Kerala High Court
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs Annakutty And Ors. on 14 October, 1992
Equivalent citations: I(1993)ACC684, 1994ACJ34, AIR1993KER299, [1994]81COMPCAS576(KER), AIR 1993 KERALA 299, 1993 (1) KERLT 727, 1992 (2) KER LJ 858, (1992) 2 KER LJ 585, (1992) 2 KER LT 727, ILR(KER) 1993 (1) KER 850, (1994) 1 ACJ 34, (1993) 1 ACC 684, (1994) 81 COMCAS 576
Author: K.S. Paripoornan
Bench: K.S. Paripoornan
JUDGMENT Paripoornan, J.
1. The second respondent in O.P. (M.A.C.) No. 200 of 1983 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kottayam -- an insurance company -- is the appellant in this appeal. The petitioners (claimants 1 to 4) and respondents 1 and 3 before the Claims Tribunal are the respondents in this appeal. The claimants are the legal heirs of one Shri Kuruvilla, who died in a motor accident that took place at Pinnak-kanad Junction on 3-10-1978 at 7.00 a.m. The claimants alleged that the accident and the resultant death of Kuruvilla occurred due to the negligence of the third respondent, driver of the bus KLK 7695, of which the first respondent was the owner and the second respondent the insurer. They claimed a compensation Rs. 50,000/-. The Claims Tribunal found that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the third respondent, who was an employee of the first respondent. The Claims Tribunal also found that Kuruvilla was not a passenger in the bus at the time of the accident and so, the liability of the insurer is not limited to the amount specified in Section 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act. An award was passed against respondents 1 to 3 in a sum of Rs. 31,000/- with future interest at 6% per annum from the date of the application (23-5-1989) till realisation and costs. Since the liability of insurer (second respondent) was not limited under Section 95(2)(b) of the Act, the insurer was directed to deposit the entire amount of Rs. 31,000/-with interest and costs. The second respondent before the Claims Tribunal (the insurer) has come up in appeal.
2. We heard counsel for the appellant, Mr. T.K.M. Unnithan, counsel for respondents I to 4 (claimants), Mr. C. S. Ananthakrishna Iyer, and counsel for respondents 5 and 6, Mr. T. 1. Abdul Salam.
3. The accident occurred on 3-10-1978. The claim for compensation should have been filed before the Tribunal on or before 4-4-1979. It was filed only on 23-5-1979. There was a delay of one month and nineteen days in filing the application. The claimants filed I.A. No. 200 of 1984 to condone the delay. The respondents did not file any counter to the said application. The plea of the claimants that the first petitioner was prevented from filing the application in time due to illness from 31-3-1979 to 17-4-79 stood un-controverted. The-other petitioners were held to be minors. The Tribunal found that there was sufficient cause to condone the delay under Section 110A(3) of the Act. The application claiming compensation was entertained.
4. Before us, neither the appellant nor respondents 5 and 6 objected to the finding of the Claims Tribunal that the claimants were prevented from filing the application in time due to sufficient cause. The condonation of delay by the Claims Tribunal was not objected by the counsel for the appellant and by counsel for respondents 5 and 6. We are also satisfied that the Claims Tribunal was justified, on the facts of this case, in condoning the delay and in entertaining the application.
5. The petitioners claimed a compensation of Rs. 50,000/-. Deceased Kuruvilla was aged 48 at the time of the accident. He met with the accident at Pinnakkanad Junction on 3-10-1978 at 7.00 a.m. He travelled from Kunnonni to Pinnakkanad. He boarded the bus, KLK 7695, from Kunnonni. The vehicle stopped at Pinnakkanad Junction to enable the passengers to get down. P.W. 2, a co-passenger and an eye witness to the occurrence, got out of the bus. Thereafter, deceased Kuruvilla was attempting to get down from the bus. But the conductor of the bus gave double bell negligently. The bus moved suddenly. Kuruvilla was thrown away on the road and the wheel of the bus ran over his body and head, as a result of which the skull was broken and he died instantaneously. Deceased Kuruvilla was an agriculturist. The claimants put forward a plea that his monthly income was Rs. 500/-. The respondents, no doubt, disputed the income of the deceased and also the dependency of the claimants. P.W. 1, the widow of Kuruvilla, deposed that deceased Kuruvilla was doing work in the property, nearly five acres in extent, and he was supervising the work. The Claims Tribunal found that there was a loss in income on account of the death of Kuruvilla, who was looking after the property and supervising the agricultural operations. Deceased Kuruvilla was looking after the family. Though there was paucity of evidence regarding the dependency of the claimants and the quantum of income earned by Kuruvilla, the Tribunal held that Kuruvilla was having some property, he was looking after the same and he was maintaining the family with the income obtained from the property and the family had no other source of income. Taking into account the positions of the deceased, his status in the family, his age and the number of persons dependent on him for their livelihood, the Tribunal held that the family could have depended on Kuruvilla at least for a period of 17 years and, considering the annual income at a minimal figure of Rs. 1,800/ -, the compensation payable could be worked out at Rs. 30,600/-. A sum of Rs. 400/- was allowed as funeral expenses. Thus, compensation was fixed at Rs. 31,000/-.
