Punjab-Haryana High Court
Anil Kumar Bimal vs State Of Haryana & Another on 12 July, 2013
Bench: Hemant Gupta, Fateh Deep Singh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
Date of Decision: July 12, 2013
CWP No.20138 of 2010
Anil Kumar Bimal ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana & another ...Respondent
Present: Mr. S.K.Garg Narwana, Senior Advocate, with
Mr. Naveen Gupta, Advocate, for the petitioner.
Mr. Sandeep Vermani, Additional Advocate General,
Haryana, for respondent No.1.
Ms. Radhika Suri, Advocate,
for respondent No.2.
CWP No.1973 of 2012
Anil Kumar Bimal ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana & another ...Respondent
Present: Mr. S.K.Garg Narwana, Senior Advocate, with
Mr. Naveen Gupta, Advocate, for the petitioner.
Mr. Sandeep Vermani, Additional Advocate General,
Haryana, for respondent No.1.
M/s B.S.Walia & O.P.Sharda, Advocates,
for respondent No.2.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FATEH DEEP SINGH
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporters or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
Kumar Vimal
2013.07.12 11:06
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 2
CWP No.1973 of 2012
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
This order shall dispose of aforementioned two writ petitions i.e. CWP No.20138 of 2010, wherein challenge is to the imposition of penalty of stoppage of two annual grade increments without cumulative effect imposed vide order dated 07.07.2010 and CWP No.1973 of 2012, wherein challenge is to the order dated 16.02.2011, whereby the petitioner was prematurely retired from service.
Firstly, we shall take up the writ petition challenging the order of minor penalty of stoppage of two annual grade increments without cumulative effect. The petitioner joined as Sub Judge (III Class) on 13.07.1984 and was promoted as Additional District & Sessions Judge. The petitioner joined as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Sirsa on 02.02.1998. An appeal titled 'Bali Singh etc. Vs. Jaspal Singh etc.' was entrusted to his Court, which came up for hearing for the first time on 24.02.1998 before him and adjourned to 30.03.1998. However, on 17.03.1998, on an application filed by the counsel for the appellant Bali Singh, the hearing of the said appeal was advanced to 25.03.1998, when counsel for the other side conveyed no objection. The final order in the appeal was pronounced on 30.03.1998.
The allegation against the petitioner is that the appeal was initially filed through Mr. R.K.Bajaj, Advocate, who was the counsel for the appellant - Bali Singh, but subsequently Mr. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate, was engaged by the appellant - Bali Singh. Mr. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate, filed an application, on which the hearing of the appeal was preponed and the appeal was ultimately decided on Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 3 CWP No.1973 of 2012 30.03.1998. Thereafter, a complaint was filed by Jaspal Singh on 22.04.1998 before this Court to the effect that in fact Mr. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate, is cousin grand-father of the petitioner. It is for the said reason, Mr. Chaudhary was engaged and a favourable order for advancing the date of hearing was passed and the appeal decided.
On the basis of said complaint, after conducting a preliminary Inquiry, charge-sheet dated 09.01.2007 was served upon the petitioner. It is Charge No.1, which is found to be proved against the petitioner. Charge No.1 reads as under:
"1. That while you were posted as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Sirsa, a Civil Appeal No.169 of 1997 titled as Bali Singh Vs. Jaspal Singh etc. was entrusted to your Court by way of transfer from the Court of Sh. G.L.Goyal, Additional District & Sessions Judge, Sirsa by the District Judge, Sirsa vide order dated 17.02.1998. The appeal was fixed for hearing on 24.02.1998. On 24.02.1998, the appeal was adjourned to 30.03.1998 for arguments. The appellant in that case was being represented by Sh. R.K.Bajaj, Advocate. After the transfer of the case to your Court, the appellant engaged Sh. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate (who is your step grand-father) to represent him with the sole motive to get a favourable order from you. You despite being fully aware of your relationship with Sh. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate, did not get the case transferred from your Court, as judicial propriety and ethics so demanded rather you opted to pre-pone the case with an intention to extend undue benefit to the appellant Bali Singh represented by your relative Sh. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate, being favourably inclined towards the appellant side and ultimately decided the appeal on 30.03.1998 in favour of the appellant.
