Allahabad High Court
Parvati Devi W/O Sri Braj Shyam Mishra vs State Of U.P. Through Its Secretary, ... on 12 June, 2007
Author: B.S. Chauhan
Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Sudhir Agarwal
JUDGMENT B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. This Special Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 10.05.2007 rendered by a learned Judge of this Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant seeking appointment as a Shiksha Mitra on the ground that she had a longer experience as Instructor in non-formal education than respondent No. 5, the selected candidate.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the State Government issued a Government Order dated 10.10.2005 (Annex.3) for appointment of Shiksha Mitras providing eligibility etc. and preference to those who had worked as Instructor/Supervisor in non-formal education in case they fulfill other eligibility. The respondent authorities issued an advertisement dated 27.10.2005 inviting applications for the said post. The advertisement prescribed the eligibility and also some bonus marks for handicapped, widows, divorcees and relaxation of age up to five years in their cases. In case an applicant had worked as Instructor/Supervisor in non-formal education scheme, he/she would be entitled for relaxation of age up to 5 years and would be given first priority in appointment provided he/she fulfilled other eligibility. The appellant, respondent No. 5 and three other candidates applied. The respondent No. 5 stood selected. Her appointment was challenged by filing Writ Petition No. 6190 of 2006 which was disposed of vide judgment and order 13.02.2006 directing the District Magistrate, Azamgarh to consider the grievance of the petitioner and pass an appropriate order. In pursuance of the said order, the District Magistrate vide order dated 30.03.2006 rejected the claim of the petitioner-appellant on the ground that respondent No. 5 had secured more quality points and had also served as instructor in the non-formal Education Scheme. Being aggrieved, the petitioner-appellant again filed a representation before the District Magistrate, Azamgarh on 22.06.2006 (Annex.7) making allegations against the educational authorities in as much as that the respondent No. 5 got appointment by paying illegal gratification, thus, her appointment was illegal. As no action was taken on her second representation, she again approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 44225 of 2006 challenging the said order of the District Magistrate dated 30.03.2006. The writ petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the Government Order dated 10.10.2005 provided for "preference" in favour of candidates who had worked as Instructors under non-formal education scheme and the respondent No. 5 as well as the appellant had worked as Instructors but the respondent No. 5 was found more meritorious than the petitioner-appellant, thus, she had rightly been appointed. The learned Single Judge rejected the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant that subsequent corrigendum/amendment dated 24.04.2006 providing for first preference in favour of the candidates having longer experience as Instructor on the ground that the said order dated 24.04.2006could not be given retrospective effect. Hence this Special Appeal.
3. Shri K.C. Shukla, learned Counsel for the petitioner-appellant has submitted that the Government Order dated 24.04.2006 was merely a corrigendum and, therefore, would apply retrospectively and as the appellant was having longer experience than the respondent No. 5, she had to be preferred than respondent No. 5, hence, the order impugned is liable to be quashed. The appellant deserves to be appointed.
4. On the other hand, Shri B.K. Narain and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents have vehemently opposed the appeal contending that the Government Order dated 24.04.2006 could not be a corrigendum but it amounts to an amendment of the earlier Government Order dated 10.10.2005 and would not apply retrospectively. Respondent No. 5 being more meritorious than appellant, stood rightly appointed. More so, the petitioner-appellant had been guilty of making scandalous allegations in her letter dated 22.06.2006 against the statutory authorities that the respondent No. 5 had secured the appointment by paying illegal gratification. Such allegations have been made without any basis. Appellant does not have a right to be heard and the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
5. We have heard Shri K.C. Shukla, learned Counsel for the petitioner-appellant, Shri B.K. Narain and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents.
6. In pursuance of the advertisement issued on 27.10.2005, five applications were received. A merit list was prepared. Quality points secured by candidates remained as under:
1. Archana Mishra - 66.98%
2. Deema Mishra - 63.96%
3. SadhnaKumari - 58.30%
4. Anjana Mishra (resp. No. 5) - 53.33 %
5. Parvati Devi (petitioner-appellant) - 52.63 %
7. The advertisement itself provided for first priority to the candidates having experience as Instructor. The same had been in pursuance of the Government Order dated 10.10.2005 which provided for first priority in favour of candidates having experience as Instructors. The petitioner-appellant claimed of having the said experience for a period from 23.07.1998 to 31.03.2001. The respondent No. 5 was having experience of about six months. Considering the fact that the respondent No. 5 was more meritorious and secured more marks (quality points) than the petitioner-appellant, she had been offered appointment. It is noteworthy that other candidates who were more meritorious than the contesting parties, stood eliminated altogether from the process of selection.
