Delhi District Court
Maharani Bagh Residents Welfare ... vs . Mcd on 17 August, 2009
IN THE COURT OF Dr. KAMINI LAU: ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE13: CENTRAL DISTRICT: DELHI CS No. 122/08 Maharani Bagh Residents Welfare Association Vs. MCD 17.8.2009 O R D E R:
Vide order dated 11.2.2009 this court had framed a preliminary issue with regard to the valuation which is as under:
Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction?
Onus of proving the said issue was upon the defendant. Being a pure question of law no evidence is required to be lead. All the parties before this court have filed written synopsis of arguments and have also made oral submissions on the said issue. Initially the suit had been filed before the Delhi High Court in the year 2001 and pursuant to the change in the pecuniary jurisdiction was transferred to the court of Ld. District Judge. According to the plaintiff the suit has been valued for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction as under:
1. For the relief of permanent prohibitory injunctions at Rs.5,05,000/ on which court fess of Rs.7,275/ is affixed.
2. For the relief of cancellation of sanctions accorded by the defendant MCD at Rs.130/ on which court fees of Rs.13/ is affixed.
3. For the relief of injunction restraining defendants no. 3 to 9 from in any manner transferring, alienating, parting with the possession or otherwise dealing with the suit property at Rs.130/ on which court fees of Rs.13/ is affixed.
4. For the relief of injunction restraining defendants no. 3 to 9 from using the suit land at Rs.130/ at which court fees of Rs.13/ is affixed.
Ld. counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has placed his reliance on the provisions of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act and Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act. He has stated that the valuation of the court fees and jurisdiction is an issue which is governed by the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 and the Court Fees Act, 1870 and the provisions of Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act enjoins that any suit of the present nature is determinable for computation of court fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. He has further stated that there is no prescribed standard for valuation of suit for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction and the question has been entirely left to the discretion of the plaintiff. He has in this regard relied upon the following judgments:
1. S.RM. AR. S. SP Sathappa Chettiar Vs. RM. AR.
RM Ramanathan Chettiar reported in AIR 1958 SC
245.
2. Sheila Devi & Ors. Vs. Kishan Lal Kalra & Ors.
reported in 1974 ILR Delhi 491 (Full Bench).
3. Shakuntala Rani Vs. Rajesh Bhatt reported in 1999 (80) DLT page 98.
4. Commercial Aviation and Travel Company & Ors.
Vs. Vimla Pannalal reported in AIR 1988 SC 1636.
Ld. counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant no. 3 to 6 has on the other hand argued that the suit has not been properly valued since this is not a case where there is one single property owned by single defendant which is the subject matter of the suit but there are four properties owned by four sets of defendants and the plaintiff has sought the relief against all these properties and therefore, the plaintiff was required to value and pay the court fees on each set of property which is a distinct subject matter of the suit as provided under Section 17 of the Court Fees Act and as such it is a multifarious suit. It is also argued that the plaintiff for ulterior motives joined together the distinct set of subject matters and there is no unity of title amongst the defendants nor their alleged illegal acts are joint and therefore the suit is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. In support of their contentions they have placed their reliance on the following authorities:
1. In re, D. Lakshminarayana Chettiar reported in AIR 1954 MADRAS 594 (Full Bench).
2. Haru Bepari Vs. Kshitish Bhusan reported in AIR 1935 Calcutta 573.
3. Hare Krishna Das Vs. Sunamani Dei reported in AIR 1940 Patna 158.
It is alleged that the plaintiff is challenging the title of the defendants 3 to 9 and is, therefore, not only seeking the relief of cancellation but also the relief of injunction which are only consequential to the suit for declaration and not otherwise and cannot be granted to the plaintiff. It is submitted that in order to avoid the court fees the plaintiff has very cleverly sought the cancellation of sanctions accorded to the defendants for constructions of their building without seeking any declaration though in the title the suit is represented to be one for declaration as well which cannot be granted unless plaintiff seeks the declaration that the sanction granted is null and void. It is stated that till the time the sanction granted to the defendants is declared null and void no relief of injunction can be granted. It is submitted that the nature of the relief and the relief sought in the present suit is one for declaration with consequential relief of cancellation and injunctions for which the plaintiff ought to have valued the suit under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act as held in the case of Godha Vs. Emperor reported in AIR 1927 Lahore 500 (DB).