As such an act reflects your favourable inclination towards the said counsel, biased mind, judicial impropriety whereas it is incumbent upon a Judicial Officer to work without any fear, favour, illwill or malice. Thus, you have acted in a manner unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and misconducted yourself and lowered the image of the judiciary in the eyes of public."Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 4 CWP No.1973 of 2012
The Inquiry Officer, on the basis of the evidence so recorded during regular departmental inquiry, gave a report on 05.06.2008 that there was relationship between the delinquent Officer and Mr. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate. It was concluded that Mr. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate, is a distant relative of the petitioner, but it was not in the knowledge of the Officer while disposing of the appeal and that no motive could be attributed to the Officer while pre-poning the hearing of the appeal as that has happened in the normal course of the Court procedure. However, the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer in the regular departmental Inquiry and recorded dissenting note on 03.12.2008. It was concluded that there was relationship between the petitioner and Mr. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate, therefore, the allegation of favourtism or extraneous consideration entering into the decision cannot be ruled out. Thus, the Committee disagreed with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and held that first Article of Charge is adequately proved. In pursuance of such note, a show cause notice was served upon the petitioner on 21.03.2009 along with copy of the dissenting note recorded. After consider the reply filed, the order of minor penalty of stoppage of two annual grade increments without cumulative effect was passed.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the petitioner was not aware of the relationship with Mr. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate, when an application for advancing the hearing of the appeal arising out of the decision on an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 was filed before his Court. It was pointed out that subsequently on inquiry, he came to know that in fact about 150 years ago Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 5 CWP No.1973 of 2012 his great grand-father had married twice and Mr. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate is grand-son from the second wife of his great grand-father and that the family of Mr. P.C.Chaudhary has no living contact with the family of the petitioner. Once the father of the petitioner confirmed the relationship, thereafter the petitioner did not hear any matter in which Mr. Chaudhary was the counsel.
It is also argued that the dissenting note recorded by the Committee does not dissent with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer that the petitioner had no knowledge about the relationship of Mr. P.C.Chaudhary, Advocate with the petitioner, therefore, the punishment inflicted on the basis of such dissenting note is wholly illegal and unwarranted. It is contended that each finding of the Inquiry Officer is required to be dissented by the Disciplinary Authority, so as to comply with the principles of natural justice. Reliance is placed upon single Bench judgments of this Court in K.L.Ahuja Vs. State of Haryana & another 2011 (1) RSJ 279; Mohinder Singh Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & another 1991 (3) RSJ 454 and Rajinder Kumar Vs. State of Punjab & others 1992 (3) RSJ 303 as well as the Supreme Court judgment in Ram Kishan Vs. Union of India & others (1995) 6 SCC 157.
It is also argued that action of the respondents stand vitiated on account of delay and laches in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. It is argued that the allegation of alleged misconduct was levelled in the year 1998, but the charge-sheet was issued only in the year 2007. Therefore, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner suffer from delay and laches. Reliance is placed upon State of Punjab & Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 6 CWP No.1973 of 2012 others Vs. Dr. Harbhajan Singh Greasy 1993 (8) SLR 9 and M.V.Bijlani Vs. Union of India & others (2006) 5 SCC 88.
On the other hand, Ms. Suri, learned counsel representing the High Court - respondent No.2, pointed out that in a writ petition this Court will not act as a Court of appeal and will examine only the decision making process. It is pointed out that all procedural safeguards were taken in respect of conduct of departmental proceedings. The petitioner was given opportunity to cross-examine the departmental witnesses and was also given opportunity to lead his defence. After considering the evidence led, in fact, the Inquiry Officer returned the findings in favour of the petitioner, but such findings recorded were disagreed by the competent authority. It is contended that the substance of the dissenting note is required to be examined. It has been recorded that the allegation against the petitioner of entertaining an appeal in which is relation was the counsel is a misconduct.