8. In Y.V. Rangaiah and Ors. v. J. Sreenivasa Rao and Ors. ; A.A. Calton v. Director of Education and Anr. ; P. Gyaneshwar Rao and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. ; P. Mahendran and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. ; and Ramesh Kumar Choudha v. State of M.P. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the view that candidates have to be assessed for selection as per the eligibility criteria existing on the date of advertisement of vacancies for the reason that selection process starts with advertisement and all those persons who apply in response to the same, would be eligible to be considered.
9. In Dr. M.V. Nair v. Union of India and Ors. , the Apex Court while dealing with the issue, held as under:
It Is well settled that suitability and eligibility have to be considered with reference to the last date for receiving the applications, unless, of course, the notification calling for applications itself specifies such a date.
10. In U.P. Public Service Commission v. Alpana , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering a large number of its earlier judgments, held that eligibility conditions should be examined as on last date for receipt of applications by the Commission though that was a case where result of a candidate was declared subsequent to the last date of submission of the applications. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that as the result does not relate back to the date of examination and eligibility of the candidate is to be considered on the last date of submission of the applications, a candidate, whose result has not been declared upto the last date of submission of applications, would not be eligible.
11. In State of M.P. and Ors. v. Raghuveer Singh Yadav and Ors. , the Apex Court examined a case where during process of selection, the Rules were amended but subsequently the Commission/State abandoned the selection process and advertised vacancies afresh to be filled up in accordance with the amendment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the action of the State on the ground that the persons, who had applied earlier, had not acquired any vested right, therefore, the State's action was justified.
12. In Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Punjab Instructions, 1995 (Suppl) 4 SCC 706, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
It is to be seen that when the recruitment is sought to be made, the last date has been fixed for receipt of the applications, such of those candidates, who possessed of all the qualifications as on that date, alone are eligible to apply for and to be considered for recruitment according to Rules.
13. In State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the case for promotion, held that the eligibility for promotion must be as in the year when the vacancies arose, but that was not a case of direct recruitment.
14. In Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekhar and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be adjudged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well established proposition of law.
15. In Dr. Ramulu and Anr. v. Dr. S. Suryaprakash Rao and Ors. , the Hon'ble Apex Court considered a large number of its earlier judgments and held that if the Rules have been amended, person has a right to be considered as per the amended Rules unless his existing rights prior to the amendment have specifically been saved and for the reason that he cannot claim to have acquired any vested right for being considered in accordance with the Rules existing prior to the amendment.
16. In Utkal University etc. v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi and Ors. ; and Gopal Krushna Rath v. M.A.A. Baig , the Hon'ble Supreme Court again reiterated that the eligibility is to be assessed as per the Rules existing on the last date of submission of the applications.
17. In Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Kaila Kumar Paliwal 2007 AIR SCW 2867, the Apex Court considered its earlier judgments and held as under:
Recruitment to a post must be made strictly in terms of the Rules operating in the field. Essential qualification must be possessed by a person as on the date of issuance of the notification or as specified in the rules and only in absence thereof, the qualification acquired till the last date of filing of the application would be the relevant date.
18. In view of the above, the legal proposition can be summarised that the candidate must possess requisite qualification/eligibility on the date of issuance of advertisement or as the rules provide, and absence of rules, on the last date of submission of the Application Form. It means that the post advertised is to be filled up as per the law existing on the date of issuance of the advertisement and in absence of the rules, as per the law existing on the last date of submission of the forms. In case the law stood amended after the date of advertisement or last date of submission of the application forms, the vacancies have to be filled up as per the law applicable prior to such amendment.
19. In Vijay v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a Statute is required to be construed giving prospective effect and the only exception to the said rule is that it does not apply to disqualifying, curative or clarificatory statutes.
20. The word "Corrigendum" (plural corrigenda) is a word of Latin origin which means a thing to be corrected.
21. The word "Erratum (French) means a mistake in printing or writing; a note drawing attention to such a mistake. A list of mistakes added at the end of a book.
22. The word "Errata" is a word of French origin and means 'a thing that should be corrected.' After a book has been printed, it often happens that certain mistakes are found to have been overlooked. In later editions, it is usual to insert, a list of such mistakes and to point out the necessary corrections. These are called 'corrigenda'.
