Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Bhupendra N. Patel And Others vs Harshavardhan Chokkani on 19 July, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999(4)ALD467, 1999(4)ALT642, AIR 2000 ANDHRA PRADESH 21, (1999) 4 ANDH LT 642, (1999) 2 RENCJ 522, (1999) 4 ANDHLD 467
JUDGMENT
1. The Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 20 of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 against the orders of the learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad (appellate authority) in RA No.126 of 1993 dated 26-2-1997 confirming the order of the learned Principal Rent Controller, Secunderabad in RCNo.189/1988 dated 31-12-1992.
2. Certain facts leading to the filing of the Civil Revision Petition are set up hereinafter.
One Smt. Pola Rajamaniamma was the landlord of the premises bearing Municipal No.4-6-241 to 4-6-244 (Old No. 1883), Subhash Road, Subric Street, Secunderabad. A rental agreement was concluded between the landlady and Mr. Harshavardhan Chokkani, the respondent herein on 23-11-1973 wherein one mulgi in the said premises was let out to Mr. Harshavardhan Chokkani for non-residential purpose. Subsequently, in the year 1987 the owner sold away the property to Mr. Babulal N. Patel and Bhupendra N. Patel duly attorning the tenancy in favour of the vendees. However, Mr. Babulal N. Paiel died subsequently. Thereafter, an application in RC No.189/1988 was filed by Mr. Bhupendra N. Patel and the legal heirs of Babulal N. Patel before the Rent Controller at Secunderabad seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement was wilful default in payment of rent. The matter was contested by the respondent. The learned Rent Controller framed the following issues :
"(1) Whether it is the respondent or the firm Brijmohan Chokkani & Sons, who is the tenant of the suit premises?
(2) Whether the petitioners who are not in occupation of any other non-residential premises in twin cities require the suit premises for the purpose of a business which the third petitioner bona fide proposes to commence?
(3) Whether the tenant has committed defaults in payment of rent for the period from April, 1987 to February, 1988 and onwards and if so whether such defaults are wilful?"
The evidence was led in before the trial Court and the documents were marked for both the parlies. The learned trial Court after considering the matter held that the tenant was the firm and the petition against Mr. Harshavardhan Chokkani was not maintainable." He also held that there was no bona fide requirement of non-residential premises. On the third issue, the learned Controller held that there was no wilful default. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned Rent Controller, the landlords filed Appeal RA No.128/1993 before the appellate authority the learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, at Hyderabad. The learned Appellate Judge concurred with the findings of the lower Court and accordingly dismissed the appeal by a judgment dated 26-2-1997. The present revision has been filed by the landlords against the judgment of the appellate authority confirming the order of the learned Rent Controller.
3. The learned senior Counsel Mr. E. Manohar, appearing for the petitioner/landlords submits that the findings recorded by the lower Court as confirmed by the appellate Court of all the three issues are legally untenable and that the Courts below misconstrued the provisions of law and fact, thereby committed errors apparent on the face of records. He submits that the revision is maintainable to check the errors of law and also the jurisdiction. He relies on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in M/s. Bhoolchand v. M/s. Kay Pee Cee Investments, and Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana, .
4. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent-tenant Mr. Murali Narayan Bung submits that the jurisdiction of the trial Court under Section 20 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control, Act, 1960 (for brief the 'Act') is very limited. If cannot be treated as an appellate jurisdiction. When, once the finding of the facts are recorded by the Courts below, it is not open for the High Court to interfere with the said findings. He relies on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Rukmini Amma's case (supra) and also Manicklal Mukherjee (Kali Durga Estate), Calcutta v. Commissioner of Sanchaita Investments. Calcutta. .
5. Before proceeding with the case on merits, it is necessary to earmark the parameters of the interference of the High Court tinder Section 22 of the Act. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court is" stipulated under Section 22 of the Act, which reads as follows :
"22. Revision :--
(1) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceeding taken under this Act by the Controller in execution under Section 15 or by the appellate authority on appeal under Section 20, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or of propriety of such order or proceeding, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.
(2) The Costs of and incident to all proceedings, before the High Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion."
Section 20 of Kerala (Buildings, Lease and Rent) Control Act, stands on similar lines of A.P. Act and Section 20 relates to revision. The Supreme Court in Rukmini Amma's case (supra) comparing the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 20 of Kerala (Buildings, Lease and Rent) Control Act, and also Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure held that Section 20 gives power to the revisional authority to call for and examine the record relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order. Considering the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in H. V. Mathai v. The Subordinate Judge, Kottayam, , Rai Chand Jain v. Miss. Chandra Kama Khosla, and Smt. Rajbir Kaur v. Ms. S. Chokosiri & Co., , the Supreme Court held that Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as 1st or 2nd Court of appeal, otherwise the distinction between the appellate and revisional jurisdiction would get obliterated. Thus, it was held that the High Court was not right in reapprcciating the enlire evidence both oral and documents. It was further held that even by the presence of the word 'Propriety' in the section, it could not be meant that there could be a re-appreciation of the evidence. It observed "of course, the revisional Court can come to a different conclusion, but not on reappreciation of evidence - on the contrary, by confining ilself, to the legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Thus, it is made clear that the revisional Court can come to a different conclusion by confining itself consideration to the legality, regularity, propriety of the order. It need not appreciate the evidence for the purpose.
6. In M/s. Bhoolchand's case (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. Para 6 is extracted below :
"The power of revision is not narrow as in Section 115 CPC, but wider requiring the High Court to examine the impugned order "for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding' which enables the High Court to 'pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.' It is clear that the High Court in a revision under Section 50 of the Act is required to satisfy itself not only as to the legality of the impugned order or proceeding but also of its correctness. The power of the High Court, therefore, extends to correcting not merely errors of law but also errors of fact. In other words, the High Court in a revision under Section 50 of the Act is required to examine the correctness of not only findings on questions of law but also on questions of fact. It is significant that the revision provided is directly against the trial Court's order and not after a provision of appeal on facts. All the same, the power in revision under Section 50 of the Act cannot be equated with the power of the Appellate Court under Section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure which is the same as that of the original Court; and the revisional power under Section 50 of the Act even though wide as indicated must fall short of the Appellate Court's power of interference with a finding offact where the finding of fact depends on the credibility of witnesses, there being a conflict of oral evidence of the parties."
Section 50 of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 confers power of revision as it confers said power under Section 22 under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, the phrase "for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order of proceeding" and further phrase "pass such order in reference thereto as thinks fit" are also available in Section 22 of the Act. The Supreme Court referred to such held that the power of the Revision under Section 50 was wide enough, though cannot be equated with that of the appellate Court's power and it can interfere with the finding of fact where such fact depends on the credibility of the witnesses, there being a conflict of oral evidence of the parties.
7. Both the learned Counsel for the parlies relied on the judgment of tlie Supreme Court reported in Rukmini Amma's case (supra). But, however, the learned Counsel for the petitioner only relies on to the extent of observation of the Supreme Court that it is always open for the revisional Court to come to a different conclusion as to the legality, propriety or regularity of the order without resort to reappreciation of the evidence. In Rukmini Amma's case (supra), it was a case dealing with the power of revisional Court under Section 115 CPC and the provisions of Section 20 of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (President's Act No.2 of 1965) (for brief the 'Kerala Act'). The revisional powers of the High Court in other rent control enactments were not in issue. However, the Supreme Court while comparing with the revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115 of CPC and the powers under Section 20 of the Kerala Act, observed thus :
"Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second Court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report (Exts.C1 and C2 Mahazar). In our considered view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word "propriety" it cannot mean that there could be reappreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional Court can come to a different conclusion but not on a reappreciation of evidence; on the contrary by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court with reference to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction."
In Manick Chandra Nandy v. Debdas Nandy, , the Supreme Court considered the powers of revisional Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held thus :
"The nature, quality and extent of appellate jurisdiction being exercised in first appeal and of revisional jurisdiction are very different. The limits of revisional jurisdiction are prescribed and its boundaries defined by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under that section revisional jurisdiction is to be exercised by the High Court in a case in which no appeal lies to it from the decision of a subordinate Court if it appears to it that the subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction is thus confined to questions of jurisdiction. While in a first appeal the Court is free to decide all questions of law and fact which arise in the case, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction the High Court is not entitled to re-examine or re-assess the evidence on record and substitute its own findings on facts for those of the subordinate Court. In the instant case, the respondents had raised a plea that the Appellant's application under Rule 13 of Order IX was barred by limitation. Now, a plea of limitation concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries a proceeding, for a finding on this plea in favour of the party raising it would oust the jurisdiction of the Court. In determining the correctness of the decision reached by the subordinate Court on such a plea, the High Court may at times have to go into a jurisdictional question of law or fact, that is, it may have to decide collateral questions upon the ascertainment of which the decision as to jurisdiction depends. For the purpose of ascertaining whether the subordinate Court has decided such a collateral question rightly, the High Court cannot, however, function as a Court of first appeal so far as the assessment of evidence is concerned and substitute its own findings for those arrived at by the subordinate Court unless any such finding is not in anyway borne out by the evidence on the record or is manifestly contrary to evidence or so palpably wrong that if allowed to stand, would result it. grave injustice to a party."
