Madras High Court
Maji vs Perumal Naidu (Deceased) on 4 April, 2013
Author: G.Rajasuria
Bench: G. Rajasuria
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 04.04.2013 Coram: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G. RAJASURIA S.A.No.1255 of 1989 Maji .. Appellant vs. 1. Perumal Naidu (deceased) 2. P.Radhabai 3. P.Jankrishnan 4. P.Gopalakrishnan 5. J.Saraswathi 6. Mangalakshmi 7. Sumathi 8. Geetha 9. Devi .. Respondents RR2 to 9 brought on record as LRs of the deceased sole respondent vide order of this Court dated 10.12.2011. This Second Appeal is focussed as against the judgment and decree of the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, S.Arcot in A.S.No.1 of 1989 and dated 11th July 1989 in confirming the judgments modifying the decree of the Court of District Munsif, Cuddalore in O.S.No.701 of 1985 and dated 28.11.1988 by allowing the cross objection preferred in A.S.No.1 of 1989 on the file of the Sub Court, Cuddalore. For Appellant : Mr.V.Raghavachari For R2 : Mr.R.Muralidharan JUDGMENT
This Second appeal is focussed animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 11th July 1989 passed in A.S.No.1 of 1989 by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, S.Arcot, in modifying and enlarging the scope of the decree of the Court of District Munsif, Cuddalore in O.S.No.701 of 1985 dated 28.11.1988 by allowing the cross objection preferred in A.S.No.1 of 1989 on the file of the Sub Court, Cuddalore.
2. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court.
3. The epitome and the long and the short of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this Second Appeal would run thus:
(a) The plaintiff Perumal Naidu @ Srinivasalu Naidu filed the suit seeking the following reliefs:
"To pass a decree in favour of plaintiff and as against defendant declaring plaintiff's absolute title to the property set out in Sch.B hereto, and for recovery of possession of the same free from the obstruction of defendant and also for declaration of plaintiff's right to use the property set out in Sch.C below to reach the backyard of plaintiff's house and garden and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant and her men from interfering with the plaintiff's exercising such right, for costs of suit."
(extracted as such) citing the following schedule of properties:
@brhj;J tpguk; @V@ bc&l;a{y;
flY}h; hpo flY}h; 1 tJ $hapz;L rg;o flY}h; lt[d; Kdprpghypo 5tJ otpc&d; 7tJ thh;L k";rf;Fg;gk; kJuh My;ngl;il ghz;onuhL cjhukhzpf;fk; tPjpapy; gpshf; vz; 32 o/v!; 1893 rJuo 23087y; thjp gpujpthjp tPl;ow;Fk; mjw;F mLj;j fhypkidf;Fk; nkw;F Uf;Fkzp mk;khs; fpua kidf;Fk; 10 mo ghijf;Fk; fpHf;F bjw;F o.v!;/vz;1892 cs;s brhj;Jf;F tlf;F ,jpy; fp/nk/$hjpao 33 bj/t $hjpao fPH;g[uk; 53 3-4 nky;g[uk; 41 ,e;j mst[s;s ,lk;
@gp@ bc&l;a{y;
ic& tPjpapy; gpshf; vz;/32 o/v!;/1893 rJuo 23087y; thjp gpujpthjp tPl;ow;Fk; mjw;F mLj;j fhypkidf;F nkw;F Uf;Fkzp mk;khs; fpua kidf;Fk; 10 mo ghijf;Fk; fpHf;F gpujpthjpf;F ghj;jpakhd fpHf;F nkw;F $hjpao 33* bjw;F tlf;F nky;g[uk; 13?1-2 mo fPH;g[uk; $hjpao 17* ? 10@ ,lj;jpw;F bjw;F o/v!;/ 1893y; thjpf;F fpua ghj;akhd ghf;fp ,lj;Jf;F tlf;F ,jpy; fPH;nky; $hjpao 33* bj t $hjpao 17* cs;s ,lKk; ,jpy; cs;s khtil kutil fpzh; cs;glt[k;
@rp@ bc&l;a{y;
ic& tPjpapy; gpshf; 32 o/v!;/vz;/1888 rJuo 2178y; bjd;g[uk; ghz;o nghFk; nuhl;Lf;F nkw;F gpujpthjpf;F ghfj;jpy; fpilj;j tPl;Lf;F tlf;F Uf;Fkzp mk;khs; fpua tPl;ow;Fk; khe; njhg;g[ 10 mo ghijf;Fk; fpHf;F uh$ khzpf;f ehlhh; kho tPl;ow;Fk; bjw;F ,jpy; fp nk $hjpao 66 bj t $hjpao 22 ,jw;F rJuo 1452 ,jw;Fs;gl;l fhypkid/@ setting out various averments in the plaint, which could succinctly and pithily be set out thus:
The 'A' scheduled property described in the plaint originally belonged to one Syed Hameed, who had two children, namely Syed Abbas and Maji, the defendant herein. Maji herein filed the earlier suit in O.S.No.157 of 1966 as against her brother Syed Abbas for partition and separate possession of her one third share in the property described in the 'A' schedule herein and other properties. 'A' scheduled property herein was described as 18th item in the said partition suit. While so, pending litigation Syed Abbas sold his 2/3rd share in the 'A' scheduled property and other properties.
