Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Atluru Chandra Sekhara Rao vs Atluru Mahesh Babu on 22 February, 2019
Bench: C.Praveen Kumar, M.Satyanarayana Murthy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY, THE TWENTY SECOND DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND NINETEEN PRESENT THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY WRIT PETITION NQ: 39760 OF 2018 Between: Atluru Chandra Sekhara Rao, S/o. Late Seetha Ramaiah, Aged 95 years, Occ. Senior Citizen, Rio, D.No. 1-141, Atkuru Vilage, Undgutur Mandal, Krishna District. PETITIONER AND 4. Atluru Mahesh Babu, S/o. Madhusucdhan Rao (died),(The 1 respondent added as pro forma party as his name is mentioned in the cause title of the Lok Adalat Case No.269/2018 of Lok Adalat Bench, Gudivada). =? Atluru Padrmavathi, W/o. Madhusudhna Rao, Aged about 63 years, Occ. Housewile, R/o. D.No. 1-143, Atkuru Vilage, Ungutur Mandal, Krishna District. (The 2nd respondent is added as L.R in O.S.No. 68/2017 through orders in LA.No. 642/2047). Anne Ratnamala, W/o. Rajashekar, Aged 44 years, Occ. Housewife, R/o. D.Na. 7-6, Rajiv Nagar, Buddavaram Village, Gannavaram Mandal, Krishna District. 4 The Lok Adalat, Gudivada, Krishna District, ALP. ud RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit fled therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue a Writ order or direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari declaring the Award of the Lok Adalat, Gudivada dated 27-04-2018 with lok adalath case register No.269 of 2018 relating O.S.No. 68/2017 on the file of the Fri. Senior Civil Judge, Gudivada and the consequential proceedings, orders thereto as ab initio void, Itegal and uncenstitutional, IA NO: 1 OF 2018 Petition under Section 151 of CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in ihe affidavit fled in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay the operation of the award of the Lok Adalat, Gudivada dated 27-04-2018 with lok adalath case register No.269 of 2018 relating O.S.No. 68/2017 on the file of the Pri. Senior Civil Judge, Gudivada consequently fo direct the unofficial respondents not to interfere with the suit schedule property of O.S.No. 68 af 2017 on the file af the Pri. Senior Civil Judge, Gudivada which is in possession and enjoyment of the petitioner during the pendency of the Writ Petition before this Nor'ble Court. Counsel for the Petitioner: M/s. B CHINNAPA REDDY Counsel for the Respondents 1 fo 3: None Counsel for the Respondent No.4: Sri J. Anil Kurnar (SC for APHC} The Court made the following: ORDER THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR _ AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY WRIT PETITION No.39760 OF 2018 ORDER:
(Per Hon'ble Sri uuslice M. Satyenaraycune Murting One Athuru Chandra Sekhara Rao, petitioner herein and defendant in O.S.No.68 of 2017 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gudivada, filed this writ petitien under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the award passed by the Mandal Legal Services Committee, Gudivada under the provisions of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for short 'Act'}.
The first respondent filed O.S.No.68 of 2017 claiming declaration that the Revocation Deed dated 19.03.2012 bearing Document Nos.2689/2012 and 2691/2012 are null and void. Moperative and consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants including the petitioner from ever interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, alleging that. on 08.02.2012 the defendant has executed two settlement deeds, settling the plaint schedule properties vide Document Nos.1213/2012 and 1214/2012 and by virtue of the said documents, Item No.1 which is the agricultural land retained with the defendant during his life time and he is entitled to enjoy the usuiruct from the sarne and whereas, plaint schedule Item No.2 is put in the possession of the plaintiff on the same day and thus the plaintiff has become the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property by virtue of the said documents. Thus, the plaintif is enjoying the plaint schedule property from the date of execution of the documents acting upon the settlement deed. The petitioner has got only right to enjoy the property during lifetime.
The first respondent herein during his INetime came to know that the defendant at the instigation of his daughter Gullapalli Naga Mani tank advantage, defendant got executed revocation deeds and thereafler the plaintiff obtained certified copies on 06.03.2017. having gone through the said decuments dated 19.03.2012, the plaintiff came ta know the factum of cancellation of documents ie. Settlement Deeds by executing cancellation deeds bearing Document Nos.2689/2012 and 2691/2012 and though those deeds were executed unilaterally by the defendant, the documents are nonest in the eye of law and not binding upon the plaintiff, since the plaintiff is not a party to the said cancellation deeds and sought the relief stated above.
While the suit was pending before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gudivada, the parties appears to have entered into compromise and to record conypromise at request of both the parties, the Mandal Legal Services Committee referred O.5.Na.68 of 2017 for settlement under Section 20 of the Act. The terms of compromise were also reduced inte writing and placed before the Mandal Legal Services Commitee. requesting fa record compromise, in view of the Setilement they arrived before the Mandal Legal Services Committee duly signed by Atluru. Padmavathi, legal representative of one Madhusudhana Rao, who died during pendency of the suit and Ailuru Chandra Sekhara Rao, affixing their thumb impression and also their respective artvorates. In terms of the compromise, award dated 27, 04.2018 was passed by the Mandal Legal Services Commitiee in Lok Adalat Bench, Gudivada in Lok Adalat Case Register No.269 of 2018 and thus in view of settlement, the suit was disposed of.
The petitioner filed the present writ petition on the ground that Decument Nas. 1213/2012 and 1214/2012 dated 08.02.2012 were obtained by playing fraud. coercion and undue influence on the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner got cancelled those documents by executing a registered cancellation deed. The deceased, first respondent herein filed O.S.No.68 of 2017 to declare that those cancellation deeds are null and void and on reference, the Mandal Legal Services Committee passed an award, though it lacks adjudicating power in view of Section 22(1} of the Act and no Rules are prescribed for setting-aside the award precured in the circumstances stated above and that, no appeal lie against such an award, in view of the interdict contained under Section 22 of the Act. Therefore, the defendant in O.S.No.68 of 2017 approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on various grounds, and the main ground urged before this Court is that the petitioner is sufficiently old, aged 95 years and the second respondent/wife of the deceased Madhusudhana Rao playéd fraud on the Court, Lok Adalat and the petitioner, to obtain award and the fourth respondent failed to exercise jurisdiction by verifying the contents of compromise, which deprived the petitioner to enjoy his right over the property. Ih is further contended that the Mandal Legal Services Committee failed to strictly adhere to Section 20(4} of the Act while passing an award and thus, the award is vitiated by fraud and sought to quash the award dated 27.04.2018 passed by the Mandal Legal Services Committee, At the time of admission, during hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner mainly contended that, Mandal Legal Services .
Cammittes failed to adhere to the mandate under Section 2O(4} of the Act and the award is Hable to be set-aside or quashed, as it was obtained by playing fraud. It is also further contended that the petitioner was entitled to life interest over Iter No.1 of the Schedule Property and at the age of 95 years, he cannot be deprived to enjoy his life interest and that, at the age of 95 years, the petitioner ought not to have entered into compromise and thus, the award is vitiated by fraud played by the second respondent and requested to set-aside the award dated 27.04.2018 passed by the Mandal Legal Services Committee in O.S.No0.68 of 2017 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gudivada.
it is an undisputed fact that the petitioner executed Document Nos. 1213/2012 and 1214/2012 and it is also an admitted fact that the petitioner executed unilateral cancellation deeds bearing Document Nos.2689/2012 and 2691/2012 registered with office of the Sub-Registrar, Garmavaram on 19.03.2012, canceling the Document Nos. 1213/2012 and 1214/2012. But, the first respondent curing his lifetime filed suit for setting aside the cancellation deeds on various grounds in O.S.No.G8 of 2017. However, during pendency of the suit. Madhusudhana Rao, husband of the second respondent died. Due to the changed circumstances, the claim in O.S.No.68 of 2017 was referred to the Lok Adalat under Section 20 of the Act for settlement. On reference to Lok Adalat, the petitioner and respondents entered into compromise and filed terms of compromise duly signed by the second respondent, affixing thumb impression of the petitioner and signature of the advocates of both the petitioner and second respondent. The Mandal Legal Services Committee passed the award impugned in this writ petition in terms of comprontise.
Though the suit O.S.No.68 of 2017 was filed for declaration that Document Nos.2689/2012 and 2691/2012 registered in Sub- Registrars Office, Gannavaram are mull and void, the Mandal Legal Services Committee recorded compromise, whereby, the petitioner herein gave up his valuable right of life interest in the property.
The main endeavour of the Sri B. Chinnapa Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner is that, when O.S.No.68 of 2017 was filed to declare the Revocation Deeds dated 19.03.3012 bearing Document Nos.2689/2012 and 2691/2012 are null and void, the Mandal Legal Services Committee ought not to have passed an award depriving the petitioner from claiming right over the property i.e. life interest over the property and that the Mandal Legal Services Committee failed to exercise its power under Section 24 of the Act.
A vague allegation is also made in the petition that the second respondent played fraud on the petitioner in obtaining the award through Lok Adalat and it is vitiated.
It is settled law that the Award passed by the Lok Adalat cannot be reversed except by way of writ petition and no other authority or Court. shall have jurisdiction (vide Sanjay Kumar v. Secretary, City Civil Court Legal Services Authority!and Sri Durga Malleswari Educational Society, Vijayawada v. District Legal Services Authority, Vijayawada2). However, when fraud is alleged, it is for the party who approaches the Court to plead and prove the alleged fraud or misrepresentation by producing cogent and satisfactory material before the Court and a pleading as contemplated under Order VI Rule 4 C.P.C. is required. But. in the affidavit fled in support of the writ petition, except making a bald allegation, no material is produced to * 2010 (3) ALD 330 (DB) "2012 (4) ALD 27 (DB) prove the alleged 'fraud' as defined under Section 17 of Indian Contract Act, 1872, which reads as under:
"E97. 'Fraud' - 'Fraud' means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or te induce him to enter into the contract:
{1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who dees nat believe if to be true; {2} the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact;
(3) «a promise made without any intention of performing tt;
(4) any other act fitted to deceive;
(8) any such act or omission as the law specially deciares to be fraudulent."
The allegation made in the affidavit does not disclose ingredients ta constitute fraud.
A similar question came up for consideration before a Division Beneh of the High Court af Judicature al Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in Kethakapu Muthyam Reddy v. Bhargavi Constructions®. whercin the Division Bench, while considering the scope of Section @1 and 22-E(1) of the Act. observed that fraud must be established beyond reasonable doubt and however suspicious may be the circumstances, however strange the coincidences. and however grave the doubt, suspicion alone can never take the place of proof. In Sanjay Kumar v. Secretary, City Civil Court Legal Services Authority (referred supra). which was approved by the Division Bench in the decision supra, the same question came up for consideration. Therein, the plea urged was *2015 {6} ALD 1 similar to the one urged in the present writ petition and it was held that when the Court finds no material, it cannot quash the orders passed by the Lok Adalat.
If the principles laid down in the above two judgments are applied to the facts of the case on hand, it is difficult te accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that by playing fraud on the petitioner, the Award was obtained from the Mandal Legal Services Authority on reference under Section 21 of the Act. When the petitioner and her counsel signed on the terms of compromise, the petitioner cannot resile from the compromise and contend that it was obtained by fraud, without producing any prima facie proot. Therefore, in the absence of any material on record to establish either fraud in obtaining the Award under challenge, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
No doubt, when the petitioner has set-up a plea that the second respondent played fraud in obtaining award, so also on the Courts and Mandal Legal Services Committee, it is for the petitioner to disclose the details of fraud, wherever it is material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge or other condition of the mind of any setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred, as required under Order VI Rule 4 C.P.C, are not disclosed in the writ petition. That too, the alleged fraud is a question of fact to be determined based on the pleadings and evidence before the competent court. But, in the absence of any prima_facie material before the Court to establish the alleged fraud played by the second respondent a6 Commitice, much less, the ingredients of fraud, as required under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act and such disputed question of fact cannot be decided by this Court in writ petition, The other contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri B. Chinnapa Reddy is that, Mandal Legal Services Committee failed to adhere to the mandatory requirement under Section 2O(4] of the Act.
Section 20 of the Act deals with cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats and Clause (4) makes it clear that, every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference before it under this Act, act with uimost expedition te arrive at a cormpromise or settlement between ithe parties and shall be guided by the principles of Justice, equity, fair play and other legal principles.
