Madhya Pradesh High Court
Laxman vs Dayalal Meghji And Co. Badashahi Bidi ... on 18 November, 1966
ORDER P.V. Dixit, C.J.
1. The petitioner's application under Section 330(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for recovery from the employer, namely, respondent 1, Dayalal Megbji & Co., of the difference in wages actually paid to him for the period from 3 September 1960 to 22 June 1961 and the wages payable to him under the Madhya Parades Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962, has been rejected by the labor court, Raipur, on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the application. The petitioner now seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing this determination of the labour court.
2. Section 33C of the Act of 1947 is as follows:
33C (1). Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. V-A, the workman may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is to due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any bone fit which is capable of being competed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be competed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such labour court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, and the amount 50 determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-section (1).
(3) * * * It was not disputed by Sri Kukday, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the applicant could have applied under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, within the prescribed time, to the authority under that Act for a direction to the employer to pay him the afoieeaid difference in wages, He, however, urged, on the authority of Central Bank of India v. P.S. Rajgapalan 1963-II L L J. 89 and Bombay Gas Company v. Cepal Behave 1963-II L.L.J 608 that under Section 330(2) a workman could apply to the labour court for recovery of the wages due to him under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the remedy given to him under Section 33C(2) was in addition to the remedy available under Section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.
3. We are unable to accede to this contention. It will be seen that tae claims which are dealt with by Sub-section (1) of Section 330 are claims referable to those "auder a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. V-A " of the Act. A claim for payment of the differance in wages actually paid to a workmen and payable to him under the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962. is clearly not a claim under any settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. V-A of the 19 7 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 33C is concerned with tae computation in terms of money of any benefit, whether monetary or non-monetary, to which a workman may be entitled and the recovery of tae amount determined of the benefit. The scope of this sub-section has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank v. K.L. Kharbanda 1962-I L.L.J. 234 at 238 by making the following observations-
Further, If we compare Sub-section (1) with Sub-section (2) of this section, it will appear that Sub-section (1) applies to cases where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. V-A and that contemplates that the amount is already computed or calculated or at any rate there can be no dispute about the computation or calculation; while Sub-section (2) applies to cases where though the monetary benefit has been conferred on a workman under an award, it has not been calculated or computed in the award itself, and there is dispute as to its calculation or computation. It cannot, therefore, be said lot king to the words used in Sub-section (2) that it only applies to cases of non-monetary benefit which has to be converted in Exams of money, It appears to us that it can also apply to monetary benefits to which a workman may be entitled which have not been calculated or computed, say, for example, in an award and about their calculation or computation there is dispute between the workman and the employer.
4. In Central Bank of India v. P.S. Rijagopalan 1963-II L.L.J. 89 (vide supra), the Supreme Court has, no doubt, pointed out that the scope of Section 33C(2) is not limited by the use of the wards "under a settlement or an award or udder the provisions of Chap. V-A" and is thus wider than that of Section 33C(1); that the three categories of claims mentioned in Section 33C(1) no doubt fall under Section 33J(2); but it is possible that claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the Provisions of Cnap. V-A., may also be competent under Section 33C(2).
We are unable, however, to read the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India 1963-II L.L.J. 89 vide supra suggesting the possibility of claims other than those under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. V-A as including a claim which could be made under Section 16 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The illustrations given in the Supreme Court's decision itself of the claims that might fall under Section 33C(2) abundantly indicate that the claims which would be competent under Section 33C(2) before a labour court, besides the claims under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. V-A, are those which would fall under the Act of 1947 itself. The observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India 1963-II L.L J. 89 vide supra with regard to the wide scope of Section 33C(2) must be read so as to make it consistent with the observations of the Supreme Court in Ambica Mills Company v. S. B Bhatt 1961-I L.L J. 1]. In that case, pointing out the scope of the Jurisdiction of the Authority under Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the Supreme Court said:
Section 15 confers jurisdiction on the authority appointed under the said section to hear and decide for any epecified area claims arising out of deductions from wages, or delay in payment of wages, of persons employed or paid in that area. It is thus clear that the only claims which can be entertained by the authority are claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages The jurisdiction thus conferred on the authority to deal with these two categories of claims is exclusive, for Section 24; of the Act provides that matters which lie within the jurisdiction of the authority are excluded from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil Courts.
(Italicizing is ours.) In the face of these observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Ambica Mills Company 1961-I LLJ. 1 vide supra there is no justification what cover the reading the observations in the case of Central Bank of India 1963-II L.L.J. 89 vide supra as meaning than a claim which could have been made under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, could also be made under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Dlsputes Act, 1947.In our opinion, the dealsloa of the Supreme Court in Ambica Mills Company v. S. B. Bhatt 1961-I L.L.J. 1] (vide supra) concludes the question of the competency of the labour court to entertain the application under Section 330(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, tiled by the petitioner for recovery of the differance in wages claimed by him.
5. The matter is also concluded by the decision of a Division Bsnon of this Court in Surafmal Mihta v. Authority, Payment of Wages Act 1965-I LL J. 274. That was a case where the question arose whether the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act could entertain an application under Section 15 of that Act for a direction to the employer to pay to its workers compensation under Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, While holding that the authority had no Jurisdiction to entertain the application, it was observed by this Court that:
Both the Industrial Disputes Act and the Payment of Wages act are special Acts. The first Act relates to the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and provides for matters dealt with by various provisions of that Act. The Payment of Wages Act is also a special Act because it only regulates the payment of wages to a certain class of persons employed in any industry and its main purpose it to determine all claims of workmen arising out of deductions from their wages or delay in their payment. The provisions of both these Acts cannot be construed in a manner our tailing the operation of one act by the other. That construction of Section 330(2) of the Industrial Disputes act and Sections 2(vi)(d) and 15 of the Payment of Wages act mast be adopted which would avoid repugnancy or redundancy and which gives effect to both the enactments.
In our opinion, there is no indication whatsoever, either in Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes act or in Section 16 of the Payment of Wages Act or in the Supreme Court decision in the case of Central Bank of India 1963-II L.L J. 89 (vide supra), that the scope of Section 33C(2) is wide enough to include claims under Ss, 2(vi) and 15 of the Payment of Wages Act.
6. The decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Qas Company v. Qopal Bhiva 1969-II L L.J. 608] (vide supra) cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is of no assistance to the applicant. In that case, the question that was considered was whether there was any period of limitation for an application under Section 330(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. While holding that there was no period of limitation, the Supreme Court said that the application of Article 181 of the Limitation Act to applications under Section 330(2) was not justified and the fact that for recovery of wages limitation has been prescribed by the Payment of Wages act would also not justify the intrcduction of considerations of limitation in regard to proceedings taken under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes act. In that case. certain workmen had applied to the labour court under Section 33C(2) for computing the benefit in terms of money to which they said they were entitled under an award and for payment of the same to them, and the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider whether the jurisdiction of the Authority under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act was exclusive. The observation of the Supreme Court in the Case of Bombay Gas Company 1963-II L.L.J. 608 (vide supra) that the fact that for recovery of wages limitation has been prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act did not justify the introduction of considerations of limitation in regard to proceedings under Section 330(2) or the Industrial Disputes Act, does not afford any justification whatsoever for holding that a claim, which can be made under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, can also be made under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel also referred us to the decision of the Bombay High Court in C.K. Iypunny v. R.N. Kulkarni 1964-I L.L.J. 197, That decision has no bearing here.
7. For all these reasons, our conclusion is that the labour court was right in holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, for recovery of the difference in wages actually paid to him for the period from 3 September 1960 to 22 Jane 1961 and the wages payable to him under the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962. The result is that this petition is dismissed with costs of respondent 1. Counsel's fee is fixed at Us. 100. The outstanding amount of security deposit if any, after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner,