Karnataka High Court
Kap Steel Ltd. vs R. Sasikala on 22 August, 1989
Equivalent citations: I(1990)ACC106, 1990ACJ913, [1991(62)FLR638], ILR1989KAR3098, 1989(3)KARLJ54
JUDGMENT Rama Jois, J.
1. In this appeal presented under S. 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act ('the Act' for short), the following two questions of law arise for consideration :-
(1) Whether the period of limitation prescribed for preferring the appeal under sub-section (2) of S. 30 of the Act should be counted from the date of the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or from the date of communication if in a given case after pronouncing the order a communication about the passing of the order was also given ?
(2) Whether depositing of the amount of interest or penalty imposed under S. 4A of the Act in addition to the compensation awarded or otherwise, is a condition precedent for preferring an appeal ?
2. In order to appreciate the two questions, it is necessary to set out the provisions of S. 30 of the Act.
"30(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely :-
(a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum :
(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4A;
(b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment;
(c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependents of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependent;
(d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (c) of S. 12; or
(e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions :
Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees :
Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties :
Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.
(2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this Section shall be sixty days.
(3) The provisions of S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall be applicable to appeals under this section"
3. Sub-section (1) of S. 30 of the Act provides that the appeal shall lie to this court as against orders specified under clauses (a) to (e) of the said sub-section. Sub-section (2) prescribes the provided of limitation for appeal and provides that the limitation is 60 days. Sub-section (3) of S. 30 of the Act provides that the provision of S. 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to appeals under the said section.
4. Having regard to the language of sub-section (2), it is clear that the appeal has to be preferred within 60 days and therefore it has got to be preferred within 60 days from the date of the act. There is no provision either in the Act or under the rules imposing a mandatory condition for the communication of the order passed and therefore the appellant cannot contend that the communication to the effect that the order had been passed on December 19, 1988 was given only on January 12, 1989 and the time for preferring the appeal should be counted from the said date. It is also clear from the order appealed against that the order was pronounced in Open Court on December 19, 1988, of which both the parties had notice. Therefore, we answer the first question as follows :-
The period of limitation prescribed for preferring the appeal under sub-section (2) of S. 30 of the Act should be counted from the date of the pronouncement of the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and not from the date of communication, even if in a given case after pronouncing the order, a communication about the passing of the order was also given.
5. As far as the second question is concerned, the learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the condition precedent prescribed under the third proviso to sub-section (1) of S. 30 of the Act applies only to an appeal falling under Clause (a) of S. 30(1) of the Act and therefore the condition precedent of depositing the amount before preferring an appeal applies only to the amount of compensation awarded and not to an appeal falling under S. 30(1)(aa) of the Act, which provides for an appeal against the order passed imposing interest or penalty under S. 4A of the Act. He submitted that in the present case, actually the appellant had deposited the amount of compensation even when the proceedings were pending before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, but as the appellant was required to deposit the amount within 30 days from the date of accident and it was deposited after about 11 months, interest and penalty had been imposed under S. 4A of the Act and whatever that may be, as the entire amount of compensation payable had been deposited by the appellant before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, there is no question of the appellant depositing the amount of compensation before preferring this appeal.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant is right in his submission that as the appeal preferred was only against the interest and penalty imposed under S. 4A of the Act, the condition of depositing the amount prescribed under the third proviso to S. 30(1) of the Act was not attracted as this appeal does not fall under Clause (a) of S. 30(1) but falls under Clause (aa) of the said section. In the result, we answer the second question as follows :
Depositing of the amount of interest or penalty imposed under S. 4A of the Act in addition to the compensation awarded or otherwise is not a condition for preferring an appeal under S. 30(1) of the Act.
7. In view of our answer to the first question there has been a delay of 19 days in presenting this appeal. The appellant has filed an application for condonation of delay in presenting the appeal. In the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, it is stated that the person who was in charge of the case retired on December 31, 1988 and thereafter the present Assistant Personnel Officer on enquiry learnt that an order had been passed on December 19, 1988 and thereafter he applied and obtained a copy on January 12, 1989 and if the period of limitation is calculated from January 12, 1989 there was no delay, but if the period of limitation is computed from the date of the order there is 19 days delay and in the circumstances the applicant has prayed for condonation of delay in presenting the appeal.
8. We are satisfied that the appellant has shown sufficient cause for the condonation of delay in presenting this appeal.
9. Accordingly, we make the following order :
The delay is condoned. The appeal is directed to be registered and posted for admission.
10. Order accordingly.