The requirement at best is that, the Lok Adalat has to dispose of such references as early as possible and make an endeavour to arrive at a compromise or setilament by and between the parties guided by the principles of justice, equity. fair play and other legal principles.
The words 'principles of justice', 'equity', 'fair play' and 'other legal principles' are not defined anywhere in the Act.
Bul, in Leela Enterprises v. Kamar Sultama*, High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad. referred the genesis of principle and it is extractecl below.
"26. The expression "equily aril good conscience" wes first usec in 1605 in the Statute which established in England Courts of Requesis (8 dae. fo ce. IS) These Courts had previously been established by Order in Coancil during the reign of Henry VII. when they were known as "ihe Courts af Conscience in the Guildhall" and had Jurisdiction te try matters of debt up to 40 shillings. The Commissioners of the Courts of Request were 4 required to niake such orders "as they shall find to stand with * 2017 (SIALOS 74 Equity and Good Conscience'. In Colliery Employees' Federation v. Northern Colliery Proprietors' Association (1904) AR 182 ai 185, Cohen J. sede tt . the words 'equity anc good conscience' leave this Court, im my opinion, in the position that. whilst not infringing any positive law ofthe country, it may do that which it believes to be right and fur and honest between mum ancl mar...
In the Long Service Leave (Engine Driver) Award case (1961) AILR, "ase 308, Gallagher J. sitting as the Coal Industry Tribunal. said that "equity arid goed corseience required the Tribunal to have regarcl to "such consideration as the requirements of natural Justice, the taking of a realistic view, the necessity of doing what is right and fair and honest between man and ran, conscientious ghservance of rules of fair play, the quality of being ecpaal or fair, common fairness as opposed lo meticulous insistence Lpart the formalities of the law."
The doctrine of justice. equity and good conscience is common law doctrine which was introduced in Caleutta in seventeenth century, later in Bormbay and Madras Presidencies. In the absence of any rules of procedure, the Courts have to decide the suits or proceedings by applying the doctrine but the rules framed under the Act, which are having statutory force of law, prescribed such procedure to decide rent control cases or appeals by Rent Controller ar Appellate Court on the basis of cormmon law principles (vide Rule 22 (8} of the Act}, and now in Legal Services Authority Act though not Courts in India are not Courts of equity but Courts of law.
The word equity allows Courts to use their discretion to disperse justice in accordance with natural law. In practice, modem equity is sometimes limited by substantive and procedural rules but this is always not in case: in the Aet, certain provisions and rules envisaged procedure, except the contents of orders passed by authority.
In thé abserice of any definition of the words 'justice, equity and good conscience in the Act or the Rules, Courts may fall back on Sony 10 judge made law since the words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary and common meaning. The term equity 'denotes the spirit and habit of fairness and justness" (vide Perrin Vs. United States}. The term conscience means "the sense of right or wrong together with a feeling of obligation to do or be that which is recognized as good" (vide Gilles Vs. Department of Human Resources Development} (quoting Black's Law Dictionary). The Court also recognized that such broad language "necessarily anticipates that the trier of fact. instead of attempting to channelize his decision with rigid the basis lor his ruling.
In International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, AL., Vs. Elizabeth H. Dole, Secretary of the United States Department of LaborS, it was held that "It goes without saying thal persons of good will may differ widely as to what is "fair", "just" and consistent with "right dealing" in a given coniext. The fairness and fjusiness of decisions made by this Court, for example, regularly occasion disagreement between successful and urisuccesslul Htigants. Just so, in the present case. Those whe have received money because of the government's error and through no fault of their own may think if nat consistent with right dealing to require them ta pay the money back, all the more so when they spent the money not knowing they had no entitlement to it. Nonetheless, the Secretary remains responsible to the taxpayers who paid in the funds paid out through bureaucratic error, and to a Congress and Executive determined to make drastic g * (20) 819 F.2d FRB cuts in TAA program spending. Given the Administration's cost-
cutting policy, a policy approved and adopted by Congress, the Secretary can hardly be taken greatly to task for making waiver of recoupment a tightly limited exception t the pay-it-back main rule. In face of the elastic nature of "equity and good conscience", and the obligation of Courts to heed the context in which the words appear, appellants argue that the Secretary's interpretation is unreasonably narrow. Appellants rely, particularly, on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Groseclose vs Bowen'. In that case, the state sought to recover overpayment of a child's insurance benefits by deducting the overpayment amount from the father's retirement insurance benefits, even though father did not himself | receive, and had no knowledge of, the overpayrnent. Groseclose vs Bowen {referred supra}. The regulation successfully challenged in Groseclose vs Bowen {referred supra) looked to one factor only, detrimental reliance. The father necessarily had not relied on receipts of which he was unaware. The Secretary maintained that, because the father was unable toe show detrimental reliance, recoupment was not barred by "equity and good conscience" as defined in the regulations."
