Allahabad High Court
Smt. Bimla Devi And Another vs Allahabad Development Authority And ... on 6 November, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR1997ALL224, AIR 1997 ALLAHABAD 224, 1997 ALL. L. J. 1073, 1998 A I H C 2580, 1997 (29) ALL LR 98
ORDER Ravi S. Dhavan, J.
1. This writ petition is about constitutions made unauthorisedly and the scope of condoning the unauthorised structures by an exercise known as compounding. The issue plainly is on what is the concept, in urban planning, of condoning an unauthorised construction on the payment of a penally and at what stage an unauthorised construction falls within the realm of an illegal act, the condonation of which the law does not permit under any circusmstances.
2. The facts on record in this case are:
In Allahabad, the north sector of it, at the crossing of Beli Road and Batuk Krishna Banerjee Road, is a property which originally was owccd by Lt. General D.W. Chakrovorti. It was pur-chased subsequently by the late Kedar Nath Tiwari, who became its owner. The municipal number of the property is 2-A, Beli Road. Kedar Nath Tiwari died leaving the proeprty in the hands, of his heirs, namely, Smt. Bimala Devi, his widow and Shri Nirmal Chandra Tiwari, his son. During the pendency of the present writ petition, Nirmal Chandra Tiwari, the petitioners No. 2, died. His heirs were permitted to be brought on record.
3. The facts which become issues between the petitioners, the Allahabad Development Authority and the State of Uttar Pradesh, was an aspect on which there is no issue. The petitioners admit that their predecessor-in-interest, the late Kedar Nath Tiwari, had submitted a plan for constructing a lodging house for students, regard being had to the circumstances, that the property was near the Allahabad University and that were easing out a shortage for housing students. In the petition they admit when they submit that before the construction started, on the advice of the contractor, wih a view to make the ultimate finished building a paying proposition, i.e., profitable return on the capital, deviations were made from the original plan, as sanctioned by the Allahabad Development Authority. It is admitted that the building as it stands completed now has a market and flats for rent. The contention is that a lot of money has been spent in constructing the building and people have been inducted into the building as tenants, students in the lodging part of it and shopkeepers in the market part of it.
4. The writ petition also accepts that while the constructions were deviated from the original plan, the petitioners received a notice from the Allahabad Development Authority cautioning the petitioners to desist from the construction beyond the plan as was sanctioned. At one stage, it is accepted in the petition that as the petitioners had continued to construct, the police had arrived requiring the petitioners to stop the construction. The only explanation given in the writ petition is that the building, at that time when the police arrived, was almost complete in the shape as it exists today. The notice intimated the predeccs-sor-in-interest of the petitioners that unauthorised constructions were and are being made and further constructions be stopped. This notice was under Section 28 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. The petitioners also mentioned in the writ petition that they gave an assurance to the local administration that the construction would be stopped. It is admitted today at the time of hearing of the writ petition also that the consiructions did proceed despite the notice to stop it and the building has been corn-pleted to the finish.
5. Ultimately, the petitioners contend that they appeared before the Mukhya Nagar Abhiyanta (The Chief City Engineer) of the Allahabad Development Authority and made a request that all the constructions which have been made by deviating from the sanctioned plan be compounded.
Of the accepted petition that the sanctioned plan was violated and deviated and the consiructions were completed, the record bears this out blantantly. Thus, it is contended that a request for revised compounding was submitted for being considered but ultimately the Allahabad Development Authority did not accept the deviations from the original plan and the Administrator of the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad (City Corporation, Allahabad) passed an order on 29 March, 1979 that the illegal constructions should be demolished. It is contended that this order by which the revised plan showing the illegal constructions were not accepted was passed behind the back of the owner of the back of the owner of the properly, i.e, late Kedar Nath Tiwari. Against this order by which demolition of the unauthorised construction had been ordered, an appeal was filed under Section 28(1) of the Act, aforesaid. This was Appeal No: 8 of 1975; Kedar Nath Tiwari v. Secretary, Allahabad Development Authority Allahabad. The appeal lay before the Chairman, Allahabad Development Authority i.e.. the Commissioner, Allahabad Division Allahabad. On the appeal, the appellate authority on 5 May 1980 passed the following order:
"Appeal No. 8/1975Kedar Nath v. Allahabad Development Authority ORDER This is an appeal filed by Kedar Nath under Section 27(2) of the Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 against the order dated 30-6-1979 passed by the Chief Engineer Allahabad Development Authority for demolition of unauthoriseid construction of shops ereeted at 2A, BeliRoad.
