Delhi District Court
Deepak Verma vs State on 8 September, 2025
IN THE COURT OF ANURAG THAKUR:
ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE (FTC) (EAST DISTRICT)
KARKARDOOMA COURTS: DELHI
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 195/2024 & 209/2024
IN THE MATTER OF:
Deepak Verma
S/o Sh. Mahesh Chand Verma
R/o House No.118, 2nd Floor,
Chowk Barsabullaha,
Near Shyam Sweets,
Chawri Bazar, Delhi-110006
(Appellant in C.A.No.195/2024)
(Respondent no.2 in C.A. No.209/2024)
Versus
1. The State (N.C.T of Delhi)
(Respondent no.1 in C.A. No.195/2024)
and in C.A. No. 209/2024)
2. Mrs. Nidhi Verma
W/o Deepak Verma
R/o 69-D, Pocket-1,
Mayur Vihar, Phase-1,
Delhi-110091
(Through her Power of Attorney
Sh. Siddhant Verma)
(Respondent no.2 in C.A. No.195/2024)
(Appellant in C.A. No.209/2024)
Instituted on : 19.11.2024 (C.A. No.195/2024)
13.12.2024 (C.A.No.209/2024)
Reserved on : 03.09.2025
Pronounced on : 08.09.2025
C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 1 of 16
Digitally
signed by
ANURAG
ANURAG THAKUR
THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08
16:33:36
+0530
JUDGMENT
1. By virtue of this judgment, two appeals, i.e. one preferred by Deepak Verma (bearing number 195/24) and another filed by Nidhi Verma (bearing number 209/24) shall be disposed of. For the purpose of this judgment, Deepak Verma shall be referred to as respondent and Nidhi Verma shall be referred to as complainant.
2. Vide judgment dated 23.08.2024, the trial court convicted the respondent for offence punishable under section 138 of The Nego- tiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'The Act'). By way of order on sentence dated 14.10.2024, the respondent was directed to pay an amount of ₹15,00,000/- as compensation to complainant within a period of one month and in default of payment of compensa- tion, the respondent was to undergo simple imprisonment for three months.
3. The respondent has assailed both the judgment as well as order on sentence passed by the trial court inter alia on the grounds that
(i) the judgment is based on surmises and conjectures, (ii) the cheque has been misused by the complainant as it was given for security purpose only, (iii) the loan allegedly given by complainant was not recoverable being time barred debt at time of presentation of cheque, (iv) undue weightage was given to the evidence led on behalf of the complainant,
(v) the entire loan amount taken from the husband of complainant by him has been repaid and (vi) lastly that the attorney had no right to step into the shoes of the complainant to depose regarding the facts of the case.
4. The complainant, in the appeal preferred through her power of attorney has assailed the order on sentence on the grounds that (i) the C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 2 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:33:57 +0530 trial court failed to appreciate the legislative intent behind The Act, (ii) the hardship faced by the complainant for over six years has not been considered, (iii) the persistent efforts made by the complainant to re- cover her hard earned money have not been recognized, (iv) the finan- cial and emotional distress caused to the complainant has not been ap- preciated and (v) that the order on sentence is bad in law and cannot be sustained.
5. An application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal was also made by the complainant under section 5 of the Limita- tion Act, 1963 praying that delay of 24 days in filing the appeal be con- doned as the certified copy of the judgment and order on sentence was received by the complainant only on 07.12.2024.