(b) However, the plaintiff herein was not aware of the pendency of the partition suit in O.S.No.157 of 1966. Subsequently, the plaintiff herein came to know about the preliminary decree passed in the partition suit. Thereafter, the plaintiff herein tried to get himself impleaded, but he was not allowed to do so. In the final decree proceedings, the said Syed Abbas, the vendor of the plaintiff, was allotted 2/3rd share in such a manner that the house and the vacant site to the north of his house bearing item Nos.15 to 17 were allotted. However, the defendant could get the entire vacant site on the north of the house allotted to her share in the final decree proceedings. As such fraud was committed by the defendant as against the plaintiff's vendor.
(c)The plaintiff's vendor had no possibility of ingress and egress to the said vacant site situated to the back and north of his house. However, while purchasing the 2/3rd share of Syed Abbas by the plaintiff, as per the sale deed, the description was different and Syed Abbas was prohibited from getting allotted his 2/3rd share in commensurate with the description as found in the sale deed. The defendant with the help of her husband, encroached to an extent of 17 feet to the plaintiff's property which he purchased from Syed Abbas and that is described as 'B' scheduled property in the present plaint. The 'C' scheduled property should be kept vacant for the plaintiff to have ingress and egress to his property.
4. The defendant filed the written statement resisting the suit setting out various pleas, the warp and woof of them would run thus:
The plaintiff fully knowing well about the partition suit in O.S.No.157 of 1966, purchased the property from Syed Abbas. Even in the sale deed, the suit O.S.No.157 of 1966 is found referred to and hence, he cannot plead ignorance of it. The plaintiff who happened to be the pendente lite purchaser, cannot try to find fault with the final decree passed by the Court in the earlier partition suit. As per the final decree in O.S.No.157 of 1966, the property allotted to the defendant herein was delivered to her in the presence of police and witnesses. There is no question of encroachment made by the defendant herein. There is no pathway or easementary right as alleged in the plaint. There is no question of delivering the 'B' scheduled property to the plaintiff by the defendant and there is no necessity for keeping the 'C' scheduled property vacant for the plaintiff to have ingress and egress to his property. There is no right of easement available for the plaintiff over the defendant's property.
Accordingly, she would pray for the dismissal of the suit.
5. The trial Court framed the relevant issues.
6. Up went the trial, during which the plaintiff/Perumal Naidu examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 and A2 were marked; and on the side of the defendant, one Mr.Mohammed Sarfar was examined as D.W.1 and Ex.B1 was marked. Exs.C1 and C2 were marked as court documents.
7. Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit partly passing the following decree:
"1. gp/gl;oay; brhj;jpy; fPH;nky; 33 mof;F bjd;tly; fPH;g[wk; 15 mo 10@ nkw;g[wk; 7 mo 6@ j;jpw;F thjpf;F chpik K:yk; cz;L vd;W ,jd; K:yk; tpsk;g[if bra;ag;gLfpwJ/ 2/ nkw;fz;l ,lj;ij vjph;thjp thjpf;Fk; ,uz;L khj';fSf;Fs; RthjPdk; bra;J bfhLf;f ntz;Lk;/ 3/ rp/gl;oay; brhj;jpy; bjd;tly; 5 mof;F thjpf;F chpik cs;sJ vd;W ,jd; K:yk; tpsk;g[if bra;ag;gLfpwJ/ 4/ nkw;fz;l rp/gl;oay; brhj;jpy; bjd;tly; 5 moia thjp mDgtpj;J tUtij vjph;thjpnah mtUila Ml;fnsh ahUk; jil bra;af;TlhJ vd;W ,jd; K:yk; epue;ju cWj;Jf;fl;lisg; ghpfhuk; tH';fg;gLfpwJ/ 5/ thjpa[k; vjhpthjpa[k; j';fs; bryt[j; bjhiffisj; jh';fns bghWj;Jf; bfhs;s ntz;Lk;/ thjp bryt[j; bjhif U:/411/00 vjph;thjp bryt[j; bjhif U:/411/00 vjph;thjp bryt[j; bjhif U:/101/50/@
8.Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said decree, the defendant preferred appeal, whereas, the plaintiff preferred cross appeal. Both appeals were taken and the scope of the lower Court's decree was enlarged by the appellate Court.
9. Challenging and impugning the judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court, this Second Appeal has been focussed by the plaintiff setting out various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law:
"(1) Whether the suit in O.S.No.701 of 85 is not barred by the res judicata in view of the judgments and decrees in O.S.No.157/66 and in O.S.No.374/70 on the file of the DMC, Cuddalore?
(2) Whether the Court below has not erred in law in decreeing the suit when the respondent herein has not been able to prove and establish the specific items of 'B' schedule especially when he has not be able to demarcate, plot out and localise even at the time of inspection of the suit property by the Commissioner appointed in the suit?
(3) Whether the Court below has not erred in law in granting a decree in favour of the respondent in regard to a pathway through 'C' schedule property when there is no specific recital in A2 and especially when no claim has been made in the suit for partition in O.S.No.157/66 and subsequently in O.S.No.374/70 on the file of the DMC, Cuddalore and whether the court below ought not to have drawn adverse inference by his failure to make any claim for easementary right over the 'C' Schedule property?
(4) Whether the Court below ought not to have seen that there is no pleadings or evidence to support the case of the respondent in regard to his claim of easementary right over the 'C' Schedule property?
(5) Whether the present suit is not barred under Order 2 Rule 2 read with Sec.11 CPC in view of the fact that the decree in O.S.No.157 of 66 and in O.S.No.374/70 have been affirmed by the High Court and the matter cannot be agitated by way of a fresh suit?
(6) Whether the Court below has not erred in law in overlooking the payment of owelty by the appellant herein and that the appellant has fully secured her rights over the property comprised in B & C schedule?
(7) Whether the Court below has not erred in law in allowing the Cross Objections filed by the respondent when there are no pleading or evidence to support the respondent's claim in regard to the width of the pathway?"
(extracted as such)
10. My learned Predecessor framed the following substantial questions of law:
"(1) Whether the Court below has not erred in law in decreeing the suit when the respondent herein has not been able to prove and establish the specific items of 'B' schedule especially when he has not been able to demarcate, plot out and localise even at the time of inspection of the suit property by the Commissioner appointed in the suit?
(2) Whether the Court below has not erred in law in granting a decree in favour of the respondent in regard to a pathway through 'C' schedule property when there is no specific recital in Ex.A2 and especially when no claim has been made in the suit for partition in O.S.No.157 of 1966 and subsequently in O.S.No.374 of 1970 on the file of the D.M.C, Cuddalore and whether the court below ought not to have drawn adverse inference by his failure to make any claim for easementary right over the 'C' Schedule property?
(3) Whether the present suit is not barred under Order 2 Rule 2 read with Sec.11 CPC in view of the fact that the decrees in O.S.No.157 of 1966 and in O.S.No.374 of 1970 have been affirmed by the High Court and the matter cannot be agitated by way of a fresh suit?"
