Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mannulal Garg vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 27 March, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 MP 476
Author: Rohit Arya
Bench: Rohit Arya
1 Mis. Cr. Case No.42429/2018
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH AT INDORE
Mis. Criminal Case No.42429 of 2018
Mannulal Garg and another
Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh and another
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Shri Amit Agarwal, Sr. Advocate assisted by Shri Rishi Tiwari and
Rohit Kumar, Advocate for the petitioners.
Ms. Swati Ukhale and Shri Mukesh Kumawat, Government Advocates
for the respondent No.1/State.
S/Shri Sunil Gupta and Vivek Agarwal, Advocates for the respondent
No.2.
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Reserved on: 10/12/2018
ORDER
(27/03/2019) Rohit Arya, J This application under section 482 Cr.P.C., is presented seeking quashment of FIR dated 15/10/2018 at crime case No.436/2018 registered at Police Station Civil Lines, Dewas for the offence punishable under sections 294, 506 and 34 IPC read with sections 3(1)(r) & (s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and sections 25/27 of the Arms Act.
2. Petitioners are old bona fide residents of Dewas, business men and also income tax payees. Petitioner No.1 is father and the petitioner No.2 is son.
It appears that the respondent No.2, an advocate and also styling himself as President of District Bar Association, Dewas has had inimical attitude and grudge towards the petitioners and their family members. In the year 2013, the respondent No.2 had objected to the application of the petitioners for establishment of petrol pump. The application met dismissal upto the appellate authority. However, with the intervention of the Sate Government vide order dated 21/09/2015 in revisional jurisdiction wherein the 2 Mis. Cr. Case No.42429/2018 Collector, Dewas was directed to grant licence to the wife of the petitioner No.2 and, accordingly, the petrol pump in the name and style of M/s Maa Kailadevi Motors has been opened and situated on the land comprising of survey Nos.640, 645, 641 and 642 Patwari Halka No.18, Indore Dewas Road, Dewas; total area 1500 sq.ft., The licence is on record as Annexure P/9. The area of ownership and possession is 1500 sq.ft.,, out of which the petrol pump is situated covering an area of 800 sq.ft., and the remaining area is lying vacant. The District Court, Dewas is just adjacent to the petrol pump and the same is separated by barbed wire fencing installed by the petitioners.
It is stated in the application that the advocate chambers of the District Court, Dewas at the relevant point of time were under construction. Building material was dumped on the main entrance gate of the District Court, therefore, heavy vehicles like trucks and dumpers could not pass through the said gate. At the request of respondent No.2, petitioners temporarily permitted (for one month) movement of vehicles carrying building material into the District Court premises through the petitioners land by removing the barbed wire fencing. The said movement appears to have continued for about three months. Since the movement of heavy vehicles into the Court premises through main gate commenced, therefore, the temporary arrangement provided by the petitioners was not required. Hence, the petitioners reinstalled the barbed wire fencing on 12/10/2018. No one objected thereto. However, on 15/10/2018, around 12.00 noon, the respondent No.2 allegedly trespassed into the land and without intimating the petitioners has removed the same with the help of some people. They have also removed cement poles supporting the barbed wire fencing. The photograph is on record as Annexure P/10. While the petitioners resisted and objected to the said uprooting of barbed wire fencing, the respondent No.2 turned furious, manhandled petitioner No.2 with a threat to implicate the petitioners under the provisions of the S.C., & S.T., Act. Though the staff of the petrol pump tried to intervene but, all in vain.
It is further stated that though they had submitted an application before the respondent No.1 on 15/10/2018 narrating the complete facts, however, no FIR was registered on the 3 Mis. Cr. Case No.42429/2018 compliant. The copy of complaint is on record as Annexure P/11. Similar application was also filed by the Manager of the petrol pump against the respondent No.2 for taking strict action. Copy of the application is on record as Annexure P/12. Besides, manager of the petrol pump has also made an application before the District Judge, Dewas and the District Collector, Dewas. The application is on record as Annexure P/13 but all in vain.
However, to the utter surprise of the petitioners, instant FIR has been registered at the instance of the respondent No.2.
In the aforesaid backdrop of the factual matrix in hand, the instant application under section 482 Cr.P.C., has been filed.