I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the records of the case. The contention of the appellant is that the plan of the construction in dispute was previously sanctioned by Allahabad Development Authority but in actual construction some change has been done with regard to the site of the construction. It is stated that an application for compounding of the case had been filed but the same was wrongly rejected. It is alleged in front of the said consiruction, other buildings have also been constructed which are in commercial use, such as Vijay Bank a laundry shop and sweetmeat shop. It is argued on behalf of the Allahabad Development Authority that previously sanctioned plan was for the extension of the existing residential buildings but the construction of shops which have been held to be unauthorised are not in the nature of the extension of the residential house but is a separate house away from the residential house and is being used for commercial purposes. The contention of the appellant, that the construction is meant for the use as lodge for the students is not correct as some of the shops have already been leased out and are in actual use as shops. Section 16 of the Urban Planning and Development Act prohibits any development against the proposal of the Master Plan. Although it is admitted that in front of the disputed construction, commercial activity like bank, laundry and sweetmant shops are continuing in other buildings but all these are old buildings in which non conformity in use could continue unless specifically prohibited by individual. It is also evident from the perusal of the plan of the unauthorised construction for the required set back for commercial purposes has not been left and the shops have been constructed on the road without leaving any vacant area. It is also clear that the appellant did not stop the construction work despite notice given to him under Section 26 of the Act and completed construction work on first floor also. Such constructions arc not fit for compounding as they are not only against the proposal of Master plan but in fact would give impetus to such unauthorised constructions by other persons.
In view of the facts discussed above, I find no force in appeal which is hereby dismissed.
5-5-1980 Sd/-
J.N. Pradhan Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Chairman, Allahabad Development Authority Allahabad
6. The Appellate Authority, i.e., the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad, was of the view that the petitioner had committed an illegality in making constructions without permission and in any case under the law the construction could not be compounded. The appeal was dismissed. The petitioners felt and were advised that the order of the Commissioner, Allahabad Division Allahabad, is worth a challenge and, thus, they filed a revision before the State Government under Section 41 (3) of the Act, aforesaid. The revision was numbered as 39 of 1981. The State Government considered the revision of the petitioners and declined to interfere with the order of the appellate authority. Relevant portion of the decision of the State Government rendered by the Special Secretary, Urban Development, dated 29 March, 1985 is as below:
"Uttar Pradesh Shashan Avas Anubhag-3 Sri Kedarnath Tiwari v. Uttar Pradesh Government No. 39 Revision/81 Dt. 29-3-1985.
This revision has been Tiled by Sri K.N. Tiwari, r/o 2, Beli Road, Allahabad, against the order dated 5-3-1980 of the Chairman, Allahabad Development Authority, Allahabad.
Sri K.N. Tiwari got a map sanctioned from the Allahabad Development Authority for making residential constructions in the campus of H. No. 2A, Beli Road/10 Batuk Krishna, Banerji Road,. At the time of making constructions, he constructed 10 shops changing the sanctioned plan. In this connection the local engineer of the Development Authority reported on 21-2-1981 about the unauthorised constructions. On this basis a show cause notice under Section 27(1) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 was issued directing to stop further constructions. On 26-3-1979, the date of hearing, the revisionist appeared in the Development Authority and accepted the unauthorised constructions. He gave an application for compounding. Since the disputed constructions were commercial, and were against the land use proposed in the master plan, the Development Authority did not agree. Orders were passed for demolition of the unauthorised constructions and the party was sent notice to demolish the construction. Against this order the opposite party filed an appeal on 16 July 1979 before the Chairman, Allahabad Development Authority. The Chairman, Development Authority, after complete hearing and perusing the file and the documents filed by the opposite party, dismissed the appeal on 5-5-1980 and vailed the stay order. Against this order Sri Tiwari has come in revision before the Government.
The revisionist has filed the revision running into 35 pages. The main ground taken in the revision is that he had filed the application for compounding with a view to have the maimum gain and the constructions were raised with the advice of the contractor. He was hopeful that these constructions would be compounded. He was raising a lodge for the residence of the students and simultaneously he raised shops in which Rs. 80,000/- was spent. He made an application for compounding but no order was passed thereon but later on he received a notice for demolition of the construction. He has also stated that opposite his house shops have been raised and a bank is located there. If a commercial activity can be done in that house, he cannot be discriminated. He has further stated that at the time when the notice for demolition was given, the State was ruled by the Janata Party and many perons were against him. He has also stated that he did not receive any notice under Section 27. His further contention was that oval plan has not yet-been made in the master plan and so the building should not be demolished. He said that Sections 8 and 10 are against the Constitution and sought it to be declared as ultra vires, he has further said that the order regarding demolition relates to ground floor constructions and not the upper floor. If the constructions of ground floor are demolished, the constructions of upper floor will automatically fall. Beside this several other contentions have been raised which do not have any direct bearing on the case. In this connection the report obtained from the Development Authority has been seen. In this the Development Authority has denied the objections and pleas of the opposite party. In the report of the Development Authority it has been stated that the revisionist was ordered to stop the constructions, but he did not stop the constructions and violated the law. So far as the master plan relates, it is in vouge in Allahabad and, thus, the contention of the revisionist has no force. The Development Authority has termed the contentions of the revisionist as not acceptable and baseless. They have further stated that reasonable opportunity for hearing Was given to him but he continued the unauthorised constructions. This is also the contention of the Development Authority that the plea of compounding at other places by the revisionist is not correct. Each case was decided on their merits and demerits.
The Chairman. Development Authority, has found in his order that the constructions in the name of a lodge are not right, but shops are being raised which is violative of Section 16 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act and, the land use under the master plan. About the commercial shops in the building opposite his house, it was said that the building was very old and prior to the master plan. The Chairman has further said that the revisionist continued the constructions even afrer receiving the notice and such constructions did not justify the compounding.
I have thoroughly studied the complete file and heard the counsel and their contentions for both the parties. In the master plan, the area in question has been shown as residential. In residential area permission for commercial cannot be given. Whatever letters etc., available on record clearly show that the revisionist continuously raised the constructions and the order which he was given for stopping the constructions, was not complied with. The land use under master plan cannot be changed by the Chairman or the Vice Chairman. The main problem is the increasing tendency to raise unauthorised constructions. If this is not checked, the master plan will have no use. Others will find support to violate the valid legal order. In such caonditions the order of the Secretary, Development Authority, is perfectly just. Therefore, this revision is dismissed.
Sd/-
M. M. Verma Special Secretary"
(Translated from Hindi)
7. In the writ petition, the petitioners basically bank their case on a circumstance that across the road some constructions have been made by others and building regulations have been violated and no set back has been left and yet these constructions have been compounded. The submission is that the refusal to compound the constructions made by the petitioners is discriminatory. The petitioners further stales that even if it is assumed that by some legal jugglery the master plan framed under Act is saved by law, yet no action for contravention Of the said master plan or industrial development plan can be made aground for an action to demolish thier constructions under the law. The petitioners submit that there is no distinction between residential and nonresidential constructions and that there is no known criteria to designate a construction as residential and non residential. The petitioners contended that the illegal constructions on which admittedly they have received no sanction cannot be refused to be compounded on the ground that they are non residential as contradistinguished from industrial constructions.
8. The record of the case shows that the petitioners had been cautioned not to proceed with constructions which were not sanctioned. The petitioners took the law in thier hands and continued with the constructions at their risk when they were put under notice. They accepted that they had violated the law and made constructions without sanction. Violating the sanctioned map to proceed with constructions unauthorisedly is accepted. This acceptance by the petitioners that they had made unauthorised constructions despite being cautioned not to do so is on record in the order of the Chief Engineer, City, dated 18 April 1979 (a copy of which is appended as Annexure-1 to the writ petition).
9. The petitioners had submitted plans for constructions of residential portion, an offece, an annexe to the main building towards the west of the corner plot. What the petitioners constructed ultimately was not a residential building, but shops and flats. Having constructed illegally, then the petitioners wanted a compromise with the authorises that the illegal constructions be overlooked, the matter compromised and compounded and the constructions regularised. The authorities indicated to them that they had violated the law with impunity, breached the faith of the adminsitration by applying to receive a sanctioned plan for constructing a residence, but instead mad non residential building by making shops and letting them about for the purposes of earning rent. The authorities declined to compromise the matter and rejected the prayer for compounding the illegal constructions and consistantly look the view that the constructions so made by the petitioners need to be demolished.
10. During the hearing of the writ petition, the petitioners' counsel, Mr. Dhruv Narain has fairly contended that what is on record of the orders which have been challenged as also the accep-tance of the petitioners in the original record of the Allahabad Development Authority that a sanctioned plan was violated, the constructions were made without authorisation and the illegality of making non residential constructions when permission was grunted for making residential one, is an aspect on which he will take no issue aginst the record. On 19 March, 1996, he made a submisison that as a new master plan has been brought, the record of this master plan ought to be brought for the perusal of the Court, in addition with the original record of the proceedings which is before the Court on a writ of certiorari.
11. The misdemeanour of the petitioners does not improve with the new master plan being brought before the Court. The standard of building regulations do not give any benefit to the petitioners except that the measurement units have been stipulated instead of feet, in metres. Under the building regulations which were in operation at the lime when the petitioners made the illegal constructions, the petitioners had to conform to a set back norm by keeping away from the centre of the road, regard being had to the circumstances that the property is a corner plot. At the time when the petitioners were violating the building regulations admittedly the set backs, they were obliged to leave as space on either side, i.e.. on the north and the east was 30 feet and 35 feet, respectively. These dimensions are given in the previous Master Plan, Volume II at page 161. The new master plan as is applicable from the year 1995 makes no difference is so far as the petitioners are concerned, as the violation had been carried out by them, and buildings constructed illegally. To them the law on date of violation would apply. AIR 1976 SC 49, Rameshwar v. Jot Ram. That was the year 1979. In today's Master Plan which was enforced in January 1996, the set back in the petitioners' locality is 20 feet or 6 metres in the front, that is North and 20 feet or 6 metres on the side, that is, East. The petitioners made their shops and flats violating even the new Master Plan, is apparent from the survey conducted by the Allahabad Developments Authority on 10 April 1981, and recorded in its proceedings file No. 2/Vikas Pradhikaran/Ward 4(27) 78-79 in the caser of the petitioners.
12. These in not shell are the facts and the controversies involved in the writ petition. On aspects on which there is no issue is the State of the record spelling out the following of circumstances (a) The plot of the petitioners was residential (b) The proposed building on which sanction was granted to the petitioners was residential, (c) The petitioners had been accorded sanction to make a residential building, (d) The petitioners violated the set backs on their corner plot, (e) They converted a residential plot into one for non residential use and, thus, changing the conforming use of their property and area both, (f) The petitioners violated the sanctioned map (g) The petitioners made illegal constructions, (h) The petitioners received notice to stop the constructions which they did not, (i) The petitioners continued to make the constructions despite being asked to stop them and (j) The petitioners completed the building and even let out the shops and the flats for use completely in violation of the law, the building regulations and the master plan. Now, the petitioners seek a compromise with the law that the illegality by condoned.
13. The petitioners have approached every conceivable authority for relief against the illegal constructions, made deliberately and in naked violation of the law. The petitioners desire that that the matter be compromised and the violation be compounded on the payment of a price. The authorities have declined to do so on the ground that it would set a bad example by permitting ratepayers or others to violate building regulations, show disrespect to laws which govern urban planning and this would jeopardise the master plan and the planned development of the city.
14. In so far as the High Court is concerned, both equity and law, is against the petitioners. From the record it is clear that the petitioners, at the time when they were making their illegal constructions were utilising their political clout to violate the law and capitalise on their property by con vertinga residence into a commercial venture. The petitioners can receive no protection from the High Court and a prerogative writ is not meant to protect those who take the law in their hands and simultaneously violate the rule of equity, justice and good conscience. The Court is not inclined to interfere in this matter for more than one reason.
15. As pressures grow upon the urban areas of the nation and the national economy liberalises and trade and commerce gets more free in its interaction than it was before and as the license raj gives way by untying the knots to red tape, the necessary corollary is faith in the rule of law and respect to the discipline which governs citizens in interaction amongst themselves in every sphere of life. The discipline of city life will also be affected by the change in the loosening of economic controls. More commercial activity will pot pressure on towns and cities. Urban planning will have to be approached with even more stricter code of conduct on the citizens who dwell in these cities and the administration will have to proceed with stricter monitoring of the law which governs an urban habitat. On this aspect, the Supreme Court has laid down the law which governs urban planning very clearly. The Court will revert to this aspect later.
16. The issue which arises in the present petition is that persons like the petitioners cannot be permitted to change the conforming uses of land merely because they have money to committ an illegality and political connections to encourage it. On record the petitioners themselves refer to these connections. If such acts, like the petitioners, were to be condoned, then, residential areas will disappear into commercial ones. This was not meant to happen. It is for this purpose that habitats are marked as residential and nonresidential and it is also as a consequence of this that ratepayers have been given the right to object when commercial activity impinges and encroaches the peace of the residential areas.
17. The basic illegalities by the petitioners or their predecessors is of violating the regulations by breaching the set-backs, in their temptation to make shops on the boundary of their residential plot, and capitalise by earning premium and rent. If every residence owner was to break his boundary wall adjoining a road and make shops, like the petitioners have done, then, the law stipulating set-backs in urban planning and discipline would cease to have meaning. Breaching the code of setback will bring chaos instead of disciplined urbanisation. Further, residential sectors will disappear into bazars. This is the beginning of anend to a city.
18. Set backs in planning in urban habitat are provided for many reasons. Set backs control the width of the road. Set backs monitor street alignment. Set backs made for an easier drainage system and civic amenities like providing for essential services like water with underground pipelines, electricity poles and telephone lines. As a city takes in the urban life, strict regulation of planning and invigilation of a habitat is the prescription of law. A town has to be planned and regulated by the book. Otherwise, like any other living institution it sows the seed for its own death. Set backs are left between a street and a buildings so that the spaces in between buildings on either side of the street take the increase of the traffic with ease on wide roads. Violation of set backs restricts the open space which is left for a street or a road. A set back may not be a public space. But, a set back is a conforming use which the law provides as being kept open at every given time and not to be covered on any occasion. If these basic norms of city planning are violated, the entire discipline which controls a habitat collapses. People like the petitioners contribute to it.
19. Conforming use of the land is a phenomena which the discipline of urban planning does not permit to be compromised. Thus the Supreme Court said, when a violation takes place of a conforming use, it is an illegality which is incurable. AIR 1974 SC 2177 : K. R. Shenoy v. Udipi Municipality. This Court has held that street alignments cannot be disturbed and set backs cannot be violated and the law sufficiently, provides to set back a building from a street. 1996 All WC 1101 : Sushil Kumar Pandey v. State of U. P.
20. Today, in matters of town planning two concepts which control the quality of a habitat, abode or locality are governed by a check and balance approach. The two concepts are 'set backs' and 'compounding'. The former is violated easily and generally. The second is taken for granted like paying a traffic fine. What is a set back? What is compounding? These two aspects in urban planning the Court has had an occasion to reflect upon. In the matter of Jan Sankalp Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd. Agra v. Agra Development Authority Writ Petition No. 1296 of 1994 the court observed :
"In arranging for urbanisation, what the law, prescribes it does not permit compromise and there can be no question of any compounding whether it is individual or institutional. For instance, if the Act, foresaid, provides that an area has to be left apart as community and public facility, it has to be that way.
The second aspect as alleged by the A.D.A. is that in 54 cases there has been violation of both front and back set backs on individual plots. Leaving a set back on a plot while building is part of the discipline in urban planning. This is a symmetry which cannot be disturbed. Every properly owner or a rate payer is obliged to conform to this pattern, otherwise it will play havoc with the system of the plans and simultaneously these violations will act as nuisance to the neighbour, affect the community and the public. Here the concept of compounding may not be made applicable. For instance, if in a locality the building regulations require that the from and back set backs will be twenty five feet and fifteen feet respectively, then this distance cannot be narrowed, curtail or bridged. When the housing of individuals is taken to be that of a community, then individual discipline reflects on community discipline. In the specific context, set backs control distance of houses from the street and thus, affect street alignment and the drainage. Viola-lion of these spaces to be left as open and called set back spaces cannot be condoned, it is an illegality. Only the building has to be removed.
Then what may be condoned ? If the front set back is twenty five feet and the building is thirty feet away from the line of street alignment and should construction be made on the five feet towards the street without permission, this would be an irregularity, permission to build ought to have been taken. This act can be condoned but with a repenalty. This penalty is known as compounding fee, commonly known as compounding.
Summing up and in the net result, narrowing, occupying and reducing the area of set backs or violating conforming uses and spaces in urban planning is an illegality, which is incurable and even if a Municipality, Corporation or Development Authority wants to compound the offence, the law does not permit it. AIR 1974SC2177:K. R. Shenoy v. The Chief Officer, Town Municipal Corporation, Udipi. The illegal construction have to be removed even under bane of prosecution of officials who permitted it. Conforming uses of land have to be given sanctity and protection. This is the rule of law in urban planning. AIR 1996SC 253 : G. N. Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority.
