State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Manager,Pandharpur Medicare (Icu) ... vs Mr.Hanumant P.Aambekar And Ors on 26 November, 2025
MA-20-94 IN A-20-246
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
MAHARASHTRA, MUMBAI
Misc.Application no.MA/20/94 IN Appeal No.A/20/246
(Arising out of order dated 08/05/2019 passed by the D.F. Solapur in /CC/17/310)
Manager
Pandharpur Medicare (ICU)
(Currently Metro City Hospital)
Bhakti Marg, Pandharpur .....Applicant/Appellant/
District Solapur org.OP no.4
Versus
1a) Mr.Sunny Hanumant Ambekar
R/o.Mahapur Chawl
Santpeth, Sangola Road
Pandharpur, District -Solapur
1b) Ms.Prachi Hanumant Ambekar
R/o.Mahapur Chawl
Santpeth, Sangola Road ......Respondent/org.complainant
Pandharpur, District -Solapur
2.Dr.Girish Borawake
Borawake Hospital
Bhakti Marg, Pandharpur
District Solapur
3. Dr.Surekha Borawake
Borawake Hospital
Bhakti Marg, Pandharpur ....Respondents/org.OP nos.1 to 3
District Solapur
4.Dr.M.R.Takale
New Karad Naka, Pandharpur
District-Solapur
BEFORE: Justice S.P.Tavade - President
Vijay C.Premchandani - Member
Advocate S.P.Rajepandhare for the applicant/appellant.
PRESENT: Advocate Ashok B.Tajane for the respondent/ org.
complainant
1
MA-20-94 IN A-20-246
FINAL ORDER
(Dt.26/11/2025)
Per Hon'ble Vijay C.Premchandani - Member
1. The present misc. application for delay condonation is filed by the applicant/ appellant, who is the original opponent no.4 for condonation of 236 days delay in filing the appeal against the judgment and order passed by the Ld.District Consumer Commission, Solapur in consumer complaint no.CC/17/310 on 08/05/2019.
The facts of the application:-
2. The applicant/appellant has contended that the Ld.District Consumer Commission after hearing the complaint was pleased to allow the consumer complaint holding the applicant/appellant and respondent no.4 liable to pay compensation to the respondent no.1/original complainant. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order, the applicant/appellant has moved the present application for condonation of 236 days delay in filing the appeal. It is contended that the applicant is made a formal party in spite of that he has been directed to pay compensation jointly and severally to the respondent no.1. The applicant is first time facing some court case, therefore, he could not understand the procedure of appeal. For that purpose he has to take legal assistance of the lawyer, which caused delay for preferring the present appeal to the extent of 236 days. The applicant prayed that the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned and the appeal be heard on merits.
3. The notice of this application was issued to the respondents. The respondent nos.1a) and 1b) appeared and filed written notes of arguments, wherein it is contended and objected to allow the present delay condonation application. It is contended that there is huge delay of 236 days. However, if the calculation is made from the date of passing of the order i.e. from 08/05/2019 till 14/02/2020 i.e. filing of appeal, there is total delay of 252 days in filing the appeal, as contemplated under the law.
2MA-20-94 IN A-20-246
4. It is contended that in the case of Himanshu Tiwari V/s. Arun Kumar Gabel- Laws (NCD) 2023-10-28 the Hon'ble National Commission while deciding the Revision on the point of condonation delay of 296 days, the same was dismissed on the ground of no sufficient cause shown by the applicant. Therefore, the present misc. application is required to be dismissed with cost.
5. After hearing learned counsel for both the parties, perusal of the misc.application and the written notes of arguments filed by the respondents as well as the citations placed on record by both the parties, we come to the conclusion that the following order should be passed as per the reasons given below:-
REASONING:-
6. Bare perusal of the application, it shows that the only cause shown by the applicant is that he was not aware about the procedural aspect for preferring an appeal and the limitation period. It is well known principle of law that ignorance of law does not have an excuse. We have also gone through the limitation period to prefer an appeal within a period of 30 days from the date of passing of the order. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents, there is delay in all of total 252 days in filing the present appeal. It is noticed that the applicant has not shown sufficient cause. The applicant has relied on the two judgments, wherein it is contended that the point of delay condonation is to be dealt liberally, if the sufficient cause has been shown. On the technical ground the application cannot be rejected. Here in the present case, the sufficient cause is not shown by the applicant.
7. We have gone through the following judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein certain principles have been laid down.
In Basavraj & anr. V/s. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 AIR SCW 6510, it is held in para 9 as under:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the 3 MA-20-94 IN A-20-246 purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently"
or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee &Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin v. A.Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v. Veena alias Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150: (2011 AIR SEW 1233); and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC 1629: (2012 AIR SCW 2412.) It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to 4 MA-20-94 IN A-20-246 enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.
8. The Hon'ble Apex court in various judgments, it is held that cause of the delay is to be considered when there is 'sufficient cause'. Here in the present case, the applicant failed to establish the same. Hence, in our view, the cause shown in the application is not proper or sufficient. Hence, we pass the following order:-
ORDER
1. Misc.application no.MA/20/94 for condonation of delay of 236 days in filing the present appeal stands dismissed.5
MA-20-94 IN A-20-246
2. Consequently, Appeal no.A/20/246 does not survive for consideration.
3. No order as to costs.
4. Copies of the order be furnished to the parties free of cost.
[Justice S.P. Tavade] President [Vijay C. Premchandani] Member MS 6