Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Tirupathi Bharathi vs The State Of Ap on 10 November, 2025
Author: R Raghunandan Rao
Bench: R Raghunandan Rao
1
RRR,J& TCDS,J
W.P.No.25601 of 2024
APHC010499242024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3529]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY,THE TENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RAO
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T.C.D.SEKHAR
WRIT PETITION NO: 25601/2024
Between:
1. TIRUPATHI BHARATHI, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, OCC-
AGRICULTURE LABOUR, R/O- C-49, NTR COLONY,
BAKKANNAPALEM, P M PALEM POST, POTHINAMALLAYAPALEM,
VISHAKHAPATNAM, ANDHRA PRADESH-530041.
...PETITIONER
AND
1. THE STATE OF AP, REP BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY FOR
HOME DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT BUILDINGS, VELAGAPUDI,
AMARAVATHI, GUNTUR DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH.
2. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, STATE OF ANDHRA
PRADESH, VADDESWARAM, MANGALAGIRI, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
3. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NTR POLICE
COMMISSIONERATE, VIJAYAWADA, ANDHRA PRADESH.
4. THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, NTR POLICE STATION, CYBER
CRIME, O/O NTR POLICE COMMISSIONERATE, VIJAYAWADA,
ANDHRA PRADESH.
2
RRR,J& TCDS,J
W.P.No.25601 of 2024
...RESPONDENT(S):
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to may be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction, more particularly one in nature of Writ of Habeas Corpus or any other Writ, order or direction directing the respondents to produce my son i.e., Thirupathi Lokesh before this Honble Court and for such consequential direction and to pass IA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to direct the respondent No.3 to produce the CCTV footage of the respondent No.4 police station, pending disposal of the Writ Petition and to pass Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. P SHASHI VARDHAN Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL The Court made the following Order:
(per Hon'ble Sri Justice R. Raghunandan Rao) Heard Sri C. Sumon, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents.
2. On 08.11.2024, the petitioner had approached this Court, by way of a lunch motion, contending that her son Sri T. Lokesh (hereinafter to be referred as „the detenue‟), was taken away by persons claiming to be police officials of the 4th respondent-police station, at 11.30 p.m, on 05.11.2024, from her house situated in NTR colony, Bakkannapalem, P.M Palem Post, Pothinamallayapalem, Visakhapatnam District, Visakhapatnam. Thereafter, 3 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 the relatives of the petitioner are said to have gone to the 4th respondent- police station, for ascertaining the whereabouts of the detenue. The police officials of the 4th respondent had informed, the relatives of the petitioner, that they did not have the custody of the detenue and that the detenue was not present at the police station. The petitioner contends that she had approached this Court, as no intimation was given to her or any family member, regarding the detention of the detenue and as the detenue was not produced before any Magistrate within 24 hours, after detention of detenue under law. When the matter came up for hearing before this Court, on 08.11.2024, the Inspector of Police of 4th respondent police station was personally present in Court and was examined by this Court. The statement given by the Inspector of Police of the 4th respondent police station, on 08.11.2024 is extracted herein below:
As the learned Government Pleader appearing from the Office of the Learned Advocate General does not have necessary instructions, we have examined Sri Janaki Ramayya, Inspector of Police.
Sri Janaki Ramayya, Inspector of Police, states that having obtained information, that the detenue was using a particular social media handle and indulging in various offences on the social media, called the brother-in-law of the detenue and informed about the registration of the case against the detenue. This call was made on the evening of 06.11.2024. Thereafter, the detenue and his brother-in-law, Mr. Mohan, appeared before the Cyber Crime Police Station, Vijayawada, on 07.11.2024. After examining the detenue, a notice under Section 35 (3) of BNSS was issued to the detenue in the afternoon of 07.11.2024, Thereafter the detenue left the Police Station. The detenue was informed that he should present himself again today morning. He appeared before the Police Station again today and was released on a bail bond. He was also given a notice to produce the electronic gadgets and other material available with him in relation to the offences, for which the case had been registered against him, in Crime No.113 of 2024, with the Cyber Crime Police Station, Vijayawada. The 4 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 detenue is informed that he has to appear before the Investigating Officer on 10.11.2024. Sri Janaki Ramayya, Inspector of Police submits that he is unaware of the present whereabouts of the detenue.
The detenue to be produced before this Court on Monday morning."
