Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal - Delhi
Union Bank Of India vs Jenus Pharmaceuticals India And Ors. on 10 December, 2002
Equivalent citations: III(2003)BC35
ORDER
K.S. Kumaran, J. Chairman
1. The appellant-Union Bank of India, filed a Civil Suit before the District Judge, Jaipur City, for the recovery of Rs. 10,60,951.92 against the respondents, which was decreed on 19.7.1989 for the said sum with subsequent interest at 16.5% per annum from the date of suit till realisation along with costs. The appellant Bank filed an application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') for issuance of a recovery certificate. This became necessary because the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') came to be passed and Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the said Act provides as follows:
"31. Transfer of pending cases.--(1) Every suit or other proceeding pending before any Court immediately before the date of establishment of a Tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action wherein it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before any Court."
2. Subsequently, by an amendment in the year 2000, Section 31A was introduced into the Act which provides as follows:
"31 A. Power of Tribunal to issue certificate of recovery in case of decree or order--(1) Where a decree or order was passed by any Court before the commencement of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act, 2000 and has not yet been executed, the decree-holder may apply to the Tribunal to pass an order for recovery of the amount.
(2) On receipt of an application under Sub-section (1), the Tribunal my issue a certificate for recovery to a Recovery Officer.
(3) On receipt of a certificate under Sub-section (2), the Recovery Officer shall proceed to recover the amount as if it was a certificate in respect of debt recoverable under this Act."
3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank, Dasuya v. Chajju Ram, V (2000) SLT 802-AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2671, held that at least after the introduction of Section 31 A, it is only the Tribunal which would have the jurisdiction of entertaining the application for execution of the decree in respect of a decree which is sought to be executed for an amount of over Rs. 10 lakhs.
4. The learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal, who considered the application of the appellant Bank for the issuance of the Recovery Certificate, dismissed the said application on the ground that it is barred by limitation. Aggrieved, the Union Bank of India has come forward with this appeal.
5. It is seen from the records that notices were issued to the respondents in this appeal and none has put in appearance for the respondents. Therefore, I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and perused the records.
6. The learned Counsel for the appellant points out that even before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, all the respondents except the 4th respondent did not take part in the proceedings. He further points out that the learned Presiding Officer observed that the decree in question was passed by the Civil Court on 19.7.1989, but the appellant Bank did not file any execution petition before the Civil Court, that the Tribunal at Jaipur was established on 26.8.1994 and the Bank should have filed application at least within three years from that date.
7. The learned Counsel for the appellant challenges these observations/findings of the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. He contends that under Section 24 of the Act, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 have been made applicable to an application made to the Tribunal, and, therefore, the application for execution of a decree and the application for issuance of a Recovery Certificate can be made within the time provided for by the Indian Limitation Act for the execution of a decree. The learned Counsel for the appellant points out that Article 136 of the Indian Limitation Act provides for a period of 12 years for the execution of a decree, and, therefore, the decree in the present case having been passed by the Civil Court on 19.7.1989 could be executed within 12 years thereof, and, therefore, the finding view of the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal that the decree should have been executed in three years from the date of the decree or within three years from the date of which the Tribunal was established, is unsustainable. The learned Counsel for the appellant points out from the impugned order that the learned Presiding Officer has himself observed that the execution proceedings can be initiated as per the provisions of Article 136, but erroneously held the period of limitation as three years.
8. I agree with the learned Counsel for the appellant. Under Article 136 of the Indian Limitation Act, the decree can be executed within 12 years from the date on which the decree became enforceable. In the present case, the decree in question was passed by the Civil Court on 19.7.1989 and, therefore, the application made for issuance of the Recovery Certificate on 24.12.1998 cannot be stated to be barred by time in view of provision contained in Article 136 of the Indian Limitation Act which is applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal also. Therefore, the finding of the learned Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur that the application for issuance of the Recovery Certificate should have been filed either within three years from the date of the decree or within three years from the date of the establishment of the Tribunal, cannot be sustained. I find that the application in question for the issuance of the Recovery Certificate has been filed in time.
9. Inasmuch as the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal has dismissed the application on the ground that it is barred by time, while allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned order dated 16.10.2001, the matter has to be remanded back to the Tribunal for consideration of the application on merits and disposal in accordance with law.
10. Resultantly, this appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 16.10.2001 passed by the learned Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the said Tribunal for taking back the matter on its file and for disposing the same on merits in accordance with law, and in the light of the observations made in this appeal,
11. A copy of this order be furnished to both the sides and also be sent to the concerned Tribunal.