23. In Capital's Legal and Med. Dictionary, Vol. I, published by Bansal and Raheja, at page 285, the word "Corrigendum" has been defined as follows:
Additional message by way of printing for correction, depicting errors in the original writing or publication and further giving details of correction.
24. In Judicial Dictionary by Justice LP. Singh and Majumdar, 2nd Edition, page 552, while quoting the following passage in Assam Rajyik Udyog Karmi Sangha v. State of Assam (1996) Gau. L.R, 236, (at page 241), the word "corrigendum" has been defined as follows:
The dictionary meaning of the word "corrigendum" means things to be correct. It means there must be an error and there is a necessity to amend and rectify it. In the garb of corrigendum, a rule cannot be altered and or changed, but that is what appears to have been done in the instant case. In order to alter or modify a rule the same procedure adopted in making of the rule have to be gone through.
25. The meaning and application of the word "corrigendum" has been considered by the Courts time and again. In Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Dunlop India Ltd., 92 STC 571, this Court held that corrigendum is issued to correct a mistake in the notification, therefore, would relate back to the date of issuance of the original notification.
In Piara Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there is no bar on issuing the corrigendum or 'more corrigenda' for correcting the arithmetical error.
26. A similar view has been taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Kandoi Kabliwala v. Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Pali 75 STC 316, while dealing with a notification granting exemption of Sales Tax on "Deshi Sweetmeats" and "Namkeens" held that corrigendum could be issued only to correct an error.
27. In view of the above, the legal position can be summarised that a corrigendum can be issued only to correct a typographical error or omission therein. However, it is meant only to correct typographical/arithmetical mistake. It cannot have the effect of law nor it can take away the vested right of a person nor it can have the effect of nullifying the rights of persons conferred by the law.
28. In Sher Singh v. Union of India and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the provisions of Section 47(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 providing for preference to the State Transport Undertaking by grant of permit and explained the meaning of 'preference' as under:
6... The expression 'preference' amongst others means prior right, advantage, precedence etc. But how would it be possible to give precedence one over the other? It signifies that other things being equal, one will have preference over the others.... Their merits and demerits must be ascertained keeping in view the requirements of (a) to (f) of Section 47(1) and after comparing the merits and demerits of both, not with the yardstick of mathematical accuracy, but other things being equal, the application of the Undertaking will have preference over others. Qualitative and quantitative comparison on broad features of passenger transport facility such as fleet, facilities to travelling public and other relevant consideration may be undertaken and after balancing these factors other things being equal, the application of the Undertaking shall be given preference over other applicants. There is no question of eliminating private operators merely because the Undertaking applies for a stage carriage permit under Chap. IV.... Competition is the essence of improved commercial service. After ensuring competition in matter of rendering more efficient transport service a public sector Undertaking is assured statutory preference, remember no monopoly, there is no denial of equality guaranteed by Article 14.... That while considering the application for stage carriage permit under Section 47, the private operator has an equal chance to get a permit even on inter-State route if it shows that the Undertaking is either unable to provide efficient and economical service or that the private operator is better equipped to render the same. Preference in this context would mean that other things generally appearing to be qualitatively and quantitatively equal though not with mathematical accuracy, statutory provision will tilt the balance in favour of the Undertaking....
29. In Executive Officer v. E. Tirupalu and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where rules provide for preference to a particular class of candidates, that preference under the Rules cannot be applied irrespective of the merit of candidates, the inmates have to be given appointment. It means that the merit of the candidates being equal, preference would be given to the inmates of the class which is to be given preferential right and it certainly does not mean an automatic appointment without considering the cases of other candidates. Therefore, even if the rules provide for preferential right, candidates having such subjects would have preferential right only when they compete with other candidates and are found on equal footings, otherwise not.
