Kunhimangalam Devaswam vs State Of Kerala on 6 April, 2022

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Kerala High Court

Kunhimangalam Devaswam vs State Of Kerala on 6 April, 2022

The petitioner, Chirakkal Kovilakom Devaswoms, represented by its Executive Officer, approached this Court with this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking to issue a writ of mandamus or such other appropriate order or direction directing the 4 th respondent to pay compensation for the land acquired as per Exts.P3 and P4 notifications, belonging to the petitioner, within a time frame fixed by this Court.

2. Ext.P3 notification under Section 3-D of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act'), was issued on 17.12.2013 by the 7th respondent declaring that the properties scheduled therein vested with the Government on acquisition for building, maintenance, management and operation of National Highway No.17. Ext.P4 is a subsequent notification issued under Section 3D of the Act declaring that certain additional items of properties, which are scheduled therein, vested with the Government on such acquisition. The 4 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 petitioner would contend that the property having an extent of 2216 sq.m. comprised in old Sy.No.218/1 (new Sy.No.218/5), acquired as per Ext.P4 notification belongs to the petitioner- Devaswom. In Ext.P4 this property was shown as 'nallathu puramboke' and its type as 'private land'. Although that property was declared to have vested with the Government and the compensation was determined as provided in Section 3G of the Act, instead of paying the compensation amount to the petitioner, its owner, the 4 th respondent has been taking steps to make payment of compensation to the State of Kerala. Immediately on getting information regarding Ext.P4 notification, the petitioner submitted Ext.P5 representation before the 2nd respondent District Collector, Kannur, requesting to carry out necessary correction the entry 'nallathu puramboke' in the revenue records, thereby to show that the said property belongs to the petitioner-Devaswom. Ext.P2 is a copy of the settlement register pertaining to the said property, which would show that the same belongs to the petitioner. Despite the earnest attempt of the petitioner to get 5 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 the mistake in the revenue records corrected and make payment of the compensation to the petitioner, the 2 nd respondent or the 7th respondent did not oblige, which necessitated filing of this Writ Petition.

3. The 6th respondent filed a counter affidavit on his behalf and on behalf of respondents 4, 5 and 7. He would contend that for the development of NH-17 (new National Highway No.66), properties were acquired on the stretch of land from KM.104.000 to KM-148.000 in Kannur District. As early as on 02.01.2013, notification under Section 3A of the Act was issued. The properties proposed to be acquired include land in Sy.No.218/1 of Cheruthazham Village as well. No objection or claim was submitted with respect to the said property before the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (for short 'CALA'), and accordingly, the notification under Section 3-D of the Act was issued on 17.12.2013. Necessary publications in the vernacular newspapers were also made. On 07.02.2014, notice under Section 3-G(3) of the Act was also published. Subsequently, on 14.07.2016, intention to acquire 6 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 more land for the same purpose, under Section 3-A of the Act was issued. One of the properties included in that notification was in Sy.No.218/1 (new Sy.No.218/5) of Cheruthazham Village. The said land was shown as 'private garden land'. Since the revenue records showed it as 'nallathu puramboke', no notice could be given to any individual. By efflux of time, even if the petitioner had title to the property, it is lost. Now, the petitioner claims title to the said property and such a claim cannot be agitated in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As per Exts.P3 and P4 notifications, no property belonging to the petitioner has been acquired. There has not been any record to show that property having an area of 2216 sq.m. comprised in Sy.No.218/1 (new Sy.No.218/5) belongs to the petitioner. No claim whatsoever has been made by the petitioner within the time stipulated as per the provisions in the Act. The claim of the petitioner is not based on any materials, but based on surmises and conjectures. At any rate, the petitioner does not have title to the said property. Their claim of title can be 7 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 decided only by a civil court in a duly instituted proceedings. The claim now put forward by the petitioner for a direction to pay the compensation for the said land is without any basis. Accordingly, this respondent sought to dismiss the Writ Petition.

