Madras High Court
M.R. Murali vs Jeetmul Jaichandal (P) Ltd. And Ors. on 24 December, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1998)1MLJ488, 1998 A I H C 2047, (1998) 1 MAD LJ 488 (1998) 2 RENTLR 228, (1998) 2 RENTLR 228
ORDER S.M. Abdul Wahab, J.
1. These four civil revision petitions arise out of two Rent Control Proceedings, i.e., R.C.O.P. Nos. l139 and 1140 of 1989. C.R.P. Nos. 2859 and 2876 of 1997 arise out of R.C.O.P. No. 1140 of 1989, while C.R.P. Nos. 2874 and 2861 of 1997 arise out of R.C.O.P. No. 1139 of 1989.
2. C.R.P. Nos. 2859 and 2874 of 1997 have been filed against the appeals preferred by the landlord against the order under Section 11(4) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1140 and 1139 of 1989.
3. C.R.P. Nos. 2861 and 2876 of 1997 are preferred against the orders in Rent Control Appeals, in turn preferred against the orders in the main Rent Control proceedings i.e. RC.O.P. Nos. 1139 and 1140 of 1989.
4. The landlord, who is the petitioner in all the Civil Revision Petitions filed R.C.O.P. Nos. 1139 and 1140 of 1989 before the VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, for eviction from the premises bearing door Nos. 244 and 264, Walltax Road Madras-3, on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. According to the landlord, the respondents paid rent till December, 1988, in January, 1989 when he filed R.C.O.P. No. 143 of 1989 for eviction on the ground of own occupation, the respondents did not file any counter.
5. The allegations in R.C.O.P. No. 1139 of 1989 are that, in the year 1970 Mr. Champalal took on lease for five years the premises bearing door No. 244, Old No. 60, Walltax Road, on a monthly rent of Rs. 2,000, for the business of his company known as Jeetmul Jaichandlall and Globe Industrial Corporation. Subsequently, the respondents entered into a tenancy agreement with respect to the premises bearing door Nos. 244, 264 and 284, Walltax Road, Madras-3, for five years, on a monthly rent of Rs. 5,250 for the said three premises, The rent for door No. 244 was Rs. 4,000 and the rent for door No. 264 was Rs. 1,000. The respondent paid the rent till December, 1988. When the petitioner filed R.C.O.P. No. 143 of 1989 for own occupation sent a cheque for Rs. 2,250 in February, 1989. Another cheque for Rs. 2,250 in March, 1989. On 17.3.1989, the petitioner issued a notice to the respondent. In the said notice, the petitioner informed that the sum of Rs. 4,500 would be adjusted towards the rent for the month of January, 1989 for door No. 244, Walltax Road, at Rs. 4,000 per month. The balance of Rs. 500 was appropriated towards the rent for door No. 284, Walltax Road at Rs. 2S0 per month. Finally the petitioner called upon the tenant to pay the rent for the building bearing door No. 264, Walltax Road, at Rs. 1,000 for January and February, 1989 before 17.3.1989. Similarly, for the premises No. 244, Walltax Road, the rent for February 1989 at Rs. 4,000 was demanded to be paid before the said date.
6. After receipt of the said notice, there was no reply. Hence, the Rent Control Original Petition No. 1139 of 1989 was filed for eviction of J.J. Lal Private Ltd., represented by its partner, from premises No. 264, Walltax Road, Madras-3.
7. The respondent filed its counter in both the Rent Control Original Petitions. The substance of the counter is that they were not aware of the lease by Champalal in 1970. However, they admitted that some time in 1983, the premises bearing door No. 264 Walltax Road, was directly taken on lease by the respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 250. The premises No. 284 was not at all taken for rent. It was submitted that only a portion in door No. 244 was taken on lease on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000. Rents were paid only by cheque and not by cash. No rent was paid at Rs. 250 for the premises bearing door No. 284. The allegation in R.C.O.P. No. 143 of 1989 that the rent for the premises No. 244 was Rs. 4,000 was denied and a counter has been filed in the said Rent Control Origi-nal Petition. The registered notice was not received. There was no default for January and February, 1989. The counter was filed in January, 1990.