The C.C.T.V. footage of the Vijayawada Cyber Crime Police Station for the period 04.11.2024 to 08.11.2024 shall be kept in a sealed cover and handed over to the Magistrate, who is presently dealing with Crime No.113 of 2024. The said record shall be handed over by tomorrow, i.e., 09.11.2024.
3. On 11.11.2024, Sri C. Sumon, appearing for the petitioner, stated that there is an error in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition inasmuch as the detenue had been taken away by the police on 06.11.2024 and not on 05.11.2024. The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Government Pleader had made further submissions which were recorded by this Court, on 11.11.2024, in the following manner:
Sri C. Sumon, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits the there was an error in the affidavit in as much as the detenue had been taken away by the police on 06.11.2024 and not on 05.11.2024. The learned counsel for the petitioner would also submit that the detenue had been detained in the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Task Force, Vijayawada at Bakinghampet from the Morning 07.11.2024 till the night of 08.11.2024. He submits that this information has come to light after the detenue had been released. Learned counsel for the petitioner also states that the detenue would be filing an affidavit detailing the various places to which he was taken and other facts which are relevant for the purpose of this writ petition.
The learned Government Pleader in the office of the learned Advocate General, on instructions, submits that no such detention had taken place and that the statement of Sri Janaki Ramaiah, Inspector of Police, Cyber Crime Police Station which 5 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 has already been recorded by this Court earlier, sets out the true and correct facts.
With a view to obviate any further defects in this case and to ascertain the facts, it would be appropriate to direct the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Task Force, Vijayawada to keep the CC T.V footage from the midnight of 06.11.2024/07.11.2024 till midnight of 08.11.2024 in a sealed cover and to produce the same before the concerned Magistrate.
4. Thereafter, an additional affidavit, of the petitioner was filed on 30.12.2024. After this, the learned Government Pleader took further time for filing a counter on 21.01.2025 and 04.02.2025. A counter affidavit was filed on 17.02.2025. The petitioner took time for filing a reply which came to be filed on 24.03.2025.
5. In this additional affidavit, filed on 30.12.2024, the petitioner stated that her initial statement of arrest of the detenue on 05.11.2024 is incorrect and the same was carried out on 06.11.2024 at 7.00 p.m. She stated that the detenue had been taken from Visakhapatnam to Vijayawada in an RTC bus which reached Vijayawada on 07.11.2024 at 6.00 a.m. Her younger son Sri T. Mohan is said to have accompanied the detenue and the officials of the 4th respondent police station. She stated that, after reaching Vijayawada, the detenue was taken to the Task Force office, situated close to the 4th respondent Cyber Crime Police Station and was kept there along with others who had been picked up for similar offences. The petitioner contends that her younger son was not allowed to meet the detenue and was informed that the detenue would be released in the evening of 7th November itself. However, the 6 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 detenue was not released on 7th November and was released only at 11.p.m on 09.11.2024. It is further contended by the petitioner that the detenue had been kept in the Cyber Crime Police Station from the morning of 7th November to the night of 8th November and the same can be ascertained by looking at the C.C T.V footage. The petitioner also set out the various police stations to which the detenue was directed to report, one after the other, and where he came to be arrested and produced before the Magistrate, who remanded the detenue to Ongole sub-jail. This Court, is not considering the subsequent movement of the detenue or the manner in which cases had been registered against him at various police stations as the present controversy revolves around the question of whether the detenue had been detained on the night of 6th November and kept under detention till he is said to have been released on the night of 9th November.
6. The 4th respondent, in his counter affidavit, filed on 14.02.2025 initially, and represented on 21.02.2025, states that Crime No.113 of 2024 had been registered against the detenue and others on 04.11.2024 for various offences under Sections 352(2), 356(2) of BNS and Section 66 read with 43 and 66 (c) of Information Technology Act, 2008 in the 4th respondent-police station. The investigating officer, to whom the complaint had been assigned, had constituted teams to trace out the accused in the case and having obtained information about the whereabouts of the brother of the detenue, had called upon the brother of the detenue, on 06.11.2024, to inform the detenue 7 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 to appear before the investigating officer. There upon, the detenue and his younger brother came to the 4th respondent police station on 07.11.2024 at about 9.30 a.m, and a confessional statement of the detenue is said to have been recorded in the presence of mediators and the mobile phone of the detenue had been seized. As the detenue had stated that he had another mobile phone that he was using, the investigating officer is said to have issued a notice under Section 35(3) of BNSS, on 07.11.2024, calling upon the detenue to produce the said mobile by 08.11.2024. The detenue is said to have appeared before the police station on 08.11.2024 and informed the investigating officer that the mobile could not be produced. Thereupon, a notice was issued to the detenue to appear on 10.11.2024. At that stage, the present Writ Petition came to be filed and this Court had directed the 4th respondent to produce the C.C T.V footage for the period 04.11.2024 to 08.11.2024 before the concerned Magistrate and the said order had been complied. It is stated the investigating officer never detained the detenue at any point of time more particularly in the Task Force Office, Vijayawada as alleged in the writ affidavit.
