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[Cites 15, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

Parveen Kumar Jain vs M/S Shamlal Shiv Shankar on 24 February, 2026

IN THE COURT OF SH. DEVANSHU SAJLAN, CCJ-CUM-ARC
          CENTRAL, TIS HAZARI COURTS

                                                                   RC ARC/245/2018
                                                                  DLCT030017572018




In the matter of:

PARVEEN KUMAR JAIN & Anr.
                                                                                  ...Petitioners

                                              v.

M/S SHAMLAL SHIV SHANKAR & Ors.
                                                                           ...Respondents

     Eviction Petition under Section 14 (1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control
                               Act, 1958

1. Date of Institution                         :                 13.03.2018
2. Date of Reserving Order                     :                 16.01.2026
3. Date of Decision                            :                 24.02.2026
4. Decision                                    :             Petition allowed

Argued by -: Mr. C.M. Sharma, Ld. counsel for the petitioner.
             Mr. Ajay Kumar Gupta, Ld. counsel for the respondents.

                                     JUDGMENT

1. Vide this judgment, this Court shall dispose of the eviction petition filed by the petitioners against the respondents under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter, the 'DRC Act') with respect to the tenanted premises i.e., one godown on the DEVANSHU SAJLAN ground floor forming part of property bearing No. 274-275, Chawri Digitally signed by DEVANSHU SAJLAN RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.1/21 Date: 2026.02.24 15:12:40 +0530 Bazar, Delhi-110006. The tenanted premises is shown in Red colour in the site plan Ex. PW1/1 annexed with the petition.

2. Summons were served upon the respondents on 20.03.2018 and leave to defend application was filed by the respondent No. 2 on behalf of the respondent No. 1 partnership firm on 03.04.2018 within the statutory time period. No leave to defend application was filed by respondent No. 3 separately.

3. Vide order dated 27.03.2019, leave to defend was granted to the respondents.

EVIDENCE

4. After the completion of pleadings, the matter proceeded for trial. At the stage of PE, the petitioner examined himself as PW-1 and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit as Ex.PW1/A. He was thereafter cross-examined and discharged. He relied upon the following documents:

1. Site plan Ex. PW1/1 (objected to regarding mode of proof)
2. Copy of sale certificate dated Mark A 25.05.1955
3. Copy of relinquishment deed Ex. PW1/3 dated 19.04.2007
4. Site plan of the property bearing Ex. PW1/4 No. 2957
5. Copy of Attornment letter Ex. PW1/5 (OSR)
6. Copy of rent receipt Ex. PW1/6 (OSR)
7. Copy of membership letter Mark B DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.2/21 DEVANSHU SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:12:45 +0530

5. Thereafter, the petitioner examined Mr. Naresh Kumar, Employee of Paper Merchant Association (Regd.) office at: 132, Gali Batashan, Chawri Bazar, Delhi. However, the said witness did not bring any documentary record.

6. Thereafter, the petitioner examined Mr. Pravesh Khatri, Junior Assistant, Sub-Registrar-VII, Shastri Nagar, Delhi. He tendered the following documents:

1. Copy of sale agreement dated Ex. PW2/1 (OSR) 20.10.2010

7. Thereafter, vide separate statement of Ld. Counsel for the petitioner dated 06.03.2023, the petitioner's evidence was closed.

8. Pursuant to the aforesaid, the matter progressed to the stage of RE, where the respondent No. 2, Mr. Asit Goel, partner of respondent firm, examined himself as RW-1. He tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex.RW1/A. He was partly cross-examined by Ld. Counsel for the petitioner on 14.08.2023. Thereafter, due to non-appearance of the witness, the right to lead RE was closed vide order dated 27.10.2023. Thereafter, matter was listed for final arguments.

DISCUSSION

9. I have heard final arguments on behalf of both the parties. On perusal of the record, I now proceed to dispose of the case by the present judgment.

10. Before examining the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to refer to the legal position governing Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. It is settled law that, to succeed under Section 14(1)(e), the landlord must establish:

DEVANSHU i. Existence of a landlord-tenant relationship; SAJLAN Digitally signed by DEVANSHU RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.3/21 SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:12:50 +0530 ii. Bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises for the landlord or any family member dependent upon him/her; and iii. Non-availability of any other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.