8. In September, 1993 an additional counter has been filed. In paragraph3 of the said additional counter, it is stated that after March, 1982, the petitioner is not the owner of the demised premises. The petitioner has no legal entity or right over any portion of the property after March, 1982. Hence, he has no right to file the application. In paragraph 4 it was stated that the Corporation had long time back terminated the tenancy if any in favour of late M.B. Ramachandra Naidu and his predecessors and without informing the said legal termination of the right to this respondent, who was an occupier, the petitioner has illegally taken out the Rent Control proceedings, as if he had any right over the property. It was also stated that the Corporation of Madras had taken steps to lease the premises in favour of the persons, who are legally entitled to the same viz., Mr. Navaratanmal Chouraria and others, provided they agreed to the terms and conditions.
9. As regards R.C.O.P. NO. 1140 Of 1989, which related to premises No. 244, Walltax Road, Madras-3, similar allegations have been made in the petition. The default in respect of the said building was for February, 1989 at Rs. 4,000 per month. In the counter of the first respondent, the allegations contained in the counter for R.C.O.P. No. 1139 Of 1989 has been repeated. But however, it is stated that a portion in door No. 244, Walltax Road, Madras-3, was taken on a monthly rent of Rs. 500 and the rent was regularly paid. In paragraph 4 there is a categorical allegation that the respondent-Jeetmul Jaichandlal Madras (P) Ltd., did not take the premises bearing door numbers 264 and 284 for rent at any time. In the last paragraph of the counter it is stated that a portion of premises No. 244 alone was taken on a monthly rent of Rs. 500 and the rent of Rs. 500 for February, 1989, was sent by cheque and was received by the petitioner. Hence, there is no default. Therefore, the question of wilful default does not arise.
10. The second respondent J.J. Lal Private Ltd., rep-resented by four Directors has also filed a counter. In the said counter, it is stated that a portion in premises No. 244, Walltax Road, was taken on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000 by that respondent. That respondent did not take the premises in door No. 284 for rent at any time. It is admitted that, that respondents have taken a portion of premises No. 244, Walltax Road, on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000 and door No. 264, Walltax Road, on a monthly rent of Rs. 250. The rent for Feb-ruary, 1989 i.e., Rs. 500 was sent by cheque and the same was received by the petitioner. The question of wilful default in payment of rent by the respondents did not arise.
11. Similarly, the third respondent Chouraria Wire Netting Industries, represented by its partners has also filed a counter. In the said counter, it is stated that the third respondent has taken a distinct and separate portion in premises No. 244, Walltax Road, Madras-3, on a monthly rent of Rs. 500. It is also alleged that the rent for February, 1989 i.e., Rs. 500 was sent by cheque and the same was received by the petitioner.
12. In R.C.O.P. No. 1140 of I989. also in September, 1993, ah additional counter has been filed by Navaratanmal Chouraria. he has stated that the Corporation has terminated the tenancy of late Ramachandra Naidu and without informing the said legal termination, the petitioner has illegally taken out the Rent Control and other proceedings. He has no legal right over the property and has no right to possession also. The Corporation has taken steps to lease the premises in favour of Navaratanmal Chouraria and others, after taking steps to collect the arrears from 1.4.1982. Hence, the petition is not maintainable.
13. After the additional counter was filed, the petitioner took out applications under Section 11(4) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 for stopping the proceedings. The said petitions viz., M.P. No. 985 of 1993 in R. CO.P. No. 1139 of 1989 and M.P. No. 986 of 1993 in R.C.O.P. No. 1140 of 1989, were not immediately taken up for enquiry. They were posted along with the main petition for disposal. The main contention urged by the respondents in the counters filed by them in the petitions filed under Section 11(4) of the Act was that the lease in favour of late Ramachandra Naidu and others was terminated by a resolution of the Corporation in the year 1989, after proper service of notice on them, as required by law. Thereafter the Corporation assumed possession after getting the Corporation levy from the occupier, who are the respondents. It is also added that the petitioner or their fore-fathers did not put up any building or any additional constructions under the lease. Therefore, the petitioner had no locus standi to maintain the petitions. Three counters were filed in M.P. No. 986 of 1993 in R.C.O.P. No. 1140 of 1989.
14. On 18.10.1994, the 14th Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras, passed an order in M.P. Nos. 985 and 986 of 1993 holding that since there was a dispute with reference to the quantum of rent, the petitions must be disposed of along with the main eviction petitions. Thereafter on 15.12.1995, the 10th Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras, has disposed of R. CO.P. Nos. 1139 and 1140 of 1989 by a common order. On 19.12.1995, the 10th Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras, has passed orders in M.P. Nos. 985 and 986 of 1993, dismissing the said petitions in view of the orders passed in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1139 and 1140 of 1989.
