Bombay High Court
Devji Ravji Patel Huf Through Its ... vs Narmada Agro Industries Ltd. on 18 December, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2001(3)BOMCR828, (2001)4BOMLR388
Author: R.J. Kochar
Bench: R.J. Kochar
ORDER R.J. Kochar, J.
1. The defendants above named have taken a serious exception to my granting leave to the plaintiff under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the High Court to receive, try and determine the suit filed by him in this Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. By the above chamber summons, the defendants have prayed for revocation and/or cancellation of such a leave granted. The defendants have filed an affidavit of one Shri Thomas Cherian in support of their chamber summons, setting out the facts and the grounds on which they have sought revocation of the leave granted to the plaintiff under clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The plaintiff has filed affidavit in reply controverting the facts and averments made in the affidavit of Shri Cherian and maintaining their case that leave under Clause 12 was rightly granted and this Court has Jurisdiction to receive, try and determine the above suit in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
2. I have heard both the learned Counsel at length. I have also gone through the various authorities cited by them. Shri Walawalkar, the learned Counsel for the defendants urged before me to have a fresh and unbiased close look at the Clause 12 of the Imperial Letters Patent conferring jurisdiction on this Court to receive, try and determine the suits of the description mentioned in the said clause. The Clause 12 must have been subjected to reading million times by innumerable learned Judges. I have read the said clause with the learned Counsel of both the sides and I have also read the same for myself. For ready reference the said clause is reproduced below :-
"And we do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, shall be empowered to receive, try, and determine suits of every description, if, in the case of suits for land or other immoveable property such land or property shall be situated, or in all other cases if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly, or in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the said High Court or if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business, or personally work for gain, within such limits; except that the said High Court shall not have such original jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court at Bombay, or the Bombay City Civil Court."
Shri Walawalkar has submitted that the subject matter of the suit is a piece of land situated at Bharuch (Gujarat). According to him the Situs of the immoveable property being the sole criteria to determine the Jurisdiction of a Court, this Court will have no jurisdiction to receive, try and determine the suit of this nature. Shri Walawalkar stressed the fact that the land or the immoveable property not being situated within the jurisdiction of this Court, such a suit cannot be entertained by this Court by granting so-called leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The learned Counsel has not disputed the fact that the agreement for sale of the suit land was executed by the parties at Mumbai on 23rd December, 1996. It is also not disputed that the plaintiff is or was residing at Mumbai and that he had paid an earnest money at the time of the agreement to the defendant at Mumbai. It was vehemently submitted by Shri Walawalkar that merely because agreement for sale of the land at Bharuch was signed by the defendant at Mumbai, this Court will have no jurisdiction to receive, try and determine the suit, as the land or the immoveable property is not situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. He has also pointed out that not only the land is situated at Bharuch, but even the defendants are permanently dwelling at Bharuch and are carrying on business at Bharuch. He has pointedly drawn my attention to Section 16 of the Code, of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the issue of jurisdiction of a Civil Court in such matters. Shri Walawalkar, further submitted that the cause of action to file the present suit is not the agreement for sale entered by the parties, but it was the termination of the said agreements by the defendants by their letter dated 4th September, 2000. It was pointed out by the learned Counsel that the defend ants had addressed two letters dated 8th March and 23rd March, 1999 making it clear to the plaintiff that time was the essence of the contract and was to be completed by 31st March, 1999. He also pointed out from the letter that the agreement was terminated with effect from 1st April, 1999. All the aforesaid three letters form part of the plaint. It is, therefore, an admitted position, ac cording to the learned Counsel, that the agreement for sale stood terminated with effect from 1st April, 1999 as was communicated by the defendants to the plaintiff by the aforesaid letter. The learned Counsel for the defendants argued that the cause of action was not the agreement for sale which was admittedly executed at Mumbai, but it was the termination of the said agreement which has given rise to the present litigation. According to him, there is no cause of action available to the plaintiff to ask for specific performance of the agreement which was already terminated and did not subsist on the date of, filing of the suit. Shri Walawalkar, therefore, pointed out from the prayers that no declaration is sought for in the prayers that the said agreement continues to subsist and that the defendant should be required to specifically perform the same.