6. Counsel for the appellant did not dispute the quantum of compensation awarded by- the Claims Tribunal. Counsel for respondents 5 and 6 also did not dispute the quantum of compensation. We are of the view that considering the age and status of the deceased and the dependence of the claimants, the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal is only a very minimal amount cannot, by any reasoning, he said to be excessive or unreasonable. We affirm the quantum of compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal.
7. The only serious question argued before by the counsel for the appellant, Mr. Unnithan, is that the liability of the insurer is limited under Section 95(2)(b) of the Act. In the written statement filed by the appellant (second respondent before the Tribunal) dated 15-9-1983, in para 6, a specific plea is taken that the amount of compensation claimed is excessive and deceased being a passenger, the liability of the company is limited to Rs. 5,000/-. The insurance policy was not produced before the Claims Tribunal. The appellant has filed C.M.P. No. 1604 of 1992, in this Court, under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying that the additional evidence produced in the appeal --office copy of Policy No. 422835938 issued by the appellant in favour of the fifth respondent herein (the first respondent before the Claims Tribunal -- the owner of the vehicle) may be received. In the application filed by the claimants before the Tribunal dated 23-5-1979, the claimants have, in Col. 17, named the appellant as the insurer and the policy number is given as 422835938. The claimants have also stated, in Col. 28 of the application, that the deceased boarded the bus at Kunnonni for going to Pinnakkanadu. The said vehicle stopped at Pinnakkanadu Junction for allowing the passengers to step down and enter, and when the deceased was going to step down from the said bus, the conductor, without caring to note whether all the passengers had alighted, gave the bell negligently for the bus to move. The bus suddenly moved, as a result of which the deceased was thrown out and fell on the road and met with the fatal accident. The appellant has stated, in the affidavit filed along with C.M.P. No. 1604 of 1992, that the policy was not produced before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under the bona fide belief that the insured (the owner of the vehicle --the first respondent herein) would produce it and this Court may require the policy to be produced for a proper, effective and meaningful disposal of the appeal. The plea of the appellant is that deceased Kuruvilla was only a passenger in the bus and the Claims Tribunal was in error in treating the deceased as a third party outside the vehicle for the purpose of fixing the compensation. Deceased Kuruvilla should have been held to be a passenger when he met with the accident and in this perspective, the liability of the insurance company is limited, under Section 95(2)(b) of the Act, to Rs. 5,000/-. Along with C.M.P. No. 1605 of 1992, the appellant has produced the office copy of the policy issued to the owner of the vehicle, viz. Policy No. 422835938, wherein the risk covered is limited to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In the written statement filed by the owner of the vehicle and the driver -- respondents 1 and 3 before the Claims Tribunal -- the claim for compensation was disputed as also the manner in which the accident occurred. It was admitted in para 7 of the written statement dated 17-11-1983 that the bus, KLK 7695, was insured with the second respondent on the date of accident, under Policy No. 422835938 and the policy was valid and subsisting on the date of the accident. It was stated that the said policy was a comprehensive policy covering unlimited liability and so, the second respondent-appellant herein is liable to pay any amount awarded by the Claims Tribunal and that the deceased was not a passenger in the vehicle at the time when he sustained the injury. It was specifically stated in Para 7 of the written statement that it was only after deceased Kuruvilla got down from the bus, he fell down and the accident occurred. All the parties before the Claims Tribunal were agreed that the policy issued in the name of the owner of the vehicle is the one evidenced by Policy No. 422835938. The owner of the vehicle --the first respondent before the Claims Tribunal -- did not produce the policy. The owner of the vehicle and also the driver did not enter the box. The material evidence available before the Claims Tribunal was the evidence adduced by the claimants, viz. Exts. Al to A4 and the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2. The respondents produced only Ext. Bl, certified copy of the charge sheet dated 3-10-1978.
