Supreme Court of India
G. Rajendra vs Vikrant Tyres Ltd. And Anr. on 19 March, 2002
Equivalent citations: [2002(94)FLR392], JT2002(SUPPL1)SC438, (2002)IIILLJ173SC, (2002)10SCC438, AIRONLINE 2002 SC 405, 2002 (10) SCC 438, (2002) 3 LABLJ 173, (2002) 4 LAB LN 57, (2002) 94 FACLR 392, 2002 LABLR 933, 2003 SCC (L&S) 787
Author: Bisheshwar Prasad Singh
Bench: Bisheshwar Prasad Singh
ORDER
1. The workmen are the appellants in these two appeals.
2. By a common judgment, the High Court allowed the writ appeals of the respondent management, setting aside the judgment of a learned single judge, dismissing the writ petitions challenging the award of the labour court which directed the management to reinstate the workmen into service without payment of back wages but with continuity of service.
3. In one case, the workman was charged for unauthorised absence from service from 24.2.1984 to 27.3.1984 and in the other case the period of absence was from 24.1.1984 to 27.3.1984. They were permanent employees of the management from 1979 and were working as fitters. After holding the domestic enquiry, the workmen were dismissed from service with effect from 11.7.1984. In 1985, the dispute about the dismissal being justified or not was referred to the labour court. The labour court held that though there was no justification for their absence, the punishment of dismissal was harsh and disproportionate for the said absence. Instead of dismissal, the punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect and denial of back wages was directed.
4. In writ appeal, the management succeeded to the extent that the direction of the labour court in respect of the continuity of service was set aside and to that extent the award was modified by judgment under appeal. The workmen are in appeal under these circumstances.
5. The division bench has held that while deciding the case of another workman, which was the subject matter of writ petition No. 15868/1996, the labour court while directing reinstatement had not only denied back wages to the said workman but also the continuing of service. It held that the labour court had not assigned any valid reasons for giving a different treatment to the appellants herein and thus the award was directed to be modified and continuity of service denied to the appellants herein.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has drawn our attention to the judgment of the learned single judge of the High Court in W.P. No. 15868/1996. The award made in that case was the sole basis for the division bench in directing modification of the part of the award in the case of the present appellants wherein continuity of service had been ordered.
7. On perusal of acts of three cases, it is evident that the labour court had denied continuity of service in one case (W.P. No. 15868/1996) and allowed it in two cases, i.e., in case of the appellants before us. The facts of the case which was the basis for the conclusion of the division bench that the different treatment has been given to the appellants herein, show that in the said case, the workman was a habitual and chronic absentee having been absent for 56 days from service between March, 1983 to February 1984. In the present case, though the workmen held to be guilty of unauthorised absence but it was a case of one time unauthorised absence as against the workman who was a chronic absentee.
8. In this view of the matter, it is not possible to concur with the view of the division bench that the different treatment was given to the appellants herein. Whether to grant or not the continuity of service while making the award depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. On consideration of the facts as above, directions for continuity of service were issued in case of the appellants which were upheld by dismissal of the writ petitions of the management. In view of different facts as noticed above, we find no reason to deny to the appellants the continuity of service awarded in their favour by the labour court.
9. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court whereby the judgment of a learned single judge was set aside and restore the award passed by the labour court. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.