Rakesh Midha vs M/S Oriental Fire Insurance Co on 29 May, 2020

[Cites 3, Cited by 0]

Delhi High Court

Rakesh Midha vs M/S Oriental Fire Insurance Co on 29 May, 2020

Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 DEL 817

Bench: C. Hari Shankar

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+ W.P.(C) 7593/2002

RAKESH MIDHA ....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mahesh Srivastava with
Mr. Vaibhav Manu Srivastava,
Advs.

Versus

M/S ORIENTAL FIRE INSURANCE CO. LTD. ...Respondent
Through: Mr. Pankaj Seth, Adv.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR

% JUDGMENT
29.05.2020

1. The petitioner, who was working as Development Officer in the
office of the respondent (Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.), was issued a
charge-sheet, dated 31st March, 1998, proposing to initiate disciplinary
action, against him, under Rule 25 of the General Insurance CDA
Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as "the CDA Rules"). The charge-
sheet contained, essentially, two charges, against the petitioner,
dovetailed into a single Article of Charge.

2. The first allegation, against the petitioner, was that he had
created a dummy agent, of the respondent, by name Yugal Gupta, with
a fictitious bank account, in which agency commission, allegedly
payable to Yugal Gupta, was deposited, and subsequently withdrawn

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 1 of 55
by the petitioner, during the period 1991 to 1996. The allegedly
fictitious agent Yugal Gupta had been assigned Agency Code 1623.
The Savings Bank account of Yugal Gupta, in the Punjab National
Bank (PNB) was also found to have been introduced by the petitioner.
It was alleged that, on enquiries being made at B-1/30, Model Town,
which was the address of Yugal Gupta, as entered in his Agency
Renewal Application, it was found that, though one Yugal Gupta was,
indeed, residing at the said address, he had nothing to do with the
Agency, assigned to the fictitious Yugal Gupta (with Agency Code
1623), or with the aforesaid Savings Bank account in the PNB. The
petitioner, on being questioned in this regard, produced, before S. C.
S. Bisht, Assistant Manager (Vigilance Cell) of the respondent, one
person, who was stated to be the agent of Yugal Gupta. The said
person produced a Driving Licence, of Yugal Gupta, r/o B-56,
Railway Road, Karnal, and stated that he had been residing at B-1/30,
Model Town till March, 1996, whereafter he shifted to Karnal. This
fact was, however, refuted by the 'other' Yugal Gupta who was found
staying at B-1/30, Model Town. It was alleged, further, that S. K.
Samantaray, Branch Manager of the respondent, stated, on 27th
November, 1996 and 9th December, 1996, that the Agency
Commission, deposited in the aforesaid Savings Bank account of
Yugal Gupta, in the PNB, was withdrawn, by the petitioner, using pre-
signed cheques, consequent on certification of the identity of the agent
by the petitioner, himself, by attesting the signature of the agent. On
the basis of these facts, it was alleged that the petitioner had stage-
managed a fictitious Yugal Gupta, to camouflage his misdemeanour of
creating a dummy agency, with a dummy bank account, in order to

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 2 of 55
wrongfully earn Agency Commission. By this method, it was alleged
that the petitioner had wrongfully earned agency commission of
3,57,852.70, during the period November, 1991 to June, 1996. A
tabular statement, of the amounts earned on a year-wise basis, also
finds place in the Statement of Imputations of Misconduct, forming
part of the charge-sheet.

3. The second charge, against the petitioner, was that the paid-up
capital of one M/s Tej International, which was also introduced by the
petitioner, using the agency of Yugal Gupta, was certified, vide
certificate dated 30th November, 1995, purportedly on the letterhead of
Tej International, as 6,50,000/-, whereas Tej International, on
verification, submitted that its paid-up capital, on 31st March, 1996,
was 22,00,000/-.

4. By these alleged machinations, the charge-sheet accused the
petitioner of having caused wrongful loss to the respondent and
wrongful gain to himself and having, thereby, violated Rules 3(1)(i)
and (iii), 4(1) and (5) of the CDA Rules.

5. The petitioner responded, to the aforesaid charge-sheet, on 6th
May, 1998. It was contended, by the petitioner, that Yugal Gupta had
been working as an agent, with the respondent, since 1991 and that,
during the period 23rd October, 1990 to 22nd October, 1993, he was
also working as an agent with M/s United India Insurance Company
(hereinafter referred to as "United India"). It was submitted that,
therefore, Yugal Gupta could not be treated as a dummy. Apropos the

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 3 of 55
allegation regarding the paid-up capital of Tej International, the
petitioner refuted the letter, of the said firm, contending that the
signature, thereon, was unclear. The petitioner submitted that
commission, to Yugal Gupta, had been paid by crossed cheques, as the
said agent had a valid agreement, subsisting, with the respondent. The
petitioner denied having taken any monetary benefits from Yugal
Gupta, or encashed any cheque, whereby money was withdrawn from
the account of Yugal Gupta.

6. Disciplinary proceedings, consequent on the issuance of the
aforesaid charge-sheet, dated 31st March, 1998, commenced. During
the course of enquiry proceedings, the petitioner sought to avail the
services of Yogesh Kumar, Senior Assistant in the office of the
respondent, as his Defence Assistant. However, it appears that Yogesh
Kumar refused to act as the Defence Assistant of the petitioner,
whereafter, vide letter dated 31st August, 1998, the petitioner sought to
appoint R. N. Sharma, retired Assistant Manager of United India, as
his Defence Assistant. The request was declined, by the Enquiry
Officer (hereinafter referred to as "EO"), on the ground that the
practice and guidelines, governing the respondent, did not allow the
appointment of a retired officer of the industry as a Defence Assistant.

7. The petitioner submitted an application, dated 13th October,
1998, to the EO, requesting for the following documents, for his
defence:

(i) a copy of the application for agency, submitted by Yugal
Gupta to the respondent,
W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 4 of 55
(ii) a copy of Agents License No. 040800/1/00089 issued by
United India, valid up to 22nd October, 1993,
(iii) a copy of the Agency Application submitted by Yugal
Gupta to United India,
(iv) a copy of Agents License No. DO/00028/95 issued by the
respondent,
(v) a copy of the letter, by the Bhogal Branch of the
respondent, recommending renewal of license No
0040800/1/89,
(vi) copies of Commission Payment Voucher, for the months
November 1991 to May 1996, of Yugal Gupta and
(vii) a statement of Bank Account No. 29223, of Yugal Gupta
with the Bhogal branch of the PNB, for the period November,
1991 to May, 1996.

8. On 27th November, 1998, the petitioner addressed another
representation, to the EO, citing the following witnesses, whose
evidence he desired to lead in his defence:

(i) an official from United India, along with the
documents/record pertaining to Agency No. 3031, License No.
040800/1/00089/90, valid till 22nd October, 1993, of Yugal
Gupta,
(ii) an official from National Insurance Company Ltd, along
with the documents/record pertaining to the Agency of Yugal
Gupta, Agent Code No. 5115, along with a copy of the
Renewed Agents License No. 360700/NAT/96/00015, valid till
8th January, 2000,
W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 5 of 55
(iii) Mr. Rajendra Prasad Gupta, r/o A-190, Shastri Nagar,
Delhi,
(iv) Mr. Harmohinder Singh Gujral, r/o C-1/51B, Janakpuri,
New Delhi,
(v) Mr. Anand Singh Rawat, r/o H. No. 542, Kalyan Vas,
Delhi, agent in Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) and
(vi) Mr. Baljeet Singh Anand, agent in the respondent-
Company.

It was requested, by the petitioner, that he be permitted to produce the
aforesaid witnesses, as and when called by the EO.

9. Enquiry proceedings were concluded, by the EO, on 11th
January, 1999, whereafter, on 16th March, 1999, the EO submitted her
Enquiry Report. Certain salient, and relevant, features of the Enquiry
Report, may be enumerated, thus:

(i) The Enquiry Report records the request, of the petitioner,
made on 11th September, 1998, for a copy of the statement,
dated 27th November, 1996, of Samantaray, on which the
charged-sheet placed reliance. However, the personnel
Department, vide letter dated 24th June, 1998, informed that no
such statement was in existence, and that the reference, thereto,
in the charge-sheet, was a typographical error.

(ii) Apropos the request for documents, made by the
petitioner vide his letter dated 13th October, 1998 supra, the
Enquiry Report records thus:
W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 6 of 55
"Mr. Midha asked for seven documents to be produced
during the enquiry proceedings vide his letter dt.
13.10.1998. The documents were refused as they had
no relevance in the present enquiry because the
enquiry pertains to a period when the Agency of Shri
Yugal Gupta was fully functioning under Shri Midha
and there is no base to prove or contest the origin of
the agency."

(iii) The EO, inter alia, placed reliance on the statements of
Samantaray, S. C. S. Bisht (hereinafter referred to as "Bisht")
and Yugal Gupta, who deposed as management witnesses MW-
1, MW-2 and MW-4 respectively.

(iv) The Enquiry Report observes that MW-1 Samantaray
confirmed his statement dated 9th December, 1996, and that the
application form, submitted by Yugal Gupta for renewal of the
license to act as agent pertained to his branch.