In U.Bransly Nongaiang Vs. U.Drolishon Syliemiong and others®, the High Court of Gauhati set aside the order on the ground that the order is violative of principles of justice, equity and good conscience but not defined the doctrine.
A similar statute ie. Residential Tenancies Act, 1987, where the same doctrine came up for consideration before New South Wales Residential-Tenancies Tribunal, In determining applications, Tribunal * R02 F.2d BOQ * 61986) 2 GLA 487 and Board members are required to act according to "equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case withoul regard to technicalities or legal forms." As such, wide discretionary power is r comferred on Property Tribunals in dispensation of justice without adhering lo any procedural fetters.
The expression "equily and gond conscience" was first used in 1606 in the Stalute which established in England Courts of Requests, These Courts had previously been established by Order In Council curing the reign of Henry VIL when they were known as "the Courts of Conscience in the Guildhall" and had Jurisdiction to try matters of debt up to 40 shillings. The Commissioners of the Courts of Request were required to make such orders "as they shall find to stand with Equity and Good Conscience". In Colliery Employees' Federation Vs. Northern Colliery Proprietors' Association®, Cohen d. said "the words 'equity and goed conscience' leave this Court, in my opinion. in the position that, whilst not infringing any positive law of the country. it may do that which it believes to be right and fair and honest between man anc maeat..".
In the Long Service Leave (Emgime Driver) Award case}, Gallagher J. silting as the Coal Industry Tribunal. said that "equity e ancl good conscience required the Tribunal to have regard to "such consideration as the requirements of natural Justice. the taking of a realistic view, the necessity of doing what is right and fair and honest between man and man, conscientious observance of rules of fair play, the quality of being equal or fair. common fairness as opposed to w meticulous insistence upon the formalities of the law.
"{1904) AR 182 at 185 "UPS6 1) ALLE. case 208 é After reviewing a large number of decided cases, Olsson expressed the view that certain "fundamental concepts" emerged from this provision: (1) A tribunal which is, by statute, enjoined to be governed in its procedure and judgmertts by equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities or legal forms or the practice of other Courts is not, generally speaking, bound to decide proceedings stricti juris. Rather it is a Court af conscience different from those regulated by established principles of law and equity and not absolutely bound to adjudicate according thereto.
(2) This is not to say that the tribunal may not or should not take established principles of law and equity into consideration and.
indeed in appropriate circumstances even decide certain cases solely upon the footing thereof as being the most just approach} but it rnust, in the final analysis, test its conclusion solely in the light of the express Statutory mandate.
(3) The wide discretionary power conferred is, in a sense, self limiting in terms of procedure. Whilst informal procecdiures and evidence may usually be adopted, nevertheless, everything done (or omitted) must stand the test of the established principles of natural justice.
(4) The very nature of the proceedings will have a direct bearing upon the exercise of discretion under the statute, both in procedural and substantive respects. Thus, for example, cases involving penal or quassi penal consequences may well be treated on a basis of evidence, standard of proot and principles substantially different from arbitral Claims or nor- penal actions.
14(5) The Tribunal is not empowered to disregard as absolute statutory directive which bears upon the subject matter and manifestly is not intended to be read down in light of a general power of conscience.