30. In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Dilip Kumar and Anr. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
The matter may be looked at from another viewpoint. The word 'preference' as understood in ordinary parlance means preferring or choosing as more desirable, favouring or conferring a prior right. What then is the purpose and object sought to be achieved by the insertion of the preference clause in the rule? There is no doubt that preference was sought to be granted under Note 1 to post-graduates in the larger interest of the administration. How would the interest of the administration be served by granting preference to post-graduates? It is obvious that it was thought that on account of their higher mental equipment the quality of performance that the State will receive from highly qualified engineers would be better and of a high order. In other words the State considered it necessary to strengthen the engineering service by recruiting post-graduates to the extent available so that the State may benefit from their higher educational qualifications and better performance. If this was the objective surely it would not be realized unless post-graduates are treated as a class and given preference en bloc over the graduates.... It is true that notwithstanding the preference rule it is always open to the recruiting agency to prescribe a minimum eligibility qualification with a view to demarcating and narrowing down the field of choice with the ultimate objective of permitting candidate with higher qualifications to enter the zone of consideration. It was, therefore, held that screening a candidate out of consideration at the threshold of the process of selection is neither illegal nor unconstitutional if a legitimate field demarcating the choice by reference to some rationale formula is carved out. Thus the challenge based on Articles 14/16 of the Constitution was repelled.
31. In Secy. (Health) Deptt. of Health & F.W. and Anr. v. Dr. Anita Puri and Ors. , the question raised before the Supreme Court was answered as follows:
....The question then arises is whether a person holding a M.D.S. qualification is entitled to be selected and appointed as of right by virtue of the aforesaid advertisement conferring preference for higher qualification? The answer to the aforesaid question must be in the negative. When an advertisement stipulates a particular qualification as the minimum qualification for the post and further stipulates that preference should be given for higher qualification, the only meaning it conveys is that some additional weightage has to be given to the higher qualified candidates. But by no stretch of imagination it can be construed to mean that a higher qualified person automatically is entitled to be selected and appointed. In adjudging the suitability of person for the post, the expert body like Service Commission in the absence of any statutory criteria has the discretion of evolving its mode of evaluation of merit and selection of the candidate. The competence and merit of a candidate is adjudged not on the basis of the qualification he possesses but also taking into account the other necessary factors like career of the candidate throughout his educational curriculum, experience in any filed in which the selection is going to the held, his general aptitude for the job to be ascertained in course of interview, extracurricular activities like sports and other allied subjects, personality of the candidate as assessed in the interview and all other germane factors which the expert body evolves for assessing the suitability of the candidate for the post for which the selection is going to be held.
32. The Supreme Court in Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission v. Y.V.V.R. Srinivasulu and Ors. , dealing with the issue held as under:
The "preference" envisaged in the Rules, in our view, under the scheme of things and contextually also cannot mean, an absolute en bloc preference akin to reservation or separate and distinct method of selection for them alone. A mere rule of preference meant to give weightage to the additional qualification cannot be enforced as a rule of reservation or rule of complete precedence.... It is not to be viewed as a preferential right conferred even for taking up their claims for consideration. On the other hand, the preference envisaged has to be given only when the claims of all candidates who are eligible are taken for consideration and when any one or more of them are found equally positioned, by using the additional qualification as a tilting factor, in their favour vis-a-vis others in the matter of actual selection. Whenever, a selection is to be made on the basis of merit performance involving competition, and possession of any additional qualification or factor is also envisaged to accord preference, it cannot be for the purpose of putting them as a whole lot ahead of others, dehors their intrinsic worth or proven inter se merit and suitability, duly assessed by the competent authority. Preference, in the context of all such competitive scheme of selection would only mean that other things being qualitatively and quantitatively equal, those with the additional qualification have to be preferred. There is no question of eliminating all others preventing thereby even an effective and comparative consideration on merits, by according en bloc precedence in favour of those in possession of additional qualification irrespective of the respective merits and demerits of all candidates to be considered.... The word first has to be construed in the context of even giving preference only in the order and manner indicated therein, inter se among more than one holding such different class of degrees in addition and not to be interpreted vis-a-vis others who do not possess such additional qualification, to completely exclude them en bloc.
33. In State of U.P. and Anr. v. Om Prakash and Ors. , after considering the earlier judgments on the issue, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the word "preference" would mean that hen the claims of all candidates who are eligible and who possess the requisite educational qualification prescribed in the advertisement are taken for consideration and when one or more of them are found equally positioned, then only the additional qualification may be taken as a tilting factor, in favour of candidates vis-à-vis others in the merit list prepared by the Commission. But "preference" does not mean en block preference irrespective of inter se merit and suitability.
34. In view of the above, it is evident that question of giving preference would arise provided the person claiming preference stands on equal footings with others, otherwise not.
35. The instant case is required to be decided in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.
36. Undoubtedly, the respondent No. 5 was having more merit-points than the petitioner-appellant. As both these contesting parties had experience as Instructors, the other candidates stood eliminated from the process of selection. The Government Order dated 10.10.2005 did not provide for first priority/first preference to a candidate having longer experience. It reads as under:
The Instructor/Supervisor working in the nonformal education schemes...will be appointed by giving first precedence (Pratham Variyata).