7. The petitioner filed a reply notice to the counter of the 4th respondent, on 24.03.2025. In this reply affidavit, the petitioner denied the version of the 4th respondent. It is stated that the C.C T.V footage of the office of Deputy Commissioner of Police, Task Force, Vijayawada had not been filed before the concerned Magistrate as no C.C T.V cameras were installed and 8 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 the same is highly doubtful and untenable, as this particular office is located in a highly sensitive area near the Rajbhavan and C.C T.V cameras would be operational in that area. The petitioner would also rely upon a judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Paramvir Singh Saini vs Baljit Singh1 wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had directed the Centre and States to install C.C T.V cameras enabled with night visions and audio recording, in every police station, and to maintain the data of such C.C T.V footage for a minimum period of 18 months.
8. In view of the rival submissions, this Court by an order, dated 17.06.2021, had directed the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada to verify the C.C T.V footage submitted to him and to report whether the presence of the detenue at the Cyber Crime Police Station could be ascertained on 07.11.2024 or 08.11.2024. The learned Magistrate submitted a report, on 02.07.2025, opining that the presence of the detenue was not found anywhere in the C.C T.V footage submitted to the learned Magistrate. After taking sometime for filing an affidavit in this regard, the 4th respondent filed an affidavit on 09.09.2025. In this affidavit, the 4th respondent has made certain statements, for the first time and nearly after 10 months had elapsed since the filing of the writ petition. It is the case of the 4th respondent that the C.C T.V footage, from all the cameras installed in the Cyber Crime Police Station had not been downloaded and C.C T.V footage of only two 1 AIR (2021) SC 64 9 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 cameras namely the Hall Camera (D9) and Hall Camera (D1) had been downloaded. It is stated that the C.C T.V footage from these two cameras alone were downloaded as downloading the C.C T.V footage of all the cameras would take considerable time to comply with the directions of the Court and that the 4th respondent had directed the technical person to download the footage with regard to the Hall camera and reception camera which would be sufficient to establish the presence of the alleged detenue on that date. However, the technical person instead of downloading the reception camera (D5), had downloaded the Hall camera (D1). It is contended that the notices were served on the detenue, in an area which was covered by the reception cameras (D5) but such footage is not available as the technical person had made a mistake. The 4th respondent filed another affidavit on 23.10.2025. In this affidavit, it is stated that, on account of certain technical parameters, fixed by the authorities, the footage of the C.C T.V cameras in the police stations, could not be stored for 18 months as required and this was corrected on 09.08.2025 by modifying the parameters. It is stated that on account of this correction, C.C T.V footage is now available for 18 months. Essentially, the 4th respondent, by virtue of this affidavit, is stating that the C.C T.V footage of the camera installed in the 4th respondent police station, is not available any more and that this Court would have to rely upon the C.C T.V footage obtained only from two cameras, and which has already been viewed by the learned Magistrate.
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RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024
9. Sri C. Sumon, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the police officials have deliberately suppressed the C.C T.V footage of all the other cameras and filed C.C T.V footage of two cameras, which are irrelevant, solely for the purpose of misleading this Court. He would submit that the silence, on the part of the 4th respondent, for a period of 10 months, about the fact that the C.C T.V footage of only two cameras, out of all the other cameras available in the police station, had been placed before the Magistrate and that the C.C T.V footage of all the cameras had not been placed before the Magistrate was a deliberate suppression of fact.