3. A reading of FIR suggests that on 15/10/2018 the complainant (respondent No.2) while he was sitting in the premises of the District Court at 01.30 pm., petitioners taking exception to the removal of barbed wire fencing alleged to have hurled filthy abuses and also by caste with a threat to kill brandishing revolver towards him in front of about 50 advocates though they were told that the fencing was initially installed inside the District Court premises on the area allotted for construction of advocate chambers. Accordingly, FIR has been registered.
4. This Court while hearing the matter on 07/12/2018, since was of the view that the dispute between the parties is not of serious nature which should require a detailed investigation and essentially sparked off due to heated exchanges therefore, could be sorted out through mediation, called upon petitioners and the respondent No.2 to remain present before this Court on the next date of hearing.
On 10/12/2018, both petitioners and the respondent No.2 were present in person.
Petitioners appeared and with folded hands submitted that they are respectful citizens of the country and permanent old residents of Dewas. They earn their livelihood through business. Neither do they believe in nor practice picking up fight with people. They cannot even think of in their wildest dream to get involved in criminality against legal fraternity/advocates or cause any harm or hurt to any person. They have esteem regard and respect to the Majesty of law. They shall abide by such orders or 4 Mis. Cr. Case No.42429/2018 directions this Court deems fit and proper.
Petitioners had shown grace with humbleness offering apology in writing if the respondent No.2 or any member of the legal fraternity either felt offended or hurt in the obtaining facts and circumstances.
This Court records appreciation for the gesture shown by petitioners.
Respondent No.2, though in the first breath agreed for resolution of the dispute or difference but, to dismay of this Court, turned around and followed the path of betrayal. It is unfortunate. It is considered apposite to observe that the legal profession is a noble profession. Persons belonging to legal fraternity are involved in the process of justice dispensation and held in respect in the society. They stand out as class and are looked up for social, moral and ethical values in society.
Alas! The respondent No.2 proved to be oblivious of such noble values of the profession.
Under the circumstances, this Court has finally heard the matter.
5. While reiterating the law as regards the scope of interference under section 482 Cr.P.C., in the matter of quashment of FIR, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal and others, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604; particularly; illustration (1) of para108 quoted below:
"108. In the backdrop of of the interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustrations wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a 5 Mis. Cr. Case No.42429/2018 case against the accused.....
.... ... ...
(5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R., or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
... ... ...
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
it is contended that if allegations in the FIR are scanned carefully it shall suggest that the accused persons entered the Court premises and pointed gun against the respondent No.2 in the presence of about 50 advocates and then petitioners conveniently fled away without resistance by advocates; an unrealistic and unbelievable maneuvered story. As such, the allegations are absurd. A man of common prudence shall not believe the same. That apart, as a matter of fact, the respondent No.2 developed grudge and inimical attitude towards the petitioners on personal scores as evident from the objection raised by him in the matter of grant of licence for running the petrol pump by the petitioners as detailed in the application.
Further elaborating, learned senior counsel submits that petitioners have shown grace allowing movement of heavy vehicles carrying building material through their land by removing the barbed wire fencing to help facilitate construction of the advocate chambers, the respondent No.2 could not have taken exception to restoration of barbed wire fencing after about three months and that too upon completion of the construction work since the passage was not further required. As such, the respondent No.2 could not have levelled such wild allegations against the petitioners in the FIR [relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court; (I) (2016) 6 SCC 310 Ramesh Rajagopal Vs. Devi Polymers; (ii) (2017) 13 SCC 369 Vineet Kumar Vs. State of U.P., and (iii) (2007) 12 SCC 1 Inder 6 Mis. Cr. Case No.42429/2018 Mohan Goswami Vs. State of Uttaranchal, to bolster his submission].
He further contends that on a plain reading of the allegations made in the FIR; it is 'as clear as noon in a day' that none of the allegations made in the FIR fulfill the ingredients of the alleged offence levelled against the petitioners. It is contended that there is no threat causing alarm to the respondent No.2 of the alleged criminal intimidation as defined under section 506 IPC. Referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manik Taneja and another (supra), 2015 7 SCC 423, it is contended that unless, the threat is with an intention to cause harm to the complainant or to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do, the alleged act shall not tantamount to criminal intimidation. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring the same within the scope of sections 503 and 506 IPC.
Likewise to constitute the offence under section 294 IPC, there must be any obscene act or utterance in any public place resulting into annoyance of the complainant.
Referring to judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Kumar (supra), it is submitted that unless the alleged words stated to have caused annoyance to the complainant, the offence is not committed.