36. The said clause was introduced by issuing another Government Order dated 24.04.2006. As the corrigendum etc. apply only for arithmetical/clerical/typographical error and does not take away the vested right of the parties or does not have the force of amending the law, the Government Order dated 24.04.2006 does not apply retrospectively. In Km. Rita Yadav v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2007 (2) ESC 788, a Division Bench of this Court categorically held that the Government Order dated 24.04.2006 has no retrospective application. The Court observed as under:
There is no indication in this subsequent circular that it is to act retrospective, in as much as there is no specific indication therein that two interpretations are possible, the circular will have to be operated as prospectively.
37. In view of the above, the vacancies had to be filled up only as per the terms of the Government Order dated 10.10.2005. It simply provided for precedence for the candidates having experience as Instructors and certainly did not provide for first priority in favour of Instructors having longer experience.
38. A Full Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 306 of 2007, Daya Ram Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. decided on 25th May, 2007 considered the Government Orders dated 10.10.2005 and 24.04.2006. The Court held that the relevant Government Orders provided for precedence "first priority" (Pratham Variyata) and not for "preference", thus, candidate having experience as Instructor/Supervisor in non-formal education schemes would be appointed even if the marks received by such candidate were less. The Government Order dated 24.04.2006 provided for preference/priority in favour of a candidate having longer experience as Instructor, if any. The Court further held that the terms of the Government Order dated 10.10.2005 read with Government Order dated 24.04.2006 would provide for en bloc priority than those who did not possess such experience. Thus, in view of the Full Bench judgment the appellant-petitioner and respondent No. 5 formed a separate class, having the experience of working as Instructors/Supervisors.
39. The Division Bench in Km. Rita Yadav (Supra) has categorically held that the Government Order dated 24.04.2006 does not apply retrospectively, thus, the vacancy, in the instant case, was to be filled up in terms of the Government Order dated 10.10.2005 which simply provided for first priority in favour of the candidate having experience as Instructor/Supervisor. The said order did not provide priority for a candidate having longer experience at all, if more than one candidate had earlier worked as Instructor/Supervisor. In the instant case, the petitioner-appellant and the respondent No. 5 both had experience as Instructors and the respondent No. 5 was found to be more meritorious, she had rightly been appointed as the Government Order dated 24.04.2006 could have no application therein.
40. In view of the above, no fault can be found with the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. Appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
41. Before parting with the case we would like to comment upon the sorry state of affairs prevailing in the State of Uttar Pradesh, as how the basic education is being imparted. It is apparent from the facts of this case that candidate who had secured 66.98% quality points stood eliminated from the selection process, in view of the Government Order giving precedence to respondent No. 4 or 5, who could secure only 53.33 and 52.63% quality points respectively. Had State laid down the criteria that candidate possessing 5 or 10 years' experience would be given precedence, it could be considered as additional qualification. But, the Government Orders applicable herein do not prescribe any minimum experience for claiming precedence. Nor the proximity of time of gaining the experience from the time of seeking employment has been mentioned. The appellant had worked for two years and eight months long back between 1998 and 2001. The position of respondent No. 5 was worse as she had worked only for a few months with no substantial or significant experience. Thus, the question arises as to whether the said Government Orders can be held to be in consonance with the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India which carves out a class which could include candidates of extremely low merit. Whether such a reservation giving a complete go-bye to merit is permissible in law, deserves to be given serious thought.
42. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors. 1984 SC 802, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Article 21 read with Articles 39, 41 and 42 provides for protection and preservation of the health and strength also of tender age children against abuse of opportunities and further provides for providing the educational facilities.
43. In Miss. Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka and Ors. 1992 SC 1858 the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with this issue held that without making "right to education" under Article 41 of the Constitution a reality the fundamental rights under Chapter III shall remain beyond the reach of the large majority which are illiterate. The State is under an obligation to make an endeavour to provide educational facilities at all levels to its citizens. The right to education, therefore, is concomitant to the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution to provide educational institutions at all levels for the benefit of the citizens. The Educational Institutions must function to the best advantage of the citizens.
