Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Raghu Nath Singh vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 5 January, 2000
JUDGMENT
S.R. Adige, Vice-Chairman
1. Applicant had filed this O.A, impugning respondents orders dated 6.5.97 (Annexure A-l) compulsorily retiring him from service w.e.f. 5.5.97 under FR 56(j) upon attaining the age of 55 years. He also impugned respondents connected orders dated 26.5,97 (Annexure A-2): dated 17.9.97 (Annexure A-3); dated 19.9.97 (Annexure A-4): dated 19.9.97 (Annexure A-5) and dated 6/7.10.97 (Annexure A-6). He sought reinstatement, continuity in service with all consequential benefits including back wages and retention of Government accommodation.
2. It is not denied that by respondents subsequent letter dated 21.1.99 a copy of which was shown to us during hearing and which has been brought on record, upon applicant's representation, he has been ordered to be reinstated in service. By Paragraph 2 of that letter dated 21.1.99 the intervening period between the date of applicant's premature retirement and his date of reinstatement has been ordered to be treated as eligible leave.
3. It is this which is the surviving grievance, namely the manner in which the intervening period should be treated.
4. Rule 56(jj) (i) reads as under:
"If on a review of the case either on a representation from the Government servant retired prematurely or otherwise, and it is decided to reinstate the Government servant in service, the authority ordering reinstatement may regulate the intervening period between the date of premature retirement and the date of reinstatement by the grant of leave of the kind due and admissible including extraordinary leave or by treating it as dies non depending on the facts and circumstances of each case."
5. Respondents Counsel Shri Bansal states that order dated 21.1.99 by which the orders of premature retirement were revoked clearly deals with the circumstances under which the said order was passed. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, it was decided to regularise the intervening period as eligible leave, and in this connection he relies on the Hon'ble Supreme Court's ruling in M.A. Ravoof v. Sr. Divisional Signal Telecom. Engineer & Anr., 1998 SCC (L&S) 1220 in support of their decision.
6. On the other hand applicant's Counsel Shri Sant Lal relies on the proviso to FR 56(jj)(i) which lays down that "Provided that the intervening period shall be treated as period spent on duty for all purposes including pay and allowances if it is specifically held by the authority ordering reinstatement that the premature retirement was not justified in the circumstances of the case, or if the order of premature retirement is set aside by a Court of Law.
It is argued that in the aforesaid order dated 21.1.99 it had been held that the decision to retire applicant prematurely under the provisions of FR 56(J) was not TENABLE since the provision of that rule had not been judiciously invoked, which fully brought applicant's case within the above proviso to FR 56(jj)(i), and in an identical case of Shri Jai Prakash Gupta v. U.O.I., 1988(2) ATR 34 (Copy at Annexure A-14), the Court had directed payment of pay and allowances for the intervening period. Other cases have also been cited in support of this reasoning.
7. There is merit in these submissions of Shri Sant Lal. It is clear that by holding that applicants premature retirement under the proviso of FR 56(j) were not tenable, since the provisions of that rule had not been judiciously invoked, applicant's case falls within the proviso to FR 56(jj)(i) cited above. The ruling in Ravoof's case (supra) relied upon by Shri Bansal was with respect to the specific guidelines dated 15.11.75 issued by the Railway Board to General Managers of all Indian Railways, but this is a case of the Indian Postal Department where those guidelines have no application. Hence Ravoof's case (supra) is different and distinguishable on facts, and the ruling in that case would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
8. As stated above, the present case is fully covered by the proviso to FR 56(jj)(i) quoted above, and the reasoning adopted in Jai Prakash Gupta's case (supra) which also relates to the Indian Postal Dept., in our view is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Incidentally the ruling in Jai Prakash Gupta's case (supra) itself relies upon a ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.L. Kalra v. Project Equipment Corporation, 1984(3) SCC 316=1984(2) SLJ 82 (SC).
9. In the result the O.A. succeeds and is allowed, to this extent that Paragraph 2 of respondents letter dated 21.1.99 is quashed and set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the aforesaid intervening period between applicant's date of premature retirement and his date of reinstatement as period spent on duty for all purposes. Respondents should release to applicant his pay and allowances, for that period accordingly, less what he has already been paid, within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.