Supreme Court of India
C. Ronald & Anr vs State, U.T. Of Andaman & Nicobar Islands on 10 August, 2011
Equivalent citations: 2011 AIR SCW 6797, 2011 (12) SCC 428, 2012 CRI. L. J. 672, AIR 2011 SC (SUPP) 673, (2011) 75 ALLCRIC 265, (2011) 3 ALLCRIR 3206, (2011) 4 DLT(CRL) 927, (2011) 4 CURCRIR 425, (2011) 50 OCR 389, (2011) 9 SCALE 59, 2011 (3) CALCRILR 233, 2011 CALCRILR 3 233, 2012 (1) SCC (CRI) 596, 2012 ALLMR(CRI) 380, (2011) 106 ALLINDCAS 225 (SC), (2011) 3 CHANDCRIC 378, (2011) 4 RECCRIR 30, (2011) 3 UC 1611, (2012) 1 ALD(CRL) 689
Bench: Markandey Katju, Chandramauli Kr. Prasad
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 749 OF 2005
C. RONALD & ANR. .. Appellant (s)
VERSUS
STATE, U.T. OF ANDAMAN
& NICOBAR ISLANDS .. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This Appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment dated
01.10.2004 passed by the Calcutta High Court, Circuit Bench at Port Blair,
in Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 2002.
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3. The facts have been set out in great detail in the impugned judgment
and hence we are not repeating the same here except wherever necessary.
4. It appears that on 26.11.1997 Sub Inspector Abdul Salam received a
secret information that in the evening of 25.11.1997 C. Ronald, appellant
No. 1 herein, participated in a gambling. Some hundred rupees notes which
were sought to be used by him in the gambling were not accepted by the co-
gamblers on the ground that they were fake, whereafter Ronald left the
place. He was searched by S.I. Abdul Salam and fake currency notes of Rs.
100 denomination were recovered from his chest pocket. Panchnama was
prepared and he was arrested. During interrogation Ronald disclosed the
name of other co-accused. One Arun disclosed the name of R. Anil Kumar,
appellant No. 2 herein.
5. Disclosures made by Arun and Anil Kumar were also referred to in
the impugned judgment. During the investigation 42 fake notes were
recovered from the house of Ronald wrapped in a red handkerchief from
inside a shoe. Each of these notes bore the same serial number. Some fake
currency notes were given by Anil to Arun, who tore them up and threw
them into a toilet, where these torn pieces were recovered from the septic
tank.
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6. The trial court acquitted the accused persons, but the High Court has
reversed that judgment and convicted the accused persons.
7. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants, contends that the trial court having taken a view and acquitted the
appellants, the High Court ought not to have reversed the same. He has
relied upon a decision of this Court in Shingara Singh vs. State of Haryana,
(2003) 12 SCC 758 [para 26], wherein it was observed :-
"... It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal the
High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence
on record but having done so, if it finds that the view
taken by the trial court is a possible reasonable view of
the evidence on record, it will not substitute its opinion
for that of the trial court. Only in cases where the High
Court finds that the findings recorded by the trial court
are unreasonable or perverse or that the court has
committed a serious error of law, or where the trial court
had recorded its findings in ignorance of relevant
material on record or by taking into consideration
evidence which is not admissible, the High Court may be
justified in reversing the order of acquittal..."
8. Mr. Shanti Bhushan has also shown us some other decisions which
have taken the same view.
9. In this connection we would like to say that a judgment of a court of
law should not be read as a Euclid's theorem nor as a provision in a statute,
vide Bharat Petroleum Corporation vs. N.R. Vairamani, AIR 2004 S.C. 4778
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(vide paragraphs 9 to 12), Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal vs. Chaudhary Devi Lal
University J.T. 2008 (8) S.C. 621, etc.
10. Section 386 (a) Cr.P.C. states that the appellate court may :
"in an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse such
order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the
accused be re-tried or committed for trial, as the case
may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him
according to law".
11. A perusal of Section 386(a) Cr.P.C. shows that no restrictions have
been placed by the Statute on the power of the appellate court to reverse an
order of acquittal and convict the accused.
12. As observed by this court in Vemareddy Kumaraswamyreddy & Anr.
vs. State of A.P. JT 2006(2) 361 (vide para 17) where the words were clear,
there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of
amending or altering the statutory provisions.
13. In Union of India & Anr. vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 323 (vide para 14), it was observed :
"It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope
of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when
the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous.
The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation
for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.
The power to legislate has not been conferred on the
courts. The court cannot add words to a statute or read
words into it which are not there".
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14. Since the language of Section 386(a) Cr.P.C. is clear and it places no
restrictions on the power of the appellate court to convert an order of
acquittal into a conviction, we cannot place restrictions on this power for
that would really be amending the statute.
