Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Youth Coordinator Nehru Yuva K vs The Labour Court No 2 Jaipur & on 12 July, 2016
Author: Anupinder Singh Grewal
Bench: Anupinder Singh Grewal
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR. ORDER Youth Coordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra Vs. The Labour Court No.2, Jaipur & anr. SB CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6593/2004. Date of order 12.07.2016. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL Mr. Neeraj Bhatt for the petitioner.
Mr. M.F. Baig for the respondent no.2.
The petitioner has challenged the award of the Labour Court dated 19.07.2004 whereby the respondent no.2 workman has been directed to be reinstated in service.
The respondent workman is stated to have been appointed on the post of Chowkidar on daily wages with the petitioner on 26.07.1982. His services were terminated on 18.11.1984. He raised industrial dispute in the year 1990. The Government declined to refer the matter for adjudication to the Labour Court vide order dated 04.02.1991 (Annexure-1). However, lateron the dispute was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court. The Labour Court while holding that the termination of the respondent workman was in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, directed his reinstatement with continuity of service but without back wages. The award of the Labour Court was challenged by the petitioner by preferring writ petition which was dismissed by Coordinate Bench of this Court on 28.02.2006. The petitioner thereafter preferred appeal thereagainst and the Division Bench in the case of Youth Coordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra, Jaipur Vs. The Labour Court No.2, Jaipur & anr.- D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.400/2006 decided on 27.10.2014 while allowing the appeal remanded the matter back to this Court as no reasoning had been advanced by the Single Bench.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the dispute was raised by the respondent workman after a delay of six years and he had himself abandoned the services and, hence, the award of the Labour Court deserves to be set aside.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has contended that as the respondent workman had worked for over two years and his services had been terminated by the petitioner in violation of Section 25F and H of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court has rightly allowed the claim and directed reinstatement of the respondent workman with continuity in service.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
The Labour Court has recorded a finding of fact that the wrokman has been appointed with the petitioner on 26.07.1982 and had worked till 18.11.1984 whereon his services had been terminated. It has been observed that the petitioner management had admitted that the respondent workman had been appointed on 26.07.1982 and left work on 18.11.1984. It is also recorded that the management witness Krishnaveer Dron has admitted, in his cross examination, the certificate W-1 produced by the workman wherein it is stated that he has worked from 26.07.1982 till 18.11.1984. The plea of abandonment put forth by the management has been rejected by the Labour Court by holding that it is not borne out from the record inasmuch as although the respondent workman is stated to have abandoned his services on 18.11.1984 but on the very next day another workman Bajrang Lal had been appointed in his place on 19.11.1984. In the event the workman had abandoned his services or not reported for duty after 18.11.1984, it was incumbent upon the management to have atleast serve him a notice or initiate an enquiry for his lapse but no such action had been taken by the management. Employing another person in place of the respondent workman immediately after dispensing his services would also amount to violation of Section 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
It is well settled that interference by this Court in the award of the Labour Court would be called for only in case of patent illegality or the finding being perverse based on no evidence. Even if on the facts and circumstances another view is possible, this Court will not interfere as it does not exercise appellate jurisdiction so as to reappreciate the evidence. Reference may be made to the judgment by the Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Silchar vs. Oil and Natural Gas Commission Contractual Workers Union [(2008)12 SCC 275] wherein it was held:-
15. We have examined the arguments advanced by the learned counsel. This Court has held time and again that the High Court had the authority to enquire as to whether a finding arrived at by the Tribunal was based on evidence and to correct an error apparent on the face of the record. The observations in Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd. case are to this effect and it has been highlighted that the High Court would be fully justified in interfering with an award of an Industrial Court on account of a patent illegality. In Seema Ghosh case this Court observed that the High Courts interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution with an award of the Labour Court was justified as the award had been rendered contrary to the law laid down by this Court and as a measure of misplaced sympathy, and was thus perverse. The other judgments cited by Mr Dave lay down similar principles and need not be dealt with individually. It will be seen therefore that the interference would be limited to a few cases and as already noted above, in the case of a patent illegality or perversity. On the contrary, Mr Sanyals reliance on Sadhu Ram case is more appropriate to the circumstances herein. It has been observed as under: (SCC p. 158, para 3)
3. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is truly wide but, for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great circumspection. It is not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate court over tribunals constituted under special legislations to resolve disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes and to readjudicate upon questions of fact decided by those tribunals. That the questions decide pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is therefore impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Labour Court and hold that the workman had raised no demand with the management.
Therefore, I do not find any perversity in the finding of the Labour Court while allowing the claim of the respondent workman. However, keeping in view the fact that the industrial dispute was raised by the respondent workman after six years and he had been appointed on daily wages, I am of the considered view that instead of directing his reinstatement the ends of justice would be met if the workman is paid suitable compensation. Reference can be made to the case of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub Division, Kota Vs. Mohan Lal [(2013)14 SCC 543] which pertained to a delay of six years in raising the industrial dispute and the workman was a work charged employee, it was directed by the Supreme Court that the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- be awarded instead of reinstatement. Reference can also be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation & anr. Vs. Gitam Singh [(2013) 5 SCC 136] wherein the workman was working on daily wages and had worked for 7-8 months and compensation of Rs.50,000/- was awarded instead of reinstatement.
The respondent workman herein has worked for a period of over two years and, therefore, compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs) would be just and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Therefore, the writ petition is partly allowed and instead of reinstatement, the respondent workman shall be paid compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs) within a period of three months from now, failing which the petitioner shall be liable to pay interest thereon @ 9% p.a. (ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL),J.
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