Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 28.05.2025 vs State Of H.P. & Another on 24 June, 2025
2025:HHC:19451 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 878 of 2024 Reserved on: 28.05.2025 Date of Decision: 24.06.2025.
Chetan Sharma @ Bantu ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & another ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No For the Petitioner : Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General
for respondent No. 1 State.
Mr. Jia Lal, Advocate, for
respondent No.2.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 78 of 2023, dated 23.12.2023, registered at Police Station Sainj District Kullu, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 336 and 304-A of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and consequential proceedings pending before 2 2025:HHC:19451 learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Banjar, District Kullu, H.P. (learned Trial Court). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court.)
2. It has been asserted that, according to the prosecution, Maheshwar Singh (since deceased) was operating a JCB Machine bearing registration No. HP49A-2240. The JCB was found parked between the water of the Tirthan River and the new bridge, beyond the Larji Forest Check Post, on 22nd December 2023. Maheshwar Singh was found missing. The petitioner, Chetan Sharma, and 2-3 other persons were found standing by the side of the road. The deceased, Maheshwar Singh, had drowned in the river. The police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. The police concluded after the investigation that the petitioner had compelled the deceased to drive the JCB Machine, and his act was the proximate cause of the death of Maheshwar Singh. These allegations are false. The petitioner never compelled Masheswar Singh to cross the river. He was not even present at the spot. Mashewar Singh died due to the increase in the water level, which was caused by the sudden release of water from the Siund Dam. The statements of 3 2025:HHC:19451 the prosecution's witnesses do not show a prima facie case against the petitioner. There is no evidence pointing towards the guilt of the petitioner or to attract the provision of Sections 336 and 304-A of the IPC. Therefore, it was prayed that the present F.I.R. and consequential proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed.
3. The petition is opposed by respondent No.1/State, by filing a reply taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability and the petitioner being estopped from filing the present petition by his act and conduct. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that Maheshwar Singh was driving the JCB machine bearing registration No. HP49A-2240, owed by the petitioner. The petitioner asked him to cross the river. The water level of the river increased suddenly, and Maheshwar Singh drowned in the river. Khem Raj had seen a black Scorpio bearing registration No. HP49A- 4040, owned by the petitioner, parked beside the road. The accident had occurred due to the negligence of the petitioner, who had forced Maheshwar Singh to drive the JCB through the river. The dead body of Maheshwar Singh was recovered subsequently in the Beas River on 03.03.2024. As per the report 4 2025:HHC:19451 of the postmortem, the deceased had died due to asphyxia secondary to antemortem wet drowning. The charge sheet has been filed before the Court, and there is sufficient material on record to establish the guilt of the petitioner.
4. I have heard Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Lokender Kutlehira, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1/State, and Mr. Jia Lal, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
5. Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent. There is nothing on record to connect him with the commission of a crime. The F.I.R. was registered on the hearsay evidence, and no witness had seen the accused compelling the deceased to take the JCB across the river. The accident had occurred due to the release of water by the Dam authorities; therefore, he prayed that the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed.
6. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that the police had collected sufficient material to connect the accused with the commission of a crime. 5
2025:HHC:19451 The charge sheet has been filed before the Court, and the competent court has taken cognisance of the matter. This court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R. at this stage. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7. Mr. Jia Lal, learned counsel for respondent No.2, adopted the submissions advanced by learned Additional Advocate General on behalf of respondent No.1/State and further submitted that the deceased was employed by the petitioner. The petitioner had asked the deceased to cross the river with the JCB. The driver of the JCB drowned in the water. The proximate cause of the death was the act of the accused of forcing the deceased to cross the river. This Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction when the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 6
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9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -
"7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a 7 2025:HHC:19451 cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4), and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.8
2025:HHC:19451 In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."
10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice.
These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before 9 2025:HHC:19451 quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).
11. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed at page 703:
"7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent 10 2025:HHC:19451 powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."
12. The term abuse of the process was explained in Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740:
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:
33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-
established and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the process of the court.
34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) "There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. ... A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process.
*** The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice."
In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. 11
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35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 : (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word "abuse of process" as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case.
36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 :
(1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances:
(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or
(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case.
37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:
"It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable."
38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:
"The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried."12
2025:HHC:19451 What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case.
13. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them. However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was observed at page 498:
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, try to read in between the lines. The Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take, for instance, the case at hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances that the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge, as alleged.
14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material 13 2025:HHC:19451 that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held :
(Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7) "5. ... Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers court would be justified in quashing any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g., want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 14
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7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not, or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death." (emphasis supplied)
14. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
15. F.I.R. reads that the informant came to know that the deceased was crossing the river with the JCB when the water level suddenly increased due to the release of water from the Siund Dam. Thus, it is apparent from the F.I.R. that the proximate cause of the death was the increase in the water level by the sudden release of the water from Siund Dam. There is no recital in the F.I.R. that the petitioner had asked the deceased to 15 2025:HHC:19451 drive the JCB machine across the river after its level had increased. Therefore, the submission that the proximate cause of the accident was that the petitioner had forced the deceased to drive the JCB across the river is not correct.
16. The informant stated that he came to know from Khem Raj that the petitioner's Scorpio was parked on the roadside, which led him to infer that the petitioner had forced the deceased to drive the JCB across the river. Merely because the Scropio of the petitioner was parked on the road cannot lead inference that the petitioner had asked the deceased to drive the JCB across the river. No person had deposed that he had seen the petitioner asking the deceased to drive the JCB across the river. Therefore, it is apparent that the charge sheet is based on no evidence, and the continuation of the proceedings in the present case will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.
17. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the FIR No.0078 of 2024, dated 23.12.2023, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 336 and 304-A of IPC at Police Station Sainj, District Kullu, H.P. as well as consequential proceedings arising out of F.I.R., pending before the learned Trial Court are quashed.
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18. Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also pending applications, if any.
19. Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the said authorities shall not insist on the production of a certified copy but, if required, may verify passing of the order from Website of the High Court.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th June, 2025 (ravinder)