Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand Through Director vs Phiran Mahto on 25 April, 2022
Author: Ravi Ranjan
Bench: Chief Justice, Sujit Narayan Prasad
[1]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.195 of 2018
1. The State of Jharkhand through Director, Primary Education, School
Education and Literacy Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi.
2. The Director, Primary Education, State of Jharkhand, P.O.-Dhurwa,
P.S.-Jagannathpur, District-Ranchi.
3. The District Superintendent of Education, Ranchi, P.O., P.S. &
District-Ranchi.
4. The District Superintendent of Education, Khunti, P.O., P.S. &
District-Khunti.
5. The Secretary, Human Resources Development Department, P.O.-
Dhurwa, P.S.-Jagannathpur, Dist.-Ranchi.
... ... Appellants/Respondents
Versus
1. Phiran Mahto, son of Late Laldeo Mahto, R/o village-Lawa, P.O.-
Khatanga, P.S.-Rania, District-Khunti.
... ... Respondent/Original Writ-Petitioner
2. The Secretary, Managing Committee, SPG Primary School, Jaipur,
Khunti, P.O., P.S. & District-Khunti.
...... Respondents/Respondents
With
L.P.A. No. 98 of 2018
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, School
Education & Literacy Department, Government of Jharkhand, having
its office at Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
2. The Director, Primary Education, Government of Jharkhand, having
its office at Project Building, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
3. The Deputy Director, Primary Education, Government of Jharkhand,
having its office at Project Building, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, District-
Ranchi.
4. The District Superintendent of Education, Ranchi, having its office at
Ranchi, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.-Sadar, District-Ranchi.
... ... Appellants/Respondents
Versus
[2]
1. Poonam, wife of Sri S.D. Tiwari, resident of C/o Biswanath Narsaria,
Narsaria Bhandar, Randhir Prasad Street, Upper Bazar, P.O.-G.P.O.,
P.S.-Kotwali, Ranchi.
... ... Respondent/Petitioner
2. Sri Sheonarayan Marwari Kanya Madhya Pathshala, Upper Bazar,
Ranchi through its Secretary, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.-Sadar, District-
Ranchi.
... ... Proforma Respondent/Respondent
-------
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
-------
For the Appellants : Mr. Sachin Kumar, AAG-II [L.P.A. No.195 of 2018]
Mr. Ashok Kumar, AAG-IV [L.P.A. No.98 of 2018]
Mr. Anish Kumar Mishra, AC to GA-I
[L.P.A. No.98 of 2018]
For the Resp. No.1 : Mr. H.K. Mahato, Advocate [L.P.A. No.195 of 2018]
Mr. Sharad Kaushal, Advocate [L.P.A. No.98 of 2018]
For the Resp. No.2 : Mr. Mahesh Kumar Mahto, Advocate
[L.P.A. No.195 of 2018]
Mr. Kumar Vaibhav, Advocate
----------------------------
ORAL JUDGMENT
27/Dated 25th April, 2022
1. Both the appeals have been taken together since common issue is involved pertaining to maximum age limit of appointment as Assistant Teacher in Government aided minority schools. However, since facts in both the appeals are different, as such, the same are being discussed separately.
L.P.A. No. 195 of 2018:
2. The instant intra-court appeal preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 06.12.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 6061 of 2015, whereby and whereunder, the writ petition has been allowed quashing the order passed in Memo No. 574 dated 23.11.2015 and further, [3] appointment of the writ petitioner as Assistant Teacher of S.P.G. Primary School, Jaipur, Khunti has been approved.
3. The brief facts as per the pleading which are required to be enumerated, read as hereunder:
The writ petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher by the Management of SPG Primary School, Jaipur, which is a Government Aided Minority School. The writ petitioner gave his joining on 05.08.2004. The case of the writ petitioner was sent to the District Superintendent of Educaiton, Ranchi by the B.E.E.O. concerned along with relevant papers for approval of his appointment and payment of salary in accordance with law. The District Superintendent of Education had approved the appointment provisionally vide Office Order dated 23.06.2005 and forwarded the matter along with preposition statement for fixation of salary of the writ petitioner for final approval with necessary information/papers to the Director, Primary Education vide his letter dated 28.06.2005. However, the office of the Director queried from the DSE vide letter no.2990 dated 08.09.2005 as to how the writ petitioner was selected and appointed when his age is more than 37 years whereas the Government Circular provides only up to 37 years for appointment for backward category candidates. The DSE replied the same clarifying the situation that vide letter no.878 dated 08.04.2003 of the Department of Human Resources Development by which JPSC also published notification/advertisement for recruitment of Primary Teachers for the State is the basis of age of the writ petitioner which prescribes the upper age limit for recruitment of primary teachers as 42 years for backward category candidates and the writ petitioner is [4] appointed while he was less than 42 years from backward caste category, but, thereafter no order was passed by the Director's office and the final approval remained pending for long years in spite of several representations of the writ petitioner as also of the Management of the School.
