Madras High Court
G.V. Srinivasan Chettiar Trust Rep. By ... vs The Inspector General Of Registration ... on 1 November, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2004(5)CTC624
Author: V. Kanagaraj
Bench: V. Kanagaraj
JUDGMENT V. Kanagaraj, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 26.6.2001, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in W.P. No. 16767 of 1994, dismissing the petition filed for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records of the first respondent to refer to the High Court to decide the matter under Section 57 of the Indian Stamp Act for adjudication of the question of law pertaining to the interpretation of the document dated 7.10.1991 presented by the respondents before the Joint-Registrar-II, Karur whether the said document is a declaration of Trust amounting to settlement or it is only a document making a declaration of pre-existing Trust and not transferring the ownership of any specific property or creating a Trust executing a deed in favour of the trustees.
2. Creating a Trust viz., Thiru G.V. Srinivasan Chettiar Trust by a registered Will dated 5.12.1990 executed by the said G.V. Srinivasan Chettiar, who died on 5.1.1991, the petitioners, who are the trustees, have applied for the registration of the by-laws to the second respondent who, by an order dated 11.12.1992, informed the petitioners that the said document was invalid since the document was a Settlement Deed ( Vw;ghL) and further directed the petitioners/appellants herein to appear before him for explaining the same. They preferred an appeal to the first respondent under Section 56(1) of the Indian Stamp Act, which had also been rejected by an Order dated 29.3.1993 and therefore, the petitioners had applied to the first respondent under Section 57 of the Indian Stamp Act for a direction to refer the matter to the High Court since the interpretation of the document would amount to a question of law and this request was also rejected by the first respondent as per his Order dated 27.1.1994 against which, the writ petition has been filed.
3. Before the learned single Judge, it would be contended by the petitioner therein that under Section 57 of the Indian Stamp Act a reference has to be made to the High Court since the interpretation of the first respondent over the documents produced involves a question of law and it is mandatory on the part of the respondents to refer the matter to the High Court and that the reason adduced for rejecting the said request is not acceptable since the document produced for registration was only a By-law and not a Trust and there was no settlement of any property belonging to G.V. Srinivasan Chettiar in favour of the said Trust under the document and hence the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent argued that late G.V. Srinivasan Chettiar has only expressed his interest to create a Trust in his name by the said Will and had not created the Trust at all by the recitals of the document.
4. Learned Single Judge, observing that, while interpreting the deed, the Court is expected to have a harmonious construction of a document without giving any interpretation of such contents and that in a case of Will, a plain reading of the contents of the Will would show that there was only an intention on the part of G.V. Srinivasan Chettiar to create a Trust and the properties bequeathed under the Will to be transferred in favour of the Trust, which would be created after his demise thereby meaning that he had not transferred the properties in favour of the Trust on the date when he executed the Will; that the petitioners in fact have transferred the immovable properties belonging to the said G.V. Srinivasan Chettiar in favour of the Trust and therefore, the respondents have directed the petitioners to pay the difference in stamp duty to the Government construing the document as a settlement deed; that the interpretation given to the document, even in view of the learned single Judge, is based on the contents of the Will and relying on the same, the first respondent refused to refer the matter to the High Court under Section 57 of the Indian Stamp Act; that such an interpretation of the document cannot be considered as any question of law involved in the matter calling for an interference from the High Court and hence dismissed the writ petition.
5. Today when the above writ appeal was taken up for consideration in the presence of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and the Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, on the part of the learned counsel for the appellants he would not only lay emphasis on those grounds which have been brought forth in the grounds of writ appeal, but also would cite the following decisions respectively reported in BANARASU DASS AHLUWALIA - V. - THE CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY, DELLHI & SHRI DIGAMBAR JAIN AND ORS. - V. - SUB REGISTRAR, STAMPS, INDORE .
6. Sofar as the first decision cited above is concerned, the learned counsel would cite the operative portion of the judgment, which is pertaining to Section 57 of the Indian Stamp Act, is as follows:-
"Section 57 affords a remedy to the citizen to have his case referred to the High Court against an order of a revenue authority imposing stamp duty and/or penalty provided the application involves a substantial question of law and imposes a corresponding obligation on the authority to refer it to the High Court for its opinion. Such a right and obligation cannot be construed to depend upon any subsidiary circumstances such as the pendency of the case before the Authority. As soon as a reference is made and the High Court pronounces its judgment the decision of the Authority is at large and the Authority, as required by Section 59(2) would have to dispose of the case in conformity with such judgment".
7. So far as the question concerned with Section 57 of the Indian Stamp Act for adjudication of the question of law pertaining to the interpretation of the document dated 7.10.1991 presented before the respondent/ Joint Registrar-II, Karur, the learned Single Judge has elaborately dealt with the subject in his order remarking thereby that such an interpretation of the document cannot be considered as any question of law involved in this matter calling for any reference to the High Court under Section 57 of the Indian Stamp Act and in view of the learned Single Judge, the interpretation given to the document is based on the contents of the Will and the same was relied upon by the first respondent for the purpose of refusing the request of the petitioners therein for reference to the High Court under Section 57 of Indian Stamp Act and therefore, we find no merit in the said contention raised on the part of the appellants/writ petitioners therein. We find the reasons assigned on the part of the learned Single Judge is appropriate and therefore, so far as this question is concerned no interference need be necessary into the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court adhering to the facts of this case.
7. In the second judgment cited above, the learned counsel for the appellants would point out the relevant portion which is as follows:-
" The cardinal rule of construction is that a document must be read as a whole each clause being read in relation to the other parts of the document, and an attempt should be made to arrive at an interpretation which will harmonise and give effect to the other clauses thereof. It is not legitimate to pick out an expression torn from its context and try to interpret the document as a whole in the light of that expression. Such a forced construction on the document in question cannot but defeat the very object which its executants had in view.
It is the duty of the court to give the expression its true meaning. It is competent for a Court to disregard the literal meaning of the words used in a document and to give to them their real meaning if they are sufficiently flexible to bear that interpretation".
8. So far as this point is concerned, the subject matter that was dealt with by the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the above said judgment is that the document therein has declared the existence of the trust coupled with transfer of its management and therefore, the same does not fall within the definition of the term "conveyance" and hence, held that the stamp duty leviable thereon would be leviable under Article 47-A and not under Article 17.
9. The fact situation insofar as the case in hand is concerned, is entirely different and the learned single Judge would offer tangible reasons to the effect that the contents of the Will goes to show that there was only an intention on the part of G.V. Srinivasan Chettiar to create the trust and his property bequeathed under the Will to be transferred in favour of the trust, which would be created after his demise, thereby meaning that he had not transferred the property in favour of the trust on the date when he executed the Will and therefore, by the document adduced by the petitioners on 7.10.1991, the petitioners therein/appellants in fact transferred the immovable properties belonging to the said G.V. Srinivasan Chettiar in favour of the Trust and therefore, only the respondents have directed the petitioners to pay the difference in stamp duty to the Government construing the document as a settlement deed and would thereby agree with the directions of the respondents and therefore, since the fact situation is entirely different from that of the case that has been dealt with by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, cited supra cannot be applied to the case in hand and it has to be dealt with on different platforms. Hence, both the above contentions raised on the part of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants having failed, in spite of two judgments cited in support of each contentions and therefore, this Court does not find it necessary to cause interference into the well considered and merited order passed by a learned single Judge of this Court which is also the considered view of this Court and hence, the following judgment.
In result,
(i) The above writ appeal does not merit acceptance but only becomes liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.
(ii) No costs.