8. It is thus clear from the above decisions that the revisional jurisdiction of the authority constituted under a particular enactments to be exercised within the frame work of the statutory provision and it cannot be equated with the appellate jurisdiction. The distinction has already been drawn by the Supreme Court in catena of decisions. Thus, if a finding of fact is based on legally admissible evidence, such a finding cannot be disturbed by a revisional Court exercising the revisional power. The revisional power under Section 22 is apparently wider than that of the power under Section 115 of CPC. The revisional Court has to satisfy itself to the legality, regularity and propriety of the order of the subordinate Court. The jurisdiction enables the revisional Court to examine correctness of the finding of fact also in appropriate cases where the finding was rendered without there being any evidence or considering the evidence which was not relevant. Thus, the reappreciation of the evidence if it is an appellate Court is not permissible. But, yet, if the finding is illegal or irregular can be corrected in the revisional jurisdiction. For this purpose, this Court need not refer to the entire evidence, but at the same time, if the finding arrived by the lower Court was such that it was perverse and no person of ordinary prudent could come to such a finding, it has to be declared as perverse finding and it can be corrected in the revisional jurisdiction.
Thus, the interference of the revisional Court cannot be totally ousted not only on the question of law, but also on finding of fact provided, the said finding was not based on any evidence or if the finding is contrary to law.
9. The question that calls for consideration is whether the finding of the Courts below that the firm is the tenant and the application was not maintainable against the individual Mr. Harshavardhan Chokkani was valid?
10. The learned senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that tbe rental agreement was entered between file landlady and Mr. Harshavardhan Chokkani in the year 1973. The agreement was entered in their respective personal capacities. However, Mr. Harshavardhan Chokkani was permitted to do the business in the demised premises as a partnership firm consisting of himself and his family members. He submits that initially Mr. Harshavardhan Chokkani was conducting the business in the name and style of M/s. Hari Om Traders of which he was sole proprietor. Subsequently, partnership firm was constituted under the name of Brij Mohan Chokkani and sons. Even since the agreement was entered between the parties, the rent was being paid by the firm only. The rent was being received by the landlady without any objection. He submits that merely because, the rent was paid by the firm it cannot be construed that the firm was the tenant. The recitals of the agreement are to be looked into for the purpose. Hence, the interpretation given by the lower Courts was completely misconceived. Mr. Murali Narayan Bung, submits that the rent receipts were being issued in the name of the firm and even when the sale was effected attornment was also made in favour of the firm and therefore the conduct of the landlords was taken into consideration and the Courts below held that the firm was a tenant and therefore the finding that application against the individual was not maintainable cannot be assailed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court reported in Bhushan Drug House, Bhatinda Through Prem Chand v. Desh Raj, 1980 (1) RCR 491 and Smt. Lajwanti v. Raghunath Prashad, 1992 (2) RCR 519. The Courts below found that the amount was being paid by the firms and that even after the sale of the premises by the earlier landlord to the present landlord, the letter was addressed to the firm itself directing the tenants to make the payment to the firm. Further, Section 8 application was also filed by the firm. Taking into consideration these factors, it was held that the firm was the tenant and not an individual. I am afraid, I cannot approve the said conclusion. The Courts below missed the basic link. The agreement was entered between the two individuals and the individual was given permission to conduct the business and also permitted to form partnership firms consisting of himself and his family. Condition No.7 reads as follows :
"The tenant has agreed that he hereby undertakes not to transfer or assign his rights under this lease, and not to underlet or sub-let the whole or any part of the said premises to any other persort or persons or to any firm or group. However, he shall be entitled to use the said premises for the business of a partnership consisting of himself and his family members."
A bare reading of the said condition itself permits the tenant to conduct the business and in fact the demised premises was leased out for non-residential purpose. Mr. Harshavardhan Chokkani was permitted to conduct the business under partnership firm. The further condition that himself and his family members should be partners of such business.
11. The payment of rent by the firm cannot be criteria to determine the tenancy between the parties. The respondent was running the business as a tenant though by constituting partnership firm and it was permitted under the terms and conditions of the tenancy. The amount was being paid by the firms. Prior to constitution of partnership firm, it was being paid by sole trader firm and after partnership the rent was being paid by the partnership firm. Moreover, the eviction petition was not filed on the ground that there was a sub-tenancy and that there was a violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement. In the counter of the respondent it was only stated that the description of the tenant was not correct. Maintainability of the application was not put in issue by the respondent. The intention of the parties coupled with the terms of the lease is the deciding factor and that is the substratum of the decision relied on by the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners. Admittedly, in the instant case, the agreement was between the landlord and the tenant individually. It is always open for the tenant either to conduct the business as a sole trader or a firm of partnership business. That would not make the firm as a tenant nor would it fall under the category of subletting. The respondent and the firm could have been parties, but non-inclusion of firm is not fatal to the case as it is not necessary party. It is the respondent who created firm either sole trading or partnership and not vice versa. Even filing of Section 8 application by the firm cannot make the firm as a tenant. Therefore, it has to be construed that the respondent is the only tenant and merely because payment of rent was made by the firm it could not be treated as a tenant. Therefore, the very finding of the Courts below runs contrary to the settled legal principles. It is not in dispute that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court has wider scope than envisaged under Section 115 CPC. Nevertheless, the limits of such revisional power have been circumscribed and such power cannot be exercised unless there are no material to support a finding or the finding was based on irrelevant or inadmissible matter or a finding was so perverse that no reasonable person could reach such a finding or conclusion based by erroneous understanding of law. The material relied on by the Courts below are obviously irrelevant in the wake of the lease agreement between the parties. Thus, I hold that the Courts below erred in finding that the firm is a tenant. Accordingly, I set aside the finding.
12. The Courts below found that the bona fide requirement was not established. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the trial Court having found that the demised premises was required for the business which the third petitioner bona fide proposed to commence fast food centre erroneously held that the claim of the petitioner was not bona fide.
13. The learned Counsel also submits that the lower Court considered irrelevant and extraneous matters. He submits that the Courts below found the bona fide requirement because the petitioner deliberately created the ground of wilful default which was not established and the petitioner was pre-determined to evict the respondent. Therefore, the learned Counsel submits that the very approach of the Courts below was erroneous and contrary to law. For proper appreciation of the case, it is necessary to refer to Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 which reads as follows :
"10(3)(a) A landlord may subject to the provisions of Clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building -
(i) .......... .............. ................
(a)..... ......... .......
(b)..... ......... .......
(ii)............. ............. ...........
(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise -
(a) for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application, or
(b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence."
14. Under the aforesaid provisions, the landlords can apply to the Controller for eviction of the tenant in respect of non-residential building if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city concerned for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence. it was the case of the petitioners that the 3rd petitioner bona fide requires the premises for commencing the proposed fast food centre. It was not in dispute that the petitioners were also having in occupation of a non-residential building on the first floor.
15. The lower Court found in para 8 as follows :
"It is not in dispute that the suit premises is any Other non-residential premises. As a matter of fact it is being used for non-residential purposes by the respondent and is being requisitioned by the petitioners for non-residential purpose. The petitioners family appears to be engaged in Gujarat type of hotel business. It is not difficult for the third petitioner to set up a similar hotel business. In fact, the third petitioner states that he wants to set up fast food centre in the suit premises. He can be said to have the necessary experience and expertise in running the said business. He can also raise the require funds for commencing the said business in view of the fact that his family appears to be well placed and they are already carrying on a hotel business. It can therefore be said that the third petitioner bona fide proposes to commence Fast Food Centre business in the suit premises."
Having rendered a finding that the 3rd petitioner bona fide proposes to commence the fast food centre, the lower Court again has considered whether the landlord has specified where the claim of the petitioner was bona fide. It observed that the petitioner deliberately created circumstances which would give rise to an allegation of wilful default. He further observed thus :
"In the face of this conduct, the petitioners plead that the respondent has committed wilful default in the matter of payment of rent for the period from April, 1987 itself. This is indicative of the fact that the petitioners had pre-determined to evict the respondent from the suit premises and they were in search of grounds for seeking such eviction and in this regard they tried to carve out the ground of wilful default in payment of rent to evict the respondent. It is thus clear that the petitioners are tainted by oblique motives in filing this petition seeking eviction of the respondent."