15. No doubt, it has been held in certain decisions of this court that there
should be good and compelling reasons for the appellate court to convert an
order of acquittal into a conviction, but these decisions have been carefully
considered in the three-Judge Bench of this court in Sanwat Singh & Ors.
vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 715 (vide para 9) wherein it was
observed:
"The foregoing discussion yields the following results:
(1) an appellate court has full power to review the
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded;
(2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup's cse 61 Ind
App 398: [(AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] afford a correct guide
for the appellate court's approach to a case in disposing
of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used
in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) "substantial
and compelling reasons", (ii) "good and sufficiently
cogent reasons", and (iii) "strong reasons", are not
intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire
evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing
so it should not only consider every matter on record
having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons
given by the court below in support of its order of
acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but
should also express those reasons in its judgment, which
lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified".
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16. In Salim Zia vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1979 SC 391 (vide para
12) it was observed by this Court:
"1. The High Court in an appeal against an order of
acquittal under S.417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 has full power to review at large the evidence on
which the order of acquittal was founded and to reach the
conclusion that upon the evidence, the order of acquittal
should be reversed.
2. The different phraseology used in the judgments of
this Court such as --
(a) `substantial and compelling reasons';
(b) `good and sufficiently cogent reasons';
(cc) `strong reasons',
are not intended to curtail or place any limitation on the
undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal
against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to
come to its own conclusion as stated above but in doing
so it should give proper consideration to such matters as
(i) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the
witnesses; (ii) the presumption of innocence in favour of
the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by
the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (ii) the
right of the accused to the benefit of any real and
reasonable doubt; and (iv) the slowness of an appellate
Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge
who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses."
17. Moreover, in the present case, it has been observed by the High Court
in the impugned judgment that :-
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"We have already demonstrated that the view taken by
the learned Sessions Judge is not a possible view on the
state of evidence. On the contrary, we have amply
demonstrated above that the learned Sessions Judge
excluded from consideration the evidence which was
there. He fell into grievous error in appreciation of the
evidence and misdirected himself; entertained a doubt for
which there was no foundation and expressed his
helplessness because the witnesses particularly the
seizure witnesses turned hostile and refused to tell the
court the truth. Attempt on his part was lacking to
marshal the evidence; to remove the grain from chaff; to
take the help of that part of the evidence of the hostile
witnesses which support the case of the prosecution. He
commented upon insincerity of the investigating agency
but did not put to use the material which was before him.
We feel no hesitation in holding that the learned Sessions
Judge was wrong and therefore we have reappraised the
evidence and come to the conclusion indicated above."
18. Hence, we do not agree with submission advanced by Mr. Shanti
Bhushan.
19. Mr. Shanti Bhushan then submitted that the statement under Section
164 Code of Criminal Procedure was wrongly taken into consideration.
20. In the present case, the person who made the statement under Section
164 Cr.P.C. also gave evidence before the trial court and was declared
hostile. He was confronted with his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
only to show that his turning hostile was not bona fide. However, even if
we ignore the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., we see no reason to
disbelieve the police witnesses.
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21. There is no principle of law that a statement made in court by a police
personnel has to be disbelieved. It may or may not be believed. It is not that
all policemen will tell lies. There are good and bad people in all walks of
life. There are good and bad police men as well. We cannot assume that
every statement of a policeman is necessarily false.
22. In the present case, there is nothing to show that the policemen were
making false statements in the court. They had no enmity with the accused.
23. Mr. Shanti Bhushan submitted that it is possible that these policemen
demanded some money from the accused which they did not give and hence
they were falsely implicated.
24. This case was not set up by the accused at any point of time and no
such suggestion was even made in the cross-examination.
25. It is next submitted by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that evidence adverse to
the appellants was not put to them in their examination under Section 313
Cr.P.C.
26. This aspect has been considered by the High Court which has held
that no prejudice has been caused to the accused on this account.
27. It is on record that fake currency notes are in wide circulation in
Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The banks have stated that common people
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have often complained in this connection vide Exts. 21, 22 and 11.
Witnesses have also been examined on that account.
28. There is sufficient evidence on record (discussed in detail by the High
Court) to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
29. Making or circulating fake currency is a serious offence. We see no
reason to take a lenient view in the matter.
30. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, while upholding
the conviction of the appellants we reduce the period of sentence to five
years rigorous imprisonment.
31. By order dated 18.03.2005 this Court has granted bail to the
appellants.
32. If the appellants have not served out sentence of five years rigorous
imprisonment as awarded by us, then their bail bonds shall stand cancelled
and they shall be taken into custody forthwith to complete the sentence of
five years rigorous imprisonment as awarded by us. Any period of
incarceration in jail which the appellants have already undergone shall be
deducted from the aforesaid period of five years rigorous imprisonment.
33. If the appellants have already served out sentence of five years
rigorous imprisonment, then their bail bonds shall stand discharged
accordingly.
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34. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is disposed of accordingly.
............................................
J. (Markandey Katju) ...............................................J. (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad) New Delhi;
10 August, 2011