15. The petitioner preferred R.G.A. Nos. 925 and 926 of 1995 against the orders passed in R.C.O.P. Nos. 1139 and 1140 of 1989. He has also filed two appeals viz., R.C.A. Nos. 932 and 933 of 1995 against the orders passed in M.P. Nos. 986 and 985 of 1993.
16. The learned VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras, the appellate authority disposed of all the four appeals on 24.12.1996. He has passed two orders, one common order in R.C.A. Nos. 925 and 926 of 1995 and another common order in R.C.A. Nos. 932 and 933 of 1995. The learned VIII Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras, has rejected all the1 four appeals. Therefore, the petitioner-landlord has preferred the above four civil revision petitions.
17. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. A. Shanmugavelu, in all the four revision petitions contended that the lower Courts have erred in not allowing the petitions for eviction on the grounds of wilful default and denial of title. Even though the ground raised in the main eviction petitions was only default in payment of rent, the other ground of denial of title was also argued on behalf of the petitioner in the appeals.
18. In the appeals R.C.A. Nos. 925 and 926 of 1995, the appellate authority has found that the default to pay rent for one month and two months is not wilful in view of the demand notices issued by the Corporation to the respondents. The appellate authority has further found that since the denial of title was based on the threat issued by the Corporation of Madras and the denial was not mala fide and therefore the eviction cannot be ordered on such a bona fide de-nial of title.
19. Now, we will consider whether the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant. It is true that the default alleged in R.C.O.P. No. 1139 of 1989 is for January and February, 1989 for the premises bearing door No. 264, Walltax Road, Madras-3, and the default alleged in R.C.O.P. No. 1140 of 1989 is for February, 1989 only for premises No. 244, Walltax Road, Madras-3. The default appears to be for a very short period. The appellate authority has considered this default and found that the default is not wilful. Since there' was notice issued by the petitioner's sister asking for partition and also the Corporation demanding lease amounts, before we consider the ground for default, the other ground of denial of title should be considered.
20. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, a fraud has been committed by the respondents against the petitioner in collusion with the authorities of the Corporation. The back-ground leading to the filing of the additional counter is irrelevant. The Additional counter states that the Corporation of Madras has cancelled the lease in respect of the land on which the building stand and steps have been taken for recognising the respondents as tenants. Therefore, the petitioner has no right to maintain or continue the eviction proceedings. It is also stated that the Corpo-ration assumed possession after getting the levy directly from the occupier, who are the respondents.
21. In the main counter filed by the respondents in R.C.O.P. No. 1139 of 1989. The tenancy is clearly admitted as follows:
The respondent submits that it took the premises bearing D. No. 264, Walltax Road, directly from the petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs. 250 some time in the year 1983 and ever since then, it has been paying the rent regularly to the petitioner.
It is again false to state that rent is paid once in two months along with cheques for the premises No. 244 and 264. The rent is being paid every month by cheque only regularly by the respondent.
Similarly, in the three counters filed in R.C.O.P. No. 1140 of 1989, it is stated by the first respondent that the respondent took the premises i.e., a portion of door No. 244 Walltax Road, on a monthly rent of Rs. 500, ever since then he has been paying the rent to the petitioner. Similarly, the respondents 2 and 3 have also stated in their separate counters that they took a distinct and separate possession of the premises in door No. 244, Walltax Road, Madras-3, from the petitioner, on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 500. They have not mentioned anything about the demand of the Corporation for payment of lease amount or any threat from the Corporation. The counters have been filed in December 1989 and Feb-ruary, 1990. But in the additional counters filed at the end of 1993 and beginning of 1994, the respondents have categorically alleged that the petitioner is not the owner of the demised premises or the building and as such, the petition filed for eviction against the respondents is not maintainable. This categorical statement is found in all the additional counters filed by the respondents. These allegations are repeated in the counters filed under Section 11(4) of the Act i.e., in M.P. Nos. 985 and 986 of 1993.
22. Are the respondents justified in making such a categorical assertion in denying the title of the petitioner? Are the respondents bona fide in making such a statement? We have to consider the circumstances that made them to make such a categorical assertion. If they are forced to make such assertions by the Corporation authorities by themselves, definitely the respondents will be justified and their statements will be bona fide. But if they are made pursuant to their own attempt or manipulation and on account of the situation created or brought about for themselves, then definitely, the statements will be mala fide.
