Madras High Court
Tamil Nadu State Transport Corpn. ... vs Lalitha on 22 February, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2005(2)CTC246
Author: Markandey Katju
Bench: Markandey Katju, D. Murugesan
JUDGMENT Markandey Katju, C.J.
1. This writ appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge dated 22.9.2004. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant.
2. The respondent is a widow. Her late husband was a driver in the service of the appellant Corporation, who had been appointed in 1979. He had some heart ailment due to which he was compulsorily retired on medical grounds by order dated 6.12.1995. Thereafter, on a representation made by him to the Corporation a settlement under section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act was reached under which he was re-employed as a mazdoor trainee by order dated 6.2.1996. However, four days thereafter i.e. on 10.2.1996 at the age of 44 he passed away. He was the only bread-winner of the family and he left behind him his widow (respondent) and two daughters.
3. The Corporation refused to give compassionate appointment to the widow (respondent) taking a technical view of the matter. Learned counsel for the appellant Corporation relied on G.O. Ms. No. 680 Transport Department dated December, 1977 and urged that under the said G.O. the respondent could not get compassionate appointment.
4. We do not agree with this submission. It must be understood that the aforesaid G.O. is a piece of beneficial legislation and hence should be liberally construed. There is no doubt that the respondent's husband had worked in the service of the appellant Corporation for 16 years and thereafter he developed heart ailment and died. Before his death he has been compulsorily retired by order dated 6.12.1995 due to his ailment, but on a representation made by him he was re-employed on 6.2.1996.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on clause 11 of the aforesaid G.O. Clause 11 of the said G.O. states:-
"Dependents of such of those temporary employees who had put in more than 240 days of work in a year before their demise and regularised and confirmed employees are alone eligible for this concession."
6. In our opinion, a liberal interpretation should be put on the aforesaid clause 11.
7. In Transport Corporation of India v. Employees Insurance Corporation, the Supreme Court observed that beneficial legislation should be given a liberal and not a technical or narrow interpretation. If two interpretations are possible, then the one in favour of the employee should be preferred.
8. In B.D. Shetty v. CEAT Limited, , the Supreme Court observed: -
" One must not lose sight of the fact that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and the provision of subsistence allowance made is intended to serve a definite purpose of sustaining the workman and his family members during the bad time when he is under suspension, pending inquiry. This provision is enacted with a view to ensure social welfare and security. Hence, such a beneficial piece of legislation has to be understood and construed in its proper and correct perspective so as to advance the legislative intention underlying its enactment rather than abolish it. Assuming two views are possible, the one, which is in tune with the legislative intention and furthers the same, should be preferred to the one which would frusturate it."
9. In Secretary, H.S.E.B. v. Suresh, , the Supreme Court observed: -
" Needless to note at this juncture that the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act being a beneficial piece of legislation as engrafted in the statute-book, ought to receive the widest possible interpretation in regard to the words used and unless words are taken to their maximum amplitude, it would be a violent injustice to the framers of the law. As a matter of fact the law is well settled by this Court and we need not dilate much by reason therefore to the effect that the law courts exist for the society and in the event of there being a question posed in the matter of interpretation of a beneficial piece of legislation, question of interpreting the same with a narrow pedantic approach would not be justified. On the contrary, the widest possible meaning and amplitude ought to be offered to the expressions used as otherwise the entire legislation would lose its efficacy and contract labour would be left at the mercy of the intermediary."
10. The respondent's husband had no doubt worked for more than 240 days before his demise. In fact he had worked for 16 years. Hence, in our opinion, the respondent (his widow) is entitled to the benefit of the said G.O. There is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed. Consequently WAMP No. 682 of 2005 is also dismissed.