It is argued that lack of knowledge of information is a feigned ignorance and has not been rightly believed. It is pointed out that it is not a coincidence that Mr. P.C.Chaudhary appeared in an appeal, which was decided by the petitioner on 30.03.1998 after an application for advancing the date filed by Mr. Chaudhary was accepted. In fact, Mr. Chaudhary had not appeared for Bali Singh before the first Appellate Court as is evident from the order dated 11.8.2000 (Annexure P-12) after the order passed by the petitioner was set aside by this Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. Mr. Chaudhary has also not appeared in the suit which stands dismissed on 05.02.2002. Therefore, Mr. P.C. Chaudhary, Advocate was engaged to appear specifically before the Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 7 CWP No.1973 of 2012 petitioner. It is pointed out that earlier preliminary Inquiry was conducted and on the basis of the report, charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner. Before issuing the charge-sheet sufficient precaution was taken so that unnecessary harassment and embarrassment on account of disciplinary proceedings against a Judicial Officer could be avoided. Still further, the petitioner has not suffered any prejudice on account of delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings, as the allegation against the petitioner is of relationship with the counsel, which the petitioner admits, but denies knowledge thereof prior to the passing of the order on 30.03.1998. Therefore, the argument raised by the petitioner is without any merit.
It is also argued that the judgments referred to by the petitioner are in the facts of each case and not helpful to the arguments raised. In fact a detailed dissenting note was recorded and an opportunity was granted to the petitioner. Therefore, the entire action against the petitioner in initiating and concluding the departmental proceedings is fair and reasonable. Thus, no case for interference is made out in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
The reasoning given by the petitioner to advance the date of hearing is that there was a direction of this Court to decide the application for injunction within one month by this Court, therefore, he deemed it appropriate to advance the date of hearing and that he has not advanced the date of hearing because Mr. P.C.Chaudhary was appearing as an Advocate as he was not aware of relationship with Mr. Chaudhary, which was a fourth-degree relationship.
Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 8 CWP No.1973 of 2012
We do not find any merit in the argument raised. In fact, the direction of this Court dated 05.11.1997 was to the trial Court to decide the application for interim injunction within a month. There was no direction for the first Appellate Court to decide appeal in any time bound manner. Still further, the application for advancing the date was filed on 17.03.1998 i.e. almost three weeks after the appeal came up for hearing before the petitioner on 24.02.1998. The date of hearing was 30.03.1998 i.e. less than two weeks later. Therefore, there was no pressing circumstance which could warrant advancing of the date of hearing. Still, it is not a matter of coincidence that Mr. P.C.Chaudhary, who filed an application for advancing the date of hearing, did not appear for Bali Singh in subsequent proceedings. Therefore, the petitioner has granted advantage to the appellant - Bali Singh of his relationship by advancing the date of hearing. It appears to be a case of feigned ignorance, as the conduct of proceedings does not support lack of knowledge on the part of the petitioner in respect of relationship between the parties.
The dissenting note gave detailed reasons for dissenting with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, which concludes the grant of benefit by the petitioner. Such dissenting note was supplied to the petitioner. The dissenting note is not like a judgment of the judicial Court, so as to deal with each of the reasoning given by the Inquiry Officer. The dissenting note is to give an opportunity to the delinquent pointing out that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are not correct on the basis of the evidence on record.
The judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner are the judgment on their own facts. In fact, the judgment in Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 9 CWP No.1973 of 2012 Ram Kishan's case (supra) is to the fact that the disciplinary authority should give specific reasons of disagreement. The said judgment does not go to the extent that every reason given by the Inquiry Officer needs to be controverted as in judicial proceedings.
The argument that the inquiry suffers from delay and laches is again not tenable. In State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570, the Court held that the disciplinary proceedings cannot be said to be vitiated only on account of delay. In fact, unless the delinquent suffers prejudice, the inquiry proceedings cannot be said to be vitiated. The Court said to the following effect:
"9. Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances."