In so far as the defendants no. 7 and 8 are concerned it has been specifically argued that this court would have no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit for the relief sought by the plaintiff at serial no. (b) to (d) since the jurisdiction of this court is only to try all the suits which have jurisdictional value of more than Rs. 3 lacs upto Rs.20 lacs and in so far as this court is concerned it would have the jurisdiction to try the suit only in respect of the relief at serial no. (a). It is further pointed out that in the present suit four properties are involved and each one is owned by a separate person i.e. property no. 7B/1 is owned by defendant no. 3; property no. 7B/2 is owned by defendant no. 4 to 6; property no. 7C is owned by defendants no. 7 and 8 and the property no. 7B is owned by defendant no. 9. It is also argued that the plaintiff has sought the relief with regard to all these properties in the present suit and therefore the present suit is a multifarious suit and the court fees is required to be paid on each set of property being a distinct subject matter of the suit as provided under Section 17 of the Court Fees Act and there is no unity of title amongst the defendants nor their acts as alleged are joint.
According to the Ld. counsel for the defendant no. 9 the valuation given by the plaintiff is arbitrary illegal and unreasonable and this court has the power to examine the correctness of the valuation given by the plaintiff and to revise the same where the plaintiff manifestly and deliberately under estimates the relief and the same is found to be patently arbitrary or unreasonable. Ld. Counsel for the defendant no. 9 has argued that the suit of the plaintiff is covered by the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act and the plaintiff has purchased the suit property for a consideration of more than Rs. 2 Crores and therefore, is required to pay the advalorum court fees and this court will have no jurisdiction to try the present suit.
In so far as the Municipal Corporation of Delhi is concerned, they have also supported the case of the other defendants that the suit of the plaintiff is a multifarious suit in respect of different properties and therefore, the plaintiff is required to value the suit in respect of each of the property and there is no unity of title amongst the defendants nor their alleged acts are joint. According to the defendant MCD they have sanctioned the building plans in respect of the property no. 7B/1, Taimur Nagar, New Delhi vide file No. 03/URC/87 dated 23.6.1988 on the basis of the documents furnished by the owners. Further the building in respect of property no. 7B/2, Taimur Nagar was sanctioned vide file no. 4/URC/87 dated 22.7.1988 on the basis of the documents furnished by the owners and in respect of property no. 7C, Taimur Nagar the building plan was sanctioned vide file No. 36/B/CZ/2000 dated 30.5.2000 and subsequently it was transpired that the owners of the aforesaid property had got the sanction through misrepresentation of the fact by concealing the subdivision of plots and accordingly the Dy. Commissioner, MCD Central Zone issued the show cause notice to the owners the owners/ occupants in response to which the owners/ occupiers have submitted their reply and have also been given a detailed hearing. It was thereafter decided by the competent authority that the building plans have been sanctioned on the basis of the documents of the revenue department i.e. sale deed, mutation etc. which have been presumed to be correct and relied upon, unless proved otherwise by the competent revenue/ civil court and therefore, it was decided that it will not be legally justified to revoke the sanction of the building plan which had been duly sanctioned by the competent authority. In so far as the property no. 7B/3, Taimur Nagar is concerned it is submitted that the building plan was sanctioned vide file no. 4/URC/89 dated 30.6.1989 on the basis of the documents furnished by the owner after which it was transpired that the owner got the sanction through misrepresentation of facts which regard to subdivision of floor pursuant to which a show cause notice to the owner as to why the sanction should not have been revoked under Section 338 of the DMC Act but since the owner has failed to file any reply to the show cause notice, the competent authority issued the revocation order vide file no. 910/EE Bldg./CZ/2001/1160 dated 21.12.2001.
I have gone through the provisions of Section 17 of the Court Fees Act which enjoins that where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the plant or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memorandum of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act.