(extracted as such)
11. All these points are taken together for discussion as they are inter linked and inter woven with one another.
12. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unassailably the 'A' scheduled property described in the schedule of the plaint along with other properties, which are not the subject matter of the present suit, originally belonged to Syed Hameed, the father of the defendant Maji herein and one Syed Abbas, the vendor of the plaintiff and after the death of the said Syed Hameed, the partition suit O.S.No.157 of 1966 was filed by Maji, the defendant herein for partition and allotment of her 1/3 share, as according to Muslim Law, Syed Abbas being the male was entitled to 2/3 share and Maji was entitled to 1/3 share. While so, pendente lite, the plaintiff Perumal Naidu vide sale deed Ex.A2, purchased the 2/3 share of Syed Abbas described in the sale deed. However, the description of the property in the sale deed does not tally with the allotment of Abbas' share in the final decree and that alone paved the way for the present suit.
13. I would like to deprecate the attitude of the plaintiff in filing the suit suppressing the material fact. The plaintiff would project and portray himself as though he was totally ignorant of the suit O.S.No.157 of 1966 pending in the Court for partition, but as correctly pointed out by the defendant, in Ex.A2 the sale deed, in favour of the plaintiff executed by Syed Abbas itself, there is clear reference to the suit O.S.No.157 of 1966. As such it is nothing but a flagrant falsehood on the part of the plaintiff in uttering so in the plaint which has to be condemned in unmistakable terms. A litigant is expected to approach this Court with clean hands.
14. At this juncture, I would like to recollect and call up the precedent of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2012) 5 MLJ 618 (SC) [A.Shanmugam vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam rep.by its President etc.]., an excerpt from it would run thus:
"42. On the facts of the present case, following principles emerge:
1. It is the bounden duty of the court to uphold the truth and do justice.
2. Every litigant is expected to state truth before the law Court whether it is pleadings, affidavits or evidence. Dishonest and unscrupulous litigants have no place in law courts.
3. The ultimate object of the judicial proceedings is to discern the truth and do justice. It is imperative that pleadings and all other presentations before the court should be truthful.
4. Once the court discovers falsehood, concealment, distortion, obstruction or confusion in pleadings and documents, the Court should in addition to full restitution impose appropriate costs. The Court must ensure that there is no incentive for wrong doer in the temple of justice. Truth is the foundation of justice and it has to be the common endeavour of all to uphold the truth and no one should be permitted to pollute the stream of justice.
5. It is the bounden obligation of the Court to neutralize any unjust and/or undeserved benefit or advantage obtained by abusing the judicial process. ........"
15. A mere running of the eye over the cited precedent would exemplify that if a person approaches the Court with falsehood, then such a person does not deserve any remedy. Proceeding further with the merit of the case, I would like to point out that pendente lite purchaser is having no separate right other than the right which the vendor had and the pendente lite purchaser is bound by the ultimate decision in the pending suit.
16. In this connection, I would like to cite the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC) [ T.G.Ashok Kumar vs. Govindammal and another]. Certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"9. ................ In Jayaram Mudaliar vs. Ayyasami AIR 1973 569 this Court held that the purpose of Section 52 of the Act is not to defeat any just and equitable claim, but only to subject them to the authority of the Court which is dealing with the property to which claims are put forward. This Court in Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh (2007) 2 SCC 404: (2007) 3 MLJ 44 held that Section 52 of the Act does not declare a pendente lite transfer by a party to the suit as void or illegal, but only makes the pendente lite purchaser bound by the decision in the pending litigation.
10. The principle underlying Section 52 is clear. If during the pendency of any suit in a Court of competent jurisdiction which is not collusive, in which any right of an immovable property is directly and specifically in question, such property cannot be transferred by any party to the suit so as to affect the rights of any other party to the suit under any decree that may be made in such suit. If ultimately the title of the pendente lite transferor is upheld in regard to the transferred property, the transferee's title will not be affected. On the other hand, if the title of the pendente lite transferor is recognized or accepted only in regard to a part of the transferred property, then the transferee's title will be saved only in regard to that extent and the transfer in regard to the remaining portion of the transferred property to which the transferor is found not entitle, will be invalid and the transferee will not get any right, title or interest in that portion. If the property transferred pendente lite, is allotted in entirely to some other party or parties or if the transferor is held to have no right or title in that property, the transferee will not have any title to the property. Where a co-owner alienates a property or a portion of a property representing to be the absolute owner, equities can no doubt be adjusted while making the division during the final decree proceedings, if feasible and practical (that is without causing loss or hardship or inconvenience to other parties) by allotting the property or portion of the property transferred pendente lite, to the share of the transferor, so that the bona fide transferee's right and title are saved fully or partially.