Within this court, Full Bench judgment in Dr. Ishar Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1993(3) PLR 499 dealt with the argument of delay in initiating and concluding inquiry proceedings. The Court observed as under:
Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 10 CWP No.1973 of 2012
"50. On assiduously examining the judgments cited at the Bar and referred to above, it emerges that (i) there is no period of limitation prescribed for initiating the disciplinary proceedings or proceeding to withheld, withdraw the pension on account of any reason. Still there must be a bonafide and reasonable explanation for delay, absence of which would entitle the Court to intervene and examine the case, (ii) If the delay is found to have caused prejudice to the employee, the Court would normally interfere in the matter (ii) Courts would be loath to prevent the trial of a person charged with grave charges merely on the ground of delay and would not exonerate him solely because of lapse of time between the date of offence and the charge sheet framed or served upon him. (iv) If the right of defence is found to have been denied due to delay, final order may be quashed, (v) It is for the delinquent officer to show how he has been prejudiced or deprived of a fair trial because of the delay; He is expected to clearly demonstrate the prejudice before an enquiry or trial can be quashed on the ground of delay. Otherwise quashing the proceedings solely on the ground of delay would be negation of justice and opposed to public policy. Delay in itself cannot result in surmising and presumptiveness and human frailties, (vi) Various factors for delay are to be kept in mind apart from the fact that nexus between delay and prejudice has to be made out. (vii) Though speedy trial is a part of the right to a fair trial to which delinquent is entitled, still factors like whether delay was sinister, whether prejudice to defence on account of the delay is made out have to be kept in mind and the delay would be fatal if a finding of being guilty would have to be returned solely because the delinquent is unable to effectively defend himself, on account of the delay, (viii) Reasonable time limit for just and reasonable exercise of wide powers for just decision, after taking note of the fact that sword of democles cannot be allowed to be kept hanging in respect with the pensioner's stale claim which is implicit in the rules itself as well as the principle that the pensioner, at some point of time has to be allowed to rest in peace, has to be kept in mind, (ix) Reasonable time limit has to be axed in the facts and circumstances of each case. Question like, was there a delay? If so how long? Was it inevitable having regard to the nature of the facts and circumstances of the case? Was the delay unreasonable? Whether it was wilful or on account of negligence and if so on the part of which party? Was it beyond control of the party? and likelihood of the prejudice caused to the defence are some of the factors which are to be kept in view while quashing the proceedings on the ground to delay alone. Delay by itself is no ground to quash the proceedings. Speedy Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 trial is no doubt a part of the right to be treated reasonably, fairly and I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 11 CWP No.1973 of 2012 justily, but at the same time mere delay by itself does not entitle the delinquent Officer to escape his trial".
The judgment in Dr. Harbhajan Singh Greasy's case (supra) though came to be delivered later than the Full Bench, but the larger Bench decision was not brought to the notice of the Court. In fact, it is a judgment based on its own facts and no rule of law can be culled down from the reading of the said judgment. In M.V.Bijlani's case (supra), it was found that the charges, which were framed related to only non- maintenance of Register and non-supervision. In the absence of any charge that he had in fact misappropriated copper wire for his own benefit out of the disposal thereof, the question as regards purported misconduct by way of mis-utilization would not arise. The Court noticed that a disciplinary proceeding was initiated five years after the appellant handed over charge. At that time he was admittedly not having possession of any documents. The enquiry officer furthermore took a period of seven years to complete the enquiry. It was thus in the facts of the said case, the Court intervened. But in the present case, the petitioner has not alleged any prejudice having suffered by him nor he has taken any such plea during the course of departmental proceedings nor can the delay be said to be of such a nature which will affect the defence of the petitioner.
In view thereof, we do not find any illegality in the decision making process leading to imposition of stoppage of two annual grade increments without cumulative effect, which may warrant interference in the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
Now coming to CWP No.1973 of 2012, wherein challenge is to the order dated 16.02.2011 whereby the petitioner was prematurely retired from service. The assertion of the petitioner is that apart from Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 12 CWP No.1973 of 2012 imposition of punishment of stoppage of two annual increments, there is no material against the petitioner on the basis of which the order of premature retirement could be passed. It is pointed out that most of the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of the petitioner are 'B Plus (Good)', but still he has been retired prematurely. The petitioner challenged the order of premature retirement on the ground that there is no material or the basis against the petitioner, which had been made basis for premature retirement of the petitioner.
