Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Ramesh Chander vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi Through on 1 April, 2011
Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench, New Delhi O.A.No.1751/2010 This the 1st day of April 2011 Honble Shri M.L. Chauhan, Member (J) Honble Shri Shailendra Pandey, Member (A) Ramesh Chander ASI of Delhi Police PIS No.28770342 R/o VPO Khera Khurd PS Narela, Delhi ..Applicant (By Advocate: Shri Anil Singal) Versus Govt. of NCT of Delhi through 1. Commissioner of Police PHQ, IP Estate, New Delhi 2. Addl. CP (PCR) PHQ, IP Estate, New Delhi 3. DCP (PCR) PHQ, IP Estate, New Delhi ..Respondents (By Advocate: Shri Chandramani Bhardwaj for Ms. Rashmi Chopra) O R D E R
Shri M.L. Chauhan:
The applicant has filed this OA thereby praying for the following reliefs:
(a) To call for the records of the case and set aside/quash the impugned order dt.23.4.2010 with all consequential benefits including promotion/seniority and arrears of pay.
(b) To Award cost of the proceedings in favor of the applicant and
(c) To pass such other and further orders as deemed it and proper in the circumstances of the case to meet the ends of justice.
2. This is a second round of litigation. Earlier, the applicant has filed OA-1963/2006 whereby he assailed the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings vide order dated 29.12.2004 and order of the disciplinary authority dated 16.1.2005 on the ground that the Joint Commissioner of Police has mechanically given the approval for initiation of the inquiry in violation of Rule 15 (2) of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980 (for short Rules 1980) and also that he was not competent authority to grant such approval. This Tribunal, after noticing its earlier decision to the effect that it is only the Additional Commissioner of Police and not the Joint Commissioner of Police, has made the following observations, vide order dated 14.3.2007:
8. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, leaving other grounds open, this OA succeeds and is partly allowed. Impugned orders are set aside. Applicant shall be reinstated in service forthwith. The applicant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits, except back wages. However, respondents are not precluded, if so advised, to take up the proceedings from the appropriate state in the light of the decision in Vijay Singhs case (supra). No costs.
3. Pursuant to the judgment of this Tribunal, the respondents have now initiated the departmental inquiry vide order dated 23.4.2010 (Annexure A-1) after obtaining the approval from the Additional Commissioner of Police/PCR under Rule 15 (2) of the Rules 1980. This order has again been challenged by the applicant on the same ground that no prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police was obtained before ordering the departmental inquiry, as required in terms of Rule 15 (2) of the Rules 1980 and also that the inquiry has been initiated after delay of more than five years from the date of alleged misconduct.
4. It is further stated that in the meantime the applicant was also promoted, which means that alleged misconduct committed by the applicant has been condoned by the respondents.
5. Notice of this application was sent to the respondents and the respondents have filed their reply wherein it is categorically stated that earlier the necessary approval under Rule 15 (2) of the Rules 1980 was accorded by the Joint Commissioner of Police concerned. Since in terms of the judgment rendered by this Tribunal in earlier OA it was required to be done by the Additional Commissioner of Police concerned, liberty was reserved to the respondents to take up further proceedings from the appropriate stage, as such no infirmity can be found in the action of the respondents whereby they have initiated the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant.
6. The respondents have further stated that the applicant was not only reinstated in service in terms of the earlier judgment of this Tribunal but he was also granted promotion, as also admitted by the applicant himself. Regarding delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings, it has been stated that the applicant with co-delinquent transferred from NW District to PCR Unit. Thus, on the receipt of the relevant record from DCP/NW District, the necessary approval under Rule 15 (2) of the Rules 1980 was accorded by the Additional Commissioner of Police/PCR, Delhi and a regular joint disciplinary inquiry was initiated against them vide order dated 23.4.2010. Thus, according to the respondents, there is no inordinate delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings and some delay in issuing the charge sheet was unavoidable and due to practical office procedure.
7. The applicant has also filed his rejoinder thereby reiterating the submissions made in the OA.
8. Learned counsel for the applicant, in order to substantiate his plea, placed reliance on the decisions of Honble High Court of Delhi in Dy. Commissioner of Police v. Hakim Khan (WP (C) No.10281/2009) decided on 6.10.2009 and in Union of India & another v. M.S. Bhatia, (WP (C) No.750/2010) decided on 5.2.2010 and also the decision of this Tribunal at Hyderabad Bench in E. Vedavyas v. Government of A.P. & another, 1990 (3) SLR 688 and argued that delay in initiating the departmental proceedings has greatly prejudiced the applicant.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decision of the Honble High Court of Delhi in D.P. Lalwani v. Delhi Development Authority, 2001 VII AD (DELHI) 452.
10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings of the case.
11. We are of the firm view that the applicant has not made out any case for grant of relief for more than one reason, as can be seen from the operative portion, as extracted above. The order of inquiry proceedings initiated by the respondents was quashed relying upon the decision of this Tribunal in ASI William Dung Dung v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (OA-503/2003) decided on 1.11.2006 on the ground that it is only the Additional Commissioner of Police, who is competent to accord approval under Rule 15 (2) of the Rules 1980 and not the Joint Commissioner of Police and liberty was granted to the respondents to initiate the fresh proceedings from the appropriate stage in the light of the decision of the Honble Apex Court in Vijay Singh v. Union of India (CA-7212/2005) decided on 23.2.2007, which was also in the same terms that an approval has to come from the Additional Commissioner of Police only and such an approval has to be accorded after due application of mind. The judgment rendered by this Tribunal has attained finality. As such, it is not permissible for the applicant to contend that the respondents should not have initiated the disciplinary proceedings against him on the flimsy ground that the impugned order at Annexure A-1 does not disclose that approval of Additional Commissioner of Police was ever taken.
12. As can be seen from the last paragraph of the impugned order, the Deputy Commissioner of Police has specifically ordered that the regular departmental inquiry is being conducted against the applicant and another person after obtaining the approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police/PCR under Rule 15 (2) of the Rules 1980. Thus, the contention raised by the applicant is required to be rejected at the threshold. That apart, the respondents have given an explanation as to why the inquiry could not have been initiated immediately. The respondents have stated that the first requirement in terms of the decision of this Tribunal was to reinstate the applicant and accordingly he was reinstated in service forthwith and after reinstatement of the applicant, he was transferred from NW District to PCR Unit. It is further stated that when the record was received from DCP/NW District, the same was required to be placed before the Additional Commissioner of Police/PCR, Delhi in order to obtain the approval in terms of Rule 15 (2) of the Rules 1980 and it was thereafter that the impugned order dated 23.4.2010 was passed regarding initiation of the inquiry proceedings against the applicant. Thus, on the explanation given by the respondents for initiating the inquiry after a lapse of more than two and a half years, it cannot be said that there is inordinate delay in initiating the proceedings, especially when viewed from the light of the directions given by the Tribunal whereby the liberty was reserved to the respondents to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. It may be stated that the incident is dated 1.10.2004 and the respondents have taken steps to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant vide order dated 29.12.2004. Thus, there was no delay in initiating the departmental proceedings against the applicant. It was on account of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that approval has to be given by the Additional Commissioner of Police and not by the Joint Commissioner of Police that the impugned order was set aside, which decision rendered by the Tribunal cannot be said to be a good law in view of the decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Tribunal whereby the Full Bench has held that obtaining the prior approval of Joint Commissioner of Police instead of Additional Commissioner of Police would meet the requirement of Rule 15 (2) of the Rules 1980. Even otherwise also, no prejudice has been caused to the applicant on account of delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings, rather he has been benefited on account of the judgment rendered by this Tribunal thereby quashing the earlier departmental proceedings against the applicant in the light of decision in Vijay Singhs case (supra), which decision is not a good law in terms of the decision rendered by the Full Bench that apart from taking the benefit of decision of this Tribunal in earlier OA, which is not a good law, the applicant has earned promotion otherwise he could not have been promoted on account of pendency of the departmental proceedings, as initiated in the first instance.
13. The contention raised by the learned counsel for applicant that since he has been promoted, as such the respondents have condoned his past misconduct, cannot be accepted inasmuch the applicant was promoted consequent upon initiation of departmental proceedings against him, rather the applicant has been benefited on account of the judgment rendered by this Tribunal in the earlier OA, which cannot be said to be a good law.
14. The judgments cited by the applicant are not attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case, rather the reliance placed by the learned counsel for respondents to the decision of the Honble High Court in D.P. Lalwanis case (supra) is squarely applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case whereby in paragraph 26 of the judgment, the Honble High Court after noticing the fact held that there was no inordinate delay in processing the departmental case against the petitioner therein, so as to call for quashing of charge sheet on the ground of delay.
15. Matter can also be looked into from another angle, i.e., in the light of the decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Tribunal whereby the Full Bench has held that obtaining the prior approval of Joint Commissioner of Police instead of Additional Commissioner of Police would meet the requirement of Rule 15 (2) of the Rules 1980. In the instant case, initially the departmental proceeding was initiated against the applicant by obtaining prior approval of the Joint Commissioner of Police. Thus, the requirement of Rule 15 (2) of the Rules 1980 was complied with. That apart, the respondents have also taken a fresh approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police/PCR and initiated fresh disciplinary proceedings vide order at Annexure A-1. Thus, it cannot be said to be a case where the applicant has been prejudiced on account of delay on the part of the respondents. For the sake of repetition, it may be stated that the incident occurred on 1.10.2004 whereas the disciplinary proceeding was initiated by the Department vide orders dated 29.12.2004 and dated 16.1.2005. The respondents cannot be held responsible for any delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings on the grave charges, which were issued immediately and it was only the applicant, who is challenging the order by filing the OA in the year 2006. Thus, the delay, if any, in not completing the departmental proceedings cannot be attributed to the respondents and it is not a case of such nature where the respondents are guilty of inordinate delay.
16. Thus, viewing from any angle, we are of the view that the applicant has not made out any case for grant of relief. Accordingly, the OA is dismissed without any order as to costs.
( Shailendra Pandey ) ( M. L. Chauhan ) Member (A) Member (J) /sunil/