20A. Before the Court there is no issue that whatever constructions are in issue they were in fact made unauthorisedly, illegally and in total defiance of the law as also the caution to the petitioners and his predecessor-in-interest to desist from building. The constructions were not made bona fide nor in compliance of any lawful permission, in fact contrary to both. In such circumstances the Supreme Court has held in a matter from Bombay that the appellant could not be permitted to retain the structure which was illegally constructed. Demolition of such constructions was me logical consequence. (1996) 5 JT (SC) 370: Kantaprasad D. Patel v. Municipality Corporation of Greater Bombay.
21. What the petitioners contend before the Court is that they be permitted to keep and relain the fruits of violaling the law for the price of money. The offence which the petitioners have committed cannot be purchased by the condonation of compounding as a penalty. It is an illegality which has to be removed, it cannot be cured. On property, and the violation of law in the planning of it the Supreme Court approvingly adopted a passage that "the interests of society are paramount to individual interests and the two must be brought to just harmonious relation. A mere property is not the final destiny of mankind, if progress is to be the law of future as it has been of the past." AIR 1996 SC 2005: Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. Equally important are the observation of the Supreme Court (at p. 2018 of AIR):
"37. Before parting with this case, we feel impelled to make a few observations. What happened in this case is illustrative of what is happening in our country on a fairly wide scale in diverse forms. Some persons in the upper strata (which means the rich and the influential class of the society) have made the 'property career' the sole aim of their life. The means have become irrelevant in a land where its greatest son born in this century said "means are more important than ends". A sense of bravade prevails; everything can be managed; every authority and every institution can be managed. All it takes is to "lackle" or "manage" it in and appropriale manner. They are developed an utter disregard for law--nay, a contempt for it; the feeling that law is meant for lesser mortals and not for them. The Courts in the country have been trying to combat this trend, with some success as the recent events show. But how many matters can we handle. How many more of such matters are still there? The real question is how to swing the polity into action, a polity which has become indolent and soft in its vitals? Can the Courts alenw do it? Even so, to what extent, in the prevailing state of affairs? Not what we wish to launch upon a diatri Be against anyone in particular but Judges of this Court are also permitted, we presume, to ask in anguissh, "what have we made of our country in less than fifty years"? Where has the respect and regard for law gone? And who is responsible for it?
22. The main plank of the petitioner's expla-
nation, on record, before the authorities has been that opposite their property another property owner had his illegal constructions compounded, thus, notwithstanding that the constructions in issue have been made without permission, unauthhorisedly and in violation of building regulations yet compounding on payment of penally must follow. What the petitioners contends is that a wrong must follow a wrong and two wrongs must be treated equally. The law gives no sanction to repeal a wrong. The petitioners seeks a prerogative writ to protect his wrong. This is not a ground for issue of a writ to perpetuate a wrong. This has been explained by the Supreme Court in the matter of Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh, AIR 1995 SC 705. Nor can the petitioners be under any legitimate expectation to receive encouragement in continuing a wrong or follow an illegality of another and claim equality on admitted illegalities. This aspect has been explained by the Supreme Court in a situation where land uses were illegally exploiled, in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Delhi Auto and General Finance Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1994 SC 2263.
23. The pelitioncrs submit that by a certiorari the High Court quash the order of the Allahabad Development Authority under Section 27(1) of the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, requiring them to remove the illegal construction (Annexure-1 to the writ petition dated 30 June 1979); the appellate order under Section 27(2) of the Act, declining to set aside or recall the order of demolishing the constructions (Annexure-5 to the writ petition, dated 5 May, 1980) and under Sections 13(2), 41(3) and 53 of the Act being the order in Revision of the State Government rejecting the prayer to revise the orders of the authorities below (Annexure-6A to the writ petition, dated 29 March, 1983). Certiorari is a certificate to correct an error or illegality of authorities subject to judicial review. The Court has considered the mattercarefully as presented in the writ petition as also examined the original record which was produced before the Court by the Allahabad Development Authority. The Court finds that the authorities below have committed no error, manifest or otherwise, nor illegality in cautioning and preventing the petitioners from constructing and preventing the petitioners from constructing illegally. The petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest made the illegal constructions at their risk and peril. The constructions made by the petitioners cannot be compounded. The orders, the quashing of which the petitioners seeks, cannot be quashed and are certified as correct and in accordance with law.
24. The writ petition is dismissed with costs. Dated: 6 November, 1996.
25. Petition dismissed.