23. We will consider the evidence now. The respondents in support of the aforesaid categorical assertions, produced number of documents. The learned Counsel for the respondents Mr. S. Vijayarangam, contended that Exs. R. 51 to R. 73 are very relevant on this aspect. Ex. R. 60, dated 28.5.1993 is a notice issued by the Corporation of Chennai to Mrs. Hiradevi Chouraria and Ex. R. 61 is also a notice issued by the Corporation of Chennai to Mrs. Hiradevi Chouraria, dated 16.4.1993. In this notice it is stated as follows:
In the aforesaid notice, it is stated that the person mentioned above has given a letter and statement, Pursuant to the letter and the statement only the notices have been issued to her demanding payment of rent. The letter dated 16.4.1993 given by the said person to the Corporation and the statement given by her to the Corporation are not produced. In the absence of any evidence showing any demand from the Corporation prior to 26.3.1993. We do not know why the respondents volunteered to write a letter on 26.3.1993 and made a statement. There is no evidence that she gave a copy of that letter to the petitioner. In Ex. R. 55, the demand is issued to N.M. Chouraria for asumofRs. 41,476-55. On 17.2.1994 N.M. Chouraria has paid Rs. 3431/- to the Corporation towards the lease rent for corporation land for No. 244 Walltax Road, Madras-3. On the same day, he has paid Rs. 862.50 as lease rent for Corporation land for No. 244 Walltax Road, Madras-3. On 9.3.1994 also he has paid Rs. 862.50 towards rent for No. 264, Walltax Road, Madras-3. These three payments have been made before Ex. R. 55, dated 16.4.1993, Only from 16.4.1993, we have demand notices issued from the Corporation pursuant to the letter dated 26.3.1993. But we do not know why even earlier, the respondents have paid to the Corporation the aforesaid amounts. There is no evidence as to and under what circumstances they paid the rents. In Exs. R. 62 and 63 the rent for premises No. 244, Walltax Road, Madras-3, is stated to be Rs. 1,010.42. In Exs. R. 51 and 52, the rent for premises No. 264, Walltax Road, to the Corporation is said to be Rs. 287.50 per month. But in Ex. R. 54, the rent is increased to Rs. 1,000. Similarly for premises No. 244, Walltax Road, Madras-3, the rent is stated to be Rs. 1,753.75 as per Exs. R. 56 and 57. EX.R. 59, the Corporation demand notice shows the rent for premises No. 244, Walltax Road, is only Rs. 1,000, but as per Exs. R. 56 and 57, the rent is stated to be Rs. 1,753.75. There is no evidence to show that whether any information was given to the petitioner when the rents were increased. From Exs. R. 51 to R. 73, we find that mere is no intimation to the petitioner at all. That apart, Exs. R. 51 to R. 73 relate only to the period from 1993 to 1994. From Exs. R. 77 and R. 78 series, we are able to see that M/s. J.J. Lal has paid the property tax on behalf of M.B. Ramachandra Naidu, the father of the petitioner, in respect of the petition premises. They themselves have produced Ex. R. 83, the lease deed, dated 15.7.1980 between M.B. Ramachandra Naidu, father of the petitioner and M/s. Jeetmuil Jaichandra Lalla Firm Merchant by its attorney Mr. Champalal Chouraria, for the premises bearing Nos. 60 and 61, Walltax Road, Madras-3. In the schedule, it is specifically mentioned mat the superstructure in Walltax Road situate at door Nos. 60 and 61 going by the name of Walltax theatre situated at No. 60, Walltax Road, Park Town, Madras-3. There is no dispute that premises No. 244, Walltax Road, Madras-3 was bearing old door Nos. 60 and 61. After having become a ten-ant under the father of the petitioner and after admitting the tenancy under the petitioner, why the respondents chose to apply to the Corporation and started paying rents to the Corporation directly. It is very suspicious. There is no evidence that before giving the letter, dated 26.3.1993 any notice or demand was issued to the respondents for payment of tax to the building under threat.