There are suggestions in same of the decided cases that where Parliament has clearly intended that a Court or tribunal should act as a "court of conscience" rather than a court of law, there can be no appeal from a decision of such a court or tribunal. This argument has then been turned around to support the proposition that if Parliament has provided an avenue of appeal. which it has with the Residential Tenancies Tribunal and the Strata Titles Board, this must indicate some restriction on the extent to which the court or tribunal against which the appeal lies may make use of the "equity and good conscience' provision. The case usually cited in support of these arguments is Moses Vs. Parker. In that case, the court in question was directed ta be guided by equity and good conscience only, and by the best evidence procurable, even if not required or admissible in ordinary cases, and not to be bound by strict rules of law. equity or by any legal forms. The question arose as to whether there was a right of appeal to the privy Council. The Privy Council held that there could be no appeal, because the members of the Court were expressly exonerated from all rules of law and equity and all legal forms. The decision carliniued:
"How then can the propriety of their decision be tested on appeal? What are the canons by which this Board is to be guided in advising Her Majesty whether the Supreme Court is right or wrong? Tt seems almost impossible that decisions can be varied except by reference to some rule; whereas the Courl making them is free from rules. If appeals were allowed, the certain result would be to establish some system of rules; and that is the very thing from which the Tasmanian Legislature has decided to leave this court free and unfettered in each case. Hit were clear that appeals ought to be allowed, such difficulties would doubtless be met somehow. But there are strong arguments to show that the matter is not an appelable nature."
In Qantas Airlines Limited Vs. Gubbins!!, the New South Wales Court of Appeal had to consider Section 108 (1) (6) and Section 118 of the Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977.
The former provision provided that the Tribunal in question "shall act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal forms". The latter provision provided for an appeal to the Su preme Court on questions of law. Gleeson C.J. and Handley J, in a joint judgment, describing these provisions as "apparently conflicting", held that the conflict could be resolved only by holding that the "equity and good conscience" provision did not release the Tribunal from the obligation fo apply rules of law in arriving at its decisions. Ik was pointed out that in some cases, the words equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case" may indicate that "the decision maker is free from any obligation to apply rules of law so that any decision will be executive rather than judicial and not subject to appeal even if that is otherwise available". In other contexts, those words have been consirued as requiring the Tribunal to apply the ordinary law.
** (1992) 28 NSWLR 26 16 in an attempt to summarize the way in which the tribunals should approach the question of equity and good conscience, Noblet J in Russito Pty Ltd Vs. Rosso!? has this to say:
'It is not appropriate to attempt an exhaustive definition of what is meant by 'equity and good conscience'. Each case must be examined on its merits. However, in view of the difficulty in reconciling some recent decisions, and having regard to my responsibility as Chairman to determine any question of law or procedure, it may be useful for me to attempt to extract from the authorities some general principles which | consider should guide the tribunal in the future.
(1) The Tribunal must ahways ensure that principles of natural justice are scrupulously observed.
(2) The Tribunal must cemply with any express statutory directive that is clearly not intended to be ignored or departed from, even if the result may nol seem to aceord with equity and good conscience.
(3) In matters of statutory interpretation, the Tribunal must not give a statute a meaning other than that which a court of law would place upon it.
(4) Subject to the above, the Tribunal may determine a matter before it by the application of conscience, fairness and common sense.
rather than according to strict law, if it is satisfied that this is an appropriate approach in all the circumstances of the particular case.
(1993) 1734595 14 Lf (5) In deciding whether this alternative approach is appropriate, the Tribunal should have regard to all relevant factors and, in particular, the following:
{a) the nature of the proceedings (the alternative approach may not be appropriate if the proceedings involve penal oar quasi-
penal consequences), {b) the nature of any dispute involved in the proceedings {the alternative approach may mot be appropriate if il would remove the degree of certainty which the law attempts to bring to eom»,ercial transactions}, {c) the conduct of the parties (the alternative approach may not be appropriate if it would remove the degree of certainty which the law attempts to bring to commercial transactions), (dq) in cases involving contracts or agreements. the relative bargaining power of the parties and the extent to which they have had legal or other appropriate advice (the alternative approach may be appropriate if one party is in an inferior position relative to the other and has acted to his or her disadvantage without advice}."
In view of the meaning given to the words "equity and good conscience" In the above judgments and applying the same meaning to the proceedings before the Legal Services Authorities Le. Mandal Legal Service Committee, they are bound to pass order /judpment applying the common law doctrine of "fustice, equity and good conscience". When such wide discretion is conferred oan Rent pes, ge exercise discretion judiciously. Merely because the Mandal Legal service Committee is given discretion, such discretion shall not be exercised at their whims anc fancies.