Learned senior counsel further contends that no offence whatsoever could be said to have been committed by petitioners under sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. Accepting the allegations made in the FIR at its face value, firstly; the petitioner No.1 is not alleged to be in possession of revolver and secondly; petitioner No.2 though did not possess revolver at the relevant point of time but, even otherwise holds the valid licence to possess the revolver. There is no allegation that petitioner No.2 manufactures, sells, transfers, converts, repairs, tests or proves, or exposes or offers for sale or transfer, or has in his possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof, any arms or ammunition in contravention of section 5 as contemplated under section 25(1)(a) of the Act. Therefore, no case is made out under section 25 of the said Act. Likewise for want of contravention of 7 Mis. Cr. Case No.42429/2018 sections 5 and 7 of said Act, even if what is alleged is true, no offence is made out under section 27 of the said Act.
Elaborating on the scope of section 5 of the Act, learned senior counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dalbir Singh (supra). Relevant para 82 is quoted below:
"The word "use" has not been defined in the Act. Therefore, the word "use" has to be viewed in its common meaning. In view of such very wide meaning of the word "use" even an unintentonal or an accidental use resulting in death of any other person shall subject the person so using to a death penalty. Both the words "use" and "results" are very wide. Such a law is neither just, reasonable nor is it fair and falls out of the "due process" test."
In the case of Deomuni Sharma (supra) 2, it has been held as under:
"For inviting conviction under section 7 of the Arms Act, it has to be proved that the firearm has been used in contravention of section 5 or Section 7 of the Arms Act. Since it was a licensed gun, there was no question that an act on the part of the accused in firing in the air to scare the aggressors would come within the mischief of Section 5(1) of the Arms Act. Therefore, the appellant is liable to be acquitted even of the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act.
While referring to the alleged offence under sections 3(1)(r) & (s) of the S.C., & S.T. Act, quoted below:
"3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.- (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-
... ... ...
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
... ... ...
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view.
... ... ..."
learned senior counsel submits that the ingredients thereof are also not complete in the instant case, viz., (a) the accused must not be a member of SC/ST community; (b) the accused should intentionally insult or intimidate with intent to humiliate a member of SC/ST in any public place; (c) the accused must have abused any member of SC/ST by caste name within public view; (d) the FIR doesn't say that accused persons don't belong to SC/ST 8 Mis. Cr. Case No.42429/2018 community which is an essential ingredient; and (e) the FIR doesn't say that complainant respondent No.2 belongs to SC/ST community within the knowledge of petitioner so as to attribute intentional insult or humiliation. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gorige Pentaiah (supra). Relevant para 6 quoted below:
"6. In the instant case, the allegation of respondent No.3 in the entire complaint is that on 27.5.2004, the appellant abused them with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (respondent No. 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate respondent No. 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law."
As such, the FIR does not contain any ingredients of any intention to humiliate in public view because intention cannot be attributed until knowledge of complaint belonging to SC/ST community is attributed, which is totally absent.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.1/State has submitted that the scope of interference is limited and the matter is under investigation. Hence, no interference is warranted.
7. There is no reply on behalf of the respondent No.2 except contending that this Court ought not to interfere in the matter at this stage.
8. Mountain of a mole perhaps is the best description of this case.
Undisputedly, the advocate chambers are constructed in the premises of the District Court, Dewas and just adjacent thereto is the petrol pump being run by the petitioners. If there is 9 Mis. Cr. Case No.42429/2018 any doubt or confusion as regards the dividing line through the boundary wall or barbed wire fencing, in all fairness, the respondent No.2 should have consulted the District Judge and sought assistance instead of picking up fight with petitioners.
9. Though there is substantial force in the submission advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, but, this Court is of the view that in the fitness of things, it shall be appropriate to direct the Superintendent of Police, Dewas for intervention in the matter and use his good office ensuring peace and tranquility settling the matter. If required, he may also seek guidance from the District Judge, Dewas as vulnerability of dividing line of boundary wall involves the ownership land of the petitioners and premises of the District Court.
At the same time, the Superintendent of Police shall also bestow conscious consideration upon the complaint filed by the petitioners vide Annexures P/11, P/12 and P/13 while carrying our directions of this Court and take a decision.
However, no coercive action shall be taken against either of the party.
10. With the aforesaid direction and observation, Mis. Cr. Case stands disposed of.
(Rohit Arya)
Judge
b/- 27 -03-2019
Digitally signed by M
V R BALAJI SARMA
Date: 2019.03.27
18:12:55 +05'30'