44. In Unni Krishnan, J.P. and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. , the Hon'ble Apex Court considered large number of judgments on this issue and came to the conclusion that the right to education is contained in as many as three Articles in Part IV, viz., Articles 41, 45 and 46, which shows the importance attached to it by the founding fathers. Even some of the Articles in Part III, viz., Articles 29 and 30 speak of education. The Court further held that right to compulsory and free education up to the age of 14 years is a fundamental right of every child.
45. In view to have greater emphasis the 86th Amendment in the Constitution of India was made in 2002 introducing the provision of Article 21A, declaring the right to free and compulsory education of the children between the age of 6 to 14 years as a fundamental right. Correspondingly, the provisions of Article 45 have been amended making it an obligation on the part of the State to impart free education to the children. Amendment in Article 51A of the Constitution inserting the Clause 'k' has also been made making it obligatory on the part of the parents to provide opportunities for education to their children between the age of 6 to 14 years.
46. This emphasis on providing compulsory education at the primary stage also involves the question of providing quality education. This necessarily requires the preference of well qualified teachers. The need for such teachers has time and again been emphasised in several decisions.
47. In Andhra Kesari Education Society v. Director of School Education and Ors. AIR 1989 SC 183, the Supreme Court recognised the importance of education for B.Ed., pointing out that, as those persons have to handle with the tiny tods, therefore the Teacher alone could bring out their skills and intellectual activities. He is the engine of the educational system. He is a superb instrument in awakening the children to cultural values. He must possess potentiality to deliver enlightened service to the society. His quality should be such as could inspire and motivate into action to the benefiter. He must keep himself Everest of ever-changing communities. He is not to perform in wooden and unimaginative way; he must eliminate unwarranted tendencies and attitudes and infuse noveliar and national ideas in younger generation; and his involvement in national integration is more important; indeed, indispensable.
48. In Ram Sukh and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 1990 SC 592, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not permit the untrained Teachers to teach the children, observing that they require proper handling by well-trained teachers. The Primary School Teachers are of most importance in development of a child's personality in the formative years. They must be able to understand child's psychology and attitude. Therefore, only trained Teachers could lead children properly. This becomes more important in respect of girls students and female Teachers who teach not only the students but also educate the entire family.
49. In Dental Council of India v. Subharti K.K.B. Charitable Trust and Anr. , the Hon'ble Apex Court explained the importance of education, observing as under:
It is equality true that unless there are proper educational facilities in the society, it would be difficult to meet with the requirements of younger generation who have keen desire to acquire knowledge and education to compete in the global market.... Since ages our culture and civilization have recognized that education is one of the pious obligation of the Society.... It is for us to preserve that rich heritage of our culture of transcending the education continuously unpolluted.
50. The Court further observed that education is not a consumer service, nor the educational institution can be equated with shops, therefore "there are statutory prohibitions for establishing and administering educational institution without prior permission or approval by the authority concerned."
51. In Rohit Singhal and Ors. v. Principal, Jawahar N. Vidyalaya and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed its great concern regarding the children education, observing that "Children are not only the future citizens but also the future of the earth. Elders in general, and parents and teachers in particular, owe a responsibility for taking care of the well-being and welfare of the children. The world shall be a better or worse place to live according to how we treat the children today. Education is an investment made by the nation in its children for harvesting a future crop of responsible adults productive of a well functioning Society. However, children are vulnerable. They need to be valued, nurtured, caressed and protected."
52. In the Full Bench decision of Daya Ram's case (supra), it has been noted that providing employment is not the object of the "Shiksha Mitra" Government Orders. The object is rather to improve the standard of elementary education.
53. Thus, in view of the above, it can be summarised that education of the children is the subject which State Authorities cannot afford to ignore.
54. The candidates who could claim selection on the basis of their merit neither challenged the selection on any ground nor the validity of the Government Orders is under challenge. Thus, we are not in a position to examine as to whether the Government Orders providing precedence in favour of the candidates having worked as Inspector/Supervisor in formal Education Schemes meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Thus, we request the State Government to consider the issue and pass appropriate order considering the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, keeping in mind the importance of basic education and protecting the interest of the children, as the basic purpose of issuance of the Government Orders seem to impart basic quality education to the children of the State and not to give employment. Lessor meritorious candidates if employed would not serve the cause of the State, as they cannot be "friends of education" rather would be "enemies of education".
55. The learned Standing Counsel is requested to send a copy of the judgment to the Principal Secretary, Basic Education for appropriate means to be undertaken for bringing about such modifications that may be necessary in the larger interest of students as observed herein above.