A Pull Bench of the Apex Court in Rattan Lal Vs. Vardesh Chanderts, while dealing with an eviction dispute between landlord and tenant come across an identical situation. relied on Namdeo Lokman Lochi Vs. Narrnadabai to hold as follows:
"It is axiomatic that the courts must apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience to transactions which come wp belore them for determination even though the statutory provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not made applicable to these transactions. It follows therefore that the provisions of the Act which are but a statutery recognition ef the rules of justice equity and good canscience alsa p govern those transfers. Uf, therefore, we are satisfied that the particular principle to which the legislature has now given effect by the amendment to Section tit ) did in fact represent a principle of justice, equity and good eormscience, undoubtedly the case will have to be decided in accerdance with the rule laid down in the section. although in express terms it has not been made applicable to leases executed prior to the Transfer of Property Act coming inte force."
In Maharaja of Vizianagaram by his Guardian and Next Friend, FW. Gillman v. Sri Rajah Setrucherla Somaseckhararaz Bahadur and Ramabhadraraz Bahadur!4, a Full Bench of Madras High Court for the first time considered the common law doctrine and held in para No. 26 as follows:
sO 'far | a 'field: as "the 'English Courts j in. 1 order there t to seek for and thence to import into [udia principles of equity we carn certainly be pardoned to go so far a field as the Irish Courts for the same purpase, We in India are not absolutely bound by the decisions of either set of Courts. as we are by the decisions of the Judicial Committee of tbe Privy Council; but without resorting to the tlecisions of the lrish Courts, I say with all deference, that the lien contended for in the present case is not importing into India any novel principle of equity based om unsound analogy and rejected as unsound by judges of such eminence > AS Bowen. and Fry, LJd.
"1976 AIR 588 "Cinag} is MELT Be and not followed by an equally eminent judge as the late Lord Justice Cotton in Falcke Vs. Scot Imp. Insurance Co.; nor is it at all at variance with the Transfer of Property Act of the Indian L egislature and with the policy of the Government as disclosed in its legislative enactments, at any rate, such of them as are in force in this presidency."
Following the principle, A Larger Bench consisting of nine judges of the Apex Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal considering the applicability of common law of England to India observed that the next question is, how far and what extent the common law of England relating to the prerogatives was accepted as the law throughout India. India at the relevant time comprised Provinces and Natives States. As Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., pointed out in Bell v. Municipal Commissioners for the City of Madras'5, "the prerogatives of the Crown in India country in which the title of the British Crown is of a very mixed character may vary in different provinces, as also in the Presidency towns as distinguished from the muffasil. The determination with anything like legal precision, of all the prerogatives of the British Crown in India is by ne means as easy task." It is well known that the Common Law of England was applied as such in the original sides of the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, and that in the muffasil Courts the principles ernmbodied in the common law were invoked in appropriate cases on the ground of justice, equity and good conscience. It cannot therefore, be posited that either the entire body of common law of England relating to prerogatives of the Kind or even the rule of construction as forming part of that law was accepted as law in every part of the country. [t has to be established whenever a question arises as to what part of the common law was accepted as the law in a particular part of the © (102) [LR 25 Sad 457 country. The decision of the Privy Council im Privy Council in Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay! in support of the contention that the common law of England was accepted as the law of our country in that regard. In that case, the question was whether the Crown was not bound by Section 222 (1] and S. 265 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act.