4. The 3rd respondent also filed a counter affidavit. The property over which the petitioner now raises claim has been lying as 'puramboke' for years together. That is why it has been shown in the settlement deed as 'nallathu puramboke'. No one has claimed possession over the said property. No tax for the same has been paid for years together. In these circumstances, the petitioner cannot claim title to the said property, and therefore, it is not eligible to get compensation. Exts.P3 and P4 notifications were issued and the matter has been sufficiently publicised. But the petitioner did not make any claim for compensation whereby its right has been forfeited. The petitioner does not have any document to prove its title. Unless the title is proved, it cannot claim any compensation.

W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019

5. The petitioner filed reply affidavits to the counter affidavits filed by respondent Nos.3 and 7.

6. As per I.A.No.1 of 2021, the petitioner has produced Exts.P6 and P7 documents, which were received on file.

7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned Government Pleader for respondents 1, 2 and 8, the learned Standing Counsel of the Malabar Devaswom for the 9th respondent and the learned Standing Counsel for National Highway Authority of India for respondents 3 to 7.

8. Ext.P3 is a notification issued under Section 3-D of the Act on 17.12.2013. Though properties comprised in Sy.No.218/1 (new Sy.No.218/5) was acquired as per Ext.P3, no claim with respect to that property has been raised by the petitioner. Ext.P4 is a notification under Section 3-D of the Act declaring vesting of various items of properties with the Central Government on acquisition for the purpose of building (widening/four-lining, etc.), maintenance, management and 9 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 operation of NH-17. Ext.P4 was published on 12.07.2017. One of the properties acquired as per Ext.P4 is 2216 sq.m. of land comprised in Sy.No.218/1 (new Sy.No.218/5) of Cheruthazham Village. It is described as private land. The nature of the property is shown as garden. In the column intended to mention the name of the person interested, it has been shown as 'nallathu puramboke'.

9. The contention of the petitioner is that the revenue authorities mistakenly described this property in the revenue records as 'nallathu puramboke' and for that reason alone the petitioner's title to the property would not lose. The petitioner, relying on Ext.P2, claims that the property belongs to the petitioner-Devaswom and at no point of time, the title has been divested from the Devaswom. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that this property is owned and possessed by the petitioner from time immemorial, and therefore, there is no document of title other than the revenue records. When Ext.P2 settlement register shows that the petitioner is the owner of the property, no 10 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 more document is required to prove its title, particularly, when nobody else has staked a claim over the property. In this regard, the learned counsel placed reliance in Vallikunnil Janaki Amma and others v. Sree Amruthamangalam Kshethram Moorthi, Kozhikode and another [2014 (1) KHC 57]. This Court after referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur [AIR 1951 SC 288], particularly the observation, "This brief review of evidence is sufficient to show that appellant has not been able by clear and conclusive evidence to rebut the presumption arising from the Record of rights and the record of Permanent Settlement and he has failed to establish his claim", held as follows:

"Even though Ext. A2 is only an extract of the Settlement Register/Adangal extract which may not by itself prove or confer title to a party in whose name the property stood registered, it can be accepted as evidence of title when there is no contra evidence. Admittedly it is adjacent to Amruthamangalam temple. The temple compound and this suit property which is adjacent to the temple are shown to be of Amruthamangalam Devaswom as 11 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 per revenue record. In these circumstances, the contention that this property did not and does not belong to the temple/Devaswom cannot be sustained at all."

10. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, placing reliance in Section 94 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 to submit that a property belonging to the Devaswom cannot be deemed to be vested in any person by virtue of the provisions of any law of limitation. The learned Standing Counsel for the Malabar Devaswom Board appearing for respondent No.9 would also submit that Section 94 of the said Act insulates the properties of religious institutions from being vested in any person by operation of the law of limitation. Section 94 reads thus,-

"94. Property of religious institutions not to vest under the Law of Limitation after Commencement of this Act.- Nothing contained in any law of limitation for the time being in force shall be deemed to vest in any person the property or funds of any religious institution which had not vested in such person or his predecessor-in-title before the commencement of this Act."