11. In this regard, reliance may be placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, AIR 2022 SC 1778, wherein it was observed that:

12. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the regular mode of eviction. Thus, in a case where a landlord makes an application seeking possession of the tenanted premises for his bona fide re- quirement, the learned Rent Controller may dispense with the pro- tection prescribed under the Act and then grant an order of eviction. Requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when there is no other "reasonably suitable accommodation". Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non availability of a reasonably suit- able residential accommodation. Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant. When the learned Rent Controller comes to the conclu- sion that there exists a bona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is no reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twin conditions mandated Under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied.

12. The concept of bona fide need has been further elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999 INSC 364, wherein it was held that the requirement must be based on a sincere, honest, and natural desire as distinguished from a mere pretext:

A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contra-distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances pro- truding the need of landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair DEVANSHU of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in SAJLAN Digitally signed by DEVANSHU SAJLAN RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.4/21Date: 2026.02.24 15:12:55 +0530 the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bonafide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant en- abling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the con- trary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pre- tence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the bonafides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objec- tive standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other ac- commodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine re- quirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or two conservative or pedantic must be guarded against.

13. Thus, for the petitioner to succeed, it must be shown that he is the owner of the property, that a landlord-tenant relationship exists, that he has a bona fide requirement of the premises, and that no other suitable alternative accommodation is available. Once these essential ingredients are proved, the petition succeeds.

14. The facts of the case and evidence led on record shall be examined in the light of the legal position enunciated above.

LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP/ OWNERSHIP:

15. With respect to the first ingredient, it is well-settled that for the purposes of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, a landlord is not required to establish absolute ownership in the manner contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act. It is sufficient for the landlord to demonstrate that their title is superior to that of the tenant. In Shanti Sharma & Ors. v. Ved Prabha & Ors., (1987) 4 SCC 193, the Digitally signed by DEVANSHU DEVANSHU SAJLAN RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.5/21 SAJLAN Date:

2026.02.24 15:13:00 +0530 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the term "owner" in this context is to be understood vis-à-vis the tenant, meaning thereby that the landlord must show himself to be "something more than the tenant." Reliance may also be placed on Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. Leela Wati & Ors., 155 (2008) DLT 383, wherein the same principle was reiterated.

16. In the present case, the petitioners are claiming ownership on the basis of the registered relinquishment deed dated 19.04.2007 Ex. PW1/3. By virtue of the said relinquishment deed, Smt. Manju Jain, wife of the erstwhile owner Sh. Bimal Kumar Jain, is stated to have relinquished her rights in the tenanted premises in favour of the petitioners herein, who are the sons of the erstwhile owner. The respondents, on the other hand, have not furnished any title documents. While they have denied the ownership of the petitioners in the WS, they have not been able to cast any doubt on the relinquishment deed Ex. PW1/3. The said deed was duly exhibited in evidence.

17. Further, in any case, the petitioners have exhibited on record the attornment letter issued by them to the respondent No. 1 firm dated 30.01.2008, Ex. PW1/5 (OSR) and the rent receipt Ex. PW1/6 (OSR). The attornment letter bears the stamp of the respondent No. 1 firm in the form of a receiving and has been signed by the respondent No. 2. The attornment letter specifically records that the petitioners are the landlords and it calls upon the respondents to pay rent to them. Again, the respondents have not been able to cast any doubt on the aforesaid documents, which were duly exhibited during evidence. In light of the said documents, the landlord-tenant relationship is duly established between the parties. Further, by virtue of Ex. PW1/3, the petitioners DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.6/21 DEVANSHU SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:13:06 +0530 have been able to show a better title to the tenanted premises as compared to the respondents. Accordingly, there is no dispute regarding the landlord-tenant relationship/ownership, and the said ingredient stands duly established.

BONA FIDE NEED:

18. In respect of the question of bona fide requirement, it is a settled law that the court must presume the bona fide requirement of the landlord and that the burden to refute the said presumption squarely lies on the tenant. A mere assertion on the part of the tenant is insufficient. It was held in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co.

Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119 that:

when a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own oc- cupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide."
19. It is further pertinent to take note of the well-settled proposition of law that a landlord can bring a petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act for the requirement of their children. It has been held in a catena of judgments that it is considered a moral duty of parents to settle their children, and as such, a petition filed by a landlord for his son or daughter is maintainable under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act (see Ravinder Singh v. Deepesh Khorana, MANU/DE/ 6474/2012).
20. In this case, from the averments in the eviction petition and the evidence affidavit of PW-1, it stands pleaded and deposed that the tenanted premises are required bona fide by the petitioner No. 1, who wishes to settle his son, Mr. Mohit Jain, in the business of paper board and fancy wedding cards etc. from the tenanted premises. It has been DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.7/21 DEVANSHU SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:13:11 +0530 mentioned that the tenanted premises will be used as a godown for the aforesaid business purpose. It has been further mentioned that Mr. Mohit Jain is unemployed.
21. The respondents have raised the following objections in relation to the aforesaid bona fide need:
a) Petitioners have another accommodation in their possession bearing property no. 334 Kucha Mir Ashiq, Chawri Bazaar, Delhi­110006 and the petitioners are running the business of M/s Delhi Jayna Paper Mart from the said premises. It has been mentioned that the said premises is being run by the petitioner's son, Mr Mohit Jain, and hence, it has been wrongly averred that Mr. Mohit Jain is unemployed. It is submitted that the petitioner's son Mr. Mohit Jain, is actively involved in the ancestral business, and the aforesaid property is two storeyed building, which is under the possession and control of the petitioners and Mr. Mohit Jain.
b) The petitioner has concealed that as per the Government scheme of shifting commercial units from the non­confirming area of Chawri Bazar, Delhi­110006, to the confirming area at Ghazipur, the petitioner has been allotted a commercial plot in IFC Ghazipur, Delhi.
c) Petitioner has deliberately filed the incorrect site plan, not showing the complete description of the accommodation available with the petitioner in the demised premises bearing no. 274­275, Kucha Mir Ashiq, Chawri Bazar, Delhi­110006.

The petitioner and his family Members already have sufficient DEVANSHU and reasonable accommodation and space available in the same SAJLAN Digitally signed by DEVANSHU SAJLAN RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.8/21 Date: 2026.02.24 15:13:16 +0530 premises, which are about 175 sq. yards, comprising the ground floor, first floor, and second floor, with a terrace having a fully covered area.

d) The petitioner has not placed any document on record to substantiate the averments made in the eviction petition.

e) The respondent no.3 has nothing to do with the tenanted godown nor has any concern with the tenanted firm M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar.

f) Petitioners have obtained the vacant peaceful physical possession of the main entrance shop at ground floor in the same property bearing no. 274­275 Kucha Mir Ashiq Chawri Bazar, Delhi­110006, from a tenant, and the same is lying unused and vacant under the control and possession of the petitioners.

g) The petitioners further have another portion shown in the photograph, having a green­coloured door which is also lying unused and locked by the petitioners on the ground floor.

h) Petitioners have another property bearing no.2499 Naiwada, Chawri Bazaar, Delhi­110006 under their control and possession from where the business under the name and style of M/s Arushi File Products is running.

i) The Petitioners have wrongly mentioned one shop in the site plan, whereas on the actual site of the property in question, there are two separate shops which are lying unused and vacant with the petitioners, as shown in photographs having brown and green colored door. The petitioners have deliberately shown the two shops as a single one in the site plan. DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by DEVANSHU SAJLAN RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.9/21 Date: 2026.02.24 15:13:22 +0530

j) The petitioners have wrongly mentioned in the eviction petition that the tenanted premises is a godown used for commercial purposes. It is submitted that the tenanted portion is meant for residential cum commercial purposes and the same is used by the respondent for both purposes.

22. The objections with respect to suitable alternate accommodation, as mentioned above, are dealt with in the next section of this judgment.