(v) Bisht, it was observed, while confirming his statement
dated 20th November, 1996, produced a blank cheque, No.
044210, purportedly signed by Yugal Gupta and submitted for
drawing his agency commission. He further confirmed that, on
20th January, 1998, he (i.e. Bisht) had written to Yugal Gupta,
residing at B-1/30, Model Town, to which Yugal Gupta had
responded, on 31st January, 1998, confirming that he was,
indeed, residing at B-1/30, Model Town, but denying the
signature of Yugal Gupta, on the Agency License, as not being
his. In the said letter, Yugal Gupta also denied having tendered
the statement dated 20th November, 1996, being the holder of
W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 7 of 55
any account at PNB, Jangpura, or being a signatory of Cheque
No. 044210. He also denied being the holder of the Driving
License which was produced by the gentleman, who was
introduced by the petitioner as being Yugal Gupta and, instead,
produced his own driving license and ration card, as evidence of
his identity. MW-2 also produced the Commission Vouchers,
evidencing drawing of commission and allegedly bearing the
signatures of Yugal Gupta, as verified by the petitioner.

(vi) The EO relied, further, on the statement of Yugal Gupta,
resident of B-1/30, Model Town, who deposed as MW-4. MW-
4 reiterated that the signatures on the application for obtaining
the Agency License were not his, though they were similar to
his signatures. He also disowned the signature of Yugal Gupta,
figuring on Cheque No. 044210, as well as the signature on the
reverse of the payment voucher, whereunder Yugal Gupta had
drawn his agency commission. During cross-examination, MW-
4 deposed that he was running a car repair shop, and had
applied for renewal of his Agency License, with United India
Assurance, in April, 1991. His agency with United India
Assurance, he informed, was valid till 21st October, 1996.

10. Having thus recorded the evidence, available before her, the EO
concluded her Enquiry Report, by holding thus:
"Based on the evidences is, management witnesses produced
and the P.O. brief it is established that Mr. Rakesh Midha
wrongfully earned agency commission under the name of
Shri Yugal Gupta's account. He put the business of M/s. Tej
International under the dummy agency code No 1623 in the

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 8 of 55
name of Shri Yugal Gupta and when the Audit Team
investigated the matter Mr. Midha managed to submit a false
certificate on the letterhead of M/s Tej International showing
their paid-up capital of 6,50,000/- whereas it was found
out by the Audit Team that M/s Tej International paid-up
capital was 22,00,000/- and it was informed by them vide
their letter dt. 11.9.1997 and thus Mr. Midha has wrongfully
earned the agency commission."

11. A copy of the aforementioned Enquiry Report, dated 16th
March, 1999, was forwarded to the petitioner, who submitted his
response, thereto, vide letter dated 1st April, 1999. The petitioner
objected to the Enquiry Report, as being unreasoned. Besides, on the
merits of the findings, in the Enquiry Report, against him, the
petitioner contended thus:

(i) The Enquiry Report did not note the fact that MW-1
Samantaray was unaware of the number of agents working in
the Bhogal branch of the respondent, and did not know the
agents personally. The report also failed to record the inability,
of MW-1 to reply, regarding direct agency of one of the agents,
or the nature of business brought by the said agent, etc. These
facts indicated that Yugal Gupta might not have been known,
personally, to MW-1. Besides, it was a matter of official
practice that commission cheques were handed over to the
Development Officers, as the agents were independent persons,
who were not required to visit the office of the respondent on a
daily basis.

(ii) Apropos Bisht (MW-2), the EO failed to take stock of the
fact that MW-2 further admitted that no identification, of the
W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 9 of 55
agent Yugal Gupta, had been taken, from him, on 20th
November, 1996, on the Driving License, the statement and
Cheque No. 044210. Further, MW-2 deposed that Cheque No.
044210 had been handed over, to the Vigilance Officer, by
Yugal Gupta, on 20th November, 1996, and not by the
petitioner, as erroneously alleged in the charge-sheet. The
statement of Yugal Gupta was recorded in his absence and
could not, therefore, be put to cross-examination. The EO also
failed to notice the fact that MW-2 had admitted not having
checked the authenticity of the Agents License, expiring on 22nd
October, 1993, from United India, and as to whether the said
licence had been issued by the said Company. The investigation
conducted by MW-2 was, therefore, incomplete and vague. It
was also suspicious, contended the petitioner, that the first
attempt, to verify the postal address of the agent Yugal Gupta,
had been by personal visit, after two years, with no letter,
having been addressed, to Yugal Gupta, during the currency of
the investigation. The petitioner also drew attention to the
admission, by MW-2, that, on being queried in that regard, Tej
International did not deny having issued the letter, dated 30th
November, 1995, showing its paid-up capital as 6,50,000/-.
The petitioner also highlighted the fact that he had never been
asked, by the Audit Department, or by the Vigilance
Department, of the respondent, to confirm the paid-up capital of
Tej International. Reliance was also placed, by the petitioner,
on the "admission", of MW-2, that he was unaware of whether
the Agency Commission cheque of 3,57,852.70, had been

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 10 of 55
deposited in the PNB account of Yugal Gupta. This, he
submitted, indicated that the investigation, undertaken by MW-
2, was inconclusive and predetermined.

(iii) Apropos MW-4 Yugal Gupta (residing at Model Town),
the petitioner drew attention to the admission, by him, in his
cross-examination, that he had applied for an agency, with the
respondent, in May, 1991, on the basis of the license, dated 22nd
October, 1993, with United India, and that he had started
working, as an agent, with the respondent, since May, 1991.
MW-4 had further admitted, in cross-examination, pointed out
the petitioner, that he had applied for renewal of the said Agents
License, to the respondent, and had obtained a renewed license,
valid till 21st October, 1996. MW-4 had also admitted the
signatures, on the application form, submitted for obtaining the
original license (valid till 22nd October, 1993), as well as for
renewal application filed in respect thereof. MW-4, he
submitted, had also admitted, in cross-examination, that he had
availed the Agency Commission paid by the respondent. He
also admitted having applied for further renewal, of the Agency
License with the respondent, to the National Insurance Co. Ltd.,
and had obtained a license, valid till 8th January, 2000, and that
he was still working as an agent with the National Insurance
Company Limited. These facts, submitted the petitioner, clearly
established that Yugal Gupta was, in fact, an agent with United
India Insurance Co. Ltd., and had worked as an agent with the
respondent. He had also received agency commission from the

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 11 of 55
respondent. The allegation that Agency Commission was drawn
by a dummy agent, set up by the petitioner was, therefore, it
was submitted, false.

(iv) Apropos his defence evidence, the petitioner initially
faulted the EO for having allowed only two, out of the six
witnesses, whose evidence he desired to lead. Thereafter, he
submitted that the evidence adduced by the two defence
witnesses, whose evidence was allowed, also established his
case, thus:

(a) A letter, dated 17th December, 1998, was received,
from United India, in which complete information,
regarding the agency of Yugal Gupta, who had applied
and obtained License No. 040800/1/00089/90, valid till
22nd October, 1993, issued by them, was provided. The
letter also confirmed that the agency of Yugal Gupta was
directly attached to the Branch Office, and also provided
a copy of the ledger, showing the Agency Commission
paid to Yugal Gupta, resident of B-1/30 Model Town, on
the basis of the aforesaid Agents License No.
040800/1/00089/90, paid during the period 4th May, 1992
to 31st March, 1993. This, therefore, supported the
deposition, of Yugal Gupta, in cross-examination, that he
had obtained an Agents License, from United India
Insurance Co. Ltd., worked as an agent, with the said
Company under the said license, and, on the basis

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 12 of 55
thereof, applied for, and obtained, and Agency License
from the respondent.

(b) Similarly, the official from the National Insurance
Co. Ltd., who deposed as DW-2, submitted all
information, regarding renewal of the Agent License No.
040800/1/00089/90 of Yugal Gupta, valid till 22nd
October, 1993, which, vide renewed License No.
360700/NAT/96/00015, valid till 8th January, 2000. DW-
2 also confirmed that Yugal Gupta was working as an
agent, with National Insurance Co. Ltd., till date.

(c) This evidence, it was submitted, clearly indicated
that Yugal Gupta was an agent with United India, the
respondent, and continues to be an agent with the
National Insurance Co. Ltd. The allegation of his being a
"dummy agent" was, therefore, false. All these facts had
been admitted, by Yugal Gupta, deposing as MW-4,
during his cross-examination on 16th December, 1998,
but found no mention in the Report, of the EO, dated 16th
March, 1999.

In the circumstances, submitted the petitioner, the Enquiry Report was
not sustainable, as it had, without due justification, rejected the
petitioners request for appointing a Defence Assistant, rejected his
request for leading defence evidence, to the extent necessary, and not
afforded, to the petitioner, proper opportunity to cross-examine MW-4

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 13 of 55
Yugal Gupta. The Enquiry Report was, therefore, it was submitted,
based on surmises and conjecture, and was liable to be rejected.

12. The Manager of the respondent, as the disciplinary authority of
the petitioner, proceeded, on 11th May, 1999, to pass Order No.
NR/CDA/43/98, which constitutes the first order impugned in this
writ petition and deserves, therefore, to be reproduced, in extenso,
thus:

"O R D E R

WHEREAS the Major penalty proceedings were initiated in
terms of Rule 25 of General Insurance (CDA) Rules 1975
against Shri Rakesh Midha Dev. Officer C.B.O. 19, Bhogal
New Delhi vide our Charge Sheet 31-03-98 for the following
misconduct:

1. He manipulated to have a dummy Agency Code
No. 1623 in the name of Sh. Yugal Gupta under his
organisation to earn the agency commission and try to
camouflage the misdemeanour by producing a person
as Sh. Yugal Gupta who is, in fact, not an Agent.

