Karnataka High Court
Mallappa Murigeppa Sajjan And Ors. vs The State Of Karnataka And Ors. on 12 September, 1979
Equivalent citations: AIR1980KANT53, AIR 1980 (NOC) 53 (KAR), (1979) KANT LJ 61, ILR (1979) 2 KANT 2504, (1979) 2 KANT LJ 466
ORDER
1. Whether , this Government 28-7-1979 are also adjourned until further can suspend the working of the Tribunal constituted under Section 48 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is the principal and important question that arises for my determination in this case. In order to decide that and other question it is necessary to notice the facts in the first instance.
2. Some time in September 1978, Government reconstituted the Tribunal for the Muddebilial Taluk of Bijapur District, In that reconstitution, Government in addition to, appointing the Assistant Commissioner of the revenue, sub-division having jurisdiction over the taluk (hereinafter referred to as 'the A. C.') as the Chairman of the said Tribunal, appointed the petitioners and respondent No. 4 who will be hereafter referred to as the petitioners as the non-official members of the said Tribunal which has been functioning with those persons ever since its reconstitution.
3. On 15-6-1979, the Deputy, Commissioner Bijapur(hereinafter referred to as 'the D. C.') acting on the directions of the Government directed the A. C. not to hold the Tribunal sitting for one week. As the said direction has spent itself, it is unnecessary to state anything further on the aforesaid, direction of the Government and the D. C. On the, expiry of the period specified therein, no further direction was issued and 'therefore' the Tribunal started functioning and was functioning till 22-7-1979. But, again on 23-7-1979 the D.C. issued a direction to A.C. conveying a phone message by him from government directing the suspension of the working of the Tribunal until further orders. That message issued by the D.C. received on that day at about 3:30 p.m. When the Tribunal was holding its sitting, reads thus:-
"Phone Message to Special Assistant Commissioner, Land Tribunal, Muddebihal.
WORKING OF MDBL. TRBL SD. BE SUSPENDED, UNTIL FURTHER ORDER.
MESSAGE RECEIVED BY THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE SPECIAL, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BIJAPUR."
Immediately thereafter, on the same day the Secretary of the Tribunal, had Issued written endorsement to the petitioners (Exhibit-D) and the same reads thus:
"As per instructions of the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bijapur, I have to inform you that the Tribunal sitting fixed on 23-7-1979 is suspended and that the cases fixed for hearing from 24-7-1979 to 28-7-1979 are also adjourned until further orders of Government."
4. The petitioners claim that they belong to a political party knows as the Indian National Congress(I) Indira Gandhi. They claim that the Government headed by Sri D.Devaraj Urs belongs to another rival political party and the action taken by the government is out of political considerations and is vitated by the mala fides.
5. In a joint return, respondents 1 to 3 while admitting the facts stated in paras 2 and 3 , have alleged that there were complaints against the working, a the Tribunal in November 1978 and on those complaints reports have been called for from the, Special Deputy Commission and the D. C. They have urged that pending reconstitution of the Tribunal, action has, been taken to prevent its working in the public interest exercising the Power of control under Section 134 of the Act. They have, denied the, allegations of the petitioners that the, impugned action has been taken, due to the political changes and to compel them to join the party headed W the Chief Minister. Lastly they have asserted that the direction issued does not interface in the decision making of the Tribunal and is, therefore permissible.
6. Sri V. H. Ron, learned counsel for the, petitioners contended that the Government had no power to suspend the working of the Tribunal and' the same is therefore, unauthorized and illegal.
7. At my request Sriyuths S.K.Venkatranga Iyengar, M.C.konnur and M.S.Gopal, learned counsel appeared and addressed useful arguments. All of them supported Sri Ron.
8. Sri V. C. Bramharkayappa, learned Additional Government Advocate, urged that under Section 134 of the Act; Government was authorized to issue the impugned directions and they have been issued for achieving the objects and purposes of the Act.
9. In their return, respondents 1 to 3 have urged that the petitioners are not aggrieved persons and have no locus standi to maintain their writ, petition. But, at the hearing Sri Bramyappa, contended that the petitioners are not aggrieved persons and have no locus standi to challenge the action of respondents 1 to 3. As this contention urged by Sri Bramharayappa goes to the root of the matter, I propose to examine the same first.
