Karnataka High Court
Uttam Kumar (Deceased) vs Madhav And Anr. on 27 March, 2002
Equivalent citations: I(2006)ACC378
Bench: H. Rangavittalachar, N. Kumar
JUDGMENT N.K. Jain, C.J.
1. This M.F.A. is filed against the judgment and award dated 21.9.1999 passed in M.V.C. No. 459 of 1995 and the same has been referred by the Division Bench to the Larger Bench by order dated 21.9.2001. As per order of the Chief Justice dated 14.3.2002, this reference is before us on 18.3.2002.
2. The facts leading to the order of reference are that on 7.1.1995 while returning from Bidar to Wanmar Palli near Keppikari Cross, the jeep driven by one Uttam Kumar collided with a lorry coming from the opposite direction driven in a rash and negligent manner and as a result of the accident Uttam Kumar sustained severe injuries. Thereafter, Uttam Kumar was admitted into hospital and he, for his treatment, incurred expenses. A claim petition in M.V.C. No. 459 of 1995 came to be filed. After issuingthe notice and hearingthe parties, the Addl. M.A.C.T., Bidar awarded compensation of Rs. 36,250 with costs and interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of realisation of the compensation amount. Uttam Kumar preferred an appeal seeking enhancement of compensation. Pending disposal of the appeal, Uttam Kumar died on 25.12.1999 and his aged parents as LRs. filed I.A.-I, for condonation of delay; I.A.-II for setting aside the abatement; and I.A.-III seeking permission to come on record as LRs. of the deceased appellant. The Division Bench of this Court relying on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Kannamma v. Deputy General Manager, Karnataka State Road Trans. Corpn. , found that cause of action will not survive and LRs. of the deceased claimant will not be entitled to compensation. The Division Bench had observed that "in view of the amended provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, the Full Bench decision in Kannamma's case may require consideration". Thus, the reference was placed before us as stated.
3. Mr. S.P. Shankar, learned Senior Counsel submits that the point in issue has already been decided by the Full Bench and also it is very clear from Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the M.V. Act') that LRs. of the deceased can pursue the remedy of compensation if death has resulted from the accident and no time has been mentioned in the section. There is also no bar under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (in short 'the I.S. Act'). Therefore, the observations of the Division Bench in para 3 of the order of reference that "The Full Bench, relying on Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 which provides that in regard to cause of action for personal injury, the cause of action will not survive on the death of the injured, held that cause of action will not survive and LRs. of the deceased claimant will not be entitled to compensation is not correct". So also the observation of the Division Bench that the provisions of the M.V. Act will supersede Section 306 of the I.S. Act and the view of the Full Bench needs reconsideration. Learned Counsel submits that these observations were made in connection with the case of Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road Trans. Corpn., II (1998) ACC512(SC) : VII(1998) ACJ 10(SC), wherein it has been said that restriction will not apply in considering the provision of the M.V. Act, as the manner of judging the said provisions is wider So also there is no question of any inconsistency with or supersession of Section 306 in the content as the law is well settled by earlier Full Bench.
4. On the other hand, Mr. G. Narayana Rao, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, submits that so far as the law is concerned the LRs. of the deceased can make an application and pursue it for compensation provided death has resulted from the accident. To that extent law is settled and the Full Bench decision needs no reconsideration. But, in the instant case without verifying the fact whether death has resulted on account of the injury, the LRs' application has been allowed. Therefore, to this extent this Full Bench should clear the position of law.
5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the material on record, gone through the relevant observations and the reasoning of the earlier Full Bench decision and the case laws on the point.
6. It will be appropriate to refer to relevant provisions of M.V. Act and the I.S. Act.
Section 166 of the M.V. Act reads as follows:
166. Application for compensation--(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in SubSection (1) of Section 165 may be made
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
(b) by the owner of the property; or
(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or
(d) by any agent duly autorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be.
Section 306, under Chapter VI of the I.S. Act, which deals with the demands and rights of action of, or against deceased survive to and against executor or administrator, reads as follows:
306. All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action of special proceedings existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory.
7. The cardinal law of interpretation is that if legislation is clear and unambiguous it is to be read with clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise also addition or subtraction of word is not permissible. The duty of the Court is not to fill up the gap by stretching a word used; it is settled that a provision is to be read as a whole and while interpreting the intention and object of the legislation have to be looked into. However, each case depends on the facts of its own.