purposes of water supply through across or under any street and into. through or under any land "whatsoever within the city... When the Municipal Corporation wanted to lay water-mains through the land belonging to the Government of Bombay the Government did nat agree except on some conditions. Thereafter, the dispute between the parties was referred to the High Court. Ulimately, setting aside the order of the High Court the Privy Council held that the rule that no statute bound the Crown was the Crown was expressly or bv hecessary iniplication made bound thereunder applied to the Crown in India and that there was no such express intention or necessary implication in the said section. Indeed. the High Court also accepted that principle. but on the construction of the relevant provisions it came to the conclusion that there was such a necessary tmplication thereunder. On the application of the principle, there was no cantest before the Privy Council: The Privy Council expressly stated so at page No. 274 of LA}, when it observed: "The High Court held. following previous decisions of its own. that the principle to be applied for the decision of the question whether or not the Crown is bound by a statute is not diflerent in the case of Indian Legislation from that which has long been applied in England. The parties concurred in "73 Ind App 271 accepting this view, and their Lordships regard it as correct. "The decision made on a concession made by the parties even though the principle conceded was accepted by the Privy Council without discussion, cannot be given the same value as one given upon a careful consideration of the pros and cons of the question raised. Further, no argument was raised beture the Privy Coumeil that the Common Law of England had legal ferce only in the said three Presidency towns and not in the rest of the country, for that case happened to be one that arose in the City of Bombay. The observations of the Privy Council that the principles obtaining in England also governed the Crown in India are rather wide. Nor any argument was raised before the Privy Council making a distinction between substantive branches of common law and mere rules of construction. It is not possible to predicate what the Privy Council would have said if that distinetion had been placed before it. Be that as it may, this decision cannot be taken as finally deciding the question that is raised before LS, After elaborate consideration of principles laid down in various decisions, the Apex Court summed up in para No. 21 as follows: "Some of the doctrines of common law of Englanct were administered as the law in the Presidency Towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. The Common Law of England was not adopted in the rest of India. Doubtless some of its principles were embodied in the statute law of our country. That apart, in the Muffasil, some principles of common Law were invoked by Courts on the ground of justice, equity and good conscience. It is, therefore, a question of fact in each case whether any particular branch of the Common Law become a part of the Law of India or in any particular part thereof. The aforesaid rule of construction is only a cannon of 22 interpretation: it is net a rule of substantive law. Though it was noticed in some of the judgments of the Bombay High Court. the decisions therein mainly turned upon the relevant statutory provision. Gne decision even questioned its correctness. There is nothing to show that it was applied in other parts of the country on the ground of justice, good conscience and equity. In Madras, it was not considered to be a binding rule of law. but only as a simple cannon of construction, In Calcutta, there was a conflict: one Bench accepted the construction and the other rejected it. The Privy Council gave its approval to the mainly on the concession of Advocates and that decision related to Bombay City. It is, therefore. clear that the said rule of construction throughout India and even in the Presidency towns il was not regard as inflexible rule of construction. In short, it has not become a law of the land."
At best, in view of the law declared by the Courts, the principles of justice, equity, fair play or good conscience is only to dispense with procedural fetters and allow the parties to settle their disputes.
But. in the present facts of the case, the Mandal Legal Services Committee in the Lok Adalat held on 27.04.2018 in view of the reference made by the Principal Senior Civil Judge. Gudivada acted in utmost expeditious manner and made an endeavour to bring the parties to setile the dispute amicably and on filing compromise before the Mandal Legal Services Committee, Gudivada, recorded compromise, the terms of compromise was signed by the petitioner and respondent. 'Therefore. in strict adherence of Section 20(4) of the Act, the Mandal Legal Services Cornmittee passed an award and the award cannot be set-aside on the ground of non-compliance of Section 20(4) of the Act.
In view of our foregoing discussion, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to set-aside the award on any one of the two the grounds urged in the petition, the first ground is playing fraud by the respondent on the petitioner, Mandal Legal Services Committee and the Court, which vitiates the award and the second ground is that the Mandal Legal Services Comumnittee failed to adhere to Section 204) of the Act, in view of the limited jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in matters of this nature, as we find no illegality or irregularity in the award passed by the Court below. Consequently, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
In the result, the writ petition is dismissed at the stage of admission.
Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall stand dismissed.
SO/- M. RAMESH BABU ASSISTANT REGISTRAR 'S TRUE COPY! 8 SECTION OFFICER To,
1. The Lok Adalat, Gudivada, Krishna District, ALP.
2. One CC to SRI. B CHINNAPA REDDY Advocate [OPUC]
3. Two CCs to the Sri £ Anil Kumar, (SC for APHC) High Court of A.P. [OUT]
4. Two CD Copies
5. OLR. Copies. _ .
6. The Under Secretary, Union of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi. oo
7. The Secretary A.P. Advocate''s Association Library, High Court Buildings, Hyderabad.
Che oe foe LENSES TU 0 SGI TET TTT TT tenn ann nay tee ea eee a es HIGH COURT DATED :22/02/2019 ORDER WP_No.39760 of 2018 W.P. IS DISMISSED 6 FS. 6121 Beng.