Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/8 vs Union Of India And 2 Ors F on 25 March, 2025
Page No.# 1/8
GAHC010280702023
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WA/37/2024
AGRICULTURAL AND PROCESSED FOOD PRODUCTS EXPORT
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (APEDA)
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES,
GOVT. OF INDIA, 3RD FLOOR, NCUI BUILDING, 3,
SIRI INDUSTRIAL AREA,
AUGUST KRANTI MARG,
NEW DELHI-16,
REPRESENTED BY ITS ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER,
REGIONAL OFFICE, GUWAHATI
2: MS. SUNITA RAI
ASSTT. GENERAL MANAGER
AGRICULTURAL AND PROCESSED FOOD PRODUCTS EXPORT
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY APEDA
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES
JAIN COMPLEX
3RD FLOOR G.S. ROAD GHY-
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND 2 ORS F
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY, GOVT. OF INDIA,
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT SHARAM SHAKTI BHAWAN,
RAFI MARG, NEW DELHI 01
2:BINOD CH. BARMAN
C/O SRI JOGENDRA NATHBORAH
HOUSE NO.598
ANANDA NAGAR
CHRISTIAN BASTI
NEAR SANI MANDIR
GHY-5
Page No.# 2/8
3:THE ASSTT. LABOUR COMMISSIONER CENTRAL
CUM CONTROLLING AUTHORITY UNDER THE PAYMENT OF GRATUITY
ACT 1972
KENDRIYA SHRAM SADAN
RK MISSION ROAD
BIRUBARI GHY-1
For the appellants : Mr. K.R. Borooah, Advocate
Mr. P. Jain, Advocate
(through video-conferencing)
For the respondents :
-BEFORE-
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. VIJAY BISHNOI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR 25-03-2025 (Vijay Bishnoi, C.J.) This writ appeal is preferred on behalf of the appellants being aggrieved with the judgment and order dated 07.09.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) 857/2013 whereby the writ petition preferred on behalf of the appellants has been dismissed.
2. In the above-referred writ petition, the appellants challenged the order dated 12.11.2012 passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Ministry of Labour, Government of India, Guwahati in its capacity as Controlling Authority while exercising powers under Sub-Section 4 of Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter to be referred as 'Gratuity Act').
3. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent No.2 herein as well as in the writ petition submitted an application before the appellants claiming gratuity. When the said application filed by the respondent No.2 had not been Page No.# 3/8 given due consideration by the appellants, he filed an application under Rule 10(1)(i) of the Payment of Gratuity (Central) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter to be referred as '1972 Rules') in the prescribed form before the Controlling Authority for issuing a direction under Sub-Section (4) of Section 7 of the Gratuity Act. The Controlling Authority, after condoning the delay, admitted the said application filed on behalf of the respondent No.2 and issued notice to the appellants in the prescribed form. On receipt of the notice, the appellants appeared before the Controlling Authority and the Authority, after providing due opportunity of hearing to the respondent No.2 as well as the appellants, passed the order dated 12.11.2012 directing the appellants to pay an amount of Rs.68250/- to the respondent No.2 as gratuity (Rs.63,000/- plus interest Rs.5,250/-) within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order dated 12.11.2012.
4. Being aggrieved with the order dated 12.11.2012, the appellants preferred the above-referred writ petition which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide the impugned order.
5. The learned Single Judge, after dealing with the provisions contained in the Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority Act, 1985 as well as the provisions contained in Gratuity Act and 1972 Rules in detail and also taking into consideration the findings recorded by the Controlling Authority, has dismissed the writ petition mainly on two counts; firstly- that while exercising the certiorari jurisdiction, this Court is not supposed to act as an appellate authority and the action complained of cannot be interfered with unless the authority, who has passed the order under challenge, has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible Page No.# 4/8 evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to be an error of law.
6. The learned Single Judge has also non-suited the appellants on the ground that they failed to avail the remedy of statutory appeal as provided under the provisions of the Gratuity Act and 1972 Rules. The learned Single Judge has also observed that the amount involved in the case is only Rs.68,250/- and there is no sufficient reason to interfere with the order passed by the Controlling Authority.
7. The relevant portion of the judgment and order dated 07.09.2023 is reproduced hereunder:-
24. The gratuity is, in its essence, a payment in consideration of past services paid at the end of the said service when the employment terminates. The Controlling Authority in the case in hand, had reached a finding that the respondent no. 2 is eligible to be paid gratuity under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act after reaching findings on the basis of the materials placed before it, that the APFPEDA being the employer, comes under the purview of the provisions contained in Section 1[3][c] of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and it does not have any other scheme of gratuity not less favourable than the benefit provided under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. It is relevant, at this stage, to mention that the petitioner as the employer, had chosen not to prefer a statutory appeal under sub-section [7] of Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 against the impugned Order dated 12.11.2012 passed by the Controlling Authority recording the above findings of fact.
25. An appeal is essentially a continuation of the original proceedings and the power of the appellate authority to re-appreciate of the fact is co-extensive. An appellate authority on re-appreciation on facts, is empowered to reverse the finding. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited in the sense that a writ of certiorari is issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction.
Page No.# 5/8 The writ jurisdiction extends to cases where orders are passed by tribunals or authorities in excess of their conferred jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal or an authority, a writ of certiorari can be issued if in recording such a finding, the tribunal or the authority has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. As it is settled that the jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari is supervisory and not appellate, the writ court does not ordinarily appreciate evidence. The writ of certiorari is intended to correct jurisdictional excesses which are clearly established. As far as the finding of fact which is one within the jurisdiction of the tribunal or the authority is concerned, it is ordinarily a matter not for the writ court to interfere for the reason that the tribunal or the authority which has jurisdiction to decide the matter has the jurisdiction to decide it correctly or wrongly. It would become a mere error and that too, an error of fact.