11. In this case, a suit for partition filed by the first respondent against the second respondent in the year 1985 which included the suit property, was pending in a court of competent jurisdiction as on the date of sale (11.4.1990) by the second respondent in favour of the appellant. The partition suit was not collusive. Having regard to Section 52 of the Act, the sale by the second respondent in favour of the appellant did not in any way affect the right of the first respondent (plaintiff in the partition suit) or the decree made in her favour in the said partition suit. It is thus evident that the sale by second respondent in favour of the appellant though not void, did not bind the first respondent who was the plaintiff in the partition suit. On the other hand, the sale in favour of appellant was subject to the right declared or recognized in favour of the first respondent-plaintiff under the decree passed in the pending partition suit. The sale pendente lite would therefore be subject to the decree in the partition suit. In the final decree passed in the partition suit, the major portion of the suit property shown by the letters, B,C, D,E,F,G,H, I, B in the Commissioner's sketch (Exhibit C-5) was allotted to the share of the first respondent and to that extent, the sale in favour of the appellant would be ineffective. But, in regard to the remaining portion of the suit property namely the portion shown by the letters A, B,I, H, A in the Commissioner's sketch (Exhibit C-) which stood allotted to the share of the second respondent in the final decree in the partition suit, the sale by the second respondent in favour of the appellant is effective, valid and binding on the second respondent and to that extent, the appellant is entitled to a declaration of title and consequential injunction.
12. We are therefore, of the view that the suit ought not to have been dismissed in entirety even if the sale by the second respondent in favour of the appellant on 11.4.1990 was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. The second respondent cannot avoid the sale made by her on the ground that she was held to be not the exclusive owner, in the pending partition suit. Therefore, the courts below ought to have decreed the appellant's suit in part, in regard to the portion of the suit property that fell to the share of second respondent instead of dismissing the suit."
17. A mere running of the said precedent would highlight and indicate that pendente lite purchaser, namely the plaintiff herein who stepped into the shoes of Syed Abbas, who happened to be the defendant in the partition suit, cannot try to set the clock back or try to modify the final decree under the pretext of projecting his case as though a fraud was played on his vendor etc.
18. The perusal of the final decree in the earlier suit would show that virtually the plaintiff's vendor was allotted the 'L' shaped property as found in the sketch. However, in the plaint, the plaintiff would try to claim as though as per his sale deed ignoring the final decree in the partition suit, the 'B' scheduled item has to be delivered to him. He would also go to the extent of averring as though the 'B' scheduled property which allegedly belonged to his vendor was trespassed into by the defendant. These are all wild allegations having no legs to stand. Ignoring all these facts, both the Courts below simply ordered delivery of possession of the 'B' scheduled property. Inspite of herculean efforts made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff herein, the description as found in the schedule of the plaint could not be fitted into the final decree topography.
19. Adding fuel to the fire, the plaintiff herein would claim that for the property allotted to the back of his house, there should be easementary right for him from the Pondy Cuddalore Main road over the property allotted to the defendant herein in the final decree.
20. I am at a loss to understand as to how such a plea could be taken. The principle under which the final decree was passed was so palpable and obvious, axiomatic and pellucid that one third share was allotted to the defendant herein and two third share was allotted to Syed Abbas her brother. Once the plaintiff's theory here is accepted, that would destroy and demolish the very principle and edifice under which the shares were effected in the final decree. There is no knowing of the fact as to how if the plaintiff's plea is accepted in toto, the principle in dividing the entire property into one third and two third share would still remain in tact. As such, without considering these basic facts, both the Courts below rendered their judgments. The first appellate Court went one step further in enlarging the alleged easement from 5 feet width to 10 feet width.