6. It is worthwhile to advert to the case set up by the com- plainant. Succinctly stated, the case of complainant is that the respon- dent is her relative and in April 2017, he sought a friendly loan of ₹10,00,000/- from her for starting some business. She agreed to advance the loan in parts as and when required by the respondent. The respondent promised to return the loan within 24 months. He further assured the complainant that if he failed to return the amount within 24 months, then he would return the same with interest. The complainant gave ₹100,000/-, ₹2,00,000/-, ₹2,00,000/- and ₹3,90,000/- on 04.04.2017, 24.04.2017, 28.04.2017 and 23.05.2017 respectively through NEFT and an amount of ₹1,10,000/- in cash on 04.06.2017 to respondent. In first week of March 2021, the complainant requested the respondent to repay the loan amount. In order to discharge his liability, the respondent issued a cheque bearing number 830372 dated 06.03.2021 of ₹10,00,000/- drawn on State Bank of India, Hauz Quazi, Delhi in favour of com-
C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 3 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:34:25 +0530 plainant. She presented the said cheque for realization through her banker ICICI Bank, Mayur Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi branch but the same was returned unpaid by the banker of respondent vide return memo dated 10.03.2021 with the remarks 'funds, insufficient'. The complainant got issued a legal demand notice dated 23.03.2021 through her counsel calling upon the respondent to pay the said cheque amount within a pe- riod of 15 days from receipt thereof. The said notice was duly served upon the respondent but the same remained unheeded. The complainant was left with no recourse but to make a complaint under section 138 of The Act. The complaint was filed by the complainant through her hus- band and duly constituted attorney Deepak Verma s/o Late L.N.Verma.
7. Arguments on on both the appeals and the applications made therein were heard on the same day, one after the other. Entire ma-
terial available on record including the written arguments filed and trial court record have been perused. At the outset, it is apposite to mention that the appeal preferred by the complainant is entertained (as the com- plainant is a victim) in compliance of judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Celestium Financial vs A. Gnanasekaran Etc., Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 804. My observations on the issues agitated are delineated hereinafter.
8. Firstly, the appeal preferred by the respondent is taken up for disposal. A defence taken by the respondent is that husband of the complainant had invested money in his business (on profit sharing basis) and the cheque was given as security by him to one Ravinder Kumar Verma for amount invested by husband of the complainant. Respondent contended that this security cheque has been misused by the com- plainant. To substantiate his assertion, he examined Ravinder Kumar C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 4 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:34:42 +0530 Verma as DW2. In his testimony, DW2 was not able to tell the exact amount which was to be invested by husband of complainant in business of respondent. He was also not able to tell the exact date, month and year when the husband of complainant agreed to invest money in the business of respondent. DW2 categorically stated that no transaction of alleged investment occurred in his presence. He was also not able to tell the exact amount supposedly invested. DW2 deposed that the cheque in question was handed over to him by the respondent but he remained completely silent as to how the cheque came into possession of com- plainant or her husband. DW2 no where stated that the cheque was given by him to complainant or her husband. He also did not state that the cheque was stolen by complainant or her husband from his possession. DW2 in his examination in chief stated that he used to collect profit from respondent and handover the same to husband of complainant, however, he was not able to tell the exact amount he had handed over to the husband of complainant or the dates on which he handed over money to husband of complainant. but surprisingly, during his cross-examina- tion, he disclosed that he gave total amount of ₹10,00,000/- to husband of complainant.
9. Regarding the amount invested by husband of complainant, the respondent at the time of service of notice of accusation under sec- tion 251 Cr.P.C stated that he had taken loan of ₹8,90,000/-, however as DW1 he testified that ₹7,90,000/- were invested by husband of com - plainant in his business. Further more in his statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C the respondent stated that he had taken only an amount of ₹7,00,000/-. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to reproduce the following excerpt from the cross examination of DW1:-
C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 5 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:34:54 +0530 I had never given profits to the complainant into the bank account of the complainant as I used to give the same in cash to her. I had never taken any acknowledgement/receipt from the complainant at the time of payment. The complainant had never sent me any message regard- ing the above said payments. I had already made all the payments to the complainant towards the invested amount.... Upon perusal of this extract, it is clear that the respondent admitted that he had taken loan from complainant and not from her husband.
10. As regards the repayment, the respondent as DW1 testified that he had given ₹2,00,000/- in cash to husband of complainant in pres- ence of Ravinder Verma and on 30.12.2019 ₹3,50,000/- were given in cash to husband of complainant in presence of complainant, Ravinder Verma, Pritam Singh and Sujata Verma. However, DW2 in his cross-ex- amination unequivocally stated that the respondent had not given any amount of ₹2,00,000/- or ₹3,50,000/- to husband of complainant in his presence or in presence of Pritam Singh. Moreover, Pritam Singh as DW3 revealed that the amount given in his presence was 2.5 lakhs. It is also noteworthy that during cross examination of CW1, no specific sug- gestion was given that amount of ₹3,50,000/- was given to him by re - spondent on 30.12.2019.