The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the same, preferred a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2300 of 2011 which was disposed of on 07.03.2014 directing the Director to pass appropriate order of approval of service of the writ petitioner and for preposition statement and further to release due salary. However, the Director passed the order dated 23.11.2015 showing his inability to approve appointment and preposition statement of the writ petitioner sent to him in 2005 itself taking help of a resolution dated 04.09.2001 of the Personnel Department, which is issued for appointment of gazetted or non- gazetted employees of the State but has not taken into consideration letter no. 878 dated 08.04.2003 of the Human Resource Development Department, which is basis of appointment of the writ petitioner by which JPSC has considered the case of the writ petitioner for appointment as Assistant Teacher.
The writ petitioner has taken the plea that the respondent- authorities has acted arbitrarily in not approving the appointment of the writ petitioner in the Government Aided Minority School following the letter no. 878 dated 08.04.2003 so far as the age is concerned.
The State took the plea before the learned Single Judge to the effect that the appointment of the writ petitioner was found to be in contravention of government circular which fixes upper age limit of the [5] backward class candidates to be 37 years and hence, the said appointment was illegal. The writ petitioner's date of birth is 20.10.1964 and date of appointment is 02.08.2004 and at the time of initial appointment, the writ petitioner was almost 40 years of age, which is three years more than the upper age limits fixed for appointment. Further plea was taken that for appointment of teachers in a minority school, the resolution dated 04.09.2001 of the Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasa Department has to be followed in absence of any specific order, which prescribes the upper age limits of 37 years for appointment of a candidates belonging to backward class categories. Further plea was taken in the light of the resolution dated 04.09.2001, the preposition statement for appointment of writ petitioner was not approved and a reasoned order dated 23.11.2015 was passed by the respondents.
The learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, has allowed the writ petition by quashing the order dated 23.11.2015 as contained in memo no. 574 with a direction to approve the appointment of the writ petitioner as Assistant Teacher of SPG Primary School, Jaipur, Khunti and further to approve prepositional statement of pay of the writ petitioner and fix salary of the writ petitioner in accordance with law within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of the order. It has further been directed that after fixation of salary, the entire amount including the arrears of pay is to be paid to the writ petitioner in accordance with law within a period of four weeks thereafter.
[6]
Such direction was passed by the learned Single Judge taking into consideration that the State has failed to substantiate the case about applicability of the maximum age of appointment to be 37 years under the backward category. Further reason has been assigned therein by discarding the circular upon which the respondent-authority has relied upon, i.e., government circular, but the respondent has failed to substantiate about its applicability in the government aided minority school, which is the subject matter of the instant intra court appeal. L.P.A. No. 98 of 2018:
4. The instant intra-court appeal preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 22.09.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 1393 of 2007, whereby and whereunder, the letter dated 08.01.2007 issued by the Director, Primary Education, Govt. of Jharkhand has been quashed by which the prepositional statement sent for fixation of pay of the writ petitioner has been directed to be approved.
5. The brief facts as per the pleading which are required to be enumerated, read as hereunder:
The writ petitioner applied in terms of the advertisement issued for appointment of Matric Trained Teacher in the newspaper on 10.07.2002. The writ petitioner appeared in the written examination held on 21.09.2002 in which she was declared successful. Thereafter, she had participated in the interview in which she was found successful by the appointment committee. Accordingly, the writ petitioner was appointed vide appointment letter dated 14.11.2002 as Assistant Teacher in the school of respondent No. 5. Thereafter, the petitioner [7] joined and has started discharging her duties and even though the respondent no.5 has sent the particulars of the petitioner's appointment to the District Superintendent of Education, Ranchi for approval on 18.06.2003 but the same has not been approved. Further, the DSE, Ranchi vide letter dated 24.11.2003 sent all the details before the Director, Primary Education for the preparation of the prepositional statement of the salary of the petitioner, but the same was pending and no steps was taken by the respondents.