In reply, the High Court has pointed out that the case of petitioner for retaining him in service on attaining age of 50 years was considered by the Full Court and it was recommended not to allow the petitioner to continue in service and forthwith retire him in public interest by giving three months pay and allowances in lieu of notice. It is pointed out that earlier on a complaint by one Shri Mam Chand, the petitioner was suspended on 19.02.2003 by the Full Court. But subsequently, the matter was dropped and on 12.05.2004 and the petitioner was reinstated. Another complaint dated 22.03.2003 was made by one Shri Gurdip Singh alleging that the petitioner decided the case of the complainant in league with the Advocate of opposite party. It was noticed by the then Hon'ble Administrative Judge on 02.06.2003 that second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree passed by the petitioner and that the complaint was ordered to be kept pending till the final disposal of RSA No.754 of 2003. Such appeal is still pending. In the year 2000-01, the Hon'ble Administrative Judge has recorded "B Satisfactory" and also reported that there were complaints about his integrity, however, there was no material available to confirm. In the year 2005-06 again, the Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 13 CWP No.1973 of 2012 Hon'ble Administrative Judge has recorded in the ACR that there were three complaints pending against him, whereas the Administrative Judge has recorded 'no serious complaint' in Column No.7 relating to Integrity for the year 2006-07. It is also pointed out that another preliminary inquiry was conducted and report dated 04.07.2008 was submitted by District & Sessions Judge -cum- Registrar (Vigilance) in respect of a case for the offences under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(g), 120-B of the IPC, wherein it was found that there are serious circumstances bringing close link between Shri S.S.Chauhan, Advocate and the petitioner, but the detailed probe was sought. A regular inquiry was ordered to be conducted and one of the Hon'ble Judge was appointed as Inquiry Officer, but in view of the premature retirement of the petitioner, the request of the Inquiry Officer was accepted to drop the proceedings for the present. In Annexure R-2/4, there is reference to various complaints filed against the petitioner, when posted as Presiding Officer in the District Tribunal, Faridabad though the documents show that such complaints have been filed.
A perusal of summary of ACRs for the period from 1984-85 to 2010-11 shows that in most of the years, the reports of the petitioner are 'B Plus (Good)'. However, in respect of some years i.e. 1984-85, 1986-87, 1987-88, 2000-01, the remarks are 'B (Satisfactory)'. The record does not show any positive qualities in the petitioner so as to allow him to continue in service. On the other hand, the service record shows that not only punishment has been awarded to the petitioner, but the allegations at different times show that the petitioner has outlived his utility to serve the institution. Many complaints have been moved against Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 14 CWP No.1973 of 2012 the petitioner, though some of them have been filed as well. The petitioner has chequered past.
The issue of premature retirement of a Judicial Officer has been subject matter of examination of the Hon'ble Supreme Court from time to time. One of the comprehensive and latest judgment in this respect is Rajendra Singh Verma (dead) through LRs & others Vs. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) & others (2011) 10 SCC 1, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Judicial service is not a service in the sense of an employment, but Judges are discharging their functions while exercising the sovereign judicial power of the State. Their honesty and integrity is expected to be beyond doubt. It should be reflected in their overall reputation. The Court observed as under:
"81. Judicial service is not a service in the sense of an employment as is commonly understood. Judges are discharging their functions while exercising the sovereign judicial power of the State. Their honesty and integrity is expected to be beyond doubt. It should be reflected in their overall reputation. There is no manner of doubt that the nature of judicial service is such that it cannot afford to suffer continuance in service of persons of doubtful integrity or who have lost their utility."
In another judgment reported as R.C. Chandel Vs. High Court of M.P. (2012) 8 SCC 58, the Supreme Court re-stated the importance of integrity of the Judicial Officers in the following words:
"29. Judicial service is not an ordinary government service and the Judges are not employees as such. Judges hold the public office; their function is one of the essential functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a Judge holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachable independence. He must be honest to the core with high moral values. When a litigant enters the courtroom, he must feel secured that the Judge before whom his matter Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 has come, would deliver justice impartially and uninfluenced by any I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 15 CWP No.1973 of 2012 consideration. The standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than an ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standards in the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from the society cannot be expected to have high standards and ethical firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. The credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who man it. For a democracy to thrive and the rule of law to survive, justice system and the judicial process have to be strong and every Judge must discharge his judicial functions with integrity, impartiality and intellectual honesty".
