Uttarakhand High Court
30 April vs State Of Uttarakhand & Others on 30 April, 2026
Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari, Pankaj Purohit
2026:UHC:3309-DB
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition Service Bench No. 272 of 2022
30 April, 2026
Sachin Kumar ... Petitioner
Versus
State Of Uttarakhand & others ... Respondents
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Presence:-
Mr. Bhupesh Kandpal, learned counsel for the petitioner
Mr. G.S. Negi, learned Additional C.S.C. for the State of
Uttarakhand
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Dated: 30th April, 2026
Coram : Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.
Hon'ble Pankaj Purohit, J.
Per: Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.
JUDGMENT
1. Petitioner has challenged judgment dated 16.02.2017 rendered by learned Public Service Tribunal in Claim Petition No. 33/DB/2016. He has also challenged the order dated 04.05.2017 whereby his review application was rejected by learned Tribunal.
2. It is not in dispute that petitioner was appointed as Constable in Civil Police on 01.06.2009 and he was dismissed from service vide order dated 23.03.2025 passed by Senior Superintendent of Police, Haridwar. He filed appeal against the punishment order, which was dismissed by Inspector General of Police, Garhwal Range vide order dated 23.08.2025. The order passed by disciplinary authority and appellate authority were challenged by petitioner before Public Services Tribunal; however, his claim petition was dismissed by learned Tribunal.
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3. The charge against the petitioner was that his date of birth is 24.06.1983, but he managed to secure appointment as Constable based on an incorrect date of birth, i.e., 07.07.1988.
4. It is not in dispute that petitioner passed High School (10th Standard) from U.P. Board of Secondary Education in the year 1999 and in the High School Certificate, his date of birth is recorded as 24.06.1983. Petitioner thereafter again passed High School (10th Standard) from National Institute of Open Schooling (in short "NIOS") in the year 2007, but in the certificate issued by NIOS his date of birth was mentioned as 07.07.1988.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in his application for the post of Constable (Civil Police), petitioner, due to mistake mentioned his date of birth as 07.07.1988, as was mentioned in the certificate issued by NIOS. He submits that petitioner had no intention to submit false information and due to mistake, petitioner had mentioned an incorrect date of birth. He submits that petitioner was not going to get any benefit by mentioning incorrect date of birth, as he was eligible even otherwise also. He further submits that petitioner had submitted application to Director, NIOS, New Delhi on 28.11.2007 to correct his date of birth as "24.06.1983", which indicates his bonafide in the matter. Thus, it is contended that punishment, imposed upon the petitioner, not only unsustainable, but harsh also.
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6. It is contended on behalf of petitioner that an FIR was registered against him regarding the same incident and he was tried for offences punishable under Sections 420 & 471 of IPC, which resulted in conviction by trial court, however, in appeal, trial court's judgment was set aside and petitioner was acquitted.
7. Learned State Counsel, per contra submits that defence of innocent mistake, taken by petitioner, is unbelievable. He submits that no one forgets his name and date of birth and even if petitioner's date of birth was wrongly recorded in the school certificate issued by NIOS, it cannot be a valid explanation for mentioning wrong date of birth in his application for appointment. He submits that petitioner obtained yet another High School Certificate from NIOS with different date of birth with evil design, as the age limit, mentioned in the advertisement dated 15.12.2008 for the post of Constable Civil Police, was between 18 to 22 years and petitioner had crossed the upper age limit of 22 years before the deadline indicated in the advertisement.
8. Learned State Counsel further submits that since age for recruitment as Constable is to be seen with reference to 1st of July, therefore, petitioner managed to get his age mentioned as 07.07.1988 in the certificate procured from NIOS to ensure that he gets maximum number of attempts to participate in the selection process. He further submits that petitioner relied upon a mark-sheet, in which he was shown as five years younger than his actual age , therefore, he would have continued in service for five 3 2026:UHC:3309-DB more years after attaining age of superannuation. He thus submits that the contention raised by petitioner's counsel that petitioner did not get any benefit by mentioning incorrect date of birth is not correct and petitioner would have secured lifelong benefits, if the fraud played by him upon the employer was not exposed in time.
9. Learned State Counsel further submits that petitioner dishonestly mentioned incorrect date of birth, is evidenced from the fact that he also submitted an affidavit in which he again mentioned his date of birth as 07.07.1988. Thus, he submits that the story developed by petitioner, that he had made application to NIOS for correcting date of birth, also falls to the ground.
10. Learned State Counsel submits that degree of proof required in a criminal trial is different from standard of proof required in disciplinary proceedings. He submits that in disciplinary enquiry, a Government Servant can be punished based on preponderance of probabilities, while in criminal trial before punishing a person, his guilt has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, he submits that petitioner's acquittal of the criminal charge by appellate court alone cannot be sufficient to interfere with the punishment imposed in disciplinary proceedings. Thus, he submits that learned Tribunal was justified in dismissing the claim petition filed by petitioner and no interference with the impugned judgment is called for.
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11. We have gone through the impugned judgment. Learned Tribunal has considered and discussed all relevant aspects, including findings returned by Enquiry Officer against the petitioner. Enquiry Officer referred to the undertaking given by petitioner in para 10 & 11 of his affidavit, where he stated that information furnished by him, regarding his educational qualification, age, etc. is correct and any information supplied by him if found to be incorrect, will make him liable to be removed from service. Learned Tribunal has opined that Disciplinary Enquiry was held as per applicable Rules.
