Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
G. Sanjeeva Reddy And Ors. vs Indukuru Lakshmamma And Ors. on 22 February, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2006(3)ALT66, AIR 2006 ANDHRA PRADESH 1335, 2008 (17) SCC 489, 2006 (5) ABR (NOC) 826 (AP), 2006 (5) AIR BOM R 826, 2006 (6) AKAR (NOC) 851 (AP), 2006 A I H C 2195, (2006) 3 ANDH LT 66, (2007) 1 CIVILCOURTC 286, (2009) 120 FACLR 1011, (2009) 1 CURLR 421, (2009) 3 LAB LN 44, (2009) 3 SCT 394, 2006 AIHC 2195
Author: Goda Raghuram
Bench: Goda Raghuram
ORDER Goda Raghuram, J.
1. The revision petitioners are the legal representatives of the plaintiff, one G. Sanjeeva Reddy, who filed the suit O.S. No. 341 of 1987 now on the file of the Court Of Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kadiri for injunctive relief against the respondents herein, in respect of the suit schedule property. The original plaintiff died and the plaintiffs 2 to 5 were brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased-sole plaintiff. The 3rd petitioner herein filed I.A. No. 2 of 2003 in the suit purportedly under Order VII Rule 14(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "the CPC") seeking leave of the Court to file a certified copy of the 10-1 revenue record.
2. In the affidavit filed in support of I.A. No. 2 of 2003 the 3rd petitioner herein pleaded that the claim in the plaint is that the plaintiffs are in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit property; that the defendants have denied the plaint plea; that as the original plaintiff-the father of the deponent of I. A. No. 2 of 2003 was looking after the litigation, the deponent had no earlier knowledge about a mutation proceedings that had occurred resulting in an entry in the 10-1 extract; and that after having been impleaded as the plaintiff and legal representative of the original plaintiff he recently learnt about the proceedings of the Mandal Revenue Officer, applied for a certified copy of the mutation proceedings; a certified copy was issued on 3-1-2003; and as the said document is material for a decision in the injunctive suit, he seeks leave of the Court to file the document as it was not filed earlier.
3. The Court below by the order impugned, rejected I.A. 2 of 2003. The Court below recorded that the 3rd plaintiff was brought on record in the suit as plaintiff consequent on orders dated 19-8-1993 in I.A. No. 393 of 1993 about nine (9) years prior to the present I. A., that the trial had already commenced; the 3rd plaintiff examined in chief; that the exercise of discretion under Sub-rule (3) of Order VII, Rule 14 is not to be as a matter of course; and that as the petitioner had failed to satisfy the Court as to why the original plaintiff was unable to present the document along with the plaint, and no steps were taken even though the petitioners were brought on record more than nine (9) years prior to I.A. 2 of 2003, no reasonable cause existed or was established for exercise of discretion under Order VII, Rule 14(3).
4. The provisions of the CPC, Order VII even as existed prior to the amendment in 1999 and 2002 require the plaintiff to state and file a list of all the documents upon which he seeks to rely in the suit. The legislative philosophy underlying this statutory requirement is that in the adversarial litigative paradigm, the opponent or defendant should not be taken by surprise and the plaintiff must disclose the broad documentary evidentiary platform on which the plaintiff's claim is projected. This requirement is no doubt not inflexible. A plaintiff could be permitted to bring on record a document subsequent to the filing of the plaint also but a reasonable cause must be shown. Order VII Rule 14(3) as amended by the amendment Act of 1999 merely makes explicit what is inherent, namely that due care should be exercised by the Court and grant of leave by the Court is a condition precedent for bringing a document on record subsequent to the filing of the suit. If grant of leave were to be a mechanically act it was not necessary for the legislature to have invested a judicial authority with such a mechanical function. Exercise of discretion by the Court even in respect of a decision under Order VII Rule 14(3) is a discretion circumscribed by legal principles and not one based on whim or caprice.
5. True it is that in the case on hand the 3rd plaintiff came on record as a legal representative of his father-sole plaintiff in 1993 but then he inherits the merits and demerits, procedural or strategic which impinge on the litigation in the hands of his predecessor in interest, the father who was the dominus litus in O.S. No. 341 of 1987. To illustrate the concept if O.S. No. 341 of 1987 had been dismissed for default and such an order had become irretrievably final for any reason, as a legatee the petitioner cannot contend that the default decree is not binding on him in respect of the suit schedule property unless he claims the property in an independent status other than as an heir of the original plaintiff.
6. For reasons alike and a fortiori the failure of the original plaintiff to have filed the mutation record or 10-1 revenue record based on such mutation/revenue record along with the plaint and failure to set out reasons why such record was not in his possession, would inure to the detriment of those plaintiffs who come on record as plaintiffs, as legal representatives of the original sole plaintiff. The diligence of the legal representative after the suit is filed would not cure the initial negligence or transgression of the letter in spirit of the CPC by the plaintiff.
7. It requires to be noticed that the defendants are parties to the litigation in the suit. It matters not to them whether the present plaintiffs are prosecuting the suit or the original sole plaintiff continues to prosecute the suit. All the defendants have to face the trauma of the pending litigation.
8. Much reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of a learned single judge of this Court in Bada Bodaiah and Anr. v. Bada Lingaswamy and Ors. . A question as to the interpretation of the provisions of Order VII Rule 14(3) of CPC directly fell for consideration in Bada Bodaiah. After setting out the back ground of the case and the legislative history of Order VII Rule 14(3) in meticulous detail, the learned judge reiterated that while a plaintiff is not altogether precluded from applying for producing documents to be received in evidence, subsequent to the filing of the suit, the provisions of Order VII Rule 14(3) must be read harmoniously with the provisions of Order VII Rule 1 and thus read the inevitable legislative signal is that the Court is required to exercise sound discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. While mere non-mention of the document in the plaint or subsequent to incidental or supplemental proceedings in the suit is not persefatal to a plaintiff's endeavor to produce the documents later the learned single judge held, the Court to which an application for grant of leave is made must exercise discretion in rare cases and not in a routine manner. On a true and fair construction of the curial opinion in paragraph 13 of the judgment, the conclusion is irresistible that this Court reiterated a sound and well established principle. The discretion is not the discretion of the judge but the discretion of the law. It is not a subjective-satisfaction of the person sitting in the judicial office but a discretion conditioned by the legal principles applied to dynamic fact situations which fertilize the application of the discretion. Indolent, negligent or careless litigants are not to be protected at the cost of the other litigants. Some flexibility should however be recognized in the system for the varieties of human conditions such as extreme illness, poverty or some other human condition which disables the orderly pursuit of litigation. A laid back or careless attitude to disciplined pursuit of a solemn proceedings like a litigation is however not to be condoned for that would be subvert the orderly progress of the society. This has always been the principle of law and is the substantive basis of Order VII Rule 14(3). This is the principle and that is what has been held in substance in the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
9. The Court below has rightly rejected the application I.A. No. 2 of 2003 as no reasonable cause was shown for exercise of judicial discretion under Order VII Rule 14(3). This Court discerns no revisable error. There are no merits in this Civil Revision Petition.
10. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed.