Delhi District Court
Sanjeev Sharma vs Tilak Raj Arora on 8 October, 2025
IN THE COURT OF DR. SAURABH KULSHRESHTHA,
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-03: WEST DISTRICT,
TIS HAZARI COURT, DELHI.
CNR No. DLWT01-009702/2023
CR No. 654/2023
PS: Moti Nagar
Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora
In the matter of:
Sanjeev Sharma
Director of M/s Shine Research and Services Pvt. Limited
294, Globe House, Prakash Mohalla,
Garhi Iskon Temple
East of Kailash,
New Delhi - 110065.
Presently at:
D-68, Yadav Nagar,
Samaipur Badli,
Delhi - 110018 .............. Petitioner
Versus
Tilak Raj Arora
S/o Late Chander Bhan
R/o C-7, New Moti Nagar,
New Delhi - 110015
Through its attorney Shri Chirag Arora ............ Respondent
Date of Institution : 04.12.2023
Date of Reserving Judgment : 18.09.2025
Date of Pronouncement : 08.10.2025
Decision : Revision Petition Allowed
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Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been preferred by the petitioner (the accused before the Ld. Trial Court) against the summoning order dated 23.10.2021 passed by the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate (NI Act) - 05, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi whereby the petitioner/ accused was summoned for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as well as the order dated 12.10.2023 passed by the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate (NI Act) - 04, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi whereby notice under section 251 Cr.P.C. was framed against the petitioner/ accused.
2. The version of the respondent/ complainant is that on the request and representations of the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma the respondent/ complainant had advanced a friendly loan of an amount of Rs. Twenty Lacs to the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma and towards discharge of this debt the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma had issued cheque bearing no. 001067 dated 21.06.2019 for an amount of Rs. Twenty Lacs drawn on Kotak Mahindra Bank, Lajpat Nagar from the account of the co-accused company namely Shine Research and Services Pvt. Limited, in favour of the respondent/ complainant. However, the said cheque was dishonoured on presentation vide memo dated 28.06.2019 with the remarks "Drawer's signature incomplete/ illegible/ differs/ required". The respondent/ complainant served a Legal Notice dated 28.06.2019 upon the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma, CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 2 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora however, he failed to make the payment of the cheque amount despite service of legal notice. Hence, the respondent/ complainant filed a criminal complaint for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma.
3. Subsequent to the filing of the aforesaid complaint, an application for amendment of complaint was moved on behalf of the respondent/complainant, wherein it was submitted that the cheque in question had, in fact, been issued from the account of the company, namely M/s Shine Research and Services Pvt. Ltd. It was further averred that due to inadvertence, the complainant had omitted to implead the said company as a co-accused in the criminal complaint case. The said application was allowed by the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 03.10.2019, and accordingly, the company namely M/s Shine Research and Services Pvt. Ltd. was impleaded as accused no. 1 in the complaint and the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma was impleaded as accused no. 2. Pursuant thereto, both the accused persons, i.e. Accused No. 1 - M/s Shine Research and Services Pvt. Ltd., and Accused No. 2 - Mr. Sanjeev Sharma, were summoned to face trial for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act vide summoning order dated 23.10.2021 passed by the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate (NI Act)- 05, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. Subsequently, vide order dated 12.10.2023, notice under section 251 Cr.P.C. was framed against both the accused persons.
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4. By way of the present revision petition the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma has assailed the aforesaid summoning order dated 23.10.2021 as well as the order dated 12.10.2023 (whereby notice under section 251 Cr.P.C. was framed against the petitioner/ accused), passed by the Ld. Trial Court.
5. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma has primarily argued that no demand notice was issued to the co-accused company and the demand notice was issued only to the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma and that too in his individual capacity and not as the Director of the co-accused company and in the absence of the statutory demand notice the complaint is not maintainable against the co- accused company. He has further argued that since the cheque in question has been issued by the co-accused company and not by the present petitioner/ accused therefore in the absence of the prosecution being maintainable against the co-accused company no case is made out against the petitioner/ accused as well as section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be pressed into operation where the company cannot be prosecuted as the principal offender. Accordingly, he has prayed for setting aside of the summoning order dated 23.10.2021 and the notice framed under section 251 Cr.P.C. on 12.10.2023. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/ accused has placed reliance upon the judgment titled as M/s H.G Retail Solutions Pvt. Ltd v. Rajiv Kumar Saxena passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Crl. M.C No. 1965/2022.
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6. On the other hand, the Ld. Counsel for the respondent/ complainant has argued that since the notice dated 28.06.2019 had been issued to the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma, who is a director of the co-accused company, that amounts to sufficient compliance of the provisions of law and the Ld. Trial Court has rightly summoned both the accused persons. Ld. Counsel for the respondent/ complainant has placed reliance upon the judgments titled as Mainuddin Abdul Sattar Shaikh v. Vijay D. Salvi, AIR 2015 Supreme Court 2579 and Ripunjay Prasad Singh v. State of Jharkhand, passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Jharkhand in W.P. (Crl.) No. 485/2024.
7. I have heard the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/ accused as well as the Ld. Counsel for the respondent/ complainant and have given due consideration to their rival contentions and have perused the record.
8. At the very outset, it is pertinent to observe that Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, encapsulates the doctrine of vicarious liability in cases where the principal offender is a company or a partnership firm. It is now a well-settled proposition of law, no longer res integra, that for the purpose of invoking the penal consequences contemplated under Section 141 against the Directors or persons in charge of the affairs of the company, in relation to an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is a sine qua non that the company itself, being the principal offender, is not only impleaded as an accused in the proceedings, but that the commission of the offence by the company must first be affirmatively established. It is CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 5 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora only upon such foundational proof of guilt on the part of the company that the vicarious liability of its Directors may validly arise and be adjudicated upon.
9. Reference may be made to the following judgments in this respect:
(i) Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd. reported as (2012) 5 SCC 661 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words "as well as the company" appearing in the Section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a director is indicted.
59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 6 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself."
(ii) Dilip Hariramani v. Bank of Baroda, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 579 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"........14. The provisions of section 141 impose vicarious liability by deeming fiction which presupposes and requires the commission of the offence by the company or firm. Therefore, unless the company or firm has committed the offence as a principal accused, the persons mentioned in sub- section (1) or (2) would not be liable and convicted as vicariously liable. Section 141 of the NI Act extends vicarious criminal liability to officers associated with the company or firm when one of the twin requirements of section 141 has been satisfied, which person(s) then, by deeming fiction, is made vicariously liable and punished. However, such vicarious liability arises only when the company or firm commits the offence as the primary offender. This view has been subsequently followed in Sharad Kumar Sanghi v. Sangita Rane (See endnote 17 on page 34), Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy (See endnote 18 on page 34) and Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (See endnote 19 on page
34)....."
10. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is manifest that the cheque in question was issued from the account of the co-accused Company. Accordingly, unless it is first established that the Company CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 7 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora has, in fact, committed the offence contemplated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the issue of fastening vicarious liability upon the Director does not and cannot legally arise. The pivotal question that thus falls for determination in the present matter is whether, in the absence of due service of the statutory demand notice upon the Company, it can nonetheless be held liable for the alleged offence under Section 138 of the said Act.
11. In this respect it is pertinent to refer to the judgment titled as Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy, reported as (2019) 3 SCC 797 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
".....6. The judgment of the High Court has been questioned on two grounds. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that firstly, the appellant could not be prosecuted without the company being named as an accused. The cheque was issued by the company and was signed by the appellant as its Director. Secondly, it was urged that the observation of the High Court that the company can now be proceeded against in the complaint is misconceived. The learned counsel submitted that the offence under Section 138 is complete only upon the issuance of a notice of demand and the failure of payment within the prescribed period. In absence of compliance with the requirements of Section 138, it is asserted, the direction of the High Court that the company could be impleaded/arraigned at this stage is erroneous.........CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 8 of 20
Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora ..........8. The judgment of the three-Judge Bench has since been followed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Charanjit Pal Jindal v. L.N. Metalics [Charanjit Pal Jindal v. L.N. Metalics, (2015) 15 SCC 768 : (2016) 3 SCC (Civ) 447 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 400]. There is merit in the second submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellant as well. The proviso to Section 138 contains the preconditions which must be fulfilled before an offence under the provision is made out. These conditions are : (i) presentation of the cheque to the bank within six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (ii) a demand being made in writing by the payee or holder in due course by the issuance of a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of the receipt of information from the bank of the return of the cheques; and (iii) the failure of the drawer to make payment of the amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice.
9. In MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan [MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan, (2013) 1 SCC 177 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 424 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 458] , this Court held thus : (SCC p. 188, para 12) "12. The proviso to Section 138, however, is all important and stipulates three distinct conditions precedent, which must be satisfied before the dishonour of a cheque can constitute an offence and become punishable. The first condition is that the CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 9 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora cheque ought to have been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. The second condition is that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, ought to make a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. The third condition is that the drawer of such a cheque should have failed to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. It is only upon the satisfaction of all the three conditions mentioned above and enumerated under the proviso to Section 138 as clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof that an offence under Section 138 can be said to have been committed by the person issuing the cheque."
(emphasis supplied)
10. The importance of fulfilling these conditions has been adverted to in a recent judgment of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in N. Harihara Krishnan v. J.
Thomas [N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas, (2018) 13 SCC 663 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 440 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 826]. Adverting to the ingredients of Section 138, the Court observed as follows:
CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 10 of 20Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora "26. ... Obviously such complaints must contain the factual allegations constituting each of the ingredients of the offence under Section 138. Those ingredients are : (1) that a person drew a cheque on an account maintained by him with the banker; (2) that such a cheque when presented to the bank is returned by the bank unpaid; (3) that such a cheque was presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date it was drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier; (4) that the payee demanded in writing from the drawer of the cheque the payment of the amount of money due under the cheque to payee;
and (5) such a notice of payment is made within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the information by the payee from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid."
11. In the present case, the record before the Court indicates that the cheque was drawn by the appellant for Lakshmi Cement and Ceramics Industries Ltd., as its Director. A notice of demand was served only on the appellant. The complaint was lodged only against the appellant without arraigning the company as an accused.
12. The provisions of Section 141 postulate that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person, who at the time when the offence was committed was in charge of or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 11 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished.
13. In the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was therefore not maintainable. The appellant had signed the cheque as a Director of the company and for and on its behalf. Moreover, in the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused.
14. We, accordingly, are of the view that the High Court was in error in rejecting the petition under Section 482 CrPC. We hence allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. In consequence, the complaint, being CRP No. 27 of 2004 shall stand quashed.
12. Further the judgment titled as H.G. Retail Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Kumar Saxena, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2728 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the case, wherein it has been as under:
".......24. It is pivotal to highlight that as per section 141 NI Act, the principal accused is the company and vicarious liability will only extend to those responsible, once the principal accused i.e. the company is also proceeded against. Thus if an offence under section 138 NI Act has been committed by a CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 12 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora company, then the company ought to be sent the demand notice, in order to comply with the statutory steps contained in section 138 NI Act. Section 138 NI Act mandates that demand notice be sent to the drawer of the cheque. In the present case the cheque was drawn by the director Karan Tomar for and on behalf of the company HG Retail. Thus the company ought to have been served the demand notice, as in the absence of serving any demand notice to the company, the essential and mandatory step of serving a demand notice to the drawer of the cheque fails.
25. In the present case, admittedly no demand notice was ever sent to the company i.e. the principal accused. There cannot be a prosecution without prosecuting the principal accused. The demand notice was only sent to the directors of the company. The company was made a party in the complaint u/s 138 NI Act, however the ingredient of section 138 NI Act which postulates that a demand notice be sent to the drawer of the cheque, stands unfulfilled. The loan agreement was also between the petitioner company HG Retail and the respondent. The director was merely acting on behalf of the company. Thus if the default or non-payment is done at the behest of the company, the company ought to have been sent a demand notice. Even though the company was arrayed as an accused in the complaint under 138, however, without demand notice being served to the company the complaint itself fails and cannot be maintainable in terms of the provisions contained in section 138 NI CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 13 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora Act. It is only when the company is prosecuted and proceeded against in compliance of section 138 NI Act, that vicarious liability in terms of section 141 NI Act will extend to its directors or others responsible for the commission of the offence.
26. It is imperative that all the elements of Section 138 of the NI Act be duly satisfied prior to taking cognizance of such a complaint. In the absence of demand notice being served upon the company, which serves as the drawer of the cheque, the complaint itself fails to meet the requirements stipulated by Section 138 of the NI Act, as one of the essential elements remains unsatisfied.
27. Given the absence of a demand notice served upon the company HG Retail, which constitutes the drawer of the cheque as the principal accused, the mandatory steps outlined in Section 138 of the NI Act have not been duly adhered to. Consequently, the complaint under section 138 NI Act is not maintainable and is bad in law. Since the complaint itself is held to be bad in law in absence of service of demand notice on the company is liable to fail. Therefore, this Court has not gone into the two remaining questions of limitation and specific averment against Kusum Tanwar......."
13. Thus, the service of the statutory demand notice upon the company is a sine qua non for invocation of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act qua the accused company.
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14. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is an admitted position that no statutory demand notice, as mandated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, was ever served upon the co- accused Company. The purported notice dated 28.06.2019 was addressed solely to the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma, and that too, in his individual capacity. Significantly, the said notice makes no reference whatsoever either to the co-accused Company or to the fact that Sanjeev Sharma was acting in his capacity as a Director of the Company. There is not even a foundational averment in the notice indicating that the cheque in question was issued by the co-accused Company or that it was drawn in discharge of any legally enforceable liability on its part. Further, the notice fails to call upon either the co-accused Company or its Director (acting in capacity of such Director) to tender payment of the cheque amount. In view of the above, the said communication/ notice dated 28.06.2019 cannot, by any stretch of legal reasoning or interpretative latitude, be deemed to constitute a valid statutory demand notice served upon the co-accused Company, as envisaged under Section 138 of the Act.
15. It is further noteworthy, and indeed perplexing, that the factual foundation laid in the demand notice dated 28.06.2019 is wholly inconsistent with the allegations in the complaint. While the notice alleges that the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma committed embezzlement of money belonging to the respondent/ complainant by cheating the respondent/ complainant with his criminal conduct, the CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 15 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora complaint, in stark contrast, is predicated upon an alleged transaction of a friendly loan.
16. The inevitable consequence of the foregoing is that, in the absence of service of any statutory demand notice upon the co-accused Company, as contemplated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the foundational ingredients necessary to constitute the said offence are conspicuously absent in the present case. Consequently, the co-accused Company could not have been legally summoned to stand trial for the alleged offence. The complaint, therefore, ought to have been dismissed, insofar as it pertains to the co- accused Company.
17. The judgment titled as Mainuddin Abdul Sattar Shaikh v. Vijay D. Salvi, AIR 2015 Supreme Court 2579 cited by the Ld. Counsel for the respondent/ complainant is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the said case, the accused, who was the Director of a company had issued a cheque drawn on his personal account in discharge of the liability of the company. It was observed by the Court that as the cheque was drawn by the accused on an account maintained by him, the Company or any of its directors could not be made liable for the offence, even if the cheque was issued by the accused towards the discharge of the debt of the company. Similarly, the judgment titled as Ripunjay Prasad Singh v. State of Jharkhand, passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Jharkhand in W.P. (Crl.) No. 485/2024 is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. The said judgment is CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 16 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora also not applicable in view of the aforesaid judgments cited herein above.