10. He would submit that the contention of the petitioner that her son, was detained illegally in the Task Force Office initially and subsequently, in the premises of the 4th respondent police station, stands undisputed, as the relevant C.C T.V footage was deliberately suppressed. He would further submit that the detenue would be entitled to compensation on account of such illegal detention and relies upon the following judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
1. Sebastian M. Hongray Vs. Union of India (UOI) & Ors2
2. Nilabati Behera Vs. State of Orissa & Ors3
3. D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal4
4. Bhim Singh Vs. State of J & K & Ors5 and 2 AIR 1984 SC 571 : (1984) 1 SCC 339 3 AIR 1993 SC 1960 : (1993) 2 SCC 746 4 AIR 1997 SC 610 : (1997) 1 SCC 416 5 AIR 1986 SC 494 : (1985) 4 SCC 677 11 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024
5. T.C. Pathak Vs. State of U.P & Ors6
11. The learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents would submit that the writ petition itself is not maintainable as no illegal detention, of the detenue, has been proved by the petitioner. He would point out that paragraph No.4 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition only states that the detenue had been taken away and the same would not amount to any illegal detention, per se, and no case of Habeas Corpus would be made out. The learned Advocate General draws the attention of this Court to paragraph No.5 of the affidavit in which the petitioner states that her relatives had gone to the 4th respondent police station to enquire about the whereabouts of her son while the affidavit, filed by her on 30.12.2024 states that her younger son had accompanied the detenue and the police officials of the 4th respondent police station, from Visakhapatnam to Vijayawada on the night of 6th November. He would also point out that the petitioner had stated, in the affidavit, filed on 30.12.2024, that the detenue had been taken to the Task Force Office while she subsequently contends that the detenue had been detained in the Cyber Crime Police Station. He would submit that these contradictory statements are sufficient to hold that the version of the petitioner cannot be accepted or believed. He would further submit that the 4th respondent, had understood the order of this Court, dated 08.11.2024, to mean that the said C.C T.V footage which should show the movement of the 6 (1995) 6 SCC 357 12 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 detenue was required and had acted on that basis. He would further submit that the subsequent error, in not downloading the C.C T.V footage of the proper camera was an unintentional error and there were no other motives which had actuated this error.
Consideration of this Court:
12. On 08.11.2024, the Inspector of Police of the 4th respondent had made a statement that the detenue was not arrested and had only appeared upon a summons given for appearance before the police station, on 07.11.2024. It was stated that the detenue had left the police station on 07.11.2024 and was informed that he had to appear before the investigating officer on 10.11.2024. The Inspector of Police further stated that he was unaware of the present whereabouts of the detenue, on 08.11.2024. on account of this submission, a direction was given for the C.C T.V footage of the 4th respondent-police station for the period 04.11.2024 to 08.11.2024 shall be handed over to the Magistrate dealing with Crime No.113 of 2024, in a sealed cover, by 09.11.2024.
13. This Court does not find any ambiguity in the said order and it is clear that the direction, given on 08.11.2024, was a direction to produce the C.C T.V footage of the entire police station. The Inspector of Police of the 4th respondent-police station, cold not have understood this direction to mean that the C.C T.V footage of the movement of the detenue was to be produced 13 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 before the Magistrate. The direction was to produce the C.C T.V footage for the period 04.11.2024 to 08.11.2024. Such a direction would not be given if the direction was only to monitor the movements of the detenue on 07.11.2024.
14. The case of the petitioner, is that her son was detained on 06.11.2024 in Visakhapatnam and brought to Vijayawada in the early morning of 07.11.2024 and initially kept in the Task Force Office and thereafter detained in the 4th respondent police station from 07.11.2024 to the night of 09.11.2024. The learned Advocate General sought to debunk this version, of the petitioner, by pointing out to discrepancies in the affidavit filed by the petitioner. He would submit that the initial statement of the petitioner that her son had been detained on 05.11.2024 clashes with the subsequent version that he was detained on 06.11.2024. The learned Advocate General would further contend that the entire tone and tenor of the affidavit of the petitioner was that her son had been detained in the Task Force Office and not in the 4th respondent-police station. He would contend that the petitioner had come up with the changed version of detention in the 4th respondent-police station at a subsequent period of time and for the purposes of covering up the lacune in the case.
15. A perusal of the pleadings, of the petitioner, does not support these contentions of the learned Advocate General. The petitioner filed an affidavit on 08.11.2024 stating that her son had been detained on 05.11.2024 14 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 by the persons claiming to be policemen from the 4th respondent-police station and that his whereabouts were not known. On 11.11.2024, the learned counsel for the petitioner had made a specific submission that the son of the petitioner, had been detained on 06.11.2024 and not on 05.11.2024. This correction was also reflected in the subsequent affidavit filed by the petitioner on 30.12.2024. In this affidavit, filed on 30.12.2024, that the petitioner stated that her son had been initially kept in the Task Force Office on 07.11.2024 and had subsequently been moved to the 4th respondent-police station and was released from there in the night of 09.11.2024. The petitioner had made the following specific statement "my son was kept at the Cyber Crime Police Station, Vijayawada from the morning of 07th November to the night of 8th November".