10. Admittedly the petitioners have been legally and validly appointed as members of the Tribunal and continue to be, the, members of the Tribunal and the impugned order has prevented from functioning as its members indefinitely. The order of the suspension has directly affected the interests of the petitioners who are in the position of the judges cannot concern themselves with the suspension of Tribunals or the adjournment of the cases and therefore, they are not aggrieved persons. Sri Bramharayappa is right and he says that the petitioners are in the position of judges and cannot interest themselves in postponment of cases. But that has no relevance in deciding whether the petitioners are aggrieved persons or not. The members, of a Tribunal w ho are in the position of judges have also a status, When the working of the Tribunal is suspended indefinitely the, status of its members if, not their emoluments is undoubtly affected In these circumstances, the petitioner ,are personally and directly affected by the action of the Government and they are, therefore aggrieved persons. Apart. from this the word aggrieved person as pointed out by the Supreme Court In Jaasbhau Motibhai V. Roshan kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed AIR 1976 SC 578 and by a Division Bench of this Court, Konandurqnandpr lingappa of, State of Karnataka (1978(1) kant LJ271) has a wider and narrow meaning Even applying the narrow meaning given to these words, the petitioners would be aggrieved persons and have locus standi to challenging the action of ,the Government. For all these reasons. hold the petitioners have locus standi to challenge the action of government and I reject the preliminary objections of Sri Bramharayappa and proceed to examine the merits of the case.
11. A Tribunal Is constituted or reconsitutated under Section 48 of the Act, Under the scheme of, the Act the Tribunal is conferred with, exclusive jurisdiction to decide certain matters of considerable importance effecting the ' rights 'of individuals also the State. The 'Tribunal is a Judicial Tribunal and in any event a quasi-judicial tribunal that exercises judicial powers and functions in respect of, matters that are exclusively assigned to it .It Is also subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution restored to its original position by the 44th amendment of, the Constitution. The direction issued by the Government directly impinges on the judicial functioning of the Tribunal. The Act does not confer power on the Government to exercise the power of superintendence or control over the judicial functioning of the Tribunal. In the absence of such a power it would not be open to Government to directly impinge on the judicial functioning of the Tribunal.
12. Section 134 of the Act on which great reliance was placed by the learned Government Advocate reads thus:
"Control- In all matters connected with the administration of this Act, the State Government shall have the some authority and control over the Deputy Commissioner and other officers acting under this Act as it has and exercises over revenue officers in general and revenue administration".
Section 134 of the Act only confers power of control over the D. C. and other officers of the Government functioning under the Act. But, the same does not authorise the Government to exercise the power of superintendence, supervision or control over the Tribunal as such. The plain language of Section 134 of the Act does not Support the case of Govermnent.
13. Sri Bramharayappa, next contend ed, that the direction issued by the, Government is not to the Tribunal. as such, to its officers viz ., D. C and A. C.
14. Section 134 confers power of control over the D. C. and other officers of the Government though that may be functioning under the Act as if they are revenue officers. Section 134 of the Act appears to have been enacted by abundant caption to preserve the disciplinary contr6lL Of Government over the officers who are working in the implementation of the Act and not permit them to go scot free for any of their misconducts. When a direction is issued to an A. C. who is the Chairman of a Tribunal to suspend the working of the Tribunal, such a direction is not really to the officer but to the Tribunal itself. Assuming that directions could be issued to the officers connected with the working of the Tribunal, it cannot be so issued as to interfere with the working of the Tribunal itself. By no stretch of imagination, it is open to the Government to Issue directions to a Chairman or other officers employed for the smooth and proper functioning of a Tribunal not to co-operate with the functioning of the Tribunal or suspend the working of the Tribunal Itself. Any such directions would only defeat the provisions of the Act and interfere with the working of the Tribunal. In these circumstances the alternative contention urged by Sri Bramharayappa is devoid of any merit and I reject the same.
15. Sri Venkataranga, lyengar urged that on the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in B. Rajagopala Naidu v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras it was not open to the Government to suspend the working of the Tribunal.
16. Section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 inserted by the Madras Amending Act of 20 of 1948, which empowered the Government to issue directions to the Tribunals functioning under the said Act reads thus:
"The State Government may issue such orders and directions of a general character as it may consider necessary in respect of any matter relating to road transport to the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, and such Transport Authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions".