2. He having put the business of M/s Tej
International under the said Agency, upon an
observation by the Audit, managed to submit a
certificate on the letter head of M/s Tej International
showing therein a paid-up capital of 6,50,000/- to
prove that there was nothing wrong in allowing the
Agency Commission since the paid-up capital was less
than 10,00,000 /-.

• On verification with M/s Tej International it
was confirmed by them vide their letter dated 11.09.97
that their paid-up capital as on 31.03.96 was
22,00,000/-. As such agency commission was not
payable. Sh. Rakesh Midha by producing a false
certificate of the paid up capital of M/s Tej
International caused wrongful loss to the company.
W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 14 of 55
3. He by the above acts wrongfully earned agency
commission to the tune of 3,57,852.70 during the
period Nov. 91 to June 96 under the name of Sh. Yugal
Gupta.

The Inquiry Officer Mrs. Usha Kashyap submitted her
report dt. 16.03.99 holding Mr. Rakesh Midha guilty
of all the charges. The copy of the report was sent to
him vide our letter dt. 17.03.99 for his representation,
if any, on the Inquiry Report.

AND WHEREAS the undersigned being the
Disciplinary Authority in the matter after having gone
through the chargesheet, his reply to the chargesheet
and after careful consideration of the entire case
records accepts the finding of the Inquiry Officer &
observes that the conduct of the Dev. officer is
blameworthy as the undersigned has sufficient and
good reasons to conclude that he was having a dummy
agency under code of 1623 in the name of the Sh.
Yugal Gupta and he had a person impersonating as Sh.
Yugal Gupta. Further he earned commission in respect
of business of M/s Tej International by producing a
certificate on their Letter-Head showing therein a paid
up capital of 6,50,000/-, when their paid-up capital
was 2200000/-, as on 31-03-96. Further he
wrongfully earned agency commission to the tune of
3,57,852.70 during the period from November 91 to
June 96 in the name of the Sh. Yugal Gupta.

NOW THEREFORE, the undersigned being the
Disciplinary Authority in the matter in exercise of
power in terms of Rule 26 of General Insurance (CDA)
Rules 1975 imposes the following penalties:

1. CENSURE

2. Reduction in existing basic pay by four
stages.

3. Recovering the amount of 3,57,852.70-
which is the agency commission wrongly earned

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 15 of 55
during the period November 91 to June 96 in the
name of Sh. Yugal Gupta.

The order of penalties comes into effect immediately
and Sh. Rakesh Midha DEV. OFFICER, be informed
accordingly and a copy of this order may be kept in his
personnel file.

-Sd/-
(P. MAHAJAN)
MANAGER
&
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY"

13. A statutory appeal, preferred, by the petitioner against the above
order of punishment, dated 11th May, 1999, was also rejected, by the
Assistant General Manager of the respondent, in his capacity as
appellate authority, vide order dated 16th May, 2000. The said order,
after reciting the facts of the issuance of charge-sheet to the petitioner,
submission of Enquiry Report by the EO, and the order, dated 11th
May, 1999, of the disciplinary authority and imposition of punishment
thereunder, proceeds to recite thus:

" WHEREAS Sh. Rakesh Midha has now preferred an
Appeal against the Order dt. 11/05/99 of the Disciplinary
Authority vide his Appeal dt. 26-05-99, wherein he has stated
that besides other contentions he denied having produced any
forged letter of M/s Tej International showing the paid up
capital of 6.50 lakhs, he was denied the statement of
account of Punjab National Bank and he denied having
produced any person by name Sh. Yugal Gupta before the
investigating officer.

WHEREAS the undersigned being the Assistant
General Manager and Appellate authority in exercise of
powers under Rule 37 of General Insurance (CDA) Rules,
1975 and after having examined the charges, the

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 16 of 55
representation of Sh. Rakesh Midha, the grounds of Appeal
and all other connected records in the matter observes that
there is no material evidence brought by the charged
employee on record and all the points raised by him in the
Appeal have already been considered and taken care of by the
Inquiry Officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority.
However his conduct is blameworthy as there are various
circumstantial evidences available on record to establish on
preponderance of probabilities that he was having a dummy
Agency in the name of Sh. Yugal Gupta and thereby earned
commission to the tune of 3,57,852.70. Hence, the
penalties imposed by the Disciplinary Authority are
commensurate with the misconduct committed by him. In the
circumstances the undersigned finds no reason to interfere
with the decision of the Disciplinary Authority.

In view of the foregoing, the appeal of Sh. Rakesh
Midha is rejected and in exercise of powers as the Appellate
Authority confirms the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority vide his Order dt. 11.05.99 which would meet the
ends of justice.

The appeal is thus disposed of and Sh. Rakesh Midha
may be informed suitably. A copy of the Order be kept in his
personal file."

14. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a "revision", challenging the
aforesaid appellate order, dated 16th May, 2000, which was treated as
a memorial and disposed of, by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director
(CMD) of the respondent, vide order dated 26th February, 2001. To the
extent it merits reproduction, the said order, dated 26th February, 2001,
of the CMD reads thus:

"AND WHEREAS Sh. Rakesh Midha has now preferred a
Memorial against the above Order and the undersigned being
the Chairman-cum-Managing Director and Competent
Authority to dispose of the said Memorial in terms of Rule 40
of General Insurance [Conduct, Discipline & Appeal] Rules,
1975 after carefully having gone through the charges, inquiry

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 17 of 55
findings, grounds of appeal, connected record of the matter
and particularly Memorial observe as under: -

1. The plea regarding amendment in the
Chargesheet is not tenable. The Disciplinary Authority
is at liberty to amend the Chargesheet and as long as
an opportunity is being given to the other party to
defend the same, the principles of Natural Justice are
not violated.

2. The plea regarding defence documents is also
not tenable. In Departmental Enquiry the charged
Officer is entitled to ask for the defence documents for
his defence which are relevant to the charge. He
cannot ask for a document which is not related to the
charge. The Enquiry Officer after examining the
demand for a particular document gives a ruling in this
regard after recording the reasons. Simply because the
Enquiry Officer denied a document on merits the
proceedings cannot stand vitiated.

3. Like-wise the Enquiry Officer allowing two
defence witnesses to be produced by the defence out of
the six demanded by them is also based on merits. The
Enquiry Officer is not expected to allow all the
witnesses demanded by the defence and is duty bound
to examine the relevancy of the witness to the charge
and the defence is allowed to produce only those
witnesses. This contention of Shri Rakesh Midha of
not allowing all the six witnesses is also not tenable.

4. The plea of the charged Officer that the
Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are
biased against him is not tenable. There is enough
documentary evidence brought on record by the
prosecution to prove the charges, and in the
Departmental Enquiries the standard of proof required
is that of "Preponderance of Probability" and not
"Proof beyond Doubt" as is required in criminal cases.

5. The plea of Shri Rakesh Midha that the
Disciplinary Authority cannot impose more than one
penalty on him is not tenable since according to Rule
23 of the General Insurance [Conduct, Discipline &

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 18 of 55
Appeal] Rules, 1975 "one or more penalties
(mentioned in the relevant Rule) for good and
sufficient reasons be imposed by the Competent
Authority."

In view of the above observations the undersigned does not
see any reason to interfere with the Penalty earlier imposed
by the Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the Appellate
Authority. The Penalty imposed is commensurate with the
misconduct committed by Shri Rakesh Midha. The Memorial
is disposed of with these observations."

15. Thus did it come to transpire that the petitioner approached this
Court, praying that the punishment order dated 11th May, 1999, the
appellate order dated 16th May, 2000 and the order, dated 26th
February, 2001, of the CMD, rejecting the Memorial of the petitioner,
be quashed and set aside, with consequential relief to him.

Analysis

16. I have heard, at length, Mr. Mahesh Srivastava, learned counsel
for the petitioner, and Mr Shoumik Mazumdar, learned Counsel for
the respondent, at length, and perused the pleadings and documents on
record.

17. It is trite and well-established, through a veritable phalanx of
judicial pronouncements over the years, that, while reviewing,
judicially, decisions taken in disciplinary proceedings, against
employees and officers, the writ court does not function as a court of
appeal. The jurisdiction of the writ court does not extend to
re-analysis, or re-examination of the evidence, as examined and

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 19 of 55
analysed by the disciplinary authority and, later, by the appellate
authority and, perchance, by the reviewing authority. The task of the
writ court is to ensure that the employee of the concerned gets a fair
deal, and that the procedure followed by the enquiry officer,
disciplinary authority and appellate/reviewing authority, is in
accordance with the statutory prescriptions in that regard, if any, as
well as the principles of natural justice and fair play. Once this bridge
is crossed, the writ court is to concern itself, with the factual findings,
of the authorities below, only with a view to examine whether they
suffer from "perversity". "Perversity", if found to exist, would vitiate
the findings, and entitled the employee, or Officer, to relief; absent
perversity, however, the examination of evidence must begin, and end,
with the authorities below, and cannot concern the writ court. The
possibility that, on the same evidence, the writ court may feel an
alternative conclusion to be more apposite, cannot justify interference,
by it, with the decision of the authorities below.