16. In the light of these pleadings, the 4th respondent had an obligation to demonstrate the whereabouts of the detenue. This Court, on 08.11.2024 itself, had directed the production of C.C T.V footage of the police station. The 4th respondent instead of producing the entire C.C T.V footage chose to instruct his technical person to download the C.C T.V footage of only two cameras. Thereafter, the 4th respondent kept silent about the number of cameras from which the C.C T.V footage had been downloaded and chose to inform this Court, after the storage period of the C.C T.V footage of all the other cameras had expired, that C.C T.V footage was downloaded only from two cameras,. The only explanation for such a strange course of action, can 15 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 be that the 4th respondent had deliberately suppressed the C.C T.V footage of all the other cameras in the police station, as such C.C T.V footage would have shown the continuous presence of the detenue, in the 4th respondent police station, on 07th November and 8th November. In such circumstances, there is no doubt in the mind of this Court, that the detenue had been illegally detained by the 4th respondent after he had been brought from Visakhapatnam on 6th morning and illegally detained by the 4th respondent on 7th and 8th also. There is every possibility that the detenue had been detained on 9th November also as per the pleading of the petitioner. However, we are unable to accept this part of the contention, only for the reason that we had sought production of C.C T.V footage up to 8th only.
17. The learned Advocate General had also sought to rely upon the notices that are said to have been given under Section 35(3) of BNSS on 07.11.2024 and 08.11.2024 as well as the self-bond and surety bonds that are said to have been obtained from the detenue. We are unable to accept these documents as being proof of notices being given on that day and as proof of the detenue being free to go out of the police station. Mere signatures of the detenue on papers, in the light of the above facts, cannot be taken to mean that the detenue was not under illegal detention.
18. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, 7 had held as follows:
7
(1993) 2 SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527 : 1993 SCC OnLine SC 135 at page 762 16 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024
17. It follows that „a claim in public law for compensation‟ for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is „distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for the tort‟ resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution.
This is what was indicated in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] and is the basis of the subsequent decisions in which compensation was awarded under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, for contravention of fundamental rights.
21. We may also refer to Article 9(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 which indicates that an enforceable right to compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of a guaranteed right. Article 9(5) reads as under:
"Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation."
22. The above discussion indicates the principle on which the court's power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is exercised to award monetary compensation for contravention of a fundamental right. This was indicated in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 17 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] and certain further observations therein adverted to earlier, which may tend to minimise the effect of the principle indicated therein, do not really detract from that principle. This is how the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] and others in that line have to be understood and Kasturilal [(1965) 1 SCR 375 : AIR 1965 SC 1039 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 144] distinguished therefrom. We have considered this question at some length in view of the doubt raised, at times, about the propriety of awarding compensation in such proceedings, instead of directing the claimant to resort to the ordinary process of recovery of damages by recourse to an action in tort. In the present case, on the finding reached, it is a clear case for award of compensation to the petitioner for the custodial death of her son.
19. In a subsequent judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., 8 again went into the question of the remedies available to a person, whose fundamental right of liberty had been infringed. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, after considering this issue had held as follows:
40.Ubi jus, ibi remedium.--There is no wrong without a remedy.
The law wills that in every case where a man is wronged and endamaged he must have a remedy. A mere declaration of invalidity of an action or finding of custodial violence or death in lock-up, does not by itself provide any meaningful remedy to a person whose fundamental right to life has been infringed. Much more needs to be done.
41. Some punitive provisions are contained in the Penal Code, 1860 which seek to punish violation of right to life. Section 220 provides for punishment to an officer or authority who detains or keeps a person in confinement with a corrupt or malicious motive. 8 (1997) 1 SCC 416 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 92 at page 437 18 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 Sections 330 and 331 provide for punishment of those who inflict injury or grievous hurt on a person to extort confession or information in regard to commission of an offence. Illustrations (a) and (b) to Section 330 make a police officer guilty of torturing a person in order to induce him to confess the commission of a crime or to induce him to point out places where stolen property is deposited. Section 330, therefore, directly makes torture during interrogation and investigation punishable under the Penal Code, 1860. These statutory provisions are, however, inadequate to repair the wrong done to the citizen. Prosecution of the offender is an obligation of the State in case of every crime but the victim of crime needs to be compensated monetarily also. The Court, where the infringement of the fundamental right is established, therefore, cannot stop by giving a mere declaration. It must proceed further and give compensatory relief, not by way of damages as in a civil action but by way of compensation under the public law jurisdiction for the wrong done, due to breach of public duty by the State of not protecting the fundamental right to life of the citizen. To repair the wrong done and give judicial redress for legal injury is a compulsion of judicial conscience.