In the purported exercise of the power conferred by the said section, Govern merit issued certain directions popularly called as marking system, regulating the grant of permits in the State of Madras. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant urged that Section 43-A enabled the Government to issue administrative instructions and not directions regulating the Judicial and quasi-judicial functions of the Tribunals constituted under that Act. Accepting the said contention the Supreme Court enunciated the principle In these words:
"Therefore, it seems to us that an a fair and reasonable, construction of Section 43-A, it ought to be held that the said section authorises the State Government to issue orders and directions of a general character only in respect of administrative matters which fall, to be dealt with by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority under the relevant provisions of the Act in their administrative capacity.
In reaching this conclusion, we have been influenced by certain other considerations which are both relevant and material. In interpreting Section 43-A we think, it would be legitimate to assume that the legislature Intended to respect the basic and elementary postulate of the rule of law, that in exercising their authority and in discharging their quasii1jaicial function the Tribunals constituted under the Act must be left absolutely free to deal with the matter according to their best judgment. It is of the essence of fair and objective administration of law that the decision, of the Judge or the Tribunal must be absolutely unfettered by any extraneous guidance by the executive or administrative wing of the State. If the exercise of discretion conferred on a quasi-judicial Tribunal in controlled by any such direction, that forges fetters an the exercise of quasi-judicial authority and the presence of such fetters would make the exercise of such authority completely inconsistent with the well accepted notion of judicial process. It is fame that law can regulate the exercise of judicial powers. It may indicate by specific provisions on what matters the tribunals constituted by it should adjudicate. It may by specific provisions lay down the principles which have to be followed by the Tribunals in dealing with the said matters The scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted by statute can well be regulated by the statute, and principles for guidance of the said tribunals may also be prescribed subject of course to the inevitable requirement that these provisions do not contravene the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. But what law and the provisions of Law may legitimately do cannot be permitted to be done by administrative or executive orders. This position Is so well established that we are reluctant to hold that In enacting Section 43-A the. Madras Legislative intended to confer power on the State Government to invade the domain of the exercise of judicial power. In fact, if such had been the intention of the Madras Legislature and had been the true effect of the provisions of Section 43-A, Section 43-A itself would amount to an unreasonable contravention of fundamental rights of citizens and may have to be struck down as unconstitutional".
On the above principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, it was not open to the Government to interfere with the working of the Tribunal and suspend its working. The this view, the impugned direction issued by the Government was unauthorized and illegal.
17. On the conclusion reached by me on the power of the Government, it is unnecessary to examine whether the directions were issued for the reasons stated by the petitioner or for the reasons stated by respondents 1 to 3. I therefore leave open the same.
18. The, Tribunals constituted and functional under the Act, replacing the ordinary civil courts in the State in matters specifically assigned to them have an important role to play. The Chairman and the other members of the Tribunals, without going into the nature of their composition and their validity are, all in the position of Judges deciding the cases that come before them. While this is so the power claimed and exercised by & Government which I have held as wholly unauthorized, is fraught with grave danger and will unduly shake the confidence of the litigant public in the impartiality and status of the members of the Tribunal and is destructive of our legal and judicial system. I fervently hope that there will be no more occasion for this Court to frown on the exercise of such power by Government. Assuming that Government had the power, even then, I am, pained to say that manner of exercise of power by Government was somewhat brusque and will not inspire confidence in the Tribunals, constituted under .the Act.
19. Before parting with the case, I record my indebtedness to Sriyuths S. K. Venkatarangg Iyengar, M. C. Konnur and W. S. Gopal, who have also assisted me in deciding the case.
20. In the light of my above discussion, I make the following order:
(a) I quash the telephonic directions issued by the Government recorded and conveyed by the Deputy Commissioner, Bijapur, on, 23-7-1979 (Exhibit-C) and Endorsement No. L.M. Meeting/79-80 dated 23-7-1979 (Exhibit-D) issued thereto by the Secretary of respondent No. 2;
(b) I declare that the Land Tribunal, Muddebihal respondent No. 2 shall discharge its functions under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act of 1961, without reference to the aforesaid directions issued by the Government and the Deputy Commissioner, Bijapur, that are quashed in this order.
21. Rule issued is made absolute.
22. Petitioners are entitled to their costs from respondents 1 to 3. Advocates fee Rs. 100/-.
23. Let a copy, of this order be communicated to respondents Nos. 1 to 3 within a week from this day. A copy of this order may also be furnished to the learned Government Advocate within the same time.
24. Petition allowed.