12. It is not the case of the petitioner before us that the Discipline and Appeal Rules applicable to him were violated or reasonable opportunity of defending himself was not given to him. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that since petitioner was acquitted of the criminal charge, therefore, punishment of dismissal from service cannot be sustained.
13. Learned State Counsel, however, points out that this ground is being raised for the first time and such contention was not raised before learned Tribunal. He further submits that petitioner secured appointment as Police Officer by relying on false certificate. He submits that higher standard of probity is demanded from Police Officers and securing appointment in Police Force by playing fraud upon the Authorities is unpardonable. He submits that Police Officers play sensitive role in maintaining order in the society, 5 2026:UHC:3309-DB therefore, they must possess unimpeachable character and integrity to maintain the community confidence.
14. This Court finds substance in the submissions made by learned State Counsel. Petitioner has not challenged the punishment on the ground of violation of the norms laid down in the applicable Discipline and Appeal Rules or for violation of Principles of Natural Justice. He has also not questioned the findings returned by Enquiry Officer. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Saran vs. I.G. of Police CRPF & others, reported as (2006) 2 SCC 541, while dealing with similar fact situation, has held as under:-
"8. The Courts should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223: [1947] 2 All ER 680(CA) commonly known as Wednesbury's case the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.
(See: V. Ramana v. A.P. SRTC and Ors., [2005] 7 SCC 338)."
15. In the present case, petitioner was held guilty of playing fraud upon the Authorities while securing appointment as Police Constable. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chandra Singh vs Savitri Devi, Appeal (Civil) No. 8216 of 2003 has enunciated the law on fraud and held as follows:-
"16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by word or letter.
17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud.
18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law 6 2026:UHC:3309-DB if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad.
24. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.
26. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata.
27. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros., it has been held that:
'20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.'
31. In Chittaranjan Das v. Durgapore Project Ltd. & others, 99 CWN 897, it has been held:
' Suppression of a material document which affects the condition of service of the petitioner, would amount to fraud in such matters. Even the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with in such a situation.
It is now well known that a fraud vitiates all solemn acts. Thus, even if the date of birth of the petitioner had been recorded in the service returns on the basis of the certificate produced by the petitioner, the same is not sacrosanct nor the respondent company would be bound thereby.'"
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & others, reported as (2006) 5 SCC 446 for contending that since petitioner was acquitted by criminal court, therefore, punishment of dismissal, imposed upon him for similar charge, is unsustainable.
17. Learned State Counsel by referring to judgment dated 06.02.2019 (Annexure 10 to the writ petition) rendered by learned Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 2018 (Sachin Kumar S/o Sri Bhudev Sharma vs. State of Uttarakhand) submits that petitioner's conviction from the charge of Sections 420 & 471 IPC was reversed by appellate court on the 7 2026:UHC:3309-DB ground that he neither fabricated nor interpolated the High School mark-sheet and the two mark-sheets, possessed by petitioner, were issued by recognised Boards, as such the offence under Sections 420 IPC is not made out against him. He points out that learned Sessions Judge further held that as a person, belonging to Other Backward Classes, petitioner was entitled to relaxation in upper age to the extent of five years, therefore, he did not derive any wrongful benefit by using incorrect date of birth and he was eligible even as per his actual date of birth.
18. Learned State Counsel submits that the reason assigned by learned Sessions Judge for acquitting the petitioner reveals that the scope of enquiry against petitioner in criminal trial was entirely different from that in Disciplinary Proceedings. He further submits that in the case of G.M. Tank (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that charge in departmental proceedings and criminal case must be identical only then acquittal in criminal case can be a ground for setting aside the punishment order.
19. He submits that in the present case, charge against petitioner in criminal trial was different from the charge in Disciplinary Enquiry. He submits that in disciplinary proceedings, charge was that he played fraud upon the authorities by mentioning incorrect date of birth which he knew was false, while in criminal trial, scope of enquiry was different. He relies upon para 28 to 30 of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme 8 2026:UHC:3309-DB Court in the case of G.M. Tank (supra), which are extracted below:-
"28. This Court in Depot Manager, A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya [(1997) 2 SCC 699 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 548] in para 8 held as under: (SCC pp. 704-05) "The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. ... Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, ... the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections 304-A and 338 IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in staying the proceedings."
29. The judgment in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [(1964) 3 SCR 25 : AIR 1963 SC 1723] was cited for the purpose that the High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant, it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in 9 2026:UHC:3309-DB a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand."
20. We find substance in the submission made by learned State Counsel. Since petitioner's conviction was reversed in appeal by learned Sessions Judge by holding that the two High School Certificates possessed by him were issued by different recognised Boards and there is no prohibition in law against passing High School examination from two different Boards and he has not made any interpolation in those certificates, therefore, reversal of his conviction in criminal trial in itself will not be sufficient for disturbing the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner, especially when he admits that he passed High School (10th Standard) from two different Boards and his date of birth is different in the certificates issued by the two Boards and further he relied upon a date of birth for securing appointment which he knew was not correct.
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21. Thus, we do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment rendered by learned Tribunal. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.
(Pankaj Purohit, J.) (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) 30.04.2026 Aswal NITI RAJ SINGH Digitally signed by NITI RAJ SINGH ASWAL DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=eacc6757ee7881e933ff8934f07477005aa85f9802a3a08b08d1369512ea30f3, ASWAL postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=44EB54CBF00B7698CB6F10C2CE3D26F5C22DACF4F4610C1FE58A58531726FBB0, cn=NITI RAJ SINGH ASWAL Date: 2026.05.16 02:26:11 -07'00' 11