18. It is an admitted position that the cheque in question was drawn by the co-accused Company and not by the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma in his individual capacity. Accordingly, any liability sought to be fastened upon the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma could only have arisen in his capacity as a Director of the co-accused Company, by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
19. Once it is held that no offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is made out against the co-accused Company, and that the complaint ought to have been dismissed qua the said Company, the necessary legal corollary is that the Director of the co-accused Company cannot be held vicariously liable by invoking the provisions of Section 141 of the said Act. Vicarious liability under Section 141 of the said Act can arise only where the principal offender, namely the Company, is shown to have committed the offence in the first instance. In the absence of such foundational liability of the Company, the complaint was not maintainable against the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma either, in his capacity as director of the co-accused Company with the aid of Section 141 of the said Act. Further the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma could not have been held liable in his personal capacity as the cheque in question was not issued from his personal account but from the account of the co-accused Company.
CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 17 of 20Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora Accordingly, the complaint ought to have been dismissed against the petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma as well.
20. In this respect reference may be made to the judgment titled as Anil Gupta v. Star India (P) Ltd., reported as (2014) 10 SCC 373 wherein it has been held:
"......13. In the present case, the High Court by the impugned judgment dated 13-8-2007 [Visionaries Media Network v. Star India (P) Ltd., Criminal Misc. Case No. 2380 of 2004, decided on 13-8-2007 (Del)] held that the complaint against Respondent 2 Company was not maintainable and quashed the summons issued by the trial court against Respondent 2 Company. Thereby, the Company being not a party to the proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and in view of the fact that part of the judgment referred to by the High Court in Anil Hada [Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] has been overruled by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Aneeta Hada [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] , we have no other option but to set aside the rest part of the impugned judgment [Visionaries Media Network v. Star India (P) Ltd., Criminal Misc. Case No. 2380 of 2004, decided on 13-8-2007 (Del)] whereby the High Court held that the proceedings against the appellant can be continued even in CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 18 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora absence of the Company. We, accordingly, set aside that part of the impugned judgment dated 13-8-2007 [Visionaries Media Network v. Star India (P) Ltd., Criminal Misc. Case No. 2380 of 2004, decided on 13-8-2007 (Del)] passed by the High Court so far as it relates to the appellant and quash the summons and proceeding pursuant to Complaint Case No. 698 of 2001 qua the appellant....."
21. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case the Ld. Trial Court ought to have dismissed the complaint against the co-accused company as well as the present petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma. Therefore, the impugned orders i.e. the summoning order dated 23.10.2021 and the order dated 12.10.2023 whereby notice under section 251 Cr.P.C. was framed against the present petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma, passed by the Ld. Trial Court are manifestly erroneous. The Ld. Trial Court has therefore not correctly exercised the jurisdiction vested in it. However, this is an error which can always be corrected in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
22. Accordingly, the impugned orders i.e. the summoning order dated 23.10.2021 passed by the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate (NI Act) - 05, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi whereby the present petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma was summoned for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the order dated 12.10.2023 passed by the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate (NI Act) - 04, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi whereby notice under section 251 CR No. 654/2023 Page No. 19 of 20 Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora Cr.P.C. was framed against the the present petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma, cannot be sustained and the same are therefore set-aside. The summoning order is also liable to be set aside against the co-accused company Shine Research and Services Pvt. Limited. The result is that the criminal complaint for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act filed by the respondent/ complainant against the present petitioner/ accused Sanjeev Sharma stands dismissed. The present revision is allowed in these terms.
23. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this judgment. Revision file be consigned to record room after compliance.
Digitally signed by SAURABH SAURABH KULSHRESHTHA
(Pronounced in the open court KULSHRESHTHA Date: 2025.10.08 15:34:53
+0530
on 08.10.2025)
(Dr. Saurabh Kulshreshtha)
Additional Sessions Judge-03 (West)
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
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Sanjeev Sharma v. Tilak Raj Arora