Karnataka High Court
Madarsab Saheblala Kattimani And Anr. vs Nagappa Vittappa Katabugol And Ors. on 18 February, 1980
Equivalent citations: AIR1981KANT117, [1983]53COMPCAS29(KAR), ILR1980KAR671, 1980(2)KARLJ514, AIR 1981 KARNATAKA 117, ILR (1980) 1 KANT 671 (1980) 2 KANT LJ 514, (1980) 2 KANT LJ 514
JUDGMENT Sabhahit, J.
1. This appeal under S. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is by the owner and the driver of the vehicle in question and is directed against the judgment and award dated 6th March 1979 made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Belgaum, in M. V. C. No. 15 of 1978 on its file absolving the Insurance Company, the third respondent herein, from paying compensation awarded.
2. It is the case of the claimants that their son Balappa was sleeping in the field in the night of 20th November 1977 at about 3.30 A. M. and that truck in question which went into the field for carrying sugar-cane load ran over, him killing him on the spot. Their son Balappa was aged about 16 years. He was working and earning. He was thus killed by the rash and negligent driving of the truck by the driver and, on those grounds, the parents of the deceased claimed Rs. 70,000/- as compensation from the respondents. Respondent 1 is the driver of the truck. Respondent 2 is the owner and respondent 3 is the insurer. Respondents 1 and 2 contended that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim application as the accident had, happened in a private agricultural land. They further contended that the accident was not the result of rash and negligent driving of the truck- According to them, if at all, the Insurance Company was liable to pay the compensation.
3. The Insurance Company, on the other hand, contended that it had no liability as the accident happened in the field and not in a public place. On these pleadings, the Tribunal raised the following issues: -
(1) Whether the petitioners prove that Kumar Balappa Nagappa Katabugol sustained fatal injuries in a motor vehicle accident on 20th November 1977 at 3.30 a. m. in R. S. No. 69 of Balekundri Budruk just near Belgaum-Bagalkot Road?
(2) Whether the said accident was due to rash and negligent act -of the driver of the truck bearing No. MYL 7611?
(3) Whether the petitioners are entitled for compensation? If so, what quantum and from whom?
(4) What order?
(5) Whether the accident took place in a public place? Is the Insurer not liable?
4. During hearing, the petitioners examined two witnesses. Respondents examined the driver and another witness. The Tribunal appreciating the evidence on record held that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the truck that the owner and the driver were liable to pay compensation of Rupees 10,000 to the claimants and that the insurer was not liable to pay compensation as the accident happened in a private land and not in a public place. Aggrieved by the said judgment and award, the owner and the driver, as stated above, have come up in appeal before this Court.
5. The learned Advocate appearing for the appellants vehemently contended that the Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the truck, that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain and award compensation as the accident had happened in a private land and further that the Tribunal if at all ought to have awarded compensation against the Insurance Company also. As against that, the learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company as also the learned counsel appearing for the claimants argued supporting the judgment and award of the Claims Tribunal.
6. The points, therefore, that arises for our consideration in this appeal are:
(1) Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the truck by its driver?
(2) Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain and try the claim application?
(3) Whether the Tribunal was justified in absolving the Insurance Company from identifying the owner?
7. We would first consider about the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. S. 110 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) states-
"A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as Claims Tribunals) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both."
Thus what gives jurisdiction to the Tribunal is that there should occur bodily injury or death as a result of motor accident or damages to property. It does not say that the accident should occur in a public place. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the Tribunal could not entertain and award compensation with regard to the death of Balappa as a direct result of motor accident.
8. The learned counsel also argued that the accident was not the result of rash and negligent driving of the truck. The evidence on record discloses that Balappa was sleeping in the field as he had taken a herd of sheep to the field. It is the usual practice of villagers to take herd of sheep for manuring purpose in a field and sleep there at night among the herd itself. Balappa was sleeping like that. The driver of the truck unmindful of the person sleeping in the field, took the truck in the field and ran over Balappa which constitutes manifestly an act of rashness and negligence on the part of the driver and, hence the Tribunal was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the truck and the death of Balappa was a direct result of such accident as Balappa, died as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident.
9. Adverting to the last point, the Tribunal has absolved the Insurance Company from liability on the sole ground that the accident did not happen in a public place. It is true that S. 95 (1) (b) of the Act reads: -
"In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of Insurance must be a policy which-
(a) ....... .......... ............ ........... .............
(b) Insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)-
(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place.
(ii) ...... ...... ......
Thus it becomes obvious that requirements of Chapter VII viz., insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks, an Act policy cover compensation with regard to bodily injury or death of a third Party in a public place Therefore, if what is issued by the company is nothing more than the Act policy as contemplated under S. 95 of the Article it can safely be concluded that the company is not liable to identify the owner in case bodily injury or death of a third party arising out of the use of the motor vehicle not in a public place but in a private land.
10. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, strenuously urged that there is nothing to bar the insured from covering wider field than what is contemplated under S. 95 of the Act by contract in the policy. In that view, he submitted that the terms in the policy are not restricted to cover only compensation regarding personal injury or death rising out of the use of the motor vehicle of a third Party in a public place. On the other hand, he submitted that it covers compensation with regard to bodily injury or death of a third party either in public or private place. Hence, he submitted, that the Company is liable to identify the owner. To appreciate, the arguments so advanced, it is necessary to refer to the clauses in the policy itself. The policy is produce the Tribunal has referred to it. It is true that it is not formally marked as an exhibit in the ease But the rigour of strict rules of Evidence Act is not applicable in proceedings before the Tribunal In fact, the seal of the Court is affixed to the policy and it is clearly written thereon that the policy is produced by the Advocate for the Insurance Company an 3rd March 1979 in M. V. C. NO. 15 of Insurance, for all the purposes the policy is admitted to evidence. For convenience sake we will now mark, it as Ex. R. 1.
11. Under the heeding Liability to Third Parties in S. II, of the Policy it is stated:
"(1) Subject to the limits of liability the Company will identify the Insured against all sums including claimants costs, and expenses which the insured become legally liable to pay in respect of
(i) death of or bodily injury to any person caused by arising out of the use (including the loading and/or unloading of the Motor Vehicle.
(ii) damage to property earned by the use (including the loading and/or unloading of the Motor Vehicle.
Thus, Clause I of Section II in the policy is made very wide subject, only to limitations mentioned in Section II of the policy. It states that the company will identify the insured against all sums including claimant's costs and expenses, which the insured shall become legally liable to pay. But it does not say that the company is liable only in respect of the accidents happening in a public place. The clause does not also state that its liability is confined to what is provided for in Section 95 of the Act. The wordings have been, very wide stating that the company will identify the insured against an sums including claimants costs and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable to pay.
12. The sole question, therefore, that arises for our consideration is whether the owner in this case is legally liable to pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal?
13. We have already pointed out above that Section 110 (1) of the Act does not confine the jurisdiction of the Tribunal only to accidents occurring in a public place. Hence, it is obvious that the owner is legally bound to pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. That being so, it is manifest that the company is liable to identify the owner against such legally recoverable sum along with his expenses and costs of the proceedings.
14. The learned counsel for the Insurance Company, however, invited our attention to the provisos (a), (c) and (g) of Section II in the policy. Proviso (a) states-
"The Company shall not be liable in respect of death, injury or damage caused or arising beyond the limits of any carriage way or thoroughfare in connection with the bringing of the load to the motor vehicle for loading thereon or the taking away of the load from the Motor Vehicle after unloading therefrom."
This obviously refers to the loading and unloading action which is mentioned in Section 11 (1) (i) and (ii). It does not generally refer to third party risks, Proviso (c) states-
"Except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939. in relation to liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the Company shall not be liable in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person (other than a passenger carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment) being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the motor vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which any claim arises."
This, obviously refers to the passengers travelling in a truck and the liability is confined to what is contained in S. 95 of the Act and it does not in terms relate to third party risks. Proviso (9) states-
"The Company shall not be liable in respect of death or bodily injury caused by or arising out of the explosion of the boiler of the motor vehicle unless such death or injury is caused by or arises out of the use of the Motor Vehicle in a public place in India within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939."
That specifically refers to the explosion of the boiler and therein it is specifically stated that such explosion shall occur in a public place. Having regard to these clauses, it becomes clear that the company confined only to accidents arising in a public place. For as can be seen in Proviso (g), it specifically refers to a public place. In the main clause (1) such a word is omitted though it is to be found, as stated above, in Section 95 of the Act. That makes it clear that it was the clear intention of the insurer to cover liability with regard to third party risks arising out of the use of the motor vehicle even in a private place, if such liability is incurred by the owner legally as in the present case.
15. It is laid down by the Supreme Court of India that the insurer and the insured can certainly make the scope of the policy much wider than what is required under Section 95 of the Act which only contemplates compulsory Act Policy, in the case of Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd., . Hence, we are persuaded to agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants that on the terms of the policy compensation with regard to death of Balappa arising out of the use of the truck in question has to be made good by the insurer in the present case. The Tribunal has not considered the terms of the policy at all. It has in a general way observed that under the compulsory policy (Act policy) the company is not liable, if the accident occurs in a private place. Hence, we are unable to bring ourselves to agree with the observation of the Tribunal, on the facts of the present case and on the terms in the policy, that the Company is not liable to indemnify the owner, and that the owner and the driver of the truck alone are liable to pay the compensation as awarded.
16. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and award of the Tribunal are modified. Rs. 10,000 awarded by the Tribunal to the claimants in the present case along with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the application till payment as also the costs of this proceeding throughout shall be paid over by all the respondents including the Insurance Company to the claimants under Section 110-B of the Act. We direct that the entire amount of compensation awarded along with costs and interest shall be paid by the third respondent insurer to the claimants as the same does not exceed its liability.
17. The respondents shall bear their own costs.
18. Appeal partly allowed.