The ground of eviction for wilful default and for bona fide requirements are different and distinct. It is always open for the landlord to plead different grounds as are available under the statute. Simply because, the petitioner could not establish one of the grounds, it cannot be a circumstance to hold that the other ground is also not bona fide or valid. The learned lower Court found the bona fide requirement as not established as the ground of wilful default was raised by the petitioner deliberately and with oblique motive. Such type of consideration would fall within the category of considering irrelevant material and the findings if any arrived basing on the irrelevant material are liable to be interfered in the revisional proceedings under Section 22 of the Act. Under Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(b), the opinion of the Rent Controller is an essential ingredient and the forming such an opinion must be based on relevant and acceptable material. In such an event the opinion cannot be interfered with. But in the instant case, this is totally absent. Hence, the finding of the lower Court is set aside. Further, during the appeal proceedings, the petition was amended as partition took place among the proceedings, the petition was amended as partition took place among the petitioners themselves and the suit mulgi fell to the share of the 3rd petitioner and that the appellate Court found that the partition was brought into effect only for the purpose of strengthening the case of the petitioners for eviction. Even some of the photographs which were filed before the appellate Court were considered and found that though presence of the 3rd petitioner in the shop cannot be conclusive proof of doing the business himself personally but the circumstances showed that it was the business of the family. This approach of the appellate Court is also equally untenable inasmuch as it is always open for the owners of the premises to partition their properties. Simply because the matter is under litigation under the Rent Control Act, it cannot be a ground to suspect the partition.
16. In the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in T. Sriramulu v. Diwn Eknathrao, (DB), it was held that a coparcener, who got to his share petition schedule mulgi in partition effected during the pendency of the appeal can implead himself as 2nd appellant and continue and prosecute eviction proceedings initiated by his father as kartha of Joint Hindu Family for the benefit of coparcener to run the cloth business therein which he intends to start and that he need not file a separate application. The requirement of Joint Hindu Family includes the requirement of an individual coparcener and when there is a division the concerned coparcener to whose share the property fell can come on record and continue the proceedings. Thus, the subsequent events which arose during the pendency of the proceedings can also be taken note of to mould the relief. Admittedly, in the instant case, the application was filed for bona fide requirement of 3rd pelitioner and in the meanwhile, the partition of the properties also took place. But, the appellate Court found the partition doubtful keeping in view the stage when it was effected. While I do not foresee any reason to doubt the situation, this Court need not go into the partition itself. Even prior to the partition, the lower Court found that the 3rd petitioner bona fide require the mulgi.
17. The Supreme Court in Boorugu Jagadeeshwaraiah & Sons v. Pushpa Trading Co., , while interpreting Section 10(3)(a)(iii), held that :
"Aspects of quality concise and suitability of the building have also been taken into consideration. Otherwise, it would frustrate the purpose of the Act."
Thus, simply because, the petitioners were having non-residential building, it cannot be concluded that the petitioner-landlord is not entitled for the accommodation. No doubt, the family is having a non-residential accommodation in the first floor. But, that itself cannot be a ground to disbelieve the bona fide requirement. More especially when the lower Court itself found that the 3rd petitioner bona fide proposes to commence the fast food centre as he was having experience and having sufficient finance to run the business. Thus, I am of the view that the Courts below erred in recording concurrent that there was no bona fide requirement on irrelevant and extraneous considerations and thus committed an error of fact and law. Hence, the said finding is liable to be set aside. According, it is set aside and the bona fide requirement of 3rd petitioner is affirmed.
18. Coming to the wilful default in the application it was alleged that the petitioner committed default from April, 1987 onwards. The lower Court after considering the evidence on record came to the conclusion that there was no wilful default on the part of the respondent. This finding of fact was also affirmed by the appellate Court. Thus, the ground of wilful default was concurrently found by the Courts below against the landlord. Since this is a finding of fact basing on the appreciation of the evidence, I am not inclined to go into the issue once again by re-appreciating the evidence on record as an appellate Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioners tried to persuade this Court that findings of the Courts below are not based on any evidence. I am not inclined to accept the same. The recitals in the order of lower Court is a manifestation of consideration of evidence and records. Thus, I find no infirmity in the findings.
19. In the result it is held that" the petition for eviction is maintainable. The bona fide requirement of the petitioners is established. The finding of Courts on wilful default is affirmed. The orders of the Courts below are set aside to the extent indicated above. Consequently, RC No.189/1988 stands allowed on the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. The respondent is directed to vacate the premises and hand over the vacant possession of the demised premises to the petitioners, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
20. Accordingly, the CRP is allowed. No costs.