26. It has been held in B.K. Muniraju vs. State of Karnataka, reported in [2008] 4 SCC 451, that whether it is a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : [i] the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law; and [ii] a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. Though the power of judicial review is there yet its exercise is discretionary. It has been held in Rengali Hydro Electric Project vs. Giridhari Sahu, reported in [2019] 10 SCC 695, even a gross error of fact does not amount to an error of law. An error of law which become vulnerable to judicious scrutiny by way of Page No.# 6/8 certiorari must be one which is apparent on the face of the record. As to what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, is a matter to be decided by the court on the facts of its case. A finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence would be perverse and such a finding of fact would constitute an error of law enabling the writ court to interfere. The writ court does not go into the question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character as those are within the ambit and scope of the tribunal or the authority exercising its original jurisdiction or of the appellate court which is entitled to re-appreciate the findings of fact reached by such tribunal or authority. On the basis of such parameters laid down for the test of perversity when the findings of facts reached by the Controlling Authority in the case in hand are considered it is found that those findings were reached by the Controlling Authority on the basis of the materials placed before it by the contesting parties. With the petitioner not preferring any statutory appeal seeking reversal of such findings of fact recorded by the Controlling Authority in the case in hand, this Court in its certiorari jurisdiction does not embark upon a process of appreciation of the materials again for considering its adequacy of sufficiency as it does not appear on the face of the record that the findings recorded by the Controlling Authority were perverse.
28. In the case of M.C. Chamaraju vs. Hind Nipon Rural Industrial [P] Ltd., reported in [2007] 8 SCC 501, the question which arose before the Authorities under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 was whether the workman therein had completed five years' continuous service so as to be eligible to claim gratuity under the Act. The Authorities considered the said question and on the basis of the evidence adduced before them, held that various units where the workman had worked were one and the same and hence the entire service of the workman ought to be considered and taken into account for the purpose of computation of benefit of gratuity. On the basis of the above reasoning, the Controlling Authority as well as the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 held that the appellant was qualified and entitled to gratuity under the Act.
Page No.# 7/8 28.1. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above obtaining fact situation, has gone on to observe as under :-
13. To us, the learned Single Judge was wholly right in dismissing the writ petition on the basis of the findings recorded by the authorities under the Act and in not interfering with the said orders. The Division Bench, surprisingly, went into the questions of fact and came to the conclusion that it was not established by the appellant workman that he had worked for more than five years continuously in the Company so as to be eligible to claim gratuity. The Division Bench also perused certain documents and observed that certain letters said to have been written were not on the letterhead of the Company and it could not be said that the appellant had worked for a period of five years continuously which was an essential requirement to claim gratuity. On that reasoning, the Division Bench held that the case was of 'no evidence'. The Bench also held that the onus to establish eligibility was on the employee and since it was not discharged by him, he should fail. Accordingly, the orders were set aside.
14. In our considered opinion, the Division Bench ought not to have undertaken the above exercise which had been done by the controlling authority as also by the appellate authority. The High Court was exercising power of 'judicial review' which, in its inherent nature, has limitations. This is particularly true since the learned Single Judge also did not think it fit to interfere. We are, therefore, of the view that the Division Bench was wrong in setting aside all the orders and in allowing the appeal of the management and in dismissing the application filed by the workman.
15. There is another aspect also which is relevant. The Act has been enacted with a view to grant benefit to workers, a 'weaker section' in industrial adjudicatory process. In interpreting the provisions of such beneficial legislation, therefore, liberal view should be taken. A benefit has been extended by the authorities under the Act to the workman by recording a finding that the applicant [the appellant herein] had completed requisite service of five years to be eligible to get gratuity. In that case, even if another view was possible, the Division Bench should not have set aside the findings recorded by the authorities under the Act and confirmed by a Single Judge by allowing the appeal of the employer.
16. Finally, we are of the view that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case also, the Division Bench was not justified in setting aside the orders passed by the authorities and confirmed by the learned Single Judge considering comparatively a small amount involved in the appeal. As already noted in the earlier part of the judgment, the appellant was held entitled to Rs 16,785 along with interest @ 10% p.a. To us, therefore, even on that ground, the Division Bench should have refrained from quashing the orders.
17. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is hereby set aside and the orders passed by the controlling authority and the appellate authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 as confirmed by the learned Single Judge is hereby restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
18. The payment to which the appellant workman is held entitled shall be Page No.# 8/8 made within a period of twelve weeks from today.
29. In view of the fact situation obtaining in the case, as discussed above, and for the reasons assign therein, including for the reason that the involvement herein only in respect of a sum of Rs. 68,250/-, this Court does not find any good and sufficient reason to interfere with the order/direction passed/taken by the Controlling Authority in exercise of the statutory powers conferred under Section 7[4] of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Consequently, the writ petition is found bereft of any merit and is liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to cost.
30. The payment to which the respondent no. 2 is held entitled shall be made within a period of twelve weeks from today, if not already paid."
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the impugned judgment and order as well as the material available on record and also taking into consideration the fact that a small amount, i.e. Rs.68,250/- is involved in the case, we do not find any case for interference with the judgment and order dated 07.09.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) 857/2013.
Hence, this writ appeal is dismissed.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Comparing Assistant