Madras High Court
Veerasekaran vs Devarasu on 29 April, 2011
Author: R.Subbiah
Bench: R.Subbiah
In the High Court of Judicature at Madras Dated: 29.04.2011 Coram: The Honourable Mr. Justice R.SUBBIAH Second Appeal No.199 of 1998 1. Veerasekaran 2. Kadirvelu (died) ..Appellants ..vs.. 1. Devarasu 2. Desingu ..Respondent (R2 brought on record as LR.of the deceased 2nd appellant vide Order of Court dated 22.11.2010 made in CMP.No.1694 of 2010) Second Appeal under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code filed, against the judgment and decree dated 29.08.1997 made in A.S.No.44 of 1996 on the file of Principal District Court, Villupuram, confirming the judgment and decree dated 31.01.1995 made in O.S.No.786 of 1990 on the file of Principal District Munsif Court, Villupuram. For Appellants : Mr.N.Suresh For Respondents : Mr.A.P.Neelamegavannan for R1 Mr.S.Mukunth for M/s.Sarvabhauman Associates for R2 JUDGMENT
The unsuccessful defendants in both the courts below are the appellants. The Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 29.08.1997 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Villupuram, in A.S.No.44 of 1996, whereby the judgment and decree passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Villupuram, dated 31.01.1995 in O.S.No.786 of 1990, were confirmed.
2. The 1st respondent herein is the sole plaintiff, who filed the suit against the appellants herein for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of 'A' schedule properties and also declaration and recovery of possession in respect of 'B' schedule properties with future mesne profits. For convenience, the parties are hereinafter described as per their array in the suit.
3. The case of the plaintiff is briefly stated as under: The suit properties originally belonged to the plaintiff's father Govindasamy and they are the ancestral properties and his father was in enjoyment of the same till his death and after his death, the plaintiff came into possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. The plaintiff's father's brother Chinnasamy was a mentally retarded person and he died intestate and therefore, his half share of the properties were also being enjoyed by Govindasamy. Govindasamy sold half of the suit items to his father-in-law Rajamanickam by a sale deed dated 05.04.1924. Thereafter, by a settlement deed dated 07.10.1960, the said Rajamanickam's wife Manickammal settled eastern half of the properties in favour of the plaintiff and hence, the plaintiff has been in possession of the entire properties and he prescribed title by adverse possession. The plaintiff also mortgaged the properties on 12.09.1960 to one Varadarajan Udayar. While so, in the year 1986, the 1st defendant attempted to take forcible possession of eastern half of the suit properties stating that Chinnasamy, the plaintiff's paternal uncle, had executed a sale deed in his favour and he trespassed into the suit 'B' schedule properties. Since the 1st defendant alleged that one Kadirvelu is in enjoyment of suit 2nd item, he has been impleaded as the 2nd defendant. Hence, the suit.
4. Denying the plaint averments, the 1st defendant filed a written statement stating that the plaintiff has originally filed a suit in O.S.787 of 1988 and thereafter, he had withdrawn the same. It is his specific defence that suit item-1 of 'B' schedule was originally belonged to Chinnasamy Udayar, who sold the same to this defendant's paternal grandfather Narayana Udayar in 1938 along with item 2 of suit 'A' schedule and other properties. Narayana Udayar had two sons, Ariyaputhiri Udayar and Thanikachala Udayar. Thereafter, Narayana Udayar died and Thanikachala Udayar also died issueless and this defendant's father Ariyaputhiri Udayar came into possession and enjoyment of eastern half of 0.65 cents in R.S.No.266/5 i.e. item No.1 of 'B' schedule and the western half of the house property i.e. Item-2 of 'A' schedule and on his death, the 1st defendant being his only son, succeeded to the said properties and has been paying the kist for the same. One Kadirvelu, the 2nd defendant (2nd appellant) is in possession of the item No.2 of 'B' schedule i.e.the eastern half of the house property. In fact, the plaintiff is in permissive possession of the western half of the house property belonging to the 1st defendant and in exchange thereof, the 1st defendant is in possession of item No.2 of 'B' schedule through the 2nd defendant. This defendant is prepared to surrender possession of the suit item No.2 of 'B' schedule to the plaintiff provided he vacates and delivers possession of the western half of the house property to him. Thus, the defendant had taken a specific stand that he is having a right in 'B' schedule property since the same had been purchased by his paternal ancestor Narayana Udayar by a sale deed dated 29.09.1938, from whom the properties devolved on his subsequent legal heirs by way of interstate succession.
5. On the said pleadings, the trial court framed necessary issues and on the side of the plaintiff, he examined himself as P.W.1 besides examining three witnesses as P.Ws.2 to 4 and marked 34 documents as Exs.A-1 to A-34 and on the side of the defendants, they examined themselves as D.Ws.1 and 2 besides examining three other witnesses as D.Ws.3 to 5 and marked 30 documents as Exs.B-1 to B-30. The trial court, after considering the entire evidence on record, both oral and documentary, had decreed the suit in respect of A and 'B' schedule properties and directed the plaintiff to take separate proceedings with regard to future mesne profits. Challenging the said finding, the defendants filed A.S.No.44 of 1996 on the file of Principal District Court, Villupuram, wherein Exs.B-31 to B-38 were marked on the side of the defendants and ultimately, the appeal was dismissed by confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. Being aggrieved, the defendants filed the present second appeal. Pending second appeal, the 2nd defendant/ 2nd appellant died and his son is brought on record as the legal heir of the deceased 2nd defendant as the 2nd respondent.
6. During the course of arguments, this Court formulated the following substantial questions of law, namely, (1) Whether the finding of adverse title by prescription in favour of the plaintiff for 'B' schedule property when the suit had been filed for recovery of possession on any imaginary cause of action of trespass, not untenable ?
(2) Whether in the fact of transfer of title by a registered sale deed, the title vested under it could be defeated by failure to obtain exclusive patta ?
Upon consideration of entire materials, this Court allowed the second appeal, by setting aside the concurrent findings of the courts below and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff.
7. Against which, the plaintiff/1st respondent herein filed Civil Appeal No.6249 of 2009 before the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Apex Court has allowed the said civil appeal with the following observation:
"..... In the present case, no substantial question of law was framed by the High Court till the commencement of hearing. The substantial question enumerated in para 8 of the impugned judgment was formulated only during the course of argument. This is legally impermissible. Unless the question is formulated and the respondent is put to notice in relation to such question, he/she is deprived of the opportunity to make submissions with reference to the substantial question of law formulated by the High Court and also show that the case does not involve such question.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court. Now, the High Court shall consider whether any substantial question of law arises in the second appeal or not. If it comes to the conclusion that the same arises, in that eventuality, the same shall be formulated. Thereafter, the appeal shall be heard and disposed of in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties".
8. Pursuant to the said remand, this Court has taken up the matter and formulated the following substantial questions of law and thereafter, heard the arguments of both sides.
(1) Whether the Courts below are right in decreeing the suit in favour of the respondent for declaration of title and for consequential relief, when the plaintiff has not chosen to file the documents of title alleged in the plaint and in the evidence ?
(2) Whether the Courts below are right in decreeing the suit on the basis of alleged adverse possession, when the plea of adverse possession is inconsistent with the plea of acquisition of title by succession ?
(3) Whether the findings of the courts below are based on misreading of evidence and mis-application of law and as such the same is liable to be interfered with by this Court ?
9. Learned Counsel for the defendants submitted that there are two schedules in the plaint. 'A' schedule consists western portion in two Survey Numbers, namely, 266/5(0.65 cents) and 41/9(east-west 30' and north-south 120' and the house). Likewise, 'B' schedule also contains the eastern portion of the same survey numbers. The learned counsel further submitted that 'B' schedule property was sold by Chinnasamy, who is the plaintiff's father's brother (the paternal uncle of the plaintiff) under Ex.B-2 sale deed dated 29.09.1938, in favour of Narayana Udayar, the grandfather of the 1st defendant. After his demise, the said property devolved upon his two sons, by name, Ariyaputhiri Udayar and Thanikachala Udayar and Thanikachala Udayar died issueless. Hence, the property devolved upon Ariyaputhiri Udayar and after the demise of Ariyaputhiri Udayar, the said property came into the hands of the 1st defendant, being the son of Ariyaputhiri Udayar. On the other hand, though the plaintiff rests upon his title with regard to 'A' schedule property, which is their ancestral property, in order to prove his title, no document was marked on his side. Under such circumstances, the suit with regard to the declaration and permanent injunction in respect of 'A' schedule property is liable to be dismissed. But the courts below, without considering these aspects, have granted a decree in his favour.
10. With regard to 'B' schedule property, it is in the possession of the 1st defendant by virtue of the sale deed Ex.B-2 dated 29.09.1938 executed by Chinnasamy and his wife in favour of Narayana Udayar. Though it was claimed by the plaintiff that Chinnasamy was a mentally retarded person and he was under the control of his brother Govindasamy Udayar (plaintiff's father), the plaintiff has not taken any steps to prove the said averment. On the other hand, the evidence on record would show that Chinnasamy is only a transgender and not a mentally retarded person. But, the courts below, without taking into consideration Ex.B-2 of the year 1938 to prove the title of the 1st defendant, have come to the conclusion that subsequent to Ex.B-2, no document was marked on the side of the 1st defendant to prove his possession and enjoyment in respect of 'B' schedule property and by way of long and continuous uninterrupted possession and enjoyment in the property, the plaintiff has prescribed title and thus, granted decree in respect of 'B' schedule property also in favour of the plaintiff, by giving a go-by to all the legal principles.
11. In this regard, the learned counsel for the 1st defendant submitted that when the person claims adverse possession must prove his continuous and uninterrupted possession in the suit property; but, in the instant case, the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove that he is in possession of 'B' schedule property. Therefore, the finding arrived at by the courts below in favour of the plaintiff is patently wrong and the same is liable to be set aside. The trial court by relying upon the kist receipts marked on the side of the plaintiff, had come to an conclusion that the plaintiff is in enjoyment and he prescribed title over the 'B' schedule property. In this regard, the learned counsel, by relying upon the decision reported in STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ..vs.. HYDERABAD POTTERIES PVT.LTD.((2010) 5 SCC 382), submitted that the revenue records cannot be taken as a conclusive proof to decide title. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the courts below based on the kist receipts marked on the side of the plaintiff that the plaintiff has prescribed title over the 'B' schedule property is not correct. Even assuming that the plaintiff is in long uninterrupted possession, it will not prove the adverse possession.
12. The learned counsel for the 1st defendant further submitted that originally the plaintiff has filed the suit in O.S.No.787 of 1988 on the file of District Munsif Court Villupuram, wherein he sought for declaration and injunction and also recovery of possession in respect of the entire suit property measuring to an extent of 0.65 cents and subsequently he had withdrawn the suit with a liberty to file a fresh suit. Later on, in 1990, he filed the present suit with a false allegation that the 1st defendant had trespassed into 'B' schedule property; but except the vague statement with regard to trespass, no specific allegation has been made in the plaint to prove the same, which would go to show that the entire case put forth by the plaintiff is false. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has relied on the decisions reported in KARNATAKA BOARD OF WAKF ..vs.. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND OTHERS ((2004) 10 SCC 779), A.VEDANAYAGAM (TMT) .vs. ANNAKILI ((2006) 3 MLJ 465), MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER .vs. GOUNDLA VENKAIAH ((2010) 2 SCC 461) and STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ..vs.. HYDERABAD POTTERIES PVT.LTD., AND ANOTHER ((2010) 5 SCC 382).
13. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, by inviting the attention of this Court to the schedule of property of the earlier suit, submitted that it is incorrect to state that the earlier suit was filed for declaration and recovery of possession of the entire suit property, whereas the said suit was filed for recovery of possession of the house property, which is in possession of the plaintiff along with the prayer of declaration and permanent injunction. After the withdrawal of the earlier suit, the defendant, by retaining half portion of the house for him, had trespassed another half portion in the house. Therefore, in the year 1990, once again the present suit has been filed. Further, Ex.B-2 sale deed dated 29.09.1938 marked on the side of the 1st defendant is a fraudulent one, because the paternal uncle of the plaintiff, viz., Chinnasamy has no mental capacity to write a sale deed since he is a mentally disabled person. Moreover, on the side of the plaintiff, the kist receipts in respect of the entire suit property have been filed to show the possession and enjoyment of the property by the plaintiff for a long period and as such, the plaintiff has prescribed title by adverse possession. The courts below, by considering these aspects only, decreed the suit and therefore, no interference is necessary. Above all, Ex.A-1, the mortgage deed dated 12.09.1960 executed by the plaintiff in favour of one Varadarajalu Udayar in respect of entire suit property, has been filed to show that the entire suit property was in possession of the plaintiff only. Therefore, no infirmity could be found in the finding arrived at by the courts below that the plaintiff has prescribed title in respect of 'B' schedule. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has relied on the decisions reported in L.N.ASWATHAMA .vs. P.PRAKASH (2009 SAR (Civil) 684) = (2009)13 SCC p.229, VENKATACHALA GOUNDER .vs. ARULMIGU VISWESARASWAMI & V.P.TEMPLE AND ANOTHER (2003 SAR (Civil) 929) = (2003)8 SCC p.752 and AVTAR SINGH .vs. GURDIAL SINGH (2007) SAR (Civil) 138) = (2006) Supp.(10) SCR p.33).
14. Heard the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent also. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record.