8. The crucial question to be decided in this case is whether deceased Kuruvilla was a passenger of the bus at the time of the accident or not, and in that view, the liability of the insurerer-appellant was limited, as contemplated by Section 95(2)(b) of the Act. The appellant-insurer had taken a definite plea that deceased Kuruvilla was a passenger at the time of the accident. In the application filed by the petitioner before the Claims Tribunal dated 23-5-1979, in Column 28, a specific plea is taken that when Kuruvilla was going to step down from the bus KLK 7695, the conductor, without caring to note whether all the passengers alighted, gave the bell negligently for the bus to move, as a result of which, the bus suddenly moved and the deceased was thrown out and fell on the road and the accident occurred. The appellant-insurer has categorically stated in the affidavit dated 22-2-1992 (C.M.P. No. 1604 of 1992) that they were under the bona fide belief that the insured will produce the policy, but he did not do so and the company did not produce the policy due to inadvertence. It is also stated that a specific plea was taken even before the Tribunal that deceased Kuruvilla was a passenger at the time of the accident. The respondents in this appeal have not filed any counter to the petition filed by the appellant, C.M.P. No. 1604 of 1992, praying for permission to produce additional evidence in the appeal. The respondents have also not filed any counter to C.M.P. No. 1605 of 1992, the document submitted by the appellant -- true copy of Insurance Policy No. 422835938. The first respondent before the Claims Tribunal/ (owner) was contend by putting forward with a bare plea that deceased Kuruvilla was not a passenger of the bus at the time of the accident and so, the liability of the appellant-insurer cannot be said to be limited. The owner of the vehicle did not produce the policy and he did not even enter the box. No formal proof was let in by the owner of the vehicle to warrant the view that the liability under the policy was comprehensive, covering unlimited liability.
9. We are of the view that a duty was cast on the owner of the vehicle, at least to let in prima facie evidence that the vehicle was covered by a comperhensive policy and the liability of the insurer is unlimited. The owner of the vehicle cannot simply fold the hands and assume the role of an onlooker in a case where a claim for compensation is made against him and rival pleas are put forward before the Tribunal regarding the quantitative and qualitative liability of the owner of the vehicle as also the insurer. It is true that the appellant-insurer should have been more vigilant and circumspect and could have procured the true copy of the policy produced before this Court even before the Claims Tribunal to substantiate its plea, that its liability was limited. But the want of circumspection or prudence on the part of the appellant-insurer will not and cannot affect the jurisdiction of this Court to admit the true copy of the policy as additional evidence, if this Court requires the same to be produced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The appellant-insurer cannot insist for the production of the additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27(1)(a) or (aa) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The mere fact that Order XLI, Rule 27(1 )(a) or (aa) is inapplicable in a particular case will not disable this Court to direct or receive any document in evidence if this Court is satisfied that the interest of justice requires or behaves the Court to invoke the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this case, the appellant-insurer and the first respondent before the Claims Tribunal (the owner) have put forward rival pleas as to whether deceased Kuruvilla was a passenger or not at the time of the accident. The plea of the claimants in Column 28 of the petition would suggest that Kuruvilla was a passenger at the time of the accident. The plea of the appellant-insurer that they were under the bona fide belief that the owner will produce the policy and so, they did not produce the policy due to inadvertence is plausible. The owner did not produce the policy. The number of the policy was mentioned even in the claim petition. There was no dispute about the same. Even in this Court, in C.M.P. Nos. 1604 of 1992 and 1605 of 1992, the document produced, the true copy (office copy) of the policy is not disputed. The facts and circumstances in this case require or need a definite finding as to whether deceased Kuruvilla was a passenger or not at the time of the accident. It is on the basis of the said finding, the exact