have taken advantage of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 02.04.2018 (supra) on coming to know of the order that payment of gratuity to the employees who have opted for the VRS is directed to be made and 16 therefore they have preferred a representation to the respondent No. 3 and on being rejected, they have then approached this Court by way of this writ petition. Apart from the fact that most of them have never raised the demand for gratuity during their service career or even when they were retired on superannuation, but after almost 10 years or so, they suddenly woke up to demand their purported rights which is not acceptable.
38. On the issue of delayed preference of this writ petition by the petitioners herein, thereby attracting the principles of delay, laches, acquiescence and waiver to the extent that they are estopped from approaching this Court as far as the prayer for payment of gratuity is concerned, this Court has noticed that this petition was filed on 14.09.2018. All the petitioners are retired employees of the MECOFED who have since retired before the year 2018. At paragraph 6 of the petition, the list of names of the petitioners giving their date of enrolment as well as date of retirement is found available therein, however, the petitioners have not been able to furnish the exact dates of enrolment as well as date of retirement except for the first four petitioners. Again, from the list it can be seen that the petitioner No. 1, S. Rahman joined service on 28.11.1984 and retired on 01.03.2017. The petitioner No. 2, S. Purkayastha joined service on 23.05.1979 and retired on 31.12.2012, the petitioner No. 3, Chinmoy Das joined service on 29.04.1984 and retired on 30.09.2011 and petitioner No. 4 Dalin Sirian Nongbet joined service on 17 14.01.2008 and retired on 24.01.2018. As far as petitioners No. 5 to 25 are concerned, no date of joining as well as date of retirement has been listed. From the above, what can be seen is that the petitioners No. 2 and 3 have retired almost six to seven years prior to filing of this petition, whereas, the petitioners No. 1 and 4 have retired about one to two years before filing of this petition. As to the other petitioners, if the submission of respondent No. 3 is to be accepted, it may be assumed that they may have retired about 10 years back.
39. If the principle of delay and laches is to be applied, stricto sensu as far as the case of the petitioners herein are concerned, except for the petitioners No. 1 and No. 4, all the other petitioners have approached this Court very belatedly and this set of petitioners can be termed as fence sitters who have approached this Court only after they came to know of the related order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court (supra). In this view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that relief cannot be granted to those set of petitioners who have failed to assert their rights of being granted gratuity at or near about the time of their retirement.
40. As far as the petitioners No. 1 and No. 4 are concerned, since the proximity of their retirement from service and the presentation of this writ petition is near about one or two years, leniency may be accorded to them and as such, if any relief is to be granted, they are accordingly entitled to the same. 18
41. On a conspectus of the issues raised in this petition, firstly, this Court would hold that the MECOFED being considered an 'Establishment' under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, it is therefore liable for payment of gratuity to its employees who fits the description as provided under Section 4 of the said Act.
42. Secondly, as regard the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court would hold that since the principle of delay and laches is applicable herein, all the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of payment of gratuity, except petitioners No. 1 and No. 4 respectively.
43. In the final analysis, the respondent No. 3 is directed to provide for payment of gratuity to the petitioners No. 1 and No. 4 respectively after proper calculation of the same.
44. In view of the above, this petition is hereby disposed of, the relief prayed for, being partly granted as indicated above.
45. There shall be no order as to costs.
Judge Meghalaya 29.11.2022 "Tiprilynti-PS"
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