The plea which was taken before the learned Single Judge that the claim of the writ petitioner for approval of her appointment and prepositional statement cannot be discarded on the ground of applying the government circular wherein 37 years has been fixed as maximum age limit for appointment as Assistant Teacher. The writ petitioner took the plea before the learned Single Judge that the aforesaid government circular prescribing the maximum age of 37 years is not applicable in the government aided minority school.
The learned Single Judge after considering the stand taken in this regard by the State authority has allowed the writ petition by quashing the order dated 08.01.2007 with a direction upon the respondents to approve the prepositional statement of pay and fix the salary of the writ petitioner in accordance with law within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. Further direction was given that after fixing the salary of the writ petitioner, the entire amount including the arrears was to be paid in accordance with law within a period of two weeks thereafter.
[8]
6. Mr. Sachin Kumar, learned AAG-II appearing for the State of Jharkhand in both the appeals has submitted that the appointment of the writ petitioners since was illegal on the ground that the said appointment was provided at the age of 40 years of age. According to him, the maximum age as per the government circular for appointment as Assistant Teacher is 37 year, as such, the writ petitioners since was appointed after the age of 37 years, therefore, their appointments is nullity in the eye of law and in that view of the matter, if the concerned competent authority of the State of Jharkhand has taken the plea by not approving their appointment, it cannot be said to suffer from error. According to the learned counsel, the learned Single Judge has not taken into consideration this aspect of the matter, therefore, the order suffers from illegality and the same are fit to be quashed and set aside.
7. While on the other hand, Mr. H.K. Mahato, learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner has submitted that there is no error in the orders passed by the learned Single Judge, reason being that the State is taking the plea about applicability of the government circular showing therein the maximum age of 37 years for appointment but the aforesaid circular is not applicable for the government aided minority school. The State has not come forward with respect to any circular/resolution/notification applying the decision of the State- authority discarding the age of 37 years to the Government Aided Minority Schools. So long such government circular has not been adopted by the State Government to make it applicable in the Government Aided Minority School, it cannot be construed to be applicable. According to the learned counsel by taking into [9] consideration this aspect of the matter, if the learned Single Judge has interfered with the impugned orders, it cannot be said that the orders suffers from infirmity.
8. Mr. Mahato, learned counsel has submitted, referring to the order passed in this case, that this Court has given ample opportunities to come out with the applicable government circular prescribing the maximum age of 37 years in the government aided minority school, but, no such circular/notification/resolution has been brought on record.
9. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. We, after going across the factual aspect as per the pleading made in the writ petition as also the counter affidavit, have found that the issue which requires to be answered by this Court is as to whether the government circular which prescribed the maximum age of 37 years for appointment as Assistant Teacher can be made applicable in the government aided minority school without issuing any resolution/circular for applying the same in such schools?
10. Admittedly, the circular upon which the State is relying pertains to government owned schools. This Court, at the time of hearing of the matter, had put a question upon the State as to whether the government circular basis upon which the applicability of 37 years is being taken a ground for negating the claim of the approval of the appointment of the writ petitioners as also prepositional statement are applicable to the government aided minority school and whether the same was adopted by the schools? The said order is being reproduced as under: [10]
"...........
On 29.01.2020 this Court directed respondent No.2 (in LPA No.195/18) to file affidavit informing this Court as to whether the School concerned has adopted Jharkhand Prarambhik Vidyalaya Nyukti Sansodhan Nyamavali, 2002 or not and if it has been adopted, whether the advertisement brought in the year 2003, under which the writ petitioner was appointed in 2004, was the first advertisement after the amendment of the aforesaid Rules or there were other advertisements also in between them.
The affidavit appears to have been filed on behalf of respondent No.2, but this Court on the next date i.e. 12.02.2020 has recorded that the affidavit filed by respondent No.2 does not answer the query raised by this Court in the order dated 29.01.2020. Another chance was given to respondent No.2 to specifically answer the issue by filing another affidavit. However, again on 19.02.2020 this Court has recorded that no answer to the query made by this Court has been given by this respondent No.2. Despite indulgence having been granted to him earlier and by way of last indulgence, respondent No.2 was again directed to file another affidavit. Today, neither such affidavit is on record nor is the learned counsel for respondent No.2 present.
In such a situation, we would direct respondent No.2 to appear in person before us through Video Conferencing on the next date of hearing and explain as to why he is avoiding and defying the direction of this Court by not answering the query raised by this Court vide aforesaid orders.