15. In view of the submissions made by the parties, the questions that arise for consideration in this appeal are, (1) Whether, in the absence of title documents, the plaintiff is entitled for declaration in respect of 'A' schedule properties ? and (2) Whether the findings rendered by the courts below that the plaintiff has prescribed title in respect of suit properties is correct ?
16. With regard to the first question, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the defendants that though the case of the plaintiff mainly rests upon two documents, namely, the sale deed dated 05.04.1924 executed by the plaintiff's father Govindasamy Udayar in favour of his father-in-law Rajamanickam and the settlement deed dated 07.10.1960 executed by Manickammal, the wife of said Rajamanickam in favour of the plaintiff, these documents were not marked by the plaintiff. Since no document of title was marked, the plaintiff is not entitled to declaration in respect of 'A' schedule properties. But, at the same time, on a perusal of the pleadings in the written statement, I find that the possession and enjoyment of half item of the suit property by the plaintiff was admitted by the 1st defendant. The relevant pleadings in the written statement are as follows:
"12. One Kadirvelu is in possession of the item No.2 of 'B' schedule viz., the eastern half of the house property. But it is false to state that this defendant took forcible possession of the cattle shed in November 1986 and inducted Kadirvelu into the possession of the same. In this context the plaintiff has purposely distorted the truth. Actually the plaintiff is in permissive possession of the western half of the house property i.e.item No.2 of the 'A' schedule belonging to this defendant and in exchange thereof this defendant is in possession of the item No.2 of the 'B' schedule through Kadirvelu. This defendant is prepared to surrender possession of the suit item No.2 of 'B' schedule to the plaintiff provided he vacates and delivers possession of the western half of the house property i.e.item No.2 of the 'A' schedule which is also the ancestral property of this defendant".
17. From the above, it could be understood that it is the case of the 1st defendant that he is entitled to half portion of the suit property out of 65 cents i.e.32-1/2 cents of land and the plaintiff is also entitled for another half. In view of the said admission in the written statement, I am of the view that even in the absence of any title document filed, no infirmity could be found in the prayer granted by the courts below with regard to 'A' schedule property.
18. Coming to the next question that whether the courts below are right in decreeing the suit for alleged adverse possession with regard to 'B' schedule property, it is the case of the 1st defendant that he is in possession of 'B' schedule property by virtue of Ex.B-2 sale deed dated 29.09.1938. According to the 1st defendant, the paternal uncle of the plaintiff, viz., Chinnasamy had sold the property in favour of Narayana Udayar, the grandfather of the 1st defendant and from whom, the property devolved upon Ariyaputhiri Udayar, the father of the 1st defendant and from him, the 1st defendant got the property. But, it is the contention of the plaintiff that Chinnasamy was the mentally disabled person and therefore, he did not have any capacity to execute the sale deed and under such circumstance, Ex.B-1 should be a forged one.
19. It is pertinent to note that no averment was made in the plaint that Ex.B-1 executed by Chinnasamy in favor of Narayana Udayar is a forged one and this submission is without any pleading. Apart from that, the evidence adduced by P.W.1 would show that the said Chinnasamy is a transgender and he is not a mentally retarded person. Therefore, the case put forth by the plaintiff that Chinnasamy is mentally disabled person has not been proved by him before the courts below. Further, I find that both the courts below have come to the conclusion that since the 1st defendant had not proved his possession subsequent to Ex.B-2, the plaintiff had prescribed title in respect of 'B' schedule property by adverse possession. It is not in dispute that, as contended by the learned counsel for the 1st defendant, the person who claims adverse possession, should prove the long uninterrupted possession over the 'B' schedule property. But, the courts below, on an erroneous approach, have come to the conclusion that since the 1st defendant has not filed any document subsequent to Ex.B-1, the plaintiff had prescribed title over the 'B' schedule property, which, in my view, is patently wrong.
20. It is to be noted that the present suit was filed for recovery of possession of 'B' schedule property only, which would show that the possession of 'B' schedule is only with the defendants and not with the plaintiff. Though the plaintiff had stated in the plaint that the 1st defendant had trespassed into 'B' schedule, except the said vague statement, no specific allegation has been made about the same. Moreover, the earlier suit was filed by the plaintiff only for recovery of possession of the house property on the allegation that the 1st defendant is in possession of the house property; but after withdrawal of the said suit, the present suit has been filed after three years i.e. in the year 1990. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that after withdrawal of the earlier suit, the 1st defendant had left half portion of the suit property and trespassed into another half portion and thus now he is in possession of half landed property and half of the house property; but absolutely, no pleadings in the plaint in this regard. The courts below, by relying upon the kist receipts, have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is in long and uninterrupted possession of the suit properties and I am of the view, as contended by the learned counsel for the 1st defendant, that merely marking kist receipts alone is not sufficient to prove the case of adverse possession.
21. In this regard, a reference could be placed in some of the judgments relied on by the 1st defendant and in (2010) 5 SCC 382, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"Entry in the revenue record alone may not be sufficient as conclusive proof of title nor can be relied on for proof of establishing the title as such. The sole basis of the appellant State to claim the land was on the strength of entries made in survey records showing that the schedule property was unserveyed area as per the old survey records which could only be declared to be government land under the Andhra Pradesh Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923. Apart from the said revenue record and issuance of gazette notification no other material document was filed by the appellant to show that the said land belonged only to the Government".
22. In (2006) 3 MLJ 465, a Division Bench of this Court has extracted the following paragraph from the decision reported in AIR 2002 SC 1012, which reads as follows:
"27. In Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs. Government of A.P.and others AIR 2002 SC 1012 : 2002 (3) SCC 258, the Honourable apex Court, considering the question of adverse possesion, has held:
"It is a well settled proposition that mere possession of the land, however long it may be, would not ripen into possessory title, unless the possessor has animus possidendi to hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. It is true that assertion of title to the land in dispute by the possessor would, in an appropriate case, be sufficient indication of the animus possidendi to hold adverse to the title of the true owner. But, such an assertion of title must be clear and unequivocal though it need not be addressed to the real owner. For reckoning the statutory period to perfect title by prescription both the possession as well as the animus possidendi must be shown to exist. Where, however, at the commencement of the possession there is no animus possidendi, the period for the purpose of reckoning adverse possession will commence from the date when both the actual possession and assertion of title by the possessor are shown to exist".
23. In (2010) 2 SCC 461, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows:
"50. Before concluding, we may notice two recent judgments in which law on the question of acquisition of title by adverse possession has been considered and reiterated. In Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam 2007 (14) SCC 308, the Court observed as under:-
"Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1) the possession of the defendant should become adverse to the plaintiff; and (2) the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It is now a well-settled principle of law that mere possession of the land would not ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown to exist at the commencement of the possession. He must continue in the said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more does not ripen into a title."
24. In (2004) 10 SCC 779, the Apex Court has held as follows:
"In the eye of law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of true owner. It is a well- settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is 'nec vi, nec clam, nec precario', that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.
A plaintiff, filing a title suit, should be very clear about the origin of title over the property. He must specifically plead it. The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced".
25. A reading of the above judgments would show that mere possession of the land, however long it may be, would not ripen into possessory title, unless the possessor has animus possidendi to hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. In the instant case, absolutely, no evidence to show that the plaintiff has animus possidendi to hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. Moreover, it could be understood from the averments in the plaint that the possession was only with the 1st defendant and not with the plaintiff. Though the plaintiff has relied upon Ex.A-1 mortgage deed of the year 1960 to show his title, a perusal of the same shows that the said document is only a simple mortgage deed and, therefore, there is no need for handing over of possession to the mortgagor.
26. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied on the decision reported in 2009 SAR (Civil) 684 = (2009)13 SCC 229 (supra) in support of his contention that the 1st defendant has not produced any evidence to show that he was in possession of the suit property for a period of 12 years prior to the suit filed by the plaintiff; but the dictum laid down in the said judgment cannot be applied to the present case because in the instant case, the plaintiff is claiming adverse possession in 'B' schedule property. Therefore, it is the paramount duty of the plaintiff to prove the case of adverse possession. But the courts below have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff had prescribed title by way of adverse possession since the 1st defendant has not filed documents to prove the possession subsequent to Ex.B-2. Such an approach is patently wrong and I am of the view that the same is liable to be set aside. The other judgments relied on by the plaintiff cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, the finding arrived at by the courts below granting declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of 'B' schedule property is liable to be set aside and the substantial questions of law are answered accordingly.
For the reasons stated above, the second appeal is allowed in part and the finding with regard to 'A' schedule properties is confirmed and the finding with regard to 'B' schedule properties is set aside and the suit is dismissed in respect of declaration and recovery of possession in respect of 'B' schedule properties. No costs.
Index: Yes/No. 29.04.2011 Internet: Yes/No. gl To 1. The Principal District Judge, Villupuram. 2. The Principal District Munsif, Villupuram. Copy to: The Section Officer, V.R.Section, High Court,Madras. R.SUBBIAH, J., gl Pre-delivery judgment in S.A.No.199 of 1998 29.04.2011