He has given emphasis that there is no such prayer, though some averments to the effect that the agreement subsisted was found in the body of the plaint. The learned Counsel, therefore, justified his grievance that the cause of action was not the agreement for sale but it was the termination of the agreement communicated by the defendants to the plaintiff who received the letter dated 4th September, 2000 and who has relied upon the said letter in the plaint. The act of termination of the agreement for sale had taken place at Bharuch and it was communicated by the defendants from Bharuch and therefore, the cause of action had arisen at Bharuch, Coupled with this fact, Shri Walawalkar also pointed out that the situs of the immoveable property is at Bharuch and even the defendants are dwelling at Bharuch and are carrying on their regular business at Bharuch. No part of cause of action has arisen at Mumbai and therefore, clause 12 of the Letters Patent cannot be said to have been attracted. The plaintiff, according to the learned Counsel for the defendants, ought to have filed the suit if at all he wanted to do so at Bharuch alone.
4. Shri Desai, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the suit is not for land or immoveable property but is for specific performance of the agreement by the defendants. According to him, the defendants having entered into the agreement for sale of the land have not performed their part of the contract which was signed by the defendants at Mumbai and payment was made at Mumbai. According to him, though there was no prayer it was averred in the plaint that the agreement for sale was in subsistence and therefore, the plaintiff would ask for its specific performance. Shri Desai further submitted that the aforesaid facts which have taken place at Mumbai, entitle the plaintiff to file the present suit before this Court and since the land was not within the jurisdiction of this Court leave under Clause 12 was rightly granted. Shri Desai relied upon the following judgments :-
(i) Hatimbhai Hassanally v. Framroz Eduljee Dinshaw, :-
Here the suit was for enforcement of mortgage. It was held that a suit to enforce mortgage was not a suit for land, which was situated outside the limits of ordinary jurisdiction of High Court. The Full Bench was considering the issue, whether a suit for mortgage was to be considered as a suit for land. The ratio of the Full Bench judgment is not applicable in the present case. The Full Bench was also not considering the question of Section 16 of the C.P.C. This judgment therefore, does not help Shri Desai.
(ii) The Baroda Oil Cakes Traders v. Parshottam Narayandas Bagulia, :-
Here the question before the Division Bench of our Court was whether the cause of action had arisen in the context of Section 20(c) of the C.P.C. read with Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act, it was a case of sale and purchase of goods. This judgment also is not applicable.
(iii) Bai Urmilabai v. Jehangir B. Pastakia and Anr., It was a suit for sale on mortgage of property outside Greater Bombay. It was held that the City Civil Court had no Jurisdiction to try the suit. This was also a case of suit for mortgage. The facts of this case are totally different from the facts in our case.
(iv) Surjit Singh Atwal v. Union of India, :-
From the facts it appears that it was a case of invalid contract, which cannot be relied upon to constitute part cause of action. The ratio of this judgment is also of no help at all.
(v) G. Venkatesha Bhat and Ors. v. M/s. Kamlapal Motilal and Ors., :-
The learned Single Judge of Madras High Court was considering the question of cause of action under Section 20 of the C.P.C. to decide the place of breach of non-performance of the contract. It was a case of sale and purchase of goods. Even this judgment dos not help Shri Desai.
(vi) Ram Das v. Kalu Ram Girdhar Lal,:-
From the facts it appears that the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court was considering a question of jurisdiction under section 20. It was a case of payment of earnest money by Hundi and acceptance of Hundi. The suit was filed for damages for breach of contract. I fail to understand how this judgment would help Shri Desai.
