Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Bio Chemicals And Synthetic Products ... vs Government Of A.P. And Ors. on 28 June, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(4)ALD806, 2002(4)ALT446
Author: Ar. Lakshmanan
Bench: Ar. Lakshmanan
JUDGMENT AR. Lakshmanan, C.J.
1. Heard both sides.
2. In accordance with the observations of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 1317 of 1986, the appellant filed an application on 23-2-1987 and subsequently on 11-6-1990 under Section 20(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as "the Act", seeking exemption on the ground that the land is of industrial value and hence, it may be exempted from the provisions of the Act. On the said application, the first respondent called for a report from the second respondent and the third respondent has inspected the land on 18.3.1992. According to the appellant-petitioner, respondents 2 and 3 have submitted recommendations in favour of the application for exemption filed by the appellant. However, the first respondent vide Memo dated: 9-3-2002 has rejected the application of the appellant for grant of exemption from the provisions of the Act. It is submitted by Sri Vedula Venkataramana, the learned Counsel for the appellant that the respondent has not accorded any reason for arriving at the conclusion that the appellant cannot be granted exemption from the provisions of the Act and in support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in T.R. Thandur v. Union of India, , wherein the Supreme Court has held that the power to grant exemption has to be exercised transparently and since surplus landholder has a legitimate expectation to retain the land, the order rejecting the exemption should necessarily be a speaking order. Paragraph 11 of the said judgment reads:
11. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 20 empowers the State Government to grant the exemption if it is satisfied having regard to the relevant factors specified in the clause that it is necessary or expedient to grant the exemption in the "public interest", subject to the conditions specified in the order. Clause (a) specifies certain relevant factors for the purpose of grant of exemption, namely, "location of such land", "the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used" and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require. Apart from the location of the excess vacant land and the purpose of its use, regard must be had to the other relevant factors, which is a question of fact in each case. However, these factors must indicate that the grant of exemption under Clause (a) is necessary or expedient in the "public interest". The expression "public interest" has a legal connotation. The broad guidelines for grant of exemption under Clause (a) are enacted in the provision. A safeguard is provided by requiring conditions to be specified in the order subject to which the exemption is granted under Clause (a). Even though there is no proviso in Clause (a) of the kind enacted thereafter in Clause (b), yet the absence of such a proviso is inconsequential since the requirement of the expressly enacted proviso in Clause (a) is implicit in the manner of exercise of the power under Clause (a). The requirement in Clause (a) of making an order having regard to the specified relevant circumstances and specifying the conditions attached to the exemption, ensures that the decision is reached for cogent reasons which are placed on record in writing culminating in the making of the written order. There is no scope for the view that exemption can be granted under Clause (a) by an order specifying the conditions having regard to the specified relevant factors without recording the reasons for doing so in writing. Every State action must satisfy the rule of non-arbitrariness and, therefore, recording of reasons in writing for granting the exemption under Clause (a) indicating that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, is an essential requirement of valid exercise of power under Clause (a). This is how Clause (a) must be construed and understood.
3. We have perused the order under appeal. The order does not give or assign any reason. By the impugned order, the first respondent has rejected the application of the petitioner for exemption without according any reasons whatsoever. The first respondent has also not notified the appellant about the personal hearing of the exemption application. Thus, in our opinion, the order passed by the first respondent is in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice and is arbitrary and the same is not passed in accordance with the provisions of Section 20(1) of the Act. Therefore, we have no hesitation to set aside the order impugned in the writ petition and also the order of the learned single Judge and remit the matter to the first respondent for consideration afresh in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court and in accordance with Section 20(1) of the Act. The appellant is at liberty to place any material in support of his case that the land has industrial value.
4. The writ appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.