23. With respect to the bona fide requirement, the primary objection that has been taken is that Mr. Mohit Jain is already running the business of M/s Delhi Jayna Paper Mart. Reliance has been placed upon the photograph Ex. PW1/R-4 and Ex. PW1/R-5 to show that Mr. Mohit Jain regularly sits in the premises of the said firm (situated at 334 Kucha Mir Ashiq, Chawri Bazaar, Delhi­110006). The aforesaid photographs have not been denied by petitioner No. 1 during his cross-examination. However, during his cross-examination, the petitioner deposed that he is the sole proprietor of M/S Delhi Jayna Paper Mart. Thereafter, he was asked whether he has filed any document on record to show that he is the proprietor of the said firm, to which he replied in the negative.

24. Accordingly, it has been submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the respondents that the entire bona fide need is a sham since Mr. Mohit Jain is already actively involved in the business of the aforesaid firm. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the said firm is a sole proprietorship concern of the petitioner No. 1, and the petitioner No. 1 wishes that his son must have a separate business of his own. To this submission, Ld. Counsel for the respondents has submitted that no document has been placed on DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.10/21 DEVANSHU SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:13:27 +0530 record to show that the petitioner No. 1 is the sole proprietor of M/S Delhi Jayna Paper Mart and hence, an adverse inference needs to be drawn against the petitioners in this regard. Accordingly, it has been submitted that based on the photographs on record, a conclusion must be reached that the business being carried out from 334 Kucha Mir Ashiq, Chawri Bazaar is being run by the petitioner's son, Mr Mohit Jain (i.e., the business of M/S Delhi Jayna Paper Mart).

25. I do not agree with the submissions of the Ld. Counsel for the respondent. As noted above, once the petitioner pleads the bona fide need on an affidavit, the onus shifts upon the respondents to disprove the same. Accordingly, the onus was upon the respondents to prove that Mr. Mohit Jain is not unemployed and is running the business of M/S Delhi Jayna Paper Mart. During cross-examination, the petitioner No. 1 has specifically deposed that the said firm is his sole proprietorship concern. Once it has been deposed that the said firm is the sole proprietorship concern of the petitioner No. 1, it cannot be categorized as being run by the son of the petitioner No. 1, Mr. Mohit Jain. Accordingly, the bona fide need cannot be categorized as a sham on this aspect.

26. Ld. Counsel for the respondent has submitted that there is no way to ascertain whether the said firm is the sole proprietorship concern of the petitioner No. 1, since no registration documents have been filed on record. Accordingly, he has submitted that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the petitioners on this aspect. However, no adverse inference can be drawn against the petitioners for not placing on record the proprietorship registration record of the said firm since the present petition has been filed for the bona fide need of Mr. Mohit Jain, and the petitioners were only required to DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.11/21 DEVANSHU SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:13:32 +0530 disclose any business/premises being run by him. Therefore, there was no requirement for the petitioners to file the registration document of the aforesaid sole proprietorship concern along-with the present petition.

27. An adverse inference could have been drawn against the petitioners if the respondents had asked PW-1 to produce the said registration record, and PW-1 had refused or failed to bring it on record subsequently. However, no such question was asked during the cross-examination. The only question that was asked was whether any registration record was filed on record. The answer to the said question was given in the following manner: "It is also correct that I have not filed any document on the record that I am the proprietor of M/S Delhi Jayna Paper Mart." However, after this question, the witness was not asked whether he can bring/produce the same now. In absence of the said question, there is no refusal/failure on the part of PW-1 regarding the production of the registration record of the concerned firm. It is a settled position of law that adverse inference u/s 114 (g) of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be drawn against a witness during cross-examination, unless the opposite party specifically calls upon the witness to produce it. Since no such question was put to PW-1, no adverse inference can be drawn against him for having not filed the registration document of M/S Delhi Jayna Paper Mart.