12 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019

11. Whether the said provision applies to the property in question is a matter to be considered at the time when the claim of the petitioner to get compensation for the said property is adjudicated upon. That is a disputed question of fact to be decided by the appropriate forum in a duly instituted proceedings. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, such a disputed question of fact does not arise for consideration. That apart, in the nature of the contentions of the parties and the reliefs claimed, a final decision on that question seldom arises.

12. The claim of the petitioner is that it is the owner of the said property, and therefore, on its acquisition, compensation should have been paid to it. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that as soon as the petitioner got information regarding the acquisition proceedings, it had submitted Ext.P5 representation before the District Collector. Of course, it was for carrying out necessary correction in the revenue records, so as to enable the petitioner to lay its claim for getting compensation before 13 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 the Competent Authority under the National Highway Authority of India and, in such circumstances, the claim now raised by the petitioner is certainly sustainable and a direction is liable to be issued to the respondent Nos 3 to 7 to pay compensation to the petitioner.

13. The respondents, both the Government of Kerala and the National Highway Authority of India, would contend that the procedure provided for in the Act is a self contained code and any claim for compensation in respect of the land acquired for the purpose of building, maintenance, management and operation of a national Highway can be made only as per the said provisions and within the time so prescribed. Since the petitioner did not make any claim within time, it has no right to get compensation. Moreover, it is contended that the nature of the claim now raised by the petitioner is one of title and its right to establish such a claim is as provided in Section 3-H of the Act and not a writ petition invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019

14. The learned Standing Counsel for the National Highway Authority of India further would submit that the delay and laches on the part of the petitioner to make the claim are so inordinate and not condonable and hence this writ petition is liable only to be dismissed. Another reason stated by the learned Standing Counsel for its non- maintainability is that alternative effective remedy for claiming compensation is provided under the provisions of the Act.

15. Ext. P1 is the scheme for the administration of the petitioner, Chirakkal Kovilakom Devaswoms. It shows that its Executive Officer is responsible for the day to day administration of the Temple. Naturally, the Executive Officer is therefore bound to protect the properties of Chirakkal Kovilakom Devaswoms with utmost care and in the best interest of the deity, a perpetual minor.

16. In A.A.Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board [(2007) 7 SCC 482] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the properties of deities, temples and 15 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 Devaswom Boards are required to be protected and safeguarded by their trustees/archakas/shebaits/employees. Instances are many where persons entrusted with the duty of managing and safeguarding the properties of temples, deities and Devaswom Boards have usurped and misappropriated such properties by setting up false claims of ownership or tenancy, or adverse possession. This is possible only with the passive or active collusion of the authorities concerned. Such acts of 'fences eating the crops' should be dealt with sternly. The Government, members or trustees of boards/trusts, and devotees should be vigilant to prevent any such usurpation or encroachment. It is also the duty of courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation.

17. In Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair [2013 (3) KLT 132] a Division Bench of this Court noticed that in A.A. Gopalakrishnan [(2007) 7 SCC 482] the Apex Court emphasised that it is the duty of the courts to protect and safeguard the interest and properties of the 16 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 religious and charitable institutions. The relevant principles under the Hindu law will show that the Deity is always treated similar to that of a minor and there are some points of similarity between a minor and a Hindu idol. The High Court therefore is the guardian of the Deity and apart from the jurisdiction under Section 103 of the Land Reforms Act, 1957 viz. the powers of revision, the High Court is having inherent jurisdiction and the doctrine of parents patriae will also apply in exercising the jurisdiction. Therefore, when a complaint has been raised by the Temple Advisory Committee, which was formed by the devotees of the Temple, about the loss of properties of the Temple itself, the truth of the same can be gone into by the High Court in these proceedings.

18. In Mrinalini Padhi v. Union of India [2018 SCC OnLine SC 667] - order dated 05.07.2018 in W.P.(C) No.649 of 2018 - the Apex Court noticed that the issue of difficulties faced by the visitors, exploitative practices, deficiencies in the management, maintenance of hygiene, proper utilisation of offerings and protection of assets may require consideration 17 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 with regard to all Shrines throughout the India, irrespective of religion practiced in such shrines.

19. In the light of the principles laid down above, the petitioner, who has the obligation as that of a trustee of the Devaswom, should have taken care of protecting the interest of the Devaswom by staking claim to get compensation for the property in dispute within the time prescribed for it. Not only that the property has been lying as abandoned, but also the petitioner was not diligent to take appropriate steps on time to ensure that the petitioner is paid with the compensation for the land, despite the notifications and publications of the matter in the news papers regarding acquisition of 2216 sq.m. of land which is claimed to be in the ownership of the petitioner. To that extent, there was negligence on the part of the petitioner. But, for that reason alone, a finding that the right of the Devaswom to claim compensation is lost altogether cannot be recorded.

20. Ext.P6 is a request submitted by the petitioner before CALA on 01.06.2018 claiming compensation for the 18 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 said property. Ext.P4 notification was issued on 12.07.2017. It is not stated by respondent No.6 in its counter affidavit, when CALA had issued notice under Section 3-G(3) of the Act with reference to Ext.P4 notification. No other party also has stated about the date of such notification.

21. Going by the provisions in sub-section (1) of Section 3-C of the Act, if any landowner has an objection, it should be submitted within 21 days from the date of publication of the notification under Section 3-A of the Act. The competent authority has to publish its declaration of acquisition as provided under Section 3-D of the Act, once a decision on objections, if any, is taken. The competent authority is expected thereafter to quantify the compensation following the procedure provided in Section 3-G of the Act. Section 3-G(3) of the Act mandates that before proceeding to determine the amount of compensation, the competent authority shall give a public notice published in two local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be 19 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 acquired. Section 3-G(4) of the Act stipulates that such notice shall state the particulars of the land and shall require all persons interested in such land to appear in person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner before the competent authority, at a time and place, and to state the nature of their respective interest in such land. In the light of the procedure laid down by the said provisions of law, the case of the petitioner has to be appreciated.

22. Respondent No.6 does not state in his counter affidavit as to the time and place so fixed. Therefore, it is not known within which time the petitioner ought to have submitted its claim in respect of the property in question. It is true that on making Ext.P4 notification and publication of the details of the acquisition in local newspapers, the petitioner did not come forward and make its claim. But only when a notice under section 3-G(3) of the Act is published, a land owner is expected to place its claim for compensation before the CALA. It is seen that the petitioner submitted Ext.P6 representation claiming compensation before the CALA only 20 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 on 01.06.2018. The contesting respondents would maintain that Ext.P6 was submitted belatedly and therefore the right of the petitioner to claim compensation was foreclosed. Ext.P5 being a representation to the Collector and the prayer was to correct the revenue records only, the same cannot be reckoned as a claim under Section 3-G(4) of the Act either.

23. Of course, if there occurred inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner to stake claim for compensation, the CALA is not obliged to consider such claim as provided in Section 3H of the Act. In Shankara Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v. M.Prabhakar and others [(2011) 5 SCC 607], the Apex Court observed regarding the laches and delay, and its consequence thus:

"It is now well settled that the power of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. Inordinate and unexplained delay in approaching the court in a writ is indeed an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioners therein. The unexplained delay on the part 21 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 of the petitioner in approaching the High Court for redressal of their grievances under Art.226 of the Constitution was sufficient to justify rejection of the petition. The other factor the High Court should have taken into consideration that during the period of delay, interest has accrued in favour of the third party and the condonatoin of unexplained delay would affect the rights of third parties."

24. Here is a case where there is an alleged long delay on the part of the petitioner. But the circumstances in which such delay and lapse occurred has to be looked into in order to have a just decision in the case. Ext.P4 contains the description as 'nallathu puramboke', instead of mentioning the ownership of the property. It is very pertinent to note that the property is shown as 'private', 'garden' land. The terminology 'nallathu puramboke' is not a common terminology to describe a Government land. Government land is ordinarily described as 'puramboke'. The term 'nallathu puramboke' may mean that the land, as on date, is lying as 'puramboke'. Even on taking that such a description would qualify the property to be belonging to the Government, the competent authority could not have stopped there, for the property in question was 22 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 described as 'private land'. In such a situation, it was necessary for the CALA to have an enquiry to ascertain to which private person the property belonged to. It was a requirement and mandate of Section 3-E of the Act that the CALA, before taking possession of the acquired property, to give notice in writing direct the owner as well as any other person who may be in possession of such land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the Government. In order for giving notice directly, details of the owner or the person in possession were required. It was therefore necessary for the competent authority to enquire about the owner of the land in question. Had Ext.P2 been perused, the CALA could have known that it was settled in the name of the petitioner. In Ext.P4 name of all land owners are given, whereas in respect of the property in question the column carries the description 'nallathu puramboke', instead of mentioning the owner's name. At the same time, it is shown as a 'private' land. Even in spite of such telling circumstances, the CALA proceeded without ascertaining as to whom the property really belonged to. 23 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019

25. Now, the question is whether this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain the claim of the petitioner. The learned counsel appearing for respondents 3 to 7 would contend that since alternative efficacious remedy was available under the Act itself, this Writ Petition cannot be entertained. In this regard the learned counsel placed reliance in Thansingh Nathmal and others v. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and others [AIR 1964 SC 1419] and a few subsequent decisions of the Apex Court rendered by benches of lesser strength. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Thansingh Nathmal (supra) held that,-

"The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative 24 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy which, without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up."

26. No doubt, the petitioner would have moved the competent authority under Section 3C of the Act and stake a claim for compensation under Section 3G(4) of the Act. We 25 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 have pointed out the circumstances which failed the petitioner to stake such a claim in time. The reasons pointed out above certainly would justify that the petitioner in the ordinary course would not have been able to notice the publication regarding acquisition. Name of the owner was not there in the gazette publication. in it and place its claim before the CALA. We are not forgetting the act that being the trustee of the Deity of Chirakkal Kovilakom Devaswom, the petitioner would have been more vigilant and on the basis of the survey number in the notification itself it should have got informed and taken timely action in the matter.

27. In Kamini Kumar Das Choudhury v. State of West Bengal and others [(1972) 2 SCC 420], the Apex Court held,-

"If this is the position with regard to the petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, we do not think that the rule that delay defeats the rights of a party to seek redress, by means of prerogative Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, could be held to be abrogated merely because, if the claim had been brought in a Civil Court, the period of limitation would not have expired.

26 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019

The question in such cases is always whether relief under Article 226 of the Constitution could more justly and properly be given than by leaving the parties to the ordinary remedy of a suit. A case in which a tax is imposed under a clearly void law is different from one where seriously contested questions of fact have to be decided before an order of dismissal could be held to be void. In the case before us, the most that the High Court could have done was to quash the order of dismissal and to leave the authorities free to take proceedings afresh against the appellant. The appellant would then have got another long period of years in front of him to go on contesting the validity of proceedings against him until he had gone past the age of retirement. In such cases, it is imperative, if the petitioner wants to invoke the extraordinary remedies available under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come to Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. If there is delay in getting an adjudication, a suit for damages actually sustained by wrongful dismissal may become the more or even the only appropriate means of redress. Every case depends upon its own facts."

28. Here the situation is that if the petitioner puts Ext.P6 before the competent authority in time, it should have been obligated to resort to the procedure provided for in 27 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 Section 3H of the Act. Section 3H reads,-

"3H. Deposit and payment of amount.-- (1) The amount determined under section 3G shall be deposited by the Central Government in such manner as may be laid down by rules made in this behalf by that Government, with the competent authority before taking possession of the land.

(2) As soon as may be after the amount has been deposited under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall on behalf of the Central Government pay the amount to the person or persons entitled thereto.

