Delhi District Court
Deepak Sahay vs . All India Federation Of The Deaf on 19 March, 2011
IN THE COURT OF SHRI. ASHISH AGGARWAL, CIVIL JUDGE1,
DWARKA COURTS, DELHI
CS. No 315/11
Deepak Sahay Vs. All India Federation of the Deaf
19.03.2011
ORDER
1. By this order I shall decide the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure filed by the plaintiff and would adjudicate the maintainability of the suit.
2. The present suit relates to the portion of Multipurpose Training Centre for the Deaf, Hostel For the Deaf, 1213, Shaheed Jit Singh Marg, New Delhi110067 under the occupation of the plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as "the suit property''). The facts relevant for deciding the application are that the plaintiff has filed this suit on the ground that he is in possession of the suit property and the defendant is trying to illegally dispossess the plaintiff. The case of the plaintiff is that he was elected as General Secretary of the All India Federation of the Deaf (the defendant herein). In that capacity, he was permitted by the defendant to stay in the abovementioned hostel. In December 2010, fresh elections were held. The plaintiff did not have a fair opportunity to contest the elections. As such, he ceased to hold the post of General Secretary. The defendant asked the plaintiff to vacate the suit property. The plaintiff requested for more time to vacate the premises. The request of the plaintiff was declined.
3. The defendant has put in appearance through its general Secretary Mr. Onkar Sharma. He has opposed the application. He states that since the suit property has been permitted to be used for the residence of only the General Secretary of the defendant and since the plaintiff does not hold the said position any longer, the plaintiff has no right to continue in the premises.
4. In order to decide the application of the plaintiff, the court is required to evaluate at the outset whether the plaintiff has succeeded in making out a prima facie case.
5. The plaintiff is seeking to protect his possession over the suit property. The capacity in which the plaintiff is in possession must be ascertained. Apparently the suit property is situated on government land which was allotted to the defendant. Under its Constitution, the defendant is empowered to establish homes and institutions. The defendant permitted the plaintiff to occupy the suit property as the General Secretary of the defendant. It is not the case of the plaintiff that he has acquired ownership rights in the suit property or the right to perpetually occupy it. The status of the plaintiff is, at best, of a licensee in the suit property. The license of the plaintiff to reside in the suit property is terminable at will. The plaintiff does not have any right to continue to occupy the premises against the wish of defendant. The plaintiff was permitted to occupy the premises only in the capacity of being General Secretary. The plaintiff having ceased to remain General Secretary, he is no longer authorized to occupy the suit property. The plaintiff seems to be aggrieved by the fact that he could not contest the elections for the post of General Secretary. However he has not filed any election petition before the returning officer in accordance with the Constitution of the defendant. He cannot be permitted to voice this grievance before this Court. The plaintiff has not, and cannot, acquire any right higher than that of the defendant. The relief that the plaintiff is claiming is not founded upon rights recognized by law, either by contract or by statute.
6. The mere fact that the plaintiff is occupying the premises since a long period does not bestow any right to continue in the premises. His possession is permissive and the plaintiff has also not claimed that his occupation has been hostile or adverse so as to invoke the law of adverse possession.
7. It is settled law that injunction against dispossession cannot be granted against the owner/allottee of the property. The use of premises by a licencee does not amount to "possession" in the eyes of law so as to deserve protection.
In the case of D.T.T.D.C vs. D.R. Mehra & Sons, 62 (1996) DLT 234 (DB), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held that a licencee is, after termination of licence, not entitled to any injunction against dispossession by the owner.
In the case of Sant Lal Jain vs. Avtar Singh, A.I.R. 1985 SC 857, it was held that a licencee cannot set up title in himself in order to avoid surrender of possession of the property on termination of the licence. It was laid down that it is the duty of such licencee to surrender possession of the property.
In the case of G.N. Mehra Vs. International Airports Authority of India (IAAI), 63 (1996) DLT 62, it was laid down that after expiry of licence, the licencee is not entitled to any injunction against the true owner. Grant of such injunction would amount to perpetuating his unlawful possession.
In the case of Thomas Cook Limited Vs. Hotel Imperial & Ors., 127 (2006) DLT 431, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi took note of a number of other decisions on the subject including that of Rame Gowda Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu, I (2004) SLT 675, and held that a licencee is a permissive occupant. His occupation does not amount to "possession" and therefore he is not entitled to the grant of injunction against dispossession.
In the case of Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. A Vismam, 1996(2) R.R.R. 353, it was held that a trespasser is not entitled to injunction against dispossession by the true owner.
8. For the aforementioned reasons, in my opinion, the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case in his favour. This indispensable requirement for grant of interim injunction remaining unfulfilled, I find no merit in the application of the plaintiff. The application is accordingly dismissed.
9. Having held so, it is pertinent to note that even if the contents of the plaint are deemed to be true and correct, that would not demonstrate a right in favour of the plaintiff to continue in occupation of the suit property. The Court cannot impregnate the decision making process by misplaced sympathy to skew the proceedings in favour of the plaintiff. The adjudicatory process has to be informed by logic and reasoning. The Court cannot, by grant of injunction, come to the aid of a person who wishes to perpetuate an illegality by overstaying in the premises despite having no legal right to do so.
10. In these circumstances, I find no good ground to keep the suit pending or to put it to trial. Even if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the averments made in the plaint, she would not become entitled to the relief claimed by her.
In the case of T. Arivandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 467, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if on a meaningful, not formal, reading of the plaint if is manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the court should reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In the case of Liverpool & London S.P.& I Association Ltd. Vs. Sea Success I & Another (2004) 9 SCC 512 it was held that when no cause of action is disclosed by the plaint, courts should not unnecessarily protract the hearing of suit. It was directed that in such cases, the court must save expenses, achieve expedition and avoid the courts' resources being used up in cases which will serve no useful purpose. It was further held that a litigation which, in the opinion of the court, is doomed to fail should not further be allowed to be used as a tool of harassment.
11. Keeping the suit pending would not only cause harassment and anxiety to both litigating parties but also show hope to the plaintiff which would, in my opinion, be deceitful and ingenuous. This must be put to an end.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, in my opinion, the plaintiff has no cause of action. Under Order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, the plaint is rejected.
File be consigned to record room.
(Ashish Aggarwal) Civil JudgeI/Dwarka Courts Delhi/19.03.2011