18. While examining whether procedural requisites have been met,
by the authorities below, however, the test of "prejudice" must apply;
breach of procedure, which does not result in prejudice, to the officer
employee concerned, is not to be treated as fatal. Though, ordinarily,
the onus to establish prejudice, is on the officer, or employee so
alleging, the writ court may, justifiably, in some circumstances, infer
the existence of prejudice - such as inordinate or unconscionable
delay in issuance of a charge-sheet, denial of adequate opportunity, to
the employee to defend the charges against him, reliance on material
undisclosed to the employee, and the like. Whether, in a given case,

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 20 of 55
prejudice has resulted, or not, is not an issue for which straight-
jacketed tests are available; ultimately, this is a matter in which the
writ court has to exercise its best judgment.

19. In the entire discretionary arena of the disciplinary procedure,
the only area in which a limited trespass, by the writ court, has been
held to be permissible, is in the matter of quantum of punishment.
Here, too, interference, with the quantum of punishment awarded by
the authorities below, is permissible only where the punishment, as
awarded, is found to be shockingly disproportionate - or, to use a
time-worn cliché, "shocks the conscience of the court". In examining
this aspect, however, the conscience of the court is expected to tread
the Wednesbury pathway; if the quantum of punishment is not
"unreasonable" by Wednesbury standards, it merits no interference.
Where, however, applying such standards, the quantum of
punishment, as meted out to the employee, or official, concerned, is
shockingly disproportionate, the writ court enjoys the authority to
substitute, in its place, a more befitting punishment.

20. These principles, then, delineate the peripheries of the arena
within which this Court may justifiably perambulate, in reviewing,
judicially, the decisions, of the disciplinary authority, the appellate
authority in the reviewing authority, in the present case, finding the
petitioner remiss in the discharge of his duties and, consequently,
awarding, to him, the punishment of censure, along with reduction of
basic pay by four stages.

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 21 of 55
21. I may observe, straightaway, that, in the present case, the
argument of proportionality is not available to the petitioner. The
punishment, as awarded to the petitioner was, if anything, lenient,
given the finding of culpability returned by the authorities below.
Indeed, Mr. Srivastava, fairly, did not press any such ground, either.
Rather, his submission was that the authorities below erred,
substantively as well as procedurally, in finding the charges, against
the petitioner, to have been proved.

22. Can the finding of culpability, as arrived at, by the disciplinary
authority, and upheld, subsequently, by the appellate and divisional
authorities, sustain judicial scrutiny?

Disallowance of representation by Defence Assistant

23. Exception has been taken, by the petitioner, to the disallowance,
by the EO, to him, of the facility of a Defence Assistant. The facts, as
noted hereinabove, disclose that the petitioner had, initially, sought to
avail the services of Yogesh Kumar, Senior Assistant, as his Defence
Assistant. However, on Yogesh Kumar declining to so act, the
petitioner desired to appoint R. L. Sharma, retired Assistant Manager,
United India, as his Defence Assistant. This request was declined, by
the EO, on the ground that the applicable guidelines did not permit
engagement of ex-employees of the Insurance industry, as defence
assistants in disciplinary proceedings.

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 22 of 55
24. The impugned disciplinary proceedings, against the petitioner,
were being conducted under the CDA Rules. Rule 25 of the said Rules
sets out the procedure, for imposing major penalties. Sub-rule (6),
thereof, allows a charged employee to "take the assistance of any
other employee", but proscribes engagement of a legal practitioner, as
his Defence Assistant. "Employee" is defined, in clause (g) of Rule 2
of the CDA Rules as meaning "any employee of the Corporation
and/or its subsidiaries other than casual, work charged or contingent
staff". "Corporation" is defined, in clause (e) of rule 2 as meaning "the
General Insurance Corporation of India referred to under Section 9 of
the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972". That the
respondent was a "subsidiary" of the General Insurance Corporation
of India, is apparent from sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of the CDA Rules,
which makes the said Rules applicable "to every person appointed to
any post under the General Insurance Corporation of India and/or its
subsidiary company/ies ..." The invocation, against the petitioner, and
the conducting of the impugned disciplinary proceedings, under the
CDA Rules, therefore, amounts to an acknowledgement of the fact
that, for the purpose of application of the said Rules, the respondent is
liable to be treated as a "subsidiary company" of the General
Insurance Corporation of India. The petitioner, therefore, qualifies as
an "employee", within the meaning of clause (g) of Rule 2 of the CDA
Rules.

25. In fact, research, conducted by this Court, reveals that National
Insurance, New India Assurance, the respondent and United India
Insurance, were the four subsidiaries of the General Insurance

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 23 of 55
Corporation of India and achieved autonomy consequent to the
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India Act, 1999.
In 1975, therefore, the respondent, as well as United India, were
subsidiary companies of the General Insurance Corporation of India.
Employees of both, i.e. of the respondent as well as of United India,
therefore, qualified as "employees", within the meaning of clause (g)
of Rule 2 of the CDA Rules.

26. To this extent, there is really no dispute. The ground, on which
the request, of the petitioner, to engage R. N. Sharma as his Defence
Assistant, was turned down, by the EO, was that the CDA Rules did
not permit engagement of an "ex-employee" as a Defence Assistant.

27. This, in my view, however, would amount to according, to
clause (6) in Rule 25 of the CDA Rules, an unduly narrow
interpretation. Admittedly, the CDA Rules do not expressly proscribe
the engagement, of a retired employee, as a defence Assistant. The
EO - and, later, the disciplinary authority, the Appellate Authority and
the CMD of the respondent - have chosen to apply, to sub-Rule (6) of
Rule 25, a hyper-technical construction, by interpreting the expression
"employee" as a person who was currently, i.e. at the time of
conducting of the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, an
employee. In my opinion, this amounts to hair-splitting, resulting in
denial, to the petitioner, due opportunity.

28. While interpreting clauses, in the CDA Rules, providing for
technical and procedural requirements in the conducting of

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 24 of 55
disciplinary proceedings against an employee, it must be borne in
mind that an individual is pitted against an institution and is, therefore,
already severely handicapped. It is the institution which has issued the
charge-sheet to the employee, and it is the institution itself that
adjudicates it. The EO, as well as the DA, are employees of the very
institution which has charged the concerned officer with misconduct,
and is adjudicating on the charge. While these may not, legally, be
inhibiting circumstances, they admittedly place the employee at a
disadvantage, and it is imperative, therefore, that technical and
procedural stipulations, governing the conduct of the disciplinary
proceedings, are expansively interpreted, with a view to extending, to
the employee - who stands alone - maximum possible opportunity to
defend himself. Else, there is failure of due process.

29. There is no dispute about the fact that R. N. Sharma, during the
tenure of his service with United India, qualified as an "employee",
within the meaning of clause (g) of Rule 2 of the CDA Rules. In my
considered opinion, and according, to sub-Rule (6) of Rule 25 of the
CDA Rules, a purposive interpretation, he could not be treated as
having ceased to be an "employee", for the purpose of application of
the said sub-Rule, and his engagement, as Defence Assistant,
thereunder, in the absence of any such indication, in the body of the
Rules, either express or necessarily to be implied, to be vitiated. The
principle of purposive interpretation has, in Shailesh Dhairyawan v.
Mohan Balkrishna Lulla1 and Richa Mishra v. State of

1
2015 (11) SCALE 84

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 25 of 55
Chhattisgarh2, been held to have, with the evolution of the law,
overtaken the principle of "literal construction" as the "golden rule" of
interpretation of statutory instruments.

30. I may observe, in this context, that a Division Bench of the
High Court of Rajasthan has, in D. K. Chaplot v. Regional Manager,
National Insurance Co.3, taken the same view. I express my
respectful concurrence with the said decision.

31. The disallowance, by the EO, of the request, of the petitioner, to
engage R. N. Sharma, as his Defence Assistant has, therefore,
necessarily to be held to have been infracted Rule 25 (6) of the CDA
Rules.

32. A right to due representation is a fundamental facet of due
process, and of natural justice and fair play. Where, therefore, the
applicable Rules, governing the disciplinary proceedings, permit the
engagement of a Defence Assistant, and the EO does not extend, to
the employee, the said permission, the proceedings stand entirely
vitiated, for want of grant of due opportunity to the charged officer.4

33. This submission of the petitioner, as articulated, before me, by
Mr. Srivastava, therefore, merits acceptance.

2
JT 2016 (2) SC 106
3
(2002) 3 SLR 536 (Raj - DB)
4
Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1983) 2 SCC 442, C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of
Customs, Cochin, (1973) 3 SCC 542, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Ashok Kumar, 2017 SCC OnLine Del
6760; Management of Jhabban Lal Dav Secondary School v. K. M. Yadav, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9097;
Kanhaiya Lal v. UOI; MANU/GH/0104/2018

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 26 of 55
On merits

34. Proceeding, now, to the meat of the matter.

35. There are, essentially, two allegations against the petitioner.
The first was that, in order to fraudulently enrich himself by agency
commission, to the tune of 3,57,852.70, the petitioner created a
dummy, or fictitious agent, by name Yugal Gupta, into whose account
agency commission was deposited and, subsequently, was withdrawn
by the petitioner, using cheques, allegedly signed by Yugal Gupta in
advance. The second was that the petitioner had misrepresented the
paid-up capital of M/s Tej International as 6,50,000/-, instead of the
actual figure of 20,00,000/-, so as to make it appear that Yugal
Gupta, as the agent for Tej International, was entitled to agency
commission.