21. The plaintiff would put forth the plea as though the plaintiff is entitled to easement of necessity, as there was no possibility of alleged ingress and egress to his vacant site situated to the back of his house. I would like to refer hereunder the Section 13 of the Easements Act:
"13. Easements of necessity and quasi-easements.-- Where one person transfers or bequeaths immovable property to another,--
(a) if an easement in other immovable property of the transferor or testator is necessary for enjoying the subject of the transfer or bequest, the transferee or legatee shall be entitled to such easement; or
(b) if such an easement is apparent and continuous and necessary for enjoying the said subject as it was enjoyed when the transfer or bequest took effect, the transferee or legatee shall, unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, be entitled to such easement; or
(c) if an easement in the subject of the transfer or bequest is necessary, for enjoying other immovable property of the transferor or testator, the transferor or the legal representative of the testator shall be entitled to such easement; or
(d) if such an easement is apparent and continuous and necessary for enjoying the said property as it was enjoyed when the transfer or bequest took effect, the transferor, or the legal representative of the testator, shall, unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, be entitled to such easement.
Where a partition is made of the joint property of several person, --
(e) if an easement over the share of one of them is necessary for enjoying the share of another of them, the latter shall be entitled to such easement, or
(f) if such an easement is apparent and continuous and necessary for enjoying the share of the latter as it was enjoyed when the partition took effect, he shall, unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, be entitled to such easement.
The easements mentioned in this section, clauses (a), (c) and (e) are called easements of necessity.
Where immovable property passes by operation of law, the persons from and to whom it so passes are, for the purpose of this section, to be deemed, respectively, the transferor and transferee."
22. The precedents emerged thereunder would unambiguously and unequivocally portray and convey the fact that the question of easement by necessity cannot be pressed into service by an individual if he could have ingress and egress through his place and through some other means. Here in the final decree proceedings the 'L' shaped land was allotted to the plaintiff's vendor and the very description itself would show that the vacant site to which the plaintiff is claiming easement of necessity is situated to the back of his house and in such a case, he should have ingress and egress to the back of his house through his house from the Pondy Cuddalore road and he cannot now plead that he wants to take his cattle and it is impossible to take his cattle through his house. Whatever be the difficulty of the plaintiff he has to bear and he cannot burden the neighbour.
23. I recollect the maxim:
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas: So use your property as not to harm another.
24. Both sides in unison would admit that earlier O.S.No.374 of 1970 was filed by the very same plaintiff contending as though the allotment effected under the final decree passed in O.S.No.157 of 1966 was incorrect, but the said suit was dismissed.
25. As such, the very framing of the suit itself is faulty and it ought not to have been entertained, but unfortunately both the Courts below blindly accepted the case of the plaintiff, warranting interference in the Second Appeal.
26. What remains ultimately is that the final decree passed in O.S.No.157 of 1966 shall hold good and if there is any violation from the final decree, committed by any one of the parties herein, then in that case, it is open for them to assert their right as per the final decree. Instead of further driving the parties to any other litigation, for the purpose of facilitating both, I would while disposing of this Second Appeal mandate thus:
The parties are at liberty to file E.P. and seek for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to locate their respective properties as per the final decree with the help of a surveyor. If their respective properties on ground are not being enjoyed by them as per the final decree, then it is open for the Executing Court to put them in their respective properties by taking appropriate steps, so to say, if either of the parties is in enjoyment of any portion in violation of the final decree, then the party concerned is entitled to get back the possession of the area concerned as per the final decree and there should not be any variation in the final decree.
26. On balance,
(i) The first substantial question of law is decided to the effect that the Courts below failed to note that the plaintiffs failed to demarcate clearly the 'B' scheduled property as the one belonging to the plaintiffs' vendor in the final decree proceedings.
(ii) The second substantial question of law is decided to the effect that the Courts below failed to hold that the 'C' scheduled property should be maintained as a pathway for the plaintiffs.
(iii) The third substantial question of law is decided to the effect that in view of the final decree passed in O.S.No.157 of 1966 and also the dismissal of the suit in O.S.No.374 of 1970, the subsequent suit, namely the suit O.S.No.701 of 1985 was barred.
Accordingly the appeal is disposed of setting aside the judgment and decree of both the Courts below. No costs.
04.04.2013 Index : Yes Internet: Yes To
1. The Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, S.Arcot.
2. The District Munsif, Cuddalore.
3. The Sub Court, Cuddalore.
G.RAJASURIA, J.
gms S.A.No.1255 of 1989 04.04.2013