11. With regard to the cheque in question, a suggestion was given to CW1 in his cross-examination that the same was given to Ravinder Kumar Verma by respondent as an unsigned cheque but at the time of service of notice of accusation, the respondent admitted that he had given the cheque in question to the complainant as blank cheque for security. During recording of his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C the respondent explained that the cheque in question when given was a blank signed cheque. Thus, even his signature on the cheque in question are admitted by the respondent.
C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 6 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:35:07 +0530
12. On the other hand, the stand of the complainant consistently has been that ₹8,90,000/- were transferred through NEFT from the ac - count of complainant to the account of respondent and the remaining amount of ₹1,10,000/- was given in cash by complainant to respondent. Testimony of CW1 was also on the same lines as the averments made in the complaint. CW1 withstood the rigor of cross examination and his testimony is creditworthy since there is hardly any inconsistency in his examination in chief and cross examination. Also the testimony of CW1 ties in with the documents on record. In the case of Georgekutty Chacko vs M.N.Saji, Civil Appeal No.11309 of 2025 decided on 01.09.2025 ; the Apex Court held that just because a person is not able to prove the trans- fer of money through official modes (through a negotiable instrument or a bank transaction), would not lead to conclusion that such amount was not paid in cash especially when the other party had issued a negotiable instrument in his favour. Moreover, the respondent during service of no- tice u/s 251 Cr.P.C upon him admitted that he received ₹8,90,000/- through NEFT from complainant into his bank account. As regards the cash payment of ₹1,10,000/- to respondent by complainant is concerned, the same has been duly proved by the oral testimony of CW1. Even oth- erwise, the respondent as DW1 in examination in chief testified that in- vested amount was around ₹10,00,000/-.
13. The defences of handing over of cheque in question to Ravinder Kumar Verma and investment by husband of complainant in the business of respondent on profit sharing basis do not inspire confi- dence especially considering the cogent evidence tendered on behalf of the complainant and the various inconsistencies and deficiencies pointed C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 7 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:35:42 +0530 out in the case canvassed by respondent. By express and implied admis- sions at various points of time during trial, the respondent has admitted the entire case adumbrated by the complainant.
14. So far as the issue of cheque being a blank instrument at the time of handing over of the same is concerned, it was specifically an- swered by CW1 in his cross examination that the respondent filled in the contents of the cheque in question in his presence. At another point in his cross-examination, CW1 voluntarily stated that the respondent had given the cheque to the complainant after duly filling and signing the same, He also denied the suggestion that the cheque in question was an unsigned cheque given to Ravinder Kumar Verma. Even otherwise, as per section 20 of The Act, a blank signed cheque can be filled or com- pleted by the holder of the cheque.
15. The cheque in question is dated 06.03.2021 and as per the mandate of Section 118(b) of The Act, until proved otherwise it shall be presumed that the cheque in question was made or drawn on that day. Assuming arguendo that the cheque in question was given for security purpose, still it does not mean that such cheque cannot form the basis for filing a complaint under section 138 of The Act. When there is existence of debt on the date of presentation of cheque and the security cheque is dishonoured, the accused would be liable under section 138 of The Act. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment of Apex Court in case of ICDS vs Beena Shabir & Anr., 2002 (6) SCC 426. In the case of Sripati Singh (D) vs State of Jharkhand, 2021 SCC Online SC 1002; the Apex Court clarified the position with regard to a security cheque in the following words:-
C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 8 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:35:56 +0530 If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
No proof of repayment of loan amount has been shown by respondent. Accordingly, it can be inferred that on the date of presentation of the cheque and dishonour of cheque in question, the debt was subsisting and the respondent was liable to repay the loan amount. Thus, even if the cheque was a security cheque, the same would be well covered within the ambit of section 138 of The Act. So, even the ground of misuse of security cheque by the complainant, is of no aid to the respondent.