24. On behalf of the respondents, Navaratanmal Chouraria also known as N.M. Chouraria, has been examined as R. W-1, He has produced Exs. R. 42 to R. 73. He has not stated that he was issued any de-mand under threat to pay the lease amount to the Corporation due by the petitioner or his father. He has admitted that he has not produced any lease deed between the respondent and the Corporation. He has also admitted knowledge about Ex. R. 45. He has further admitted that the D.R.O. did not call him in 1993. He has also admitted that the copy of the letter given to the Corporation is not with him. Again he has admitted in the cross-examination as follows:
Before the above statement, in the cross-examination on the same, date in 1995, R. W-1 has stated as follows:
These statements are found in the deposition of R. W-1. If his intention was bona fide when the Corporation authorities informed him about the termination, he should have immediately informed the petitioner's father about it. But without any information, he has been in direct contact with the Corporation from 1992 onwards. This witness alone has produced Ex. R. 45, wherein, the petitioner has written a detailed letter to the Corporation of Madras about the death of his father on 20.7.1991. He has also informed about the pendency of the cases against the respondents. He has also requested the Corporation not to transfer the lease in favour of the respondents. He has further stated that from the counter filed by the respondents, he learnt about the termination of lease standing in the name of his father and giving it to one of the respondents. He has also intimated that the termination and transfer of lease without notice to him is in contravention of the fundamental rights to property. From this we are albe to see that the respondents, particularly, R. W-1, taking advantage of the death of Ramachandra Naidu, had directly approached the Corporation to get the lease of the land transferred in his name or in the name of his family members. Though, he knew folly well that the superstructures were put up by Ramachandra Naidu, under whom he became a tenant in respect of the superstructure, in-cluding the land. Therefore, his attempt to deal with the Corporation behind the back of the petitioner after the death of Ramachandra Naidu is deliberate, mala fide and dishonest and fraudulent on his part to grab at the property, to which he was inducted only as a tenant. Another important fact is that the respondents filed under Ex. P. 32 a common order, dated 3.8.1994 in I.A. Nos. 8850, 8856, 8853 and 8854 of 1994 in O.S. Nos. 3586 to 3589 of 1994. In the said order, the XI Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, has categorically found that the lease in favour of the' grandfather of the petitioner has not been terminated by the Corporation and he has also found that by suppressing the truth, the attempt of the respondents de-nying the title of the petitioner was not proper. The learned Judge has also held that the case of the respondents that they became direct tenants under the Corporation was unbelievable. After finding so, the Judge has given only an injunction restraining the petitioner from interfering with the possession of the respondent except in accordance with law as they are sub-tenants under him. Inspite of the said order, the respondents have chosen to continue their stand that the petitioner has no right to collect the rent and he has no right whatsoever in the building in question. They have contested the petitions under Section 11(4) of the Act, namely, M.P. Nos. 985 and 986 of 1993. Another aspect also needs consideration. The respondents have filed the suit O.S. Nos. 3586 to 3589 of 1994. The relief claimed in the said suits are on the face of it is a deliberate, wilful and persistent attempt on the part of the respondents to deny the lawful title of the petitioner. All the suits have been filed in 1994 one after another. They have claimed for the relief of declaration that they are not the tenants under the petitioner herein. In Q.S. No. 3589 of 1994, the respondents have prayed for declaration that they were the direct tenants of the suit property, under the second respondent Corporation. The plaint copies have been marked as Exs. R. 46 to R. 49. Only in the aforesaid suits, the respondents filed Interlocutory Applications and obtained the order from the XI Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, on 3.8.1994 under Ex. P. 32 as mentioned above. From the facts stated above, the respondents are not genuine or bona fide in denying the title of the petitioner. Their idea only is to become the owner of the superstructure and grab at the lease hold right inherited by the petitioner from his ancestors.
25. If this kind of attempt like the one made by the respondents is not condemned, it will lead to anoma-lous situation and the rights of the lessees under the public institutions, local bodies will be easily de-feated. The contention by the learned Counsel for the respondents that his clients were under threat of eviction or auction etc., are self-made. Even if there was any such threat that were brought about by their conduct with ulterior motive there is absolutely no evidence that due to any wilful neglect or negligent conduct of the petitioner or his father, the Corporation authorities issued any demand notice or auction notice to sell the lease-hold right of the ancestors of the petitioner in any public auction. In fact, the lower appellate Court found that prima facie the petitioner was not evicted from the lands and the respondents were tenants only under the petitioner even at the commencement of the eviction proceedings.
26. The lower appellate Court has justified the de-nial of title on the ground that there were several proceedings between the petitioner and the Corporation pending. But actually from the evidence only the suits filed by the respondents against the petitioner seem to be pending. That apart, in the order under Ex. P. 32, the learned Judge has clearly found that the respondents were not justified in denying the title of the petitioner. Since the respondents are continuing to deny the title of the petitioner even after the said order, if this Court refuses to hold that the denial is wilful and mala fide, it would be as good as treating the ground of eviction provided under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is only an empty formality and in no case an order of eviction be passed on the ground of denial of title.
27. The learned Counsel for the respondents cited the following decisions in respect of his contention that the denial of title under threat from the paramount title holder is justified.