nature of liability of the appellant has further to be fixed. On the above aspects, the over-all picture remains obscure. There is inherent lacuna or defect, which hinders a proper evaluation and appraisal in meting out justice to the parties. In order to pronounce a more satisfactory and meaningful judgment and in the interest of justice, considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, we are satisfied that the true copy of the policy produced by the appellant-insurer along with C.M.P. Nos. 1604 and 1605 of 1992 is needful and should be admitted as additional evidence in this appeal, in exercise of the powers vested in this Court under Order XLI, Rule 27(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Unless it is to so done, it will not enable this Court to satisfactorily and completely deal with all aspects necessarily arising in the case and which requires adjudication. The mere fact that the appellant-insurer was imprudent or was less circumspect in not producing the true copy of the policy before the Claims Tribunal or that the defect was realized only later and pointed out by a party, will not deter this Court from invoking the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, if, in the interest of justice, this Court is satisfied that the powers vested in this Court under the said provision should be invoked. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of the Supreme Court in K. Venkataramiah v. Seetharama Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1526 : (1963 All LJ 903 at page 1530) and the Patna High Court in Ganesh Sahi v. Ramdeni Sahi, AIR 1953 Pat 316. We allow C.M.P. Nos. 1604 and 1605 of 1992. We admit the office copy of the policy produced before this Court as additional evidence in the appeal and mark the same as Ext. B2. It is clear from the true copy (office copy) of the policy --Ext. B2 -- that the liability of the insurer is limited to the one imposed by the Act (Motor Vehicles Act) and for such amount as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Under Section 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, as it stood at the material time (1978), the liability of the insurer in the case of one accident is limited, where the vehicle in which the 'passengers' are carried for hire or reward, in respect of passengers, to Rs. 5,000/- for each individual passenger (Section 95(2)(ii)(4) as it stood then). So, we hold that the liability of the insurer in this case in respect of each passenger is limited to Rs. 5,000/-.
10. Having held that the liability of the appellant-insurer in respect of each passenger is limited to Rs. 5,000/-, we have to further adjudicate as to whether deceased Kuruvilla was a passenger of the bus (KLK 7695) or not at the time of the accident. The Claims Tribunal has positively found that deceased Kuruvilla was in the foot-board to get out of the bus and the double bell was given and the bus moved and Kuruvilla fell down from the bus and the wheel ran over him. The Tribunal also referred to the decision in M/ s. Southern Motors, Madurai v. Sivajothiammal, AIR 1982 Mad 219 to hold that in the circumstances, deceased Kuruvilla cannot be considered to be a passenger in the bus. We are of the view that the Claims Tribunal has totally misunderstood and misapplied the decision in M/s. Southern Motors' case, AIR 1982 Mad 219 to the facts of this case. The said decision has no application to the facts of this case. In Southern Motors' case, one Guruswami attempted to get into the bus and failed to get an entry into the bus and fell down. He travelled in the bus from Point 'A' to Point 'B'. He got down at Point 'B'. Therefore, he wanted to continue the journey. He attempted to get into the bus. The bus began to move before the deceased got into the bus. After seeing the bus moving, the deceased ran after the bus and attempted to get into the moving bus. It is at that stage, he fell down and sustained the injuries. The Madras High Court held that deceased Guruswamy was not a passenger and was only a person who attempted to get into the bus, but failed to get into the bus. The said decision has no application in the instant case, where, admittedly, deceased Kuruvilla was on the foot-board to get out of the bus when the double bell was given and the bus moved and Kuruvilla fell down. The learned Judges of the Madras High Court left open the question as to whether a person travelling on the footboard can be a passenger in the bus. We are of the view that the Claims Tribunal was wrong in relying on the decision in Southern Motor's case, AIR 1982 Mad 219 to hold that deceased Kuruvilla was not a passenger in the bus at the time of the accident.
11. Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Unnithan, submitted that the word 'passenger', occurring in Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act is not defined in the Act, that the said general word should receive a general construction according to the common understanding and acceptance of the term in English. It was argued that the import of the term is very wide and any person travelling in a bus or performing journey in the bus is a passenger. Strong reliance was placed on the decision in Venkataswami Motor Service v. Chinnaswamy, 1989 All CJ 371 : 1989 All LJ 868 para 20. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the following decisions -- Uvaraja v. Parvathi Ammal, 1986 All CJ 506: (AIR 1987 All 127); Subramani v. Mani, 1990 (1) ACJ 37; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sundaravali, 1990 (2) ACJ 821; Sivakumar Transports v. Mani, 1990 (2) ACJ 836 and Pandit Ram Saroop v. Balbir Singh, 1988 ACJ 500 to contend that though deceased Kuruvilla was on the foot-board and was attempting to get of the bus, since the vehicle moved suddenly Kuruvilla fell down and the wheel ram over him, he cannot be considered to be a passenger.
12. We should say that out of the above decisions, only three decisions deal with the question, as to whether a person alighting from a bus at the destination stop, but fell down due to the sudden movement of the bus and sustained injuries could be considered as a passenger or not. Those decisions are, Venkataswami Motor Service's case, 1989 All CJ 371 : 1989 All LJ 868; Subramani's case, 1990 (1) ACJ 37 and National Insurance Co.'s case, 1990 (2) ACJ 821. The decision of the Delhi High Court in Pandit Ram Saroop's case, 1988 ACJ 500 was also a case of a person getting down from the bus when it suddenly started and the person fell down and the question was whether he was a passenger or not. But the reasoning in that case proceeded on different grounds. The other two decisions, viz.. Uvaraja's case, 1986 (I) ACJ 506 : (AIR 1987 All 127) and Sivakumar Transports case, 1990 (2) ACJ 836, are cases where a person attempted to board the bus and he fell down and sustained injuries and the question was whether he could be considered as a passenger or not. We may at once state that the case of a person who attempted to get into the bus, but failed to get an entry into the bus and fell down, as was the case in Southern Motors' case, AIR 1982 219; Uvaraja's case, 1986 (I) ACJ 506 : (AIR 1987 All 127) and Sivakumar Transports' case, 1990 (2) SCJ 836, is distinguishable. The person concerned, who only attempted to get into the bus had no nexus with the bus. He had not got into the bus. It cannot be said that he was travelling or performing any journey in the bus. He has yet to enter the bus. In those cases, it is plausible to contend that the person who attempted to get into the bus but was not successful and fell down and sustained injuries, cannot be said to be a passenger. The said three decisions are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case.
12.1 The learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in Subramani's case, 1990 (I) ACJ 37 and National Insurance Co.'s case, 1990 (2) ACJ 821 held that a person alighting from the bus at a bus stop, who sustained injuries due to the negligence of the bus driver cannot be considered as a passenger. In National Insurance Co.'s case, 1990 (2) ACJ 821, the learned Judge held, in paragraphs 13 to 16, that one who is either getting into the bus or getting down from the bus cannot be said to be a traveller at that point of time. Before coming to the said conclusion, the learned Judge placed reliance on the meaning of the word 'passenger' in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and on Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules. According to the learned Judge, a person could travel in a passenger vehicle only in two ways; either by remaining seated in the seating accommodation provided or by standing in vehicles where travel by standing is specially permitted. Any other person found in the bus cannot be considered as a passenger. Similar reasoning prevailed with the same learned Judge in coming to the same conclusion in Subramani's case, 1990 (1) ACJ 37.
13. We are of the view that the import of the word 'passenger', occurring in Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, has been unduly qualified or cut down and the wider meaning applicable to the said word in common parlance or found in the dictionaries has not been given effect to in the said decision. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary 1990 Edition at page 869, the meaning of the word 'passenger' is stated thus:
"a traveller in or on a public or private conveyance other than the driver, pilot, crew, etc."
For the word 'traveller', the meaning is given thus, at page 1300:
"a person who travels or is travelling"
The meaning of the word 'travel' is given thus, at page 1300;
"go from one place to another, make a journey, esp. of some length or abroad".
It is a matter of common knowledge that all passenger vehicles carry persons even beyond the seating or standing capacity allowed by the Rules for the particular vehicle. Such persons do travel in the bus; they perform journey from place to place. Can this common import and understanding of the word be ignored, by giving an unduly restricted meaning to the word 'passenger' as a person who is provided with seating accommodation or whose travel is permitted by standing capacity, permitted for the vehicles under the Rules? In our considered view, the import of the word 'passenger' cannot be restricted by reference to the Motor Vehicles Rules, by which the seating accommodation is provided or standing in the vehicle is specifically permitted. The dictionary meaning is of wide import and we can look into the dictionary meaning of the term, in the absence of any definition in the Act for understanding the meaning to be given to a particular word Commissioner of Income-tax v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, AIR 1957 SC 768 at 772 para 10. It is a salutary principle of statutory construction that in constructing the words in a section, the first task is to give the words therein their plain and ordinary meaning and then to see whether the context or some principle of construction requires that some qualified meaning should be placed on those words. Gardiner v. Admiralty Commissioner, 1964 (2) All ER 93 at 97 (HL). The import of words cannot be cut down by arbitrary addition or retrenchment in language. With great respect to the learned Judge, who rendered the decision in Subramani's case (1990 (1) ACJ 37) and National Insurance Co.'s case 1990 (2) ACJ 821, we are unable to hold that the word 'passenger' occurring in Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, should be limited to the case of a person who travels in the vehicle either by remaining seated in the seating accommodation provided or by standing in vehicles where travel by standing is specially permitted. We are of the view that any person who performs the journey in the bus will be a passenger. He will continue to be a passenger even at the time of alighting from the bus, if his physical contact with the bus still remains. We are of the view that the ordinary connotation of the word 'passenger' cannot be restricted or limited to only those persons who travel in the vehicle either by remaining seated in the seating accommodation provided or by standing in vehicles where travel by standing is specially permitted. We concur with the view stated in Venkataswami Motor Service's case 1989(1) ACJ 371: (1989 All LJ 868) para 20.
14. In Pandit Ram Saroop's case 1988 ACJ 500, as a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court was faced with a different situation. There, a person boarded the bus at 'G' stop and the destination point was 'O'. The bus did not stop at the point 'O'. If it had stopped there, the person could have got down. What happened was, the bus went ahead without stopping at the point 'O' preventing the person from getting down at the point of destination. The bus went much ahead and when the person was trying to get down, the bus started and its rear wheels ran over him and killed him. The learned single Judge held that the character of the deceased as a passenger came to an end at the bus stop 'O', for which destination he had obtained the ticket. We are of the view that though this decision held that the deceased was not a passenger at the time of the accident, by a different reasoning, it cannot be said that the deceased was not performing a journey at the time when he was trying to get down from the bus and met with the accident. In the light of our reasoning that the word 'passenger' should be given the wide meaning so long as the person is performing the journey, with great respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to accept the decision in Pandit Ram Saroop's case 1988 ACJ 500 as laying down the correct law.
15, In the light of our above reasoning, we hold that deceased Kuruvilla was a passenger when he was in the foot-board and was attempting to get out of the bus and the bus moved suddenly and Kuruvilla fell down from the bus and met with the accident. Since he was a passenger, the liability of the appellant-insurer is limited, under Section 95 (2)(ii)(4) of the Act (as it stood then), to Rs.5,000/-. We have already held that the compensation awarded against respondents I to 3 before the Tribunal in a sum of Rs. 31,000/- with future interest at 6% per annum from the date of the application is justified and valid in law. The claimants can recover a sum of Rs. 5,000; - with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the application (23-5-1979) till realisation with proportionate costs from the appellant-insurer. The balance, with interest and proportionate costs, recoverable from respondents 1 and 3 before the Tribunal - respondents 5 and 6 in this appeal. It is seen that one-half of the amount awarded has been directed to be paid by the appellant in C.M.P. No. 32042 of 1984 by order dated 5-12-84. We have held that the appellant-insurer is liable to pay only Rs. 5,000/ - with interest and proportionate costs. Any amount in excess of the liability, which we have fixed on the appellant, if paid and disbursed to the claimants, shall be realised by the appellant-insurer from respondents 5 and 6 in this appeal, on whose behalf, the amount should be deemed to have been deposited by the appellant. The claimants shall be entitled to realise the balance amount from respondents 5 and 6 herein after giving due credit to the amount already deposited and withdrawn by the claimants as per the order passed by this Court in C.M.P. No. 32042 of 1984 dated 5-12-1984.
The award passed by the Claims Tribunal dated 16-3-1984 is set aside in part and the award is accordingly modified, as stated herein above. The appeal is allowed.