(vii) Entores Ld. v. Miles Far East Corporation, :-
From the head note it appears that the Queens Bench was considering the question of place of contract in the context of offer and acceptance. In our case, there is no dispute about the facts in respect of place of contract. Even this judgment is of no assistance to Shri Desai.
(viii) Prahlad Madhoba Ruikar and Ors. v. Aboobaker Abdul Rehman & Co.,:-
The Division Bench in this case was considering the question of suit to enforce mortgage and it was held that such a suit was not for land.
(ix) Prem Prakash v. Neetu Dharamveer Bhatia,- :-
The learned Single Judge was considering the suit for specific performance of an agreement filed before this Court. It was held by the learned Judge that it was a suit for enforcement of agreement and therefore, it was required to act in personam and not a suit for land. Leave under Clause 12 was granted. The facts in that case are different as also the learned Single Judge has not considered the question of Section 16 of the C.P.C.
(x) In the last judgment in the matter of Noorjahan wd/o Altaf Ahmed and Ors. v. Sadurnnisa wd/o. Haji Fatchulla Khan and Ors., the facts were different from the facts in the case at hand. Even the question of Section 16 of the C.P.C. was not under consideration before the learned Judge.
5. Though Shri Desai, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff has cited the above judgments, in no judgments, the facts are similar to the facts in the present case except in the case before Justice Jhunjhunuwala, In no judgments the question of applicability of Sections 16 and 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure was considered along with clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Even the judgment by Jhunjhunuwala, J. has not considered Section 16 of the C.P.C. in juxta position of the Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. I do not find in any of the judgments anything contrary to the view which I am taking in this judgment on analysis or dissection of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The following conditions must exist on facts to determine the jurisdiction of this Court.
(a) land or the other immoveable property should be situated within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of this High Court;
(b) all other cases, if the cause of action arises wholly or partly within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court;
(c) if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit dwells or carries on business or personally work for gain within such limits.
6. It is, therefore, clear that the rule has made clear distinction between a cause of action pertaining to the land or immoveable property and other cases, i.e. the cases which, are not pertaining to any land or immoveable property. This Court will have jurisdiction to receive, try and determine suits pertaining to the lands and immoveable properties situated within its local limits. The rule has given utmost importance to the site of the land/immoveable property to vest jurisdiction in this Court. The second part is in respect of the disputes or cases which are not concerning or involving such land or immoveable property. If the whole cause of action has arisen within the local limits of this Court, then this Court will have jurisdiction to receive, try and determine such suits.
7. Thirdly, if part of cause of action has arisen within the local limits of this Court, in that case, the plaintiff is permitted to file a suit in this Court after obtaining leave of this Court under this clause. The last limb of the clause is the residence of the defendant and if that is within the local limits of this Court, such a suit can be maintained here. According to me the rule is significantly silent on the cases where the land is situated outside the local limits of this Court. I am emphasising this part as the site of the land is of paramount importance to confer Jurisdiction on any Civil Court. As far as the Mumbai Court is concerned, it alone will have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the dispute regarding land or immoveable property situated within its local limits. There are two broad distinct categories of the disputes in the rule. One, dispute concerning land or immoveable property and second disputes in relation to other than the land or immoveable property, i.e. to say, business transactions or commercial transactions, money lending transactions and all such transactions, which do no involve land or immoveable property. In the latter category, if the whole cause of action has arisen within the local limits of Mumbai, in that case, there is absolutely no doubt that such a suit would be maintainable in this Court. The third special category for which leave is made essential is if, a part of cause of action has arisen within the local limits of this Court. According to me, the rule does not contemplate at all a dispute relating to land or immoveable property outside the local limits of this Court. The moment it is shown that a dispute has arisen in respect of the land or the immoveable property situated outside the local limits of this Court, Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure will come into operation and will automatically intercept. By engrafting Clause 12, the Legislature had not forgotten and had not become oblivion of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Clause 12 was inserted in respect of the land or immoveable property within the local limits of the Mumbai. The Legislature was aware of the fact that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, were attracted in respect of the land or other immoveable properties situated outside the local limits of Mumbai and therefore, according to me, it was not contemplated to confer jurisdiction on this Court to deal with or to decide the matters relating to the land or the immoveable