(1)Sella Pillai v. Balaraman (1982) 2 M.L.J. 282; (2) Abdul Azeez Khan v. Appachi Gounder ; (3) Venkata Naicker Trust A Private Trust Rep. by its Manager v. Muthuswamy Chettiar, 1994 T.L.N.J. 155; (4) Thanikaehala Naicker v. Vinaitheertha Vinayagar Koil by its Managing Trustee, 1974 T.L.N.J. 492.
28. In Sella Pillai v. Balaraman (1982) 2 M. LJ. 282 the Government issued several notices for payment of rent in due course. As we have seen in this case on hand, there was no such threat from the Corporation. The respondents themselves voluntarily chose to approach the Corporation and attempted to become direct tenants under the Corporation by passing the rights of the petitioner, pursuant to the respondent's letter, dated 26.3.1993, only the demand notices have been issued. Therefore, the denial of title of the petitioner in the present case is not bona fide and at any rate cannot be said to be under an imminent danger of eviction.
29. Abdul Azeez Khan v. Appachi Gounder is also not applicable to the present case. In the said case, the tenancy itself was disputed from the beginning. Therefore, the learned single Judge of this Court found that even if the finding given by the Rent Controller was in favour of the landlord, since the dispute related to the root of the matter, namely, the tenancy, the denial of title cannot be taken as a ground for eviction. But here, after becoming a ten-ant under the petitioner's father, by a device invented by the respondents, they attempted to deny the title of the petitioner. Therefore, the present case is entirely different from the case cited above.
30. Venkata Naicker Trust a Private Trust represented by its Manager v. Muthurswamy Chettiar, 1994 T.L.N.J. 155 is also not applicable to the present case. In the said case, the lease was only for the land and the tenant claimed that he put up the superstructure. The appellate authority found the case of the tenant to be true. The High Court concurred with the finding of the lower appellate court. In the circumstances, the learned Judge has held that the denial of title with reference to the building is bona fide.
31. In Thanikachala Naicker v. Vinaitheertha Vinayagar Koil by its Managing Trustee, 1974 T.L.N.J. 492 the claim of the tenant was that he put up the superstructure and the learned Single Judge of this Court found that the claim of the tenant was bona fide The said case is also not helpful. The cases cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents are not at all helpful to them.
32. When we come to the next question of default also, it is true that the period of default is for one month or two months. But as we seen above, the beginning to any title of the petitioner starts after the death of Ramachandra Naidu in 1991. After the death of the petitioner's father, without any information to the petitioner, the respondents have chosen to approach the Corporation directly to become a direct tenant under the Corporation with a view to defeat the rights of the petitioner, both in the building and the land. The quantum of rent has also been disputed in this case. When the petitioner claims Rs. 4,000 as rent per month for premises No. 244, Walltax Road, Madras-3, the respondents claim that they are ten-ants in respect of different portions at Rs. 1,500 per month. As regards the claim for premises No. 264 also, when the petitioner has claimed the rent at Rs. 1,000, the respondent has stated that amount was Rs. 250 only. Further, the respondents in R.C.O.P. No. 1140 of 1989 has contended that they are separate tenants. But the lower appellate court has found that the case of the respondents that they are separate tenants in respect of different portions is not correct and they have taken the entire building on lease jointly. Further, it is also found in paragraph 9 that the rent also was Rs. 4,000 for premises No. 244 and Rs. 1,000 for premises No. 264 as per Exs. P. 1 to P. 6. Even though the default period is very short, it has to be treated as wilful, since several circumstances indicated above leads to the said presumption. Here, in this case, the default is based upon a series of attempts to deprive the petitioner's lawful rights and with a mala fide and fraudulent motive of becoming the owners of the superstructure put up by the ancestors of the petition and become direct tenants under the Corporation. In such a situation, it have no hesitation to hold that the default is wilful.
33. On a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the petitioner is entitled to succeed in C.R.P. Nos. 2861 and 2876 of 1997. Hence, they are allowed. The orders of both the Rent Control Original Authority and the appellate authority are set aside. The petition for eviction, namely, R.C.O.P. Nos. 1139 and 1140 of 1989 stand allowed.
34. When we come to the other two Civil Revision Petitions, viz., C.R.P. Nos. 2859 and 2874 of 1997, as we have mentioned above, they arise out of Section 11(4) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Since, I have passed orders on the main petitions themselves, in detail, there is no necessity for passing any orders on these petitions. In a sense when the main petitions are disposed of, there is no point in considering the applications under Section 11(4) of the Act. Therefore, they are dis-missed as infructuous. However, there will be no order as to costs.