In so far as the aforesaid provisions of Court Fees Act, 1870 are concerned the distinct subjects must arise out of different cause of actions. In the present case the plaintiff before this court M/s. Maharani Bagh Residents Welfare Association through its President M.L. Mehra has approached this court in the present suit for permanent, prohibitory injunctions, cancellation and declaration. The reliefs sought are as under:
A) Pass a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction retraining the defendants no. 3 to 9 from carrying out any construction in or upon the suit land, i.e. land comprised in Khasra Nos. 809/1/1 and 809/1/2 in Revenue State Kilokri, Tehsil Hauz Khas (renumbered as Plots 7B/1, 7B/2, 7B/3, 7B and 7C); B) Pass a decree of injunction restraining the said defendants from opening any entrance on the rear of their plots which will result into an opening into the plaintiff company;
C) Pass a decree for cancellation of sanction accorded by the defendant no. 1 for construction of building on the said land;
D) Pass a decree of injunction restraining defendants 3 to 9 from in any manner transferring, alienating, parting with the possession or otherwise dealing with the suit property;
E) Pass a decree of injunction restraining the defendant no.
3 to 9 from in any manner using the suit land.
It is evident from the record that the case of the defendant that they are carrying the constructions as per the sanctions obtained by them. In this regard it is necessary to highlight that in so far as the sanctions are concerned the plans of the four properties had been sanctioned separately as under:
1. Property no. 7B/1, Taimur Nagar, New Delhi vide file no. 03/URC/87 dated 23.6.1988 on 23.6.1988;
2. Property no. 7B/2, Taimur Nagar, New Delhi vide file no. 04/URC/87 dated 22.7.1988;
3. Property no. 7B/3, Taimur Nagar, New Delhi vide file no. 4/URC/89 dated 30.6.1989;
4. Property no. 7C, Taimur Nagar, New Delhi vide file no. 36/B/CZ/2000 dated 30.5.2000.
All the aforesaid sanctions were accorded on the basis of the documents placed before the Municipal Corporation by the respective owners. It was observed later that the owners of the property had got the sanction through misrepresentation by concealment and accordingly show cause notices were issued to the owners/ occupiers. It is evident that in so far as the property no. 7B/1, 7B/2 and 7C are concerned, the occupiers had given their detailed replies and were also afforded a hearing on the basis of which it was decided by the competent authority that it would not be legally justified for them to revoke the sanction of the building plan which had been sanctioned by the competent authority. However, in so far as the property bearing no. 7 B/3, Taimur Nagar, New Delhi is concerned since the owner had failed to satisfy by filing a reply or failed to appear before the competent authority, the revocation order bearing no. 910/EE (B)/ Cent. Zone/2001/1160 dated 21.12.2001 was passed.
It is a settled law that the first rule to be observed in determining the court fee payable in any suit is to ascertain the nature of the suit with reference to the different provisions contained in different clauses to this section read with Schedule I or Schedule II. The second rule with regard to the determination of the category of a suit for computation of court fee is that the allegations and the prayers of the plaint are to be looked into and in this regard such allegations are to be assumed to be correct, the court' s decision on the question cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on merits. The third rule to be observed is that the court has to look beyond the mere form and verbiage of the plaint of the plaint and to arrive at what is the real substance of the claim. The fourth rule is that where on a suit in which advalorem fee is payable on the value of the subject matter in dispute and where there is no special way as to how such value is to be assessed, the basis of computation for the courtfee is the value given in the plaint and it should be taken to be the real value of the subject matter of the suit. The fifth rule is that where the plaintiff asks for unnecessary reliefs, so long as he asks for them, he should pay courtfee on them. The sixth rule is that in computing courtfee payable a general prayer in the plaint for such other relief as the court may grant is to be discarded.
It is evident that this court is required to determine the court fees at the first instance and not by the denial by the defendant in their written statement or by the allegations made nor on the defence set up by the defendants. Mere form and language of a plaint is not the final test but it is necessary for the court to find out what the real substance of the claim. Ordinarily this court would accept court fee paid in the first instance as correct, but if it transpires subsequently that the allegations on the basis of which the court fees was computed is not correct, then it is within the power of the court to demand such court fees. In interpreting the plaint, the court must look at the real nature of the suit in whatever language the plaint would have been couched and decide what exactly is the plaintiff asked for and on what basis. It is the duty of the court to examine the plaint carefully to see what in substance is the nature of the relief which the plaintiff require and to call upon them to pay courtfees accordingly. The mere fact that the plaintiff may have cast their prayer in a mould so as to avoid payment of court fees which under the law they are bound to pay, will not be of any avail if on an examination of the entire plaint it appears that the nature of the relief claimed by them is substantially different from the form which they appear to give it. The courts are required to construe the pleadings reasonably and not extravagantly and see the real substance of the relief asked for, taking away all the froth and foam, the exaggerations and contradictory claims. The allegations made in the plaint and the plaint must be read as a whole and in its substance, caution being observed to see that nothing is imported in it which it does not really contain either actually or by necessary implication.
I have gone through the pleadings in the plaint. It is evident from the bare reading of paragraph no. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 that the plaintiff is alleging deceit having been played by one Avtar Singh the predecessor in interest of the defendants upon the DDA for obtaining the sanction for construction of house on the land of his wife namely Smt. Jaswant Kaur. It is alleged that Avtar Singh had fraudulently by playing fraud and misleading the public authorities got released his own land from the acquisition proceedings. Further reliance has been placed on the last Will and Testament of Avtar Singh on the basis of which his sons Devender Singh and Kulwant Singh i.e. the defendant no. 3 and 4 are stated to have grabbed and are wrongly in use and occupation of 250 sq. yards of land not belonging to them but to the MCD and Delhi Administration and according to the plaintiff the said users are the land grabbers and usurpers of public land. In paragraphs no. 14 to 36 the plaintiff has alleged further fraud being perpetuated by Avtar Singh and his successor in interest i.e. the defendants no. 3 to 6 in sub division of the said piece of land which was separately mutated and awarded its Khasra numbers after which the sanction plan was obtained by Avtar Singh who also transferred the adjoining plot to his son Devender Singh. It is also alleged that Avtar Singh has expired in the year 1982 and in the year 1987 his legal heirs i.e. defendants no. 3 to 6 committed another fraud on the public authorities when they got recorded with the revenue authorities an entry vide Intkal No. 2970 seeking to divide the land comprised in Khasra No. 809/1/1 into 3 plots alleging that the total land comprised was 1050 sq. yards and it was divided into 3 plots of 350 sq. yards each which had been done practicing deceitfully and fraud by misleading the public authorities. Since the total land comprised in the said Khasra no. was 1008 sq. yards out of which 200 sq. yards stood vested in the MCD for road widening leaving only 808 sq. yards. it is alleged that no permission for subdivision had been applied and the said sub division was done only to avail of the benefits of smaller plots i.e. of a larger FAR and easy transferability only to overreach the Urban Land Ceiling Act and DMC Act. The plaintiff has further challenged the measurements given by the defendants no. 3 to 6/ sellers of the plot to S. Chand & Company i.e. the defendant no. 9 where in their sale deed they shown to have sold the plot measuring 733 sq. yards whereas it now transpired that as per the last entry of mutation they have only been given 708 sq. yards of land. The plot of S. Chand & Co. Ltd. is numbered by defendants no. 3 to 7 as 7B. It is further alleged that the land admeasuring 300 sq. yards adjoining the land sold to defendant no. 9 has been sold to the defendants no. 7 and 8 by registered sale deed and the said plot is numbered as 7C. It is also alleged that in the year 198889 the defendants no. 3 to 6 have wrongly and illegally got sanctioned the construction of building on the three plots each admeasuring 300 sq. yards which have been numbered as 7 B/1, 7B/2 and 7B/3. It is stated that since the said purchase the defendant no. 9 has got sanctioned a plan from the MCD for construction on their plot of land which they have not commenced pursuant to the sanction and are using the house constructed by Avtar Singh pursuant to sanction fraudulently obtained in the year 1968. It is further stated that the defendants have obtained the sanction by wrong representations to the municipal authorities and on the basis of the said false statements they have obtained the permission for entrance from the rear side of their plot which is from the plaintiff' s colony resulting into serious prejudice, injuries, damages and harms the rights and interest of the plaintiff. The plaintiff in this regard has placed its reliance on the resolution of the MCD dated 6.6.1989 deciding that the building activities of subdivided plots is to be allowed in unauthorized regular colonies only in cases where sub division was carried out prior to the cutoff date of 30.6.1977 in case of residential plots. According to the plaintiff the said subdivision carried out by the defendants no. 3 to 6 and their predecessor in interest is unauthorized and illegal and no sub division can be permissible and any order passed by the municipal corporation permitting any further division would not be applicable and is illegal and all the subsequent sanctions which have been obtained on the basis of the said illegal subdivision are required to be declared as null and void. It is alleged that the plans so sanctioned come in direct conflict with the zonal plan and development plan made for the area and in case if the entrance is permitted to any of the plots it shall seriously violate, breach and contravene the scheme besides prejudicing the rights of the plaintiffs colony and therefore the defendants no. 3 to 6 have flagrantly violated the sanctions obtained by them, cannot be allowed to misuse their properties and encroach upon the public land. Therefore, the plaintiff have claimed the relief of permanent and prohibitory injunction, seeking to restrain the defendants no. 3 to 9 from carrying out any construction on the land and the decree of injunction restraining the defendants from opening any entrance on the rear side of their plots.
Having so examined the pleadings of the plaintiff as aforesaid, it is evident that the main grievance of the plaintiff is firstly with regard to the alleged fraud played by Avtar Singh upon the DDA in respect of the land measuring 1008 sq. yards comprised in Khasra no. 809 in village Kilokri from the erstwhile owner Pandit Indraj vide sale deed dated 17.6.1958 which was mutated in the revenue records vide mutation no. 1789 dated 3.8.1960 and was appointed Khasra no. 809/1/1. Secondly with regard to the said Avtar Singh obtaining sanction for construction in the land belonging to his wife Smt. Jaswant Kaur pursuant to which he raised the construction. Thirdly Avtar Singh having made representations to the public authorities of having transferred to his son Devender Singh a total of 568 sq. yards out of which 275 sq. yards was out of the land earlier belonging to his wife Jaswant Kaur which was left open after building the said house and the remaining 193 sq. yards was out of Avtar s own land. Fourthly with regard to the lat Will and Singh' Testament of Avtar Singh set up by his sons Devender Singh and Kulwant Singh filed before the MCD showing that Avtar Singh had sought to bequeath not only what he held but also 200 sq. yards which had vested in the Corporation for road widening and an additional 50 sq. yards which he had encroached and grabbed from the public authorities showing that the defendant no. 3 to 9 have grabbed and wrongly in use and occupation of 250 sq. yards not belonging to them. Fifthly with regard to the fraudulent scheme allegedly perpetuated by Avtar Singh and his successor in interest in the manner of subdivision of the land and their mutations. Sixthly with regard to the recording of the revenue entries vide Intkal no. 2970 in respect of the land comprised in Khasra no. 809/1/1 of all the three plots. Seventhly with regard to the wrong and illegal subdivision of three plots of 350 sq. yards each for which no permission was obtained from the MCD which according to the plaintiff was done to over reach the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the DMC Act. Lastly with regard to the sanction plans so obtained by the defendants from the municipal corporation allowing them to make constructions of the building over the said land and from opening the entrance from the rear side only to financially gain from the subdivision to command a higher price which plant were sanctioned and came into direct conflict with the Zonal Plan and Development Plan made for the area.
Admittedly four plans have been sanctioned in respect of the entire property allegedly in dispute before this court of which the sanction plan in respect of the property bearing no. 7B/3 has already been revoked by the MCD. The plans have been sanctioned in respect of different properties on different point of time on the basis of different documents and the competent authority has heard the owners of the said properties and has refused to revoke the same by way of different sent of orders. Therefore, there is neither any unity of title amongst the defendants nor their acts are joint. On the one hand the plaintiff is placing their reliance on the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (c) of Court Fees Act and Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act whereas on the other hand the defendants are placing their reliance on the provisions of Section 17 of the Suit Valuation Act. I find merit in the objection raised by the defendants. The suit of the plaintiff has been very cleverly couched in a language to avoid the payment of court fees. The final test is to ascertain what is the real substance of the claim and it has been observed that the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff is substantially different from the form in which it appears to give it. In fact the plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief of injunction unless a declaration with regard to the nullity of the various acts and transactions of Avtar Singh and his successor in interest is granted. The present suit is in fact a suit of the nature of declaration with a consequential relief of cancellation and injunction in respect of all four set of properties for which three different plans had been sanctioned independently at various point of time. In the prayer clause C the relief sought by the plaintiff for cancellation of sanction for construction of the building on the suit land, cannot be granted since the suit land is not one land but has already been subdivided and separately mutated by the MCD into 4 different plots for which sanction had been accorded at different point of time and therefore, declaration with regard to each sanction for a separate plot would form a distinct and separate subject of claim on which a separate amount of court fees is required to be paid.