The Court considered the consequences of the order of premature retirement and held that it is not a punishment nor has any penal consequence. It also held that the entire service record is required to be taken into consideration, before a decision is taken to allow a judicial officer to continue in service. The officers of doubtful integrity, questionable reputation and wanting in utility are not entitled to benefit of service after attaining the requisite length of service or age. The Court observed as under:
"26. It is true that the appellant was confirmed as District Judge in 1985; he got lower selection grade with effect from 24.03.1989; he was awarded super timescale in May 1999 and he was also given above super timescale in 2002 but the confirmation as District Judge and grant of selection grade and super timescale do not wipe out the earlier adverse entries which have remained on record and continued to hold the field. The criterion for promotion or grant of increment or higher scale is different from an exercise which is undertaken by the High Court to assess a judicial officer's continued utility to the judicial system. In assessing potential for continued useful service of a judicial officer in the system, the High Court is required to take into account the entire service record. Overall profile of a judicial officer is the guiding factor. Those of doubtful integrity, questionable reputation and wanting in utility are not entitled to benefit of service after attaining the requisite length of service or age.
27. .....The consideration of the appellant's case for grant of selection grade and super timescale stood on different footing. The entire service record and overall profile of a judicial officer guide the High Court in Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 16 CWP No.1973 of 2012 reaching its satisfaction about the continuance or otherwise after the judicial officer has attained the required length of service or age. When the entire service record of a judicial officer is under consideration, obviously the High Court is alive to such judicial officer's having got promotion(s), increments, etc. during the service".
There is no lack of bona-fides attributed at any stage, therefore, no case is made out for interference in the collective wisdom of all the Judges as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court again in Rajendra Singh Verma's case (supra), wherein it has been held to the following effect:
"191. Further, in case where the Full Court of the High Court recommends compulsory retirement of an officer, the High Court on the judicial side has to exercise great caution and circumspection in setting aside that order because it is a complement of all the Judges of the High Court who go into the question and it is possible that in all cases evidence would not be forthcoming about integrity doubtful of a judicial officer. As observed by this Court in High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. Ishwar Chand Jain 1999 (4) SCC 579, at times, the Full Court has to act on the collective wisdom of all the Judges and if the general reputation of an employee is not good, though there may not be any tangible material against him, he may be given compulsory retirement in public interest and judicial review of such order is permissible only on limited grounds. The reputation of being corrupt would gather thick and unchaseable clouds around the conduct of an officer and gain notoriety much faster than the smoke. Sometimes there may not be concrete or material evidence to make it part of the record. It would, therefore, be impracticable for the reporting officer or the competent controlling officer writing the confidential report to give specific instances of shortfalls, supported by evidence.
192. Normally, the adverse entry reflecting on the integrity would be based on formulations of impressions which would be the result of multiple factors simultaneously playing in the mind. Though the perceptions may differ, in the very nature of things there is a difficulty nearing an impossibility in subjecting the entries in the confidential rolls to judicial review. Sometimes, if the general reputation of an employee is not good though there may not be any tangible material against him, he may be compulsorily retired in public interest. The duty conferred on the appropriate authority to consider the question of Kumar Vimal 2013.07.12 11:06 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No.20138 of 2010 & 17 CWP No.1973 of 2012 continuance of a judicial officer beyond a particular age is an absolute one. If that authority bona fide forms an opinion that the integrity of a particular officer is doubtful, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before courts. When such a constitutional function is exercised on the administrative side of the High Court, any judicial review thereon should be made only with great care and circumspection and it must be confined strictly to the parameters set by this Court in several reported decisions. When the appropriate authority forms bona fide opinion that compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is in public interest, the writ court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the order."
In view of the above, we find no illegality or irregularity in the order of premature retirement of the petitioner.
Consequently, both the writ petitions are dismissed.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
JUDGE
12.07.2013 (FATEH DEEP SINGH)
Vimal JUDGE
Kumar Vimal
2013.07.12 11:06
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh