Allahabad High Court
Smt. Saroj Devi And 3 Others vs Amar Jeet Singh And Another on 10 August, 2021
Author: Subhash Chand
Bench: Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, Subhash Chand
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Court No. - 37 Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 3462 of 2016 Appellant :- Smt. Saroj Devi And 3 Others Respondent :- Amar Jeet Singh And Another Counsel for Appellant :- Anubhav Sinha Counsel for Respondent :- Rahul Sahai Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker,J.
Hon'ble Subhash Chand,J.
1. Heard Shri Anubhav Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company.
2. This appeal , at the behest of the claimants, challenges the judgement and award dated 01.10.2016 passed M.A.C.T/Additional District Judge, Court No. 3, Gautam Budh Nagar (hereinafter referred to as "Tribunal") in M.A.C. No. 101 of 2014.
3. Brief facts as culled out from the record are that on 15.11.2013 at 7:00 p.m in the evening Lakphat Singh was going to Pari Chauk, Greater Noida by riding bicycle to attend his duty and when he reached near gram Garhi, he was hit by a car bearing No. U.P.-16 A.L. 2432 due to the rash driving of the driver of car. Lakhpat Singh sustained injuries and was admitted to Yatharth Hospital, Noida, then to E.S.I. Hospital, Noida and because of his deteriorating condition he was shifted to AIIMS Hospital, New Delhi where he succumbed to his injuries at 5:00 a.m on 22.11.2013.
4. The deceased was 38 years of age at the time of accident. He was a security guard in I.S.S. S.D.B Security Services Private Limited and was earning Rs. 10,000/- p.m. He was survived by his mother, wife, son and daughter. The tribunal has considered his income to be Rs. 7413 p.m, deducted 1/4th towards personal expenses of the deceased, granted multiplier 15, granted Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of love and affection, loss of consortium, loss of estate, Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs. 10,000/- towards transport and ultimately assessed the total compensation to be Rs. 16,36,200/-.
5. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the Tribunal has deducted 50% of the award holding deceased to be negligent which is bad as the deceased was not plying the vehicle which met with accident.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the deceased was an security guard in I.S.S. S.D.B Security Services Private Limited, hence, his income as considered by the Tribunal is on the lower side and it should be considered to be Rs.10,000/Per month. It is further submitted that the Tribunal though has granted amount for future loss of income of the deceased and also the amount awarded under non-pecuniary heads granted by the Tribunal is on the lower side and which should be as per the decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, 2017 0 Supreme (SC) 105. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the interest as awarded by the Tribunal is on the lower side and requires to be enhanced.
7. As against this, ld advocate Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company submits that income as suggested by the appellants cannot be granted even in the year of accident. It is further submitted by ld counsel for respondent that the Tribunal has erred in granting future loss of income to be 40% as it should be 30% in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi (Supra).
8. It is submitted by Sri Rahul Sahai that the quantum of compensation and the interest awarded by the Tribunal is not just and proper and calls for interference by this Court and requires recalculation. Issue of negligence is also required to be argued by the respondent in this appeal though no cross appeal is filed.
9. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, we will have to consider the negligence from the perspective of the law laid down.
10. The term negligence means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental which is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby "the things speak for itself" would apply.
11. The principle of negligence has been discussed time and again. A person who either contributes or is author of the accident would be liable for his contribution to the accident having taken place and not otherwise.
12. The Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 ( Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs. Smt. Renu Singh And Others) decided on 19.7.2016 has held as under :
"16. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed.
17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to c "4. It is a case of composite negligence where injuries have been caused to the claimants by combined wrongful act of joint tort feasors. In a case of accident caused by negligence of joint tort feasors, all the persons who aid or counsel or direct or join in committal of a wrongful act, are liable. In such case, the liability is always joint and several. The extent of negligence of joint tort feasors in such a case is immaterial for satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiff/claimant and need not be determined by the by the court. However, in case all the joint tort feasors are before the court, it may determine the extent of their liability for the purpose of adjusting inter-se equities between them at appropriate stage. The liability of each and every joint tort feasor vis a vis to plaintiff/claimant cannot be bifurcated as it is joint and several liability. In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between tort feasors for making payment to the plaintiff is not permissible as the plaintiff/claimant has the right to recover the entire amount from the easiest targets/solvent defendant.
14. There is a difference between contributory and composite negligence. In the case of contributory negligence, a person who has himself contributed to the extent cannot claim compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the accident to the extent of his own negligence;whereas in the case of composite negligence, a person who has suffered has not contributed to the accident but the outcome of combination of negligence of two or more other persons. This Court in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan & Ors. [2008 (3) SCC 748] has held that in case of contributory negligence, injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong doer separately. It is only in the case of contributory negligence that the injured himself has contributed by his negligence in the accident. Extent of his negligence is required to be determined as damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries have to be reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder :
"6. 'Composite negligence' refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrong doers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrong-doers. In such a case, each wrong doer, is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong-doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong-doer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence of the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stands reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence.
7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of 'composite negligence' will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error."