36. Para 1 of the Articles of Charge against the petitioner, which
dealt with the first of the above two allegations, read thus:

"He manipulated to have a dummy Agency Code No. 1623 in
the name of Sh. Yugal Gupta under his organisation to earn
the agency commission and tried to camouflage the
misdemeanour by producing a person as Sh. Yugal Gupta
who in fact is not an Agent having Agency Code No. 1623"

37. The corresponding paragraphs, in the Statement of Misconduct,
following the Articles of Charge, dealing with the aforesaid allegation,
read thus:

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 27 of 55
"One Sh. Yugal Gupta is working as an Agent under the
Organisation of Sh. Rakesh Midha under Agency code no.-
1623. In the name of Sh. Yugal Gupta there is a S. B. A/c.
No.- 29223 in PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK, Bhogal which
was introduced by Sh. Rakesh Midha. As per the Agency
Renewal application of the Sh. Yugal Gupta his Residential
address has been shown as B-1/30, Model Town, Delhi-
110009. However, upon verification it was found that
although one Sh. Yugal Gupta is residing at the said address,
neither he has anything to do with the Insurance Agency no.-
1623, nor he has the S. B. A/c. No.- 29223 with Punjab
National Bank, Bhogal.

Sh. Rakesh Midha produced a person before Mr. S. C. S.
Bisht, A. M., Vigilance Cell, New Delhi who was stated to be
Sh. Yugal Gupta, Agent. The said person, as a proof of his
identity handed over a Photocopy of his Driving License No.-
56318 indicating therein his Residential Address as B-56,
Railway Road Karnal (Haryana). As per the said Yugal
Gupta, up to March '96 he was staying at Model Town and
then shifted to Karnal whereas as stated above this was
denied by Sh. Yugal Gupta who is the resident of Model
Town. Thus it is clear that Sh. Rakesh Midha stage managed
a person as Sh. Yugal Gupta to camouflage his misdemeanour
of having a dummy agency and a dummy Bank Account in
order to earn wrongful Agency commission.

It is further stated by the Sr. Branch Manager, B.O.- Bhogal,
Sh. S. K. Samantaray in his statement dt. 09/12/96 that the
Agency commission cheques in the name of Sh. Yugal Gupta
were taken by Sh. Rakesh Midha used to give him presigned
cheques for withdrawing the amount from Sh. Yugal Gupta.
He has stated in his statement dated 27/11/96 that Sh. Rakesh
Midha used to give him presigned cheques for withdrawing
the amount from Sh. Yugal Gupta's Account.

Thus Sh. Rakesh Midha, Dev. Officer wrongfully earned
agency commission under the name of Sh. Yugal Gupta as
detailed below:

Nov '91 to March '92 18949.10
April '92 to March '93 74941.85
April '93 to March '94 63833.30
April '94 to March '95 86576.00

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 28 of 55
April '95 to March '96 98299.65
April '96 to June '96 15252.80
357852.70

The Agency Commission was released on the basis of
certification of the identity of the agent by Sh. Rakesh Midha
by attestation of the signature of the agent. This has been
confirmed by the Sr. Branch Manager."

38. The specific ingredients of allegation against the petitioner
were, therefore, that (i) the agency commission cheques, in the name
of Yugal Gupta, were taken by the petitioner, (ii) the petitioner used to
give pre-signed cheques, for withdrawing the amount from the
account of Yugal Gupta, (iii) for this purpose, the signature of Yugal
Gupta was verified by the petitioner, (iv) the person at the address
reflected in the Agency Renewal application of Yugal Gupta (B-1/30,
Model Town), however, though bearing the same name (Yugal
Gupta), claimed to have nothing to do with the Insurance Agency No.
1623, or with the Savings Bank account No. 29223, held by the
alleged agent, Yugal Gupta, with the PNB, and (v) though the
petitioner produced, before Bisht, a person, who identified himself as
Yugal Gupta and handed over, as proof of identity, a photo copy of his
driving license, and who claimed to have been residing at Model
Town till March 1996, this fact was denied by the person (Yugal
Gupta) actually found residing at B-1/30, Model Town. On the basis
thereof, it was alleged that an impersonator had been produced, by the
petitioner, as being Yugal Gupta, and that, in fact, the petitioner had
created a dummy agent, a dummy agency, and a dummy bank
account, so as to wrongfully enrich himself, with the Agency

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 29 of 55
Commission amount, deposited in the name of the allegedly fictitious
Yugal Gupta.

39. The EO has, in her Enquiry Report dated 16th March, 1999,
referred to the evidence of the Management Witnesses and the
Defence Witnesses, and has gone on to opine that, in view of the said
evidence, read with the brief of the Presenting Officer, the charge,
against the petitioner, stood proved.

40. As has already been observed, hereinabove, the parameters of
judicial review, inherent in this Court by virtue of Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, do not permit a re-appreciation of evidence,
already appreciated by the EO. At the same time, this Court is bound
to examine whether the manner in which the evidence was appreciated
by the EO suffers from perversity. Triveni Rubber & Plastics v.
Collector of Central Excise5 contains the following, authoritative,
definition of "perversity", applied in the context of discharge of
judicial, or quasi-judicial, functions:

"An order suffers from perversity, if relevant piece of
evidence has not been considered or if certain inadmissible
material has been taken into consideration or where it can be
said that the findings of the authorities are based on no
evidence at all or if they are so perverse that no reasonable
person would have arrived at those findings."

This definition has, later, been cited, by the Supreme Court itself, in
Prem Kaur v. State of Punjab6.

5
1994 Supp (3) SCC 665
6
(2013) 14 SCC 653

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 30 of 55
41. The person who was, allegedly, produced by the petitioner,
before Bisht, claiming him to be Yugal Gupta, Agent, tendered the
following statement:

"This is to bring to your kind notice that I, Yugal Gupta S/o
late B. B. Gupta is residence of A-56-59 Railway Road
Karnal.

My nature of job previously was of insurance vide agency no.
1623 with Bhogal Branch. Now I am doing my trading
business of polythene bags and rolls. I became agent about
4/5 years back. I have opened a SB A/c with PNB no. 29223
at Bhogal. This account was introduced by my Development
Officer Shri Rakesh Midha. I am still operating that account
myself.

I was earlier living in Delhi till March 1996. I was staying in
Model Town. I do not remember the house no. I was helping
my father in his business at that time. My father expired in
July 5th, 1996. The House at Model Town was on rent. Now I
and all my close relatives are in Karnal. No relative is in
Delhi. My father and Shri Mr. Midha's father were known to
each other therefore I know Mr. Rakesh for many years.

I have opened my account in Bhogal PNB because it was near
to Oriental I have no other account in Delhi. This account is
operated duly for agency commission. I was collecting the
cheques of my commission from the oriental and depositing
in PNB. I have issued some cheques in the name of Mrs. Laj
Devi (mother of Shri Rakesh Midha) Mrs. Seema Midha
(Mrs. Of Mr. Midha) and Shri S. L. Midha also. One cheque
was issued in the name of Jupiter consultant. These cheques
were issued because I was collecting cash from respected
parties from time to time. I have also issued a cheque for
6779 in favour of Oriental which was against some insurance
policy, where premium was not received by me from that
party. One cheque was issued to Shri Rakesh Midha 12550.
I was canvassing the business on behalf of oriental and Shri
Rakesh Midha was issuing the Cover notes. I had neither the
cover note book nor the authority to issue the cover note. I

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 31 of 55
have requested Mr. Rakesh Midha to close my agency with
oriental, the account is still open but there is no transaction in
it.

Perusal of license for Agency renewal dated nil bears my
signature. This form was not filled by me. I am signing this
form today. This signature (Yugal) is my original signature
which is in PNB Account no. 29223.

I am submitting a photocopy of my D/licence 56318 which
also I am signing I have also brought the cheque book which
has ch. No. 044210 to 044220 as blank. I am giving my once
cheque 044210 with my signature as my specimen.

Sd/-
Yugal"

42. On 31st January, 1998, Yugal Gupta, residing at B-1/30, Model
Town, responding to certain queries addressed by the respondent,
asserted that the signature, on the License No. DO/040800/1/00089,
expiring on 22nd October, 1993, was not his, that he was not the
deponent to the statement, allegedly made by Yugal Gupta, that he
had no Account No. 29223 in PNB, Jangpura, that the signature, on
Cheque No. 044210 was not his, that the Driving License No. 56318
was also not his, that he was not a resident of B-56, Railway Road,
Karnal, and that he had not received any commission from the
respondent.

43. Yugal Gupta, the signatory to the above-mentioned letter dated
31st January, 1998, also deposed as a Management Witness, during the
enquiry proceedings. In his examination-in-chief, Yugal Gupta denied
the signatures, on the application for renewal of agency license,
Cheque No. 044210, of PNB, Jangpura, and on the payment voucher,
W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 32 of 55
whereby agency commission was paid to Yugal Gupta on 1st May,
1995, asserting that they were not his. In cross-examination, however,
Yugal Gupta admitted (i) having applied, for Agency, with the
respondent, on the basis of the Agency License issued by United India
Insurance Company limited, (ii) the signatures, on the said application
for license, submitted to the respondent, as being his, and (iii) having
taken commission, from the Bhogal branch of the respondent.

44. Bisht, too, deposed, during the enquiry proceedings, as a
Management Witness. In his examination-in-chief, Bisht testified that
the petitioner had produced a person, introducing him as Yugal Gupta,
on 20th November, 1996, and that he had recorded the statement of the
said person, who produced a driving license and Cheque No. 044210,
of PNB Jangpura, with his signature. He also confirmed that the
Agency Commission voucher No. 00074, dated 1st May, 1995,
whereunder agency commission had been paid to Yugal Gupta,
contained, on the reverse thereof, the signature of Yugal Gupta,
certified by the petitioner. Bisht was cross-examined by the
petitioner, and testified, therein, that the person, stated to be Yugal
Gupta, had been produced by the petitioner after various requests had
been made, to him, by Bisht and other officers. He also drew attention,
during his cross-examination, to the statement made by Yugal Gupta,
before him on 20th November, 1996, to the effect that he had issued
cheques in favour of family members of the petitioner. He confirmed
that, on 20th November, 1996, he had obtained the signature of Yugal
Gupta on the Agency License No. DO/00020/95. At the same time, he
admitted that the statement of Yugal Gupta had been taken, by him, in

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 33 of 55
the absence of anyone else, and that, during the recording of the said
statement, the petitioner was seated outside the room.

45. Examining the legality and propriety of the findings against the
petitioner, as entered by the EO and upheld, successively, by the
disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the CMD of the
respondent, the first feature, which becomes immediately apparent, is
the complete lack of reasons, at any stage of the proceedings. The EO,
under the heading "Evaluation of C.E.'s Report", in her Enquiry
Report dated 16th March, 1999, merely states that, "regarding the
remaining points as mentioned in his report every point has been
clarified and recorded in the order sheets from 1 to 23 and in my
enquiry report now being submitted to the Disciplinary Authority".
Thereafter, the "Conclusion", which follows, is, admittedly, "based on
the evidences, management witnesses produced and the P.O. Brief".
Apparently, therefore, the defence, of the petitioner, to the allegations
against him, did not, in the EO's opinion, warrant serious
consideration at all. Following this observation, the EO holds that the
allegations, against the petitioner, stood established. No evidence of
independent appreciation, by the EO, of the material on record, or the
contentions advanced by the petitioner, in his defence, are
forthcoming in the Enquiry Report.

46. The petitioner submitted his representation, against the Enquiry
Report, on 1st April, 1999. The various points, raised by the petitioner
that the said representation, already stand enumerated in para 11
supra. The Order of punishment, dated 11th May, 1999, passed by the

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 34 of 55
disciplinary authority, however, far from reflecting any appreciation
of the aforesaid representation, dated 1st April, 1999, submitted by the
petitioner, does not even deign to make reference thereto. The
disciplinary authority, admittedly, has passed the impugned Order,
dated 11th May, 1999 "after having gone through the chargesheet, his
reply to the chargesheet and after careful consideration of the entire
case records". No reference, to the representation, dated 1st April,
1999, submitted by the petitioner, finds place in the said order.
Neither is there, in the Order, a single word, reflecting independent
appreciation of mind, by the disciplinary authority, or any finding that
may be treated as having returned by the disciplinary authority. All
that the disciplinary authority states is that, after having gone through
the charge-sheet, the reply, of the petitioner, to the charge-sheet and
considering the entire case records, he "accepts the findings of the
Inquiry Officer & observes that the conduct of (the petitioner) (was)
blameworthy". What follows, thereafter, in the said paragraph of the
Order, dated 11th May, 1999, is merely a reiteration of the allegations
in the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner.

47. Equally perfunctory, unfortunately, was the Order, dated 16th
May, 2000, passed by the appellate authority, which merely observes
that no "material evidence" had been brought on record by the
petitioner, and that "all the points raised by him in the appeal (had)
already been considered and taken care of by the Inquiry Officer as
well as the Disciplinary Authority." Nevertheless, observes the said
Order, the petitioner's "conduct (was) blameworthy as there (were)
various circumstantial evidences available on record to establish on

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 35 of 55
preponderance of probabilities that he was having a dummy Agency in
the name of Sh. Yugal Gupta and thereby earned commission to the
tune of 357,852.70".

48. The Order, dated 26th February, 2001 (also impugned in the writ
petition), passed by the CMD, dismissing the memorial, submitted by
the petitioner against the aforesaid appellate Order dated 16th May,
2000, merely records findings regarding the challenge to the
amendment, by the EO, of the charge-sheet after commencement of
enquiry, non-furnishing of defence documents (to which I would
allude, in some greater detail, hereinafter), the decision, of the EO to
allow only two defence witnesses, and the plea of bias and double
jeopardy. No finding, regarding the submissions, by the petitioner,
apropos the merits of the allegations, against him, finds place, in the
said Order, of the CMD, either.

49. The disciplinary authority, appellate authority and, if so
available, the revisionary authority, concerned with disciplinary
proceedings against an employee of an organisation, exercise quasi-
judicial, not pseudo-judicial, functions. While the law does not
require, or even expect, orders, passed by these authorities, which
constitute, essentially, part of the administrative hierarchy of the
organisation, they cannot afford to be perfunctory, either. The
consequences, of a disciplinary proceeding, on an employee, are often
more psychosocially, then materially, damaging. The image of the
employee gets irretrievably tarnished and, often, even if the employee
succeeds before a Court of law, the damage done is irreversible. It is

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 36 of 55
of utmost essence, therefore, that decisions taken by authorities, in the
administration, dealing with such issues on a quasi-judicial basis,
reflect due awareness, on their part, of the gravity thereof. Among the
most fundamental requisites, of such discharge, is the providing of
reasons, while holding against the employee, or officer, concerned.

50. A comparison, of the allegations against the petitioner, vis-à-vis
the petitioner's defence, and the evidence that emerged, reveals the
following:

(i) The charge, against the petitioner, as levelled in the
charge-sheet dated 31st March, 1998, could, essentially, be sub-
divided into four ingredients, viz.
(a) that the petitioner had created a dummy agency,
with Agency Code No. 1623, in the name of a dummy
agent Yugal Gupta, in whose name a dummy Savings
Bank Account No. 29223 had also been opened with the
PNB, Jangpura Branch,
(b) that agency commission, deposited in the said bank
account, was withdrawn, by the petitioner, by presenting,
to Samantaray, pre-signed cheques, purporting to bear the
signature of the fictitious agent Yugal Gupta,
(c) that, when questioned in this regard, the petitioner
produced, before Bisht, a person, who claimed to be
Yugal Gupta, holding an Agency with the respondent,
and also claimed to have been staying in Model Town,
before shifting to Karnal, and

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 37 of 55
(d) that the petitioner submitted a false certificate,
dated 10th November, 1995, on the letterhead of Tej
International, reflecting its paid-up capital to be
6,50,000/-, so as to illegally avail agency commission,
whereas Tej International, in its letter dated 11th
September, 1997, intimated that it is paid-up capital, on
31st March, 1996, was 22,00,000/-.

(ii) In his reply, dated 6th May, 1998, to the charge-sheet, the
petitioner asserted thus:

(a) Yugal Gupta could not be regarded as a dummy, or
fictitious, agent. He had been working as an agent, with
the respondent, since 1991, prior to which he was
working as an agent with United India, vide Agency
License No. 040800/1/89/90, which continued from 23rd
October, 1990 to 22nd October, 1993. In fact, he had been
permitted to work, as an agent, by the respondent, on the
basis of the said earlier agency, held by him with United
India.

(b) Agency commission, on behalf of agents, was
often collected by the concerned Development Officers,
in whose branch the agent worked, so that the agent
would not have to daily visit the respondent. All agency
commission, paid to Yugal Gupta, was duly credited in
the account of Yugal Gupta. The petitioner had never

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 38 of 55
withdrawn any amount from the said account, and there
was no evidence to justify this allegation.

(c) The allegation, of the petitioner having submitted a
false certificate, of Tej international, in which its paid-up
capital was wrongly shown, was also denied. The
veracity of the letter, dated 11th September, 1997,
purportedly written by Tej International, on which the
charge-sheet placed reliance, was also questioned.

(iii) In order to establish these assertions, advanced by him in
his defence, the petitioner, vide letter dated 13th October, 1998,
sought for, inter alia, copies of
(a) the application for agency, submitted by Yugal
Gupta to the respondent,
(b) Agents License No. 040800/1/00089, issued by
United India to Yugal Gupta, valid till 22nd October,
1993,
(c) Agents License No. DO/00028/95, issued to Yugal
Gupta by the respondent,
(d) the letter, addressed by the Bhogal Branch of the
respondent, recommending renewal of the said Agents
License issue to Yugal Gupta,
(e) Commission Payment Vouchers, reflecting
payment made to Yugal Gupta for the period November,
1991 to May, 1996, and

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 39 of 55
(f) the statement of Savings Bank Account No. 29223,
held by Yugal Gupta with the PNB, Jangpura, for the
period November, 1991 to May, 1996.