The plaintiff is seeking to challenge the separate set of transactions as enumerated herein above for which a separate relief of declaration is required to be sought in accordance with law for which separate court fees is required to be affixed. The relief of injunction which is a consequential relief cannot be granted till all such transactions are declared null and void. That, however, would be a different issue as to whether the plaintiff can now after so many years challenge the said transactions as per the law of limitation and it shall be open for the parties to agitate this issue at appropriate stage.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shamsher Singh vs. Rajinder Prashad & Ors. reported in AIR 1973 SC 2384 (DB) has observed that:
" .......the question whether the relief of injunction prayed for should be considered as a consequential relief to the main relief or not has to be decided on the basis of the allegations and prayers contained in the plaint. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to impede the court from looking at the substance of the relief asked for. In a case where there is no controversy from an intelligent reading of the plaint, the court is not required to go further and the relief of injunction can be granted but if from the written statement or the documents placed on record it is evident that the plaintiff has made a narration which is not factually correct then under these circumstances injunction would become a consequential relief and it would be necessary for the plaintiff to first seek a declaration...."
In the present case the provisions which are attracted are of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act and as per the provisions of Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act and the relief for the purposes of valuation of the suit must also correspond to the valuation for the purposes of the jurisdiction. In so far as the provisions of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act is concerned, if it is necessary to seek a declaration before being entitled to consequential relief which in the present case is of injunction, the valuation would be difference to those cases where only injunction simplicitor is prayed for. It has been held by own own High Court in the case of Mahant Purushottam Dass and Ors. Vs. Har Narain & Ors. reported in AIR 1973 SC 2384 following the judgment of the Hon' ble Apex Court in the case of Shamsher Singh Vs. Rajinder Prashad & Ors. (Supra), held that where the relief of injunction prayed for by the plaintiff should be considered as a consequential to the main relief or not has to be decided on the basis of allegations and the prayers contained in the plaint and mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to impede the court from looking at the substance of the relief asked for. The present suit in fact being a suit for declaration with a consequential relief of injunction advalorem court fees is required to be affixed and since in the present case the plaintiff has in fact seeking a number of declaration which he has cleverly avoided to mention in his prayer clauses, he would be required to affix the court fees on each declaration so sought without which the consequential relief of injunction cannot be granted.
Therefore, under these circumstances, I hereby decide this issue against the plaintiff and hold that the plaintiff is required to separately and specifically mention the reliefs of declarations which they are seeking and also the consequential reliefs in respect of the various properties and to value the suit accordingly. The plaintiff shall thereafter affix the court fees on such reliefs. In the interest of justice the interim order is continued till the next date of hearing. Case is hereby listed for 5.10.2009.
Announced in the open court (Dr. KAMINI LAU)
Dated: 17.8.2009 Addl. District Judge: Delhi
M/s. Maharani Bagh Residents Vs. MCD
Suit No. 122/08
17.8.2009
Present: Sh. Noor Alam advocate for the plaintiff.
Sh. Prakash Chander advocate for defendants no. 3 to 6.
None for other defendants.
Vide my separate detailed order dictated and announced in the open court but not yet typed, I hereby decide the preliminary issue regarding valuation against the plaintiff and hold that the plaintiff is required to separately and specifically mention the reliefs of declarations which they are seeking and also the consequential reliefs in respect of the various properties and to value the suit accordingly. The plaintiff shall thereafter affix the court fees on such reliefs. In the interest of justice the interim order is continued till the next date of hearing. Case is hereby listed for 5.10.2009.
(Dr. Kamini Lau) ADJ: DELHI/ 17.8.2009