8. In the instant case what is to be seen is whether there is any inconsistency between the provisions of Section 166 of the MV Act and Section 306 of the I.S. Act for the LRs of the deceased who died as a result of the accident to claim compensation or pursue their remedies.
9. A bare reading of the above Section 166 clearly reveals that in case of an accident a person who sustains injury can make application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal and if any death has resulted from the accident, any or all LRs can be brought on record and can pursue under Section 166(l)(c). Hence, in case of death resultant of the accident the LRs of the deceased can file claim petition.
So also it is clear from Section 306 of the I.S. Act that cause of action survives to and against the executors or administrators of the decer sed whose death is the result of the personal injuries sustained in the accident, already stated.
10. As stated above, the provisions under Section 166 of the MV Act are very clear that the representatives of the deceased who died as a result of the accident can claim compensation and so also Section 306 of the I.S. Act does not say anything to the contrary and thus there is no question of any inconsistency.
11. A Division Bench of this Court referred the following question to the earlier Full Bench:
Whether in a claim petition under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, claiming compensation for personal injury resulting from a motor accident as also compensation towards expenses incurred and towards loss of income, etc., if the claimant dies during the pendency of the petition, his legal representatives can come on record and continue the proceedings?
12. Considering this question, the Full Bench of this Court in Kannamma's case (supra), has held thus:
(i) The common law rule 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' as embodied in Section 306 of Indian Succession Act since applies to India, a claim by a person for compensation for personal injuries caused in a motor accident does not, on that person's death not being the consequence of such injuries, survive to his/her legal representatives;
(ii) Cause of action for personal injuries being founded on tort (motor accident caused by the tortfeasor), injured person's claims for damages under heads recognised by common law and not by statute, based on such tort and not independently of it, cannot, on such person's death, survive for prosecution by his/her executors or administrators (or legal representatives) since Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, in express terms, declares that the cause of action in favour of a person for personal injuries (tort) does not survive on such person's death to his/her executors or legal representatives;
(iii) A claim by a person for compensation for personal injuries, be it pending before the Claims Tribunal, be it pending in the First Appellate Court or be it pending in the Second Appellate Court, does not survive on such person's death not caused as a consequence of personal injuries, to his legal representatives;
(iv) A claim of a person for compensation for personal injuries if has resulted in an award of the Claims Tribunal or decree of the Appellate Court, survives to his legal representatives on his death, even if such death is not the consequence of personal injuries sustained by him and hence, if such award or decree is disputed in the First Appellate Court, or the Second Appellate Court, the same could be resisted by the legal representatives of the claimant;
(v) A person's claim for compensation for personal injuries under the head loss to his/her estate, can, on his/her death as a consequence of such injuries, be prosecuted by his/her legal representatives, if they do not include a claim for compensation under that head, as and when they file a claim petition under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act, on the death of the person injured.
13. After elaborate discussion and detailed order, the Full Bench answered thus:
(i) A claim petition presented under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by the person sustaining bodily injuries in a motor accident, claiming compensation for personal injuries as also for compensation towards expenses, loss of income, etc. (loss to the estate) cannot, on such person's death occurring not as a result or consequence of bodily injuries sustained from a motor accident, be prosecuted by his/her legal representatives; but
(ii) A claim petition presented under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by the person sustaining bodily injuries in a motor accident, claiming compensation for personal injuries as also for compensation towards expenses, loss of income, etc, (loss to the estate) can, on such person's death occurring as a result or consequence of bodily injuries sustained in the motor accident, be prosecuted by his/her legal representatives only insofar as the claim for compensation in that claim petition relates to loss to estate of the deceased person due to bodily injuries sustained in the motor accident.
14. On overall consideration and as discussed above, we are in full agreement with the well reasoned order made by the Full Bench since that part will not say anything regarding Section 306 of the I.S. Act and it is not necessary to go into the observation. It is also not necessary to go into the question of fact as alleged by the LRs that the deceased died due to the injuries sustained in the accident and that question can only be considered while considering the compensation. We answer the reference in the affirmative and fully approve the earlier Full Bench decision in Kannamma's case (supra), as stated.
The reference is answered accordingly.