(3) Where several persons claim to be interested in the amount deposited under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the persons who in its opinion are entitled to receive the amount payable to each of them.

(4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated.

(5) Where the amount determined under section 3G by the arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the competent authority, the arbitrator 28 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 may award interest at nine per cent. per annum on such excess amount from the date of taking possession under section 3D till the date of the actual deposit thereof.

(6) Where the amount determined by the arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the competent authority, the excess amount together with interest, if any, awarded under sub-section (5) shall be deposited by the Central Government in such manner as may be laid down by rules made in this behalf by that Government, with the competent authority and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (4) shall apply to such deposit."

29. Once rival claims are received, the competent authority should look into it as provided in sub-section (3) of Section 3H and find out who the person really entitled to get the compensation. If the question relates to the title and the competent authority is unable on the basis of the materials before it to decide the entitlement to get compensation, the only option for him is to refer the parties under sub-section (4) of Section 3-H of the Act to the Principal Civil Court of civil jurisdiction after following the procedure for deposit as in Rule 4 in the National Highways (Manner of depositing the amount 29 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 by the Central Government; Making requisite funds available to the competent authority for acquisition of land) Rules, 2019.

30. We have pointed out above that the CALA did not discharge its duties invested upon it as per the provisions of Sections 3-D, 3-E and 3-G(3) of the Act, inasmuch as the notifications, did not disclose the details of the owner of the property in question. On account of the incongruity in the facts given in Ext.P4 regarding ownership of the property in question, the petitioner was denied an opportunity to stake its claim for compensation in time. When such inaction contributed to the result of denying opportunity for the petitioner to stake its claim for the compensation with respect to the land in dispute, this Court is bound to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to remedy such a travesty of justice in the light of the principles laid down in Kamini Kumar Das Choudhury (supra).

31. Therefore, we are of the view that there shall be a 30 W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019 direction in the nature of a writ of mandamus to respondent Nos.4 to 7 to treat Ext.P6 as a claim raised under Section 3G(4) of the Act in time and, to take action under Section 3H of the Act. Needless to say, the Competent Authority shall determine as provided in Section 3-H(3) of the Act, who in its opinion is entitled to receive the amount of compensation payable for 2216 sq.m. of land comprised in Sy.No.218/1 (new Sy.No.218/5) of Cheruthazham Village. In case the Competent Authority is unable to decide the entitlement, it shall refer the dispute to the decision of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction concerned. It is further directed that if not already released to the 1 st respondent, the Competent Authority shall deposit in that court the amount of compensation.

The Writ Petition is disposed of as above.

Sd/-

ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE Sd/-

                                    P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE
dkr
                                31
W.P.(C) No.23983 of 2019



                 APPENDIX OF WP(C) 23983/2019

PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1            TRUE    COPY   OF    THE    SCHEME    OF
                      ADMINISTRATION    OF    THE    CHIRACKAL
                      KOVILAKAM DEVASWAMS DATED 29/05/1972.
EXHIBIT P2            TRUE COPY OF THE ADANGAL EXTRACT DATED
                      18/06/2019    ISSUED   BY    THE   7TH
                      RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P3            TRUE   COPY OF    THE RELEVANT   PAGES
                      (NOS.54,   59,    60   AND  103)    OF
                      NOTIFICATION   NO.S.O.3683 (E)   DATED
                      17/12/2013 ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL
                      HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA (NHAI),
                      THE 7TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P4            TRUE   COPY OF    THE RELEVANT    PAGES
                      (NOS.30,31,32,33 & 53) OF NOTIFICATION
                      NO.S.O.2189(E) DATED 12/07/2017 ISSUED
                      BY THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF
                      INDIA (NHAI), THE 7TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P5            TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
                      17/07/2017 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER
                      BEFORE THE 3RD RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P6            TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
                      01.06.2018 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER
                      BEFORE THE 4TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P7            TRUE   COPY   OF   THE   SCHEME   DATED
                      29.05.1972 OF THE PETITIONER TEMPLE.

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