42. Article 9(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR) provides that "anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have enforceable right to compensation". Of course, the Government of India at the time of its ratification (of ICCPR) in 1979 and made a specific reservation to the effect that the Indian legal system does not recognise a right to compensation for victims of unlawful arrest or detention and thus did not become a party to the Covenant. That reservation, however, has now lost its relevance in view of the law laid down by this Court in a number of cases awarding compensation for the infringement of the fundamental right to life of a citizen. (See with advantage Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798] ; Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India [(1984) 1 SCC 339 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 87 and (1984) 3 SCC 82 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 407] ; Bhim Singh v. State of J&K [1984 Supp SCC 504 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 60 and (1985) 4 19 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 SCC 677 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 47] ; Saheli, A Women's Resources Centre v. Commr. of Police [(1990) 1 SCC 422 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 145] .) There is indeed no express provision in the Constitution of India for grant of compensation for violation of a fundamental right to life, nonetheless, this Court has judicially evolved a right to compensation in cases of established unconstitutional deprivation of personal liberty or life. (See Nilabati Behera v. State [(1993) 2 SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527 : 1993 Cri LJ 2899] )
43. Till about two decades ago the liability of the Government for tortious acts of its public servants was generally limited and the person affected could enforce his right in tort by filing a civil suit and there again the defence of sovereign immunity was allowed to have its play. For the violation of the fundamental right to life or the basic human rights, however, this Court has taken the view that the defence of sovereign immunity is not available to the State for the tortious acts of the public servants and for the established violation of the rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In Nilabati Behera v. State [(1993) 2 SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527 : 1993 Cri LJ 2899] the decision of this Court in Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P. [(1965) 1 SCR 375 : AIR 1965 SC 1039 : (1965) 2 LLJ 583] wherein the plea of sovereign immunity had been upheld in a case of vicarious liability of the State for the tort committed by its employees was explained thus : (SCC p. 761, para 14) "In this context, it is sufficient to say that the decision of this Court in Kasturilal [(1965) 1 SCR 375 : AIR 1965 SC 1039 : (1965) 2 LLJ 583] upholding the State's plea of sovereign immunity for tortious acts of its servants is confined to the sphere of liability in tort, which is distinct from the State's liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application in the constitutional scheme, and is no defence to the constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution which enables award of compensation for contravention of fundamental rights, when the only practicable 20 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 mode of enforcement of the fundamental rights can be the award of compensation. The decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798] and others in that line relate to award of compensation for contravention of fundamental rights, in the constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. On the other hand, Kasturilal [(1965) 1 SCR 375 :
AIR 1965 SC 1039 : (1965) 2 LLJ 583] related to the value of goods seized and not returned to the owner due to the fault of government servants, the claim being of damages for the tort of conversion under the ordinary process, and not a claim for compensation for violation of fundamental rights. Kasturilal [(1965) 1 SCR 375 : AIR 1965 SC 1039 : (1965) 2 LLJ 583] is, therefore, inapplicable in this context and distinguishable."
44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen.21
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20. The fundamental rights of the detenue, guaranteed under Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution of India, protecting him against arbitrary detention and assuring him of being produced before a magistrate, within 24 hours of such detention have clearly been breached. In view of the above principles of law, enunciated by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the detenue would be entitled for payment of compensation for the period of his illegal detention. As there is no allegation of any third degree methods being applied on the detenue, we are of the opinion that a sum of Rs.10,000/- would suffice as compensation, for the period of illegal detention suffered by the detenue. This sum is to be paid to the detenue, by the 4th respondent, and a receipt signed by the detenue, shall be submitted to the Registrar Judicial, of this Court, within a period of four weeks from the date of this order.
21. The Registrar Judicial, shall place a report before this Court, on 15.12.2025 as to whether such a receipt has been submitted or not. In the event of non submission, of such receipt, further directions shall be issued.
22. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
_______________________________ R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J ___________________ T.C.D. SEKHAR, J RJS 22 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 THE HON'ABLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RAO AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T.C.D. SEKHAR WRIT PETITION No: 25601 of 2024 (per Hon‟ble Sri Justice R Raghunandan Rao) 10.11.2025 RJS 23 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024 24 RRR,J& TCDS,J W.P.No.25601 of 2024