(iv) These documents were, ex facie, necessary, in order to
enable the petitioner to defend the charges against him. The
Agents License No. 040800/1/00089, issued by United India,
may have established that Yugal Gupta had, in fact, been a
registered Agent with United India, even before joining as an
agent with the respondent. The actual fact of agency, of Yugal
Gupta, with the respondent, may have been established by the
Agency Application, submitted by him to the respondent,
Agents License No. DO/00028/95, issued to him by the
respondent and the letter, of the respondent, recommending the
renewal thereof. The statement of the Savings Bank account,
held by Yugal Gupta with the PNB, Jangpura, for the period
November 1991 to May, 1996, may have indicated whether any
amounts, as allegedly withdrawn by the petitioner had, in fact,
so been withdrawn (though this would, even if established, not
have proved the allegation that the petitioner had withdrawn the
amount and misappropriated it). I use the expression "may"
studiedly, as this Court does not intend to enter into any
examination of the evidence, thereby donning the mantle of the
EO, or of the DA; the relevance of the documents, sought by
the petitioner cannot, nevertheless, be gainsaid.

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 40 of 55
(v) The Enquiry Report, dated 16th March, 1999, of the EO,
rejected the petitioners request for being provided copies of the
above mentioned documents, not on the ground that the
documents did not exist, but because "they had no relevance in
the present enquiry because the enquiry pertains to a period
when the Agency of Shri Yugal Gupta was fully functioning
under Shri Midha and there is no base to prove or contest the
origin of the agency". To my mind, this finding of the Enquiry
Officer, and the decision of the Enquiry Officer to deny, to the
petitioner, the documents sought by him, are manifestly
violative of the principles of natural justice, and also suffer
from perversity. The observation, of the EO, that "the enquiry
pertains to a period when the agency of Shri Yugal Gupta was
fully functioning under Sh. Midha and there is no base to prove
or contest the origin of the agency", in fact, itself negates the
allegation, in the charge-sheet, that Yugal Gupta was a dummy
agent. In observing thus, the EO impliedly accepts the fact that
an agent, by name Yugal Gupta was, in fact, working with the
respondent. This observation, in fact, takes the wind away from
the sails, as it were, of the most fundamental allegation in the
charge-sheet, as levelled against the petitioner. Besides, the
observation is clearly perverse, as it fails to notice -
intentionally or otherwise - the fact that the charge-sheet
against the petitioner was premised on the assumption that
Yugal Gupta, into whose account agency commission was paid
and, subsequently, misappropriated by the petitioner, was a
dummy/fictitious agent. It is impossible to understand,

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 41 of 55
therefore, how the EO held that there was "no base to prove or
contest the origin of the agency". The EO had, therefore, either
not even understood the Government of the allegations against
the petitioner, or was determined not to allow documents to the
petitioner, on one ground or the other.

(vi) The inequity inherent in the above approach of the EO is
underscored by the fact that as many as ten documents were
permitted to be produced by the respondent-Management. The
EO, thereby, ensured that the petitioner would not be provided
with a level playing field, which is the sine qua non of due
process and fair play.

(vii) In the opinion of this Court, ordinarily, documents sought
by a charged officer, the providing of which lies within the
power of the management/establishment, ought to be provided
to him. The EO is not, ordinarily, expected to sit in appeal over
the decision of the charged officer, regarding the documents
which, according to him, are necessary for his defence. Of
course, if it does not lie within the province of the management,
to provide the said documents, or if the request for documents
is found to be manifestly unreasonable, or a deliberate attempt
to protect, or otherwise frustrate, the disciplinary proceedings,
the request for providing documents may be denied. In such an
event, however, the precise reason for denying the said request
would necessarily have to find place in the Enquiry Report.
The reasons cited by the EO, in the Enquiry Report, dated 16th

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 42 of 55
March, 1999, in the present case, i.e., that the documents,
requested by the petitioner, were not relevant to the enquiry,
conveniently omits to notice the fact that the documents were,
in fact, extremely necessary, for the petitioner to be able to
establish the points raised, by him, in his defence. They cannot,
therefore, sustain.

(viii) Insofar as the rejection, by the EO, of the request, of the
petitioner, to lead the evidence of as many as four, out of six
defence witnesses named by him, is concerned, the Enquiry
Report records that the "remaining witnesses were not relevant
to the present enquiry". I am unable to appreciate this finding.
The very substratum of the charge, against the petitioner, was
that he had set up an impersonator, representing him to be an
agent of the respondent. Reliance has been placed, in the
Enquiry Report, on the statement, allegedly tendered by the said
impersonator, before Bisht, as well as the statement of Yugal
Gupta, stated to have been found residing at B-1/30, Model
Town. When, by leading the evidence of these witnesses, the
respondent was permitted, by the EO, to support its allegation
that the gentleman, produced by the petitioner and stated, by
him, to be Yugal Gupta was, actually, an impersonator, it stands
to reason that the petitioner had to be given adequate
opportunity to establish otherwise. The proposed witnesses at S.
Nos. 3 to 6 of the letter dated 27th November, 1998 supra,
especially Anand Singh Rawat, agent, LIC and Baljeet Singh
Anand, agent of the respondent itself, could have confirmed,

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 43 of 55
one way or the other, whether the person, produced by the
petitioner, and alleged to be an impersonator was, in fact, an
impersonator. The EO has not condescended to provide any
justification for her finding that the persons, named at S. Nos. 3
to 6 of the letter, dated 27th November, 1998, were not relevant
to the enquiry against the petitioner. In Hardwari Lal v. State
of U.P.7, the Supreme Court declared the entire disciplinary
enquiry, against the appellant, before it, to be vitiated on the
sole ground that two relevant witnesses had not been produced
in the witness-box. There is no reason why this principle would
not apply, even in a case in which the charged officer is
prevented from producing evidence, of witnesses relevant for
his defence. The wholesale rejection, by the EO, of the request,
of the petitioner, to lead the evidence of the said persons, with
no reason, therefor, being forthcoming, has also, therefore,
necessarily to be regarded as arbitrary and violative of the
principles of natural justice.

(ix) Proceeding to the evidence that emerged during the
course of the enquiry, the following aspects are significant:

(a) Regarding the allegation that the petitioner had
created a dummy agent, a dummy agency, and a dummy
bank account, and had withdrawn agency commission,
from the said bank account, deposited in the name of the
dummy agent Yugal Gupta:

7
(1999) 8 SCC 582

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 44 of 55
(i) This allegation was based, essentially on the
alleged denial, by Yugal Gupta, residing at B-1/30,
Model Town, of any connection with Agency
Code No. 1623, or with the Savings Bank account
No. 29223, with PNB, Jangpura, and on the
statement, of Samantaray, to the effect that the
petitioner was withdrawing the agency
commission, deposited in the name of the alleged
dummy agent Yugal Gupta, in the aforesaid
Savings Bank account, using cheques, pre-signed
by Yugal Gupta.

(ii) In his reply to the charge-sheet, the
petitioner denied the allegation that Yugal Gupta
was a dummy, or fictitious, agent, set up by him in
order to earn unlawful agency commission. He
pointed out that Yugal Gupta had, in fact, been
working as an Agent which the respondent, since
1991, prior to which he was an Agent with United
India, with Agent's License No. 040800/1/89/90,
which was valid from 23rd October, 1990 to 22nd
October, 1993, and that he had, in fact, been
permitted to work as an agent, by the respondent,
on the basis of the said license, held by him with
United India from a prior point of time. Insofar as
collection of Agency Commission was concerned,
the petitioner contended that it was a matter of

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 45 of 55
normal practice for Agency Commission to be
collected by Development Officers, on behalf of
the Agents, so as to obviate the requirement of the
Agents visiting the respondent's office. The
petitioner categorically denied having ever
misappropriated any amount, from the account of
Yugal Gupta, and pointed out that there was no
evidence to support this allegation.

(iii) MW-4 Yugal Gupta admitted, during cross-
examination,
(a) that he was the holder of Agents
License No. 040800/1/89/90, of United
India, which was valid till 22nd October,
1993
(b) having applied for agency, with the
respondent, on the basis of the earlier
Agents License No. 040800/1/00089/90,
issued by United India and held by him,
(c) consequent to the application having
been allowed, having started working, as an
Agent, with the respondent, from May,
1991, and
(d) having applied, to the respondent, for
renewal of agency, whereupon he was
issued License No. DO/00028/95, by the
respondent, valid till 21st October, 1996, and

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 46 of 55
(e) having availed agency commission,
from the respondent.

(iv) The petitioner, too, produced a letter, dated
17th February, 1998, issued by United India,
acknowledging that Agents License No.
040800/1/89/90 had been issued to Yugal Gupta,
resident of B-1/30, Model Town. A copy of the
application, submitted by MW-4 Yugal Gupta, for
renewal of the said Agency with United India, was
also produced by R. K. Gupta, who testified as a
defence witness on behalf of the petitioner. He was
not cross-examined.

(v) Bisht, testifying as MW- 2 during enquiry,
also admitted that Agency License No.
DO/00028/95, valid till 21st October, 1996, had
been issued to MW- 4 Yugal Gupta, on the basis of
the Agents License No. 040800/1/00089/90, issued
to him by United India.

(vi) MW- 1 Samantaray, in cross-examination,
confirmed that, as a matter of practice, payment of
agency commission was given to Development
Officers, except where the agent concerned
himself visits the office of the respondent. The
petitioner's submission that collection of the

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 47 of 55
agency commission of Yugal Gupta, by him, was
not irregular, was therefore, supported by the
evidence, during enquiry, of the witness of the
management itself.

(vii) Bisht, testifying during the enquiry
proceedings as MW- 2, acknowledged that the
Agency Commission cheques had been submitted,
not by the petitioner, but by Yugal Gupta himself.

(viii) The petitioner categorically denied having
withdrawn any amount, from the account of the
agent Yugal Gupta. Bisht, in cross-examination,
also admitted never having checked the account of
Yugal Gupta, to ascertain whether the amount of
3,57,852.70 had been deposited in the said
account, and had, or had not, been withdrawn
therefrom.

Cumulatively seen, the above evidence could, prima
facie, lead to an inference that, in fact, MW-4 Yugal
Gupta, resident of the B-1/30, Model Town, was working
as an agent, with the respondent, and that he had been
permitted, initially, to work as an agent on the basis of
Agency License No. 040800/1/00089/90, issued to him
by United India, whereafter he applied for renewal of
agency, and was issued Agents License No.

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 48 of 55
DO/00028/95 by the respondent, valid till 21st October,
1996. It also appears that MW-4 Yugal Gupta had,
indeed, availed agency commission from the respondent.
Insofar as the allegation of the agency commission
cheques, payable to the agent Yugal Gupta, having been
handed over to the petitioner, while the correctness of
this allegation is doubtful on facts, Samantaray
confirmed that this was part of normal practice in the
respondent-institution. No evidence, of any amount
having been withdrawn, by the petitioner, from the
agency commission deposited in the account of Yugal
Gupta, came on record and, rather, Bisht, testifying on
behalf of the respondent during enquiry, acknowledged
that he had not checked the account of Yugal Gupta, inter
alia regarding the amount of 3,57,852.70.

(b) Re. the allegation that the petitioner had produced
an impersonator as Yugal Gupta:

The petitioner categorically denied this allegation and, in
fact, in his various representations and appeal,
consequent to the decision of the disciplinary authority,
pointed out that there was no evidence, supporting this
allegation. The submission merited consideration. In
fact, the only material, to support the said allegation, was
the statement of Bisht, who testified that the petitioner
had produced the "fictitious" Yugal Gupta before him,
and that he had recorded his statement. Strangely,
W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 49 of 55
however, the statement was recorded in the absence of
the petitioner, with the petitioner being made to sit
outside the room, as admitted by. There is no explanation
therefor. Even more significantly, there is no explanation
for why the respondent did not choose to lead the
evidence of the said allegedly "fictitious" Yugal Gupta,
as a Management Witness. In Hardwari Lal7, as already
noted hereinabove, the Supreme Court declared the entire
disciplinary enquiry, against the appellant, before it, to be
vitiated on the sole ground that two relevant witnesses
had not been produced in the witness-box.

There is substance in the submission, of Mr. Srivastava,
that the very allegation, in the charge-sheet issued to his
client, with respect to Tej International, is difficult to
understand. The certificate, dated 30th November, 1995,
submitted by the petitioner on the letterhead of the Tej
International, reflecting its paid-up capital to be
6,50,000/-, is sought to be castigated as a
misrepresentation, on the ground of a subsequent
communication, dated 11th September, 1997, allegedly by
Tej International, reflecting the paid-up capital, of the
said Company, as 22,00,000/-, on 31st March, 1996.
Mr. Srivastava submits that, even if it were to be
assumed that, on 31st March, 1996, the paid-up capital of

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 50 of 55
Tej International Private Limited was 22,00,000/-,
that, by itself, did not indicate the paid-up capital of
6,50,000/-, as on 30th November, 1995, to be a
misrepresentation. That apart, the respondent did not
choose to lead the evidence of Tej International, and the
petitioner specifically drew the attention, of the EO, the
disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the
CMD of the respondent, to the fact that Tej International
had never specifically disowned the letter dated 30th
November, 1995.

51. I have already observed, hereinabove, that the jurisdiction of a
writ court, exercising judicial review over disciplinary proceedings,
and the decisions taken therein by the competent authority/authorities,
is not appellate in character. This Court does not, therefore, revisit the
evidence, or sit and wait to arrive at any conclusion, this way or that,
regarding the correctness of the charges against the employee, or
official, concerned. The jurisdiction exercised by this Court, in such
cases, is essentially of the nature of certiorari, concerned more with
the manner in which the authorities below have acted, rather than with
the merits of their decisions. At the same time, perversity, as also
noted hereinabove, vitiates the acts of the authorities below. A
decision is to be treated as perverse, where it does not consider
relevant aspects, or takes, into account, irrelevant considerations. I
have, in para 50 supra, referred to the evidence forthcoming before
the authorities below, and the submissions of the petitioner, advanced
in his defence, only to underscore the aspects, which, in due and

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 51 of 55
inexorable succession, the EO, the disciplinary authority, the appellate
authority, and the CMD, have failed to address, thereby rendering
their decisions perverse in law. In the present case, the recital,
hereinbefore, makes it clear that several issues arose for consideration,
before the EO, the disciplinary authority and, subsequently, the
appellate authority and the CMD. The charges, against the petitioner,
involved disputed issues of fact. The onus to establish that the
petitioner had committed misconduct was, unquestionably, on the
respondent. Absent discharge of such initial onus, the petitioner could
not be burdened with the responsibility of defending himself against
the allegations. The petitioner was also entitled to be extended all due
opportunity, and to the benefit of the principles of natural justice and
fair play.

52. In the present case, the proceedings stand vitiated at nearly
every stage. Documents, sought by the petitioner, and necessary for
his defence, were denied to him, without any reason whatsoever. The
request, of the petitioner, to lead the evidence of seven defence
witnesses, was also substantially rejected, with the evidence of only to
defence witnesses being allowed. The evidence of the said two
defence witnesses, clearly, supported the case of the petitioner. There
is complete absence of reasons, or of any application of mind, by the
disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the CMD, to the
merits of the allegations against the petitioner, and his defence thereto.
Some application of mind is apparent, if at all, only in the order, dated
26th February, 2001, of the CMD which, at least, condescends to
return certain findings on the petitioner's submissions, albeit only

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 52 of 55
regarding preliminary issues, without adverting to merits. These
findings, too, are unsustainable. The CMD has held that, in a
departmental enquiry, the denial, by the EO, of the request, of a
charged officer, to documents, would not vitiate the proceedings,
without any application of mind as to whether, in the present case, the
documents sought were, or were not, necessarily for the petitioner's
defence. Again, on the aspect of allowing of defence witnesses, the
CMD has contended himself by making a general observation that the
EO had the discretion to decide whether to allow, or disallow, any
particular defence witness. No evidence of application of mind, by
the CMD, to the issue of whether, in fact, the disallowance, by the EO,
in the present case, of as many as four, out of the six defence
witnesses, whose evidence the petitioner desired to lead, was, in fact,
justified. On merits too, to reiterate, there is no finding, whatsoever,
even by the CMD.

53. This Court is constrained to observe that, in the present case,
there has been clear denial of due process, to the petitioner. In fact,
merely lip-service, to the principles of natural justice, has been made,
and the Court is left with the distinct impression that the respondent
was intent on deciding against the petitioner, and holding the charges
against him to be proved, any which way. The court notices, with
some discomfiture, that even the EO, whose Enquiry Report is the
only document which makes any observations, regarding the merits of
the allegations against the petitioner, has also been economical with
the manner in which the evidence, available before her, has been set
out, choosing to make selective reference to the deposition, of the

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 53 of 55
Management Witnesses in cross-examination, especially MW-2 Bisht
and MW-4 Yugal Gupta.

54. Twenty-two years have passed, since the issuance, to the
petitioner, of the charge-sheet, on 31st March, 1998, and twenty-one
years have elapsed, since the petitioner was punished, on the basis
thereof. Remanding the matter for reconsideration, at this stage, is
bound to be an exercise in futility, and would inevitably result in
unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings. In the circumstances, this
Court is of the view that the matter deserves to be laid at rest, at least
at this stage.

Conclusion

55. Resultantly, the impugned proceedings against the petitioner,
commencing with the charge-sheet, dated 31st March, 1998, and
culminating in the order, dated 26th February, 2001, of the CMD of the
respondent, are quashed and set aside. It is averred, in CM
12917/2002 (whereby stay of the impugned order of punishment was
sought) that deductions, from the petitioner's salary, had commenced.
The record reveals that no order, staying the operation of the
punishment imposed on the petitioner, was passed by this Court.
Accordingly, in case any amount has been recovered, from the
petitioner, consequent to the impugned Order, dated 11th May, 1999,
passed by the disciplinary authority, the said amount would be
refunded to the petitioner. The petitioner would also be entitled to
differential payment, to which he would be entitled, had the order of

W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 54 of 55
punishment, dated 11th May, 1999, reducing his basic pay by four
stages, never been passed. The differential amount, to which the
petitioner has consequently become entitled, would also be disbursed
to him, by the respondent.

56. Payments, in accordance with para 55 supra, would be
disbursed to the petitioner, by the respondent, within a period of four
weeks from the date of uploading, of the present judgment, on the
website of this Court. In view of the present situation, in which Courts
are functioning by video-conferencing, the Registry/Court-master
shall intimate, to the learned Counsel who represented the parties
before me, of the uploading of the present judgment on the website.

57. The writ petition stands allowed accordingly, with no order as
to costs.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

MAY 29, 2020 HJ W.P.(C) 7593/2002 Page 55 of 55

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