property situated outside the local limits of Mumbai. It is totally erroneous to bring before this Court the matters relating to the lands and immoveable properties situated outside the local limits of Mumbai by a device of doing some paper work within the local limits of Mumbai viz., by signing agreement within the local limits of Mumbai. In Clause 12 there is clear cut distinction between the disputes relating to the land and the immoveable properties and the disputes other than the land and the immoveable properties. Clause 12 does not at all contemplate the third category of disputes relating to land and the immoveable properties situate outside the local limits of Mumbai with some paper work performed in respect of such property within the local limits of Mumbai. By doing so, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would have been and have been relegated to non-existence. I, therefore, stress that Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure operates simultaneously in respect of the lands and other immoveable properties situated outside the limits of Mumbai. To be precise, this Court will have jurisdiction qua the immoveable property within its local limits and this Court will not have jurisdiction qua the immoveable properties outside the local limits. It is immaterial whether the parties enter into paper work in the local limits of this Court. The situs of the immoveable property is the sole criteria to determine the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. It cannot be said that the parties can confer jurisdiction on a Civil Court outside the Mumbai limits in respect of the land or the immoveable property situated in Mumbai by getting the papers signed outside the local limits of Mumbai. I am, therefore, absolutely clear in my mind that Clause 12 confers jurisdiction on this Court to receive, try and determine suits of every description relating to land or other immoveable properties situated within the local limits of this Court. This Court has no jurisdiction to receive, try and determine any suits relating to the lands or other immoveable properties not situated within its local limits and situated outside its local limits. The litigation follows the land and not the other way round. The situs of the land is the predominant and crucial factor to determine jurisdiction of this Court and every Civil Court. For ready and instant reference I reproduce the Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure as below :-
"Suits to be instituted where subject matter situate:- Subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, suits -
(a) for the recovery of immoveable property with or without rent or profits;
(b) for the partition of immoveable property;
(c) for foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a mortgage of or charge upon immoveable property;
(d) for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property;
(e) for compensation for wrong to immoveable property;
(f) for the recovery of moveable property actually under distraint or attachment.
shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the properly is situate :
Provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immoveable property held by or on behalf of the defendant may, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience, be instituted either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain."
Rule 37 of the Letters Patent has specifically ordained that the High Court shall be guided always by the provisions of the C.P.C. It cannot be imagined that by framing the Clause 12 it was contemplated to usurp or take away the original civil jurisdiction of other Civil Courts outside Mumbai which were specifically conferred jurisdiction to deal with question relating to the land or the immoveable properties situated within their local limits.
7. We cannot interpret Clause 12 in such a fashion that other competent Civil Courts are deprived or denuded of this legitimate jurisdiction lawfully conferred by the C.P.C. It is further clear from the clause that the High Court was held not to have such original jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court at Bombay or the Bombay City Civil Court. Clause 12 has specifically clarified that the High Court shall not have original jurisdiction over the matters which legitimately fell within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court or City Civil Court. Similarly it cannot be said that the High Court shall have original civil jurisdiction over the matters which were falling within the jurisdiction of other Civil Courts under the C.P.C.
8. Jurisdictional primacy would be the place Or situs of the land or the immoveable property and not the place where both the parties complete the paper work of contract. Clause 12 does not take any departure from the jurisdictional philosophy underlying the Civil Procedure Code. On the contrary it engrafts within its ambit both the provisions providing and limiting jurisdictional areas of Civil Courts in respect of immoveable and moveable properties and other transactions of civil nature. Instead of taking a radical departure the letters patent have accepted the C.P.C. as the guiding philosophy; I find no valid reason or justification to interpret Clause 12 as an exception to Section 16 of the C.P.C. that irrespective of the place or site of the land or the immoveable property not within the local limits of Mumbai, this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain and decide a lis in respect thereof. Whatever may be the nature the lis between the parties and whereever they might have executed their contract, the sheet anchor of the civil jurisdiction is the site or place of the land or the immoveable property as well defined and distinctively carved out under Section 16 of the C.P.C. Clause 12 has no inbuilt efficacy to supersede or to take away the strength of Section 16 of the C.P.C.
9. It is an ex facie fallacy to interpret by overstretching the second clause of the clause 12 " .... or in all other cases if the cause of action shall hove arisen, either wholly, or in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original Jurisdiction of the said High Court. . . ." to push in or foist upon this Court a dispute relating to land or immoveable property outside the local limits of Mumbai under the pretext of "execution of contract" or the paper work having taken place within the local limits of Mumbai. Obviously the second clause excludes the first clause relating to land and immoveable properties situated within the local limits. And Clause 12 which takes care of and provides for jurisdiction for the land and immoveable property and other transactions occurring wholly or partly within the local limits of Mumbai, cannot be stretched to encroach upon the lands and immoveable properties outside the local limits of Mumbai which are squarely and properly covered by Section 16 of the C.P.C. under the garb of interpreting "partly" or "in part" within the local limits. In my opinion, therefore, the second clause of Clause 12 is intended to cover only such cause of action which is not in any way related to land or immoveable property.
10. I have laid my hand on the following Judgments which form very good precedent for me in support of my view. My learned brother Rebello, J. has also independently considered the question of clause 12 of Letters Patent in the judgment delivered in the case of Vishram Parbat v. Shruti Builders and Anr., After considering a number of judgments cited before him the learned Judge has concluded as under in paras 12 and 13 and I am in respectful agreement with the view taken. For ready reference paras 12 and 13 are reproduced below:-
Para 12 :
"It is thus clear from all the observations that the earlier concepts of distinguishing causes of action based on an action in rem or in personam is no longer determinative or effective, as in modern times actions in rem are restricted to admiralty jurisdiction and status. Therefore, the test is as to what is the relief sought. Do the reliefs require determination of title to the land? Do they seek recovery of possession of the land or partition and if so, whether these reliefs are incidental or substantial whilst deciding the issue in question.
Useful reference may also be made to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saraoji v. Onkarmal Ishar Pass (supra) more specifically to para 6 of the judgment wherein Chagla, CJ. observed as under :-
"It is well settled that a suit for partition of immoveable properties is a suit for land. And under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the Court would have jurisdiction in the case of suits for land or other immoveable property if such land or property is situated within jurisdiction. The construction of Clause 12 has been responsible for more judicial decisions than perhaps any other clause in the Letters Patent, and many learned Judges have pointed out the various possible constructions to which the language of Clause 12 lends itself."
In para 22 of the same judgment Bhagwati, J. as he then was observed as under :-
"A suit for partition of immoveable property is a suit for land and this Court had therefore no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for such partition because no part of the land was situated within Jurisdiction. The case would, however, be different in regard to the moveable properties, and this Court would have Jurisdiction to entertain the suit for partition of moveable properties if by reason of the situs or location of some of the moveables within jurisdiction it could be said that a part of the cause of action had arisen within jurisdiction. In that event with leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent being granted this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit for partition of all the moveable properties which were the subject matter of the suit."
I, refrain from adding for the sake of adding. To my mind the observations culled out, by themselves, should be the beacon for understanding clause 12.
Para 13 :
Applying the aforesaid tests to the reliefs as sought for in the suit, can it be said that the suit is basically for enforcing the agreement as sought in prayer Clause (c) and all other reliefs are merely consequential to relief in prayer Clause (c). The plaintiff is seeking a declaration for cancellation of documents, namely prayer clauses (a) and (b) against defendant No. 1 based on his title to the land alongwith defendant Nos. 2 and 3. Plaintiff will, therefore, have to establish his title to the land against defendant No. 1 to get the reliefs in prayer clauses (a) and (b) These are not incidental questions to be decided or reliefs to be granted to hold that the action is in personam. To my mind if the tests applied by the learned Judges; of the Federal Court as also of this Court are applied, the suit involves the following :-
"(a) determination of the plaintiffs title to the land as without such determination the reliefs as prayed for in prayer Clauses (a) and (b) cannot be granted;
(b) partition of land or Sub-division of sub-plots as prayed for in prayer clause (c):
(c) recovery of possession as has been prayed for in prayer clause (d)."
Therefore, to my mind the suit is a suit substantially for land and as the land is situated outside the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court his no jurisdiction to here and decide the present suit.
In the light of that, I answer the issue of jurisdiction in favour of defendant No.1 and accordingly, direct the plaint to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation before the proper Court."
11. To conclude, I hold that this Court will have no jurisdiction to receive, try and determine any suit relating to any land or other immoveable properties not situated within the local limits of this Court. All such suits relating to the lands and the immoveable properties would be governed by the provisions of the C.P.C. In the present case the land is situated at Bharuch, State of Gujarat. The question of jurisdiction would be decided by competent or appropriate Court under the provisions of the C.P.C.
12. Secondly, the agreement for sale having been terminated by the defendants at Bharuch, the cause of action has arisen at Bharuch and therefore, this Court will have no jurisdiction to try, receive and determine the suit. On this issue I am supported by the judgment of my learned brother Lodha, in the case of Garware Nylons Limited v. Swastik Yarns. In para 11 the learned Judge has observed thus :-
"In the circumstances aforesaid, it would be seen that the offers were made on telephone by the defendant from Surat, and the same were accepted, on telephone, and, therefore, the acceptance of the offers was received by the defendant at Surat on telephone, and therefore, the contract shall be made to have been concluded in Surat. Pursuant to the said contract, the goods were delivered in Surat by the plaintiff through its Depot office from Surat. The payment in respect of the goods delivered was made by the defendant to the plaintiff by cheques which were received by the plaintiff at Surat, Therefore, the material part of cause of action, in any case, can be said to have been arisen only in Surat. Under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit other than relating to land or immoveable property, if the entire cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. This Court has also jurisdiction to try such suits if the part of cause of action, of course material, has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court, and leave has been obtained under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent before admission of such plaint. However, as observed above, the material part of cause of action in the present case cannot be said to have arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. Besides that the balance of convenience also does not appear to be in favour of trial of the suit at Bombay. The defendant carries on business at Surat. The goods were supplied at Surat. The plaintiff has its Depots at Surat. The payments made through cheques were collected by the plaintiff through its Depots at Surat. The substantial evidence, therefore, is available at Surat."
In our case also the defendant carries on business at Bharuch and as the land is situated at Bharuch substantial evidence would be available at Bharuch. Besides, the agreement was terminated by the defendant at Bharuch as discussed by me above. The material part of cause of action has therefore arisen at Bharuch and not at Bombay to attract Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.
13. In the aforesaid circumstances, I revoke the order passed by me granting leave under Clause 12 to the plaintiff to receive, try and determine the suit in this Court. The plaintiff would be at liberty to institute appropriate proceedings before the appropriate Court in accordance with law. The plaint is hereby ordered to be returned to the plaintiff. The chamber summons is made absolute with no orders as to costs.
14. Last though not the least, I may add in the interest of justice to the litigants that presently the life of a suit in this Court is not less than 25 years, while in the districts elsewhere it might be on an average 5/6 years. There has been dockets explosion. Why not litigate at the legitimate place where results are quicker? Here one has to hand down the litigation to his/ her legal heirs
15. At the request of the learned Counsel for plaintiff the order is stayed for eight weeks.
16. All concerned to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court.