18. This Court in Challa Bharathamma &Nanjappan (supra) has dealt with the breach of policy conditions by the owner when the insurer was asked to pay the compensation fixed by the tribunal and the right to recover the same was given to the insurer in the executing court concerned if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination for the tribunal and the issue has been decided in favour of the insured. The same analogy can be applied to the instant cases as the liability of the joint tort feasor is joint and several. In the instant case, there is determination of inter se liability of composite negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd and 1/3rd of respective drivers. Thus, the vehicle - trailor-truck which was not insured with the insurer, was negligent to the extent of 2/3rd. It would be open to the insurer being insurer of the bus after making payment to claimant to recover from the owner of the trailor-truck the amount to the aforesaid extent in the execution proceedings. Had there been no determination of the inter se liability for want of evidence or other joint tort feasor had not been impleaded, it was not open to settle such a dispute and to recover the amount in execution proceedings but the remedy would be to file another suit or appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows :
(i) In the case of composite negligence, plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tort feasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several.
(ii) In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tort feasors vis a vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them.
(iii) In case all the joint tort feasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/tribunal to determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence between the joint tort feasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of payment to the plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/ extent of their negligence has been determined by the court/tribunal, in main case one joint tort feasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings.
(iv) It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tort feasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tort feasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tort feasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award."
emphasis added
18. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection.
19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all.
20. These provisions (sec.110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies.
21. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ(SC) 1840).
22. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side."
emphasis added
14. The deceased was a cyclist. The Tribunal has rightly held him not to have contributed to the accident taken place. It is not proved by the driver of the offending vehicle that the deceased had contributed to the accident having taken place, thus oral submission of respondent is rejected.
15. This takes this Court to the issue of compensation. We would place reliance on the Apex court decision in Vimal Kanwar Vs. Kishor Dan and others (2013) 7 SCC, Malarvizhi & Ors Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited, 2020 (4) SCC 228 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Indira Devi & Ors, 2018 (7) SCC 715. and in The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Mangey Ram and others, 2019 0 Supreme (All) 1067 and the recent judgment of the Apex Court in New India Assurance Company Vs. Urmila Shukla decided by the Apex Court on 6.8.2021 reported in MANU/SCOR/24098/2021 and Kirti and others vs Oriental Insurance company Ltd reported in 2021(1) TAC. It could not be culled out from record that on what basis, the Tribunal has deducted the pecuniary benefits from the income cannot be fathomed. The income of the deceased in the year of accident and looking to his salary slip was Rs.10,736/- per month and the tribunal could not have considered his income to be Rs. 7413/- as judgement of Vimal Kanwar (Supra) will not permit such deductions. Hence, his income is considered to be Rs. 10,000/- per month to which as the deceased was in the age bracket of 36 to 40 years, 50% future loss of income requires to be added in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi (Supra). As far as amount under the head of non-pecuniary damages are concerned, it should be Rs.70,000/- + 10% rounded to Rs. 30,000/- increase as per the decision of the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi (Supra) as three years have elapsed hence, the lump sum amount under this head would be Rs.1,00,000/-. The deceased was in hospital from 15.11.2013 to 22.11.2013. The Tribunal has not given any reasons why family was not entitle to trauma expenses and medical expenses. Let trauma and medical expenses to be Rs. 25,000/-
16. Hence, the total compensation payable to the appellants is computed herein below:
i. Income Rs.10,000/-
ii. Percentage towards future prospects : (50%) Rs.5000/-
iii.Total income : Rs. 10,000 + 5,000= Rs.15,000/-
iv. Income after deduction of 1/3rd : Rs. 10,000/- (rounded up) v. Annual income : Rs. 10,000 x 12 = Rs.1,20,000/-
vi. Multiplier applicable : 15 vii. Loss of dependency: Rs.1,20,000 x 15 = Rs.18,00,000/-
viii. Amount under non-pecuniary head= 70,000/-Plus Rs 30,000/as per pranay sethi (supra) = 1,00,000/-
ix.Trauma and Medical expenses = 25,000/-
x. Total compensation :RS: 19,25,000/-
17. As far as issue of the rate of interest is concerned, it should be 7.5%. In the view of the latest decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mannat Johal and Others, 2019 (2) T.A.C. 705 (S.C.) wherein the Apex Court has held as under :
"13. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The High Court, after making a substantial enhancement in the award amount, modified the interest component at a reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find no reason to allow the interest in this matter at any rate higher than that allowed by High Court."
18. No other grounds are urged orally when the matter was heard.
19. In view of the above, the appeal is partly allowed. Oral objections are allowed and compensation recalculated. The judgment and award passed by the Tribunal shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The respondent-Insurance Company shall deposit the amount within a period of 12 weeks from today with interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of filing of the claim petition till the amount is deposited.
20. In view of the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of Smt. Hansagori P. Ladhani v/s The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., reported in 2007(2) GLH 291 and this High Court in , total amount of interest, accrued on the principal amount of compensation is to be apportioned on financial year to financial year basis and if the interest payable to claimant for any financial year exceeds Rs.50,000/-, insurance company/owner is/are entitled to deduct appropriate amount under the head of 'Tax Deducted at Source' as provided u/s 194A (3) (ix) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the amount of interest does not exceeds Rs.50,000/- in any financial year, registry of this Tribunal is directed to allow the claimant to withdraw the amount without producing the certificate from the concerned Income- Tax Authority. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this High Court in Review Application No.1 of 2020 in First Appeal From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt. Sudesna and others Vs. Hari Singh and another) and in First Appeal From Order No.2871 of 2016 (Tej Kumari Sharma v. Chola Mandlam M.S. General Insurance Co. Ltd.) decided on 19.3.2021 while disbursing the amount.
21. Record be sent to tribunal forthwith.
22. This Court is thankful to both the learned Advocates for getting this matter disposed of during this pandemic.
Order Date :- 10.8.2021 PS