16. Another limb of defence is that the loan had become a time barred debt and the same was not recoverable at the time of issuance of alleged cheque. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the debt became time barred in June 2020 whereas the cheque in question was issued in March 2021, so the cheque was issued for a time barred debt. Where the loan is to be repaid in a specific time duration, the limi- tation for filing suit for recovery of loan amount would commence from the date of expiry of repayment period/duration and not from the date of loan. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment of High Court of Delhi in the case of Vijay Polymers Pvt. Ltd. vs M/s Vinnay Aggarwal, 2009 (2) C.C.Cases (HC) 419; wherein it observed as follows:-
A perusal of the complaint and other documents as referred to above goes to show that the complainant had paid a sum of Rs. 6 lakhs by way of cheque to petitioner No.1 at the asking of petitioner No.2 somewhere in January, 2002 and the said cheque was credited in the account of petitioner No.1 on 1.2.2002 and was payable after six C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 9 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:36:08 +0530 months and was not paid within three years from 31.8.2002 that is the period within which it was under limitation and as such the loan be- came time barred......
It is noteworthy that as per the complaint, the loan was advanced to the respondent in parts from April to June 2017. The loan was repayable within 24 months. Ordinarily, the limitation period for filing a suit to re- cover the loan amount would have commenced from June 2019. and elapsed in June 2022. The cheque in question was presented for encash- ment in March 2021, so it is incorrect to suggest that the cheque in ques- tion was issued for payment of a time barred debt. It is clear as noon day that the the date on which the cheque was presented, the underlying debt was recoverable.
17. The last ground raised by the respondent is that the SPA holder of the complainant was not competent to depose as a witness in the case. In affidavit of examination in chief Ex.CW1/A (filed along with the complaint) CW1 in point number 1 affirmed that he was well conversant with the facts of the case on the basis of his personal knowl- edge and bank records and was thus in a position to depose about the correctness or otherwise of facts stated in the complaint. Not only this, during his cross-examination, CW1 disclosed that he was present at the time of handing over of cash of ₹1,10,000/- by complainant to respon - dent and he was also present when the legal notice was got issued to the respondent. He had also revealed that the cheque in question was signed and filled by the respondent in his presence. Moreover, it is the defence of respondent himself that CW1 had invested money in his business and he had paid interest and repaired part of the principal amount to CW1. In addition to being the attorney holder, CW1 is also the husband of the complainant (who is a homemaker). It is not unusual for a homemaker C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 10 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:36:25 +0530 wife to enter into financial transactions in the presence of or with the consent or knowledge of her husband. All the factors mentioned in the preceding part of this paragraph lead to the irresistible conclusion that CW1 had sufficient knowledge to depose as a witness regarding the loan transaction between the complainant and the respondent as well as re- garding issuance and dishonour of cheque, legal notice and its service upon the respondent, etc.
18. It ought to be kept in mind that while entering his plea of defence, the respondent stated that he had not filled the body of cheque in question. Thus, he impliedly admitted his signature on the cheque. Once the signature on the cheque in question were admitted, the pre- sumptions under section 118(a) and 139 of The Act were raised. Regard- ing the effect of these presumptions and the manner in which the same can be rebutted, the Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Jain vs Ajay Singh, 2023 SCC Online SC 1275; observed as under:-
34. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that 'unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability'. It will be seen that the 'presumed fact' directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138.
35. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a 'shall presume' clause is illustrative of a presumption of law.
Because Section 139 requires that the Court 'shall presume' the fact stated therein, it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. The rules discussed hereinbelow is common to both the presumptions under Section 139 and Section 118 and is hence, not repeated-Reference to one can be taken as reference to C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 11 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:36:56 +0530 another But this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary as is clear from the use of the phrase 'unless the contrary is proved'.
36. The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had been issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer of the cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque and secondly, in the event where the complainant proves that cheque was issued/executed in his favour by the drawer. The circumstances set out above form the fact(s) which bring about the activation of the presumptive clause. [Bharat Barrel Vs. Amin Chand] [(1999) 3 SCC 35]
37. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that presumption takes effect even in a situation where the accused contends that 'a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar].
Therefore, mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of the entire contents in the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption.
38. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further.
39. ....................
40. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-existence of the presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of 'preponderance of probabilities', similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa vs. Mohan (AIR 2010 SC 1898)].
The presumptions u/s 118(a) and 139 of The Act are rebuttable. The respondent could have rebutted the presumptions by leading cogent defence evidence or by crafty cross-examination he could have brought C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 12 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:37:29 +0530 forth the deficiencies, inconsistencies and lacunae in the case of the complainant. However, the respondent miserably failed to do either. As observed earlier, the respondent ended up admitting the entire case of complainant. Consequently, the appeal preferred by the respondent is dismissed being bereft of merit. The impugned judgment suffers from no illegality or perversity, rather the same is based on fair appreciation of evidence. Therefore, the judgment dated 23.08.2024 is upheld.
19. Now, the appeal filed by the complainant is taken up. It is imperative to firstly decide the application seeking condonation of delay made with this appeal. The order on sentence was announced on 14.10.2024. But the complainant filed the appeal on 12.12.2024. While computing the period of limitation, the day of pronouncing order is to be excluded, therefore, the limitation is to be reckoned from the next day.
The first day of limitation i.e. 15.10.2024 is also to be excluded. The limitation period for assailing the order on sentence would have ordinarily elapsed on 14.11.2024. However, the complainant applied for a copy of the judgment and order on sentence on 14.11.2024 and received the copy on 07.12.2024. This entire period from 14.11.2024 to 07.12.2024 is to be excluded while computing the limitation period. The afore-mentioned time periods have been excluded (while computing the prescribed period of limitation) in terms of section 12 of Limitation Act, 1963. Hence, there is a delay of 4 days in filing the appeal. By taking recourse to section 5 of Limitation Act, an appeal can be admitted even if preferred after the prescribed period, if sufficient cause is shown for delayed filing. It is trite that the delay has to be properly explained. The circumstances which led to the delayed filing have not been properly laid out. It has been held by the Apex Court in the case of C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 13 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:37:40 +0530 N.Balakrishnan vs M.Krishnamurthy, AIR 1998 SC 3222; that it is not the length of delay but the acceptability of explanation which is the only criterion to condone the delay. Since, the delay of 4 days has not been explained therefore, the application seeking condonation of delay is dismissed being meritless. As a corollary, the appeal filed by the complainant is not admitted.
20. Regarding the quantum of sentence to be imposed in a cheque dishonour case, the following observation was made by the Apex Court in the case of R.Vijayan vs Baby, AIR 2012 SC 528:-
As the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act strongly lean towards grant of reimbursement of the loss by way of compensation, the courts should, unless there are special circumstances, in all cases of conviction, uniformly exercise the power to levy fine upto twice the cheque amount (keeping in view the cheque amount and the simple interest thereon at 9% per annum as the reasonable quantum of loss) and direct payment of such amount as compensation. Direction to pay compensation by way of restitution in regard to the loss on account of dishonour of the cheque should be practical and realistic, which would mean not only the payment of the cheque amount but interest thereon at a reasonable rate. Uniformity and consistency in deciding similar cases by different courts, not only increase the credibility of cheque as a negotiable instrument, but also the credibility of courts of justice.
While sentencing, neither substantive imprisonment nor fine have been imposed by the learned trial court, rather only compensation has been di- rected to be paid. This direction is not in consonance with the observa- tion made by the Apex court, accordingly, the order on sentence dated 14.10.2024 is modified as under:-
• The convict is directed to pay fine of ₹15,00,000/- for com - mission of offence punishable under section 138 of the Act and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. The entire fine amount is awarded as com-
C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 14 of 16 Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:37:50 +0530 pensation to the complainant. The fine amount shall be paid by the convict within 30 days of disposal of these appeals.
21. Copy of this judgment be given dasti, free of cost against acknowledgment to the respondent. A copy of this judgment be also sent to the trial court or its successor court for information and execution of sentence. TCR be also sent back to the court concerned within three working days.
Digitally Dictated and announced signed by ANURAG in open Court on 08th September, 2025 ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:38:14 +0530 (Anurag Thakur) Addl. Sessions Judge (FTC) (East) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi This judgment consists of 16 pages and each and every page of this judgment is signed by me.
Post Script
138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless--
C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 15 of 16
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.]
139. Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.
118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.- Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:-
(a) of consideration:- that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;
(b) as to date:- that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date ______________ Digitally signed by ANURAG ANURAG THAKUR THAKUR Date:
2025.09.08 16:38:32 +0530 C.A. No. 195/24 & 209/24 Deepak Kumar Vs. The State & Anr. 16 of 16