Let respondent No.5 transmit a copy of this order to respondent No.2 so that he would join us through Video Conferencing on the next date of hearing. However, if prior to next date such affidavit answering the query is filed, then, only the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 would be required to be present.
Put up this case on 14th of October, 2020.
Since the learned counsel for respondent No.2 is not present today at the time of passing of this order, let a copy of this order be communicated to him though the Office."
11. An affidavit was been filed on 09.03.2021 annexing therein a rule notified on 06.03.2003. It appears from the said notification that the same has been issued by the Human Resources Development Department of the State of Jharkhand which was issued in the name of Governor of the State to be known as Jharkhand Primary School Appointment Amended Rules, 2003. The original Rule has not been brought on record, however, the amended rules, i.e., by way of notification dated 06.03.2003 has been produced before this Court. The said notification appears to be for appointment as Assistant Teacher in the government owned school but no such notification / circular / [11] resolution has been produced before this court applying the aforesaid rules for government aided minority school.
12. During the course of hearing, this Court had again put a question upon the learned AAG-II as to whether any circular/resolution/notification has been issued applying the maximum age limit of 37 years for appointment as Assistant Teacher in the government aided minority school or not?
It has fairly been submitted by the learned counsel that no such circular/resolution/notification has ever been issued.
13. Therefore, it is clear that time was allowed to bring on record any resolution applying the maximum age limit of 37 years for appointment in government aided minority school but the State failed to do so. As such, the question would be that the plea which has been taken by the Director Primary Education for not approving the appointment of the writ petitioners under the garb of having cross the maximum age of 37 years, would be said to be justified action on the part of the concerned Director?
The answer of this Court would be in negative, reason being that the State authority is required to discharge their duties on the basis of rules, regulations, circulars, resolutions or instruction, etc. and if any action is being taken in absence of any of the above, the said action of the concerned authority will be said to be without jurisdiction.
14. In the given facts of the case, the writ petitioners, although have been appointed at the age of approximately 40 years, however, in absence of any criteria of age limit applicable for appointment as Assistant Teacher [12] in the government aided minority school, not approving the appointment of the writ petitioners is nothing but arbitrary exercise of power.
15. Further, a question will arise when the authority was taking a decision for appointment, it must be on the basis of statutory power or the power conferred by issuance of executive instruction on behalf of the Government. If any decision is being taken by the concerned authority on the administrative side in absence of any authority, the same will be said to be without jurisdiction.
16. It is evident from the discussion made hereinabove that despite ample opportunities granted to the State, no such circular / resolution / notification could be produced showing the applicability of maximum age limit of 37 years for appointment of Assistant Teacher in the government aided minority school, therefore, if there is no maximum age bar for appointment and any appointment has been made then, non- approval of appointment and prepositional statement will be nothing but arbitrary exercise of power.
17. Both the writ petitions were filed for quashing the orders dated 23.11.2015 and 08.01.2007 passed in this regard and the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the jurisdictional issue has quashed the impugned orders. According to the considered view of this Court, the same cannot be said to suffer from error reason being that the writ of certiorari can well be issued if any decision either by the quasi- judicial authority or by the administrative authority is being passed without any authority of law, the same would be considered to be without jurisdiction and in that circumstances, the same is required to [13] be quashed. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, A.I.R. 1964 SC 477. Paragraph no.7 of the said judgment is being reproduced as under:
"The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : (AIR 1958 SC 398) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168.
In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph no.21 as under:
"With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or [14] Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari."
In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under:
"12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra)
13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice."
In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.66 and 67 as under:
"66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant "the feel of the expert" by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land.[15]
67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed."
In Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships, while discussing the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference into the finding of the Tribunal, has been pleased to hold, placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para-17 as under:
"17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows:
The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ......... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.
This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case:
It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of [16] interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority."
In General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 695 the Apex Court has delved upon the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down that, if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order would be fit to be quashed/set aside.
18. This Court, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove and after going across the order/judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, is of the considered view that if the impugned orders have been quashed taking into consideration the fact that the Government has failed to substantiate their plea about applicability of the maximum age limit of 37 years for appointment of Assistant Teacher in the government aided minority school. Thus, the same cannot be said to suffer from any error.
19. Accordingly, both the appeals fail and stand dismissed.
20. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Dr. Ravi Ranjan, C.J.) (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Saurabh/ A.F.R.