28. Next, it has been submitted that even if M/S Delhi Jayna Paper Mart is considered to be a proprietorship concern, the respondents have shown that Mr. Mohit Jain is involved in its business, since photographs have come on record showing his presence in the concerned premises from where the business of the aforesaid firm is DEVANSHU SAJLAN RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.12/21 Digitally signed by DEVANSHU SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:13:38 +0530 carried out (see Ex. PW1/R-4 and Ex. PW1/R-5). However, I am of the considered view that the said position will not impact the bona fide need pleaded in the petition, since it is a settled position of law that the petitioner/their dependent is not required to sit idle while the eviction petition drags on for years. The law is well settled that the present occupation or business activity of the landlord does not disentitle them from seeking eviction for establishing a separate and independent venture. In Raghunath G. Panhale v. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co., (1999) 8 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically observed:

Joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back one's premises. For that matter assuming the landlord was in a job and had not resigned it or assuming that pending the long-drawn litigation he started some other temporary water business to sustain himself, that would not be an indication that the need for establishing a grocery shop was not a bona fide or a reasonable requirement or that it was motivated or was a mere design to evict the tenant.

29. Again, in Ramkubai v. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak, (1999) 6 SCC 540, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that employment during litigation does not defeat bona fide need, holding:

...he could not be expected to idle away the time by remaining unemployed till the case is finally decided. It has already taken about 25 years. Therefore, we do not think that taking up contractor work, in the meanwhile, will militate against his carrying on the business of Kirana which is his family business, which was carried on by his father and is being carried on by his brother independently. The facts that the landlady during her life time was a partner in the firm carrying on Kirana business and her elder son is carrying on Kirana business do not disentitle Bhikchand to establish his own business. We are not impressed by the other reasoning and conclusion of the Appellate Court which are confirmed by the High Court. In our view, none of the reasons leads to the inference that Bhikchand did not intend to start family Kirana business, so relief cannot be denied to the landlady to recover the suit premises for personal requirement of Bhikchand to establish Kirana business independently. DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by DEVANSHU SAJLAN RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.13/21Date: 2026.02.24 15:13:42 +0530

30. The same principle has been applied by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Ashok Sehgal v. Subhash Chandra Sharma, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 815, wherein it was held that:

It is also immaterial if the respondent is employed somewhere and is getting salary after his retirement. The fact of the matter is the respondent requires the tenanted shop for his personal use to start his business of footwear in a commercial market.
20. In case of Sait Nagjee Purushotam & Co. vs. Vimalbai Prabhulal and Others, (2005) 8 SCC 252 the Apex Court held that a person who has started the litigation cannot be expected to sit idle.
21. In case of Raghunath G. Panhale (dead) by L. Rs. vs. Chaganlal Sunderji and Co., AIR 1999 SC 3864 the Apex Court held joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back one's premises.

31. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, it is evident that the petitioner's son is not required to sit idle till the outcome of the present eviction petition. There is no bar upon him to help his father in his business till he is able to commence his own business upon the vacation of the tenanted premises. It has already been noted that M/S Delhi Jayna Paper Mart is the sole proprietorship concern of the petitioner No. 1, and is not owned by his son, namely Mr. Mohit Jain. Therefore, merely because the petitioner No. 1's son is helping his father in running the said business, the petitioners cannot be barred from seeking eviction of the tenanted premises for the independent business venture of the son of petitioner No. 1. Therefore, the respondents have not been able to raise any tenable objection with respect to the bona fide need of the petitioners. Therefore, no triable issue is raised with respect to the aspect of bona fide requirement.

AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION:

32. With respect to the third ingredient of the availability of other suitable alternate accommodation, it is to be noted that to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, an alternate accommodation must be DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.14/21 DEVANSHU SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:13:48 +0530 reasonably suitable, in comparison with the tenanted premises in question. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, AIR 1999 SC 2507, has held that for an eviction petition to fail on the ground of availability of alternate suitable accommodation, the availability of another accommodation must be suitable as well as convenient in all respects as the tenanted accommodation from which the landlord seeks eviction of the tenant.

33. The respondents have deposed about the availability of the following alternate accommodation available to the petitioners:

(i) Commercial plot in IFC, Ghazipur, Delhi

34. It has been submitted that the petitioner has concealed that as per the Government scheme of shifting commercial units from the non-confirming area of Chawri Bazar, Delhi-110006, to the confirming area at Ghazipur, the petitioner has been allotted a commercial plot in IFC Ghazipur, Delhi.

35. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that PW-2, i.e., the Junior Assistant from the office of Sub-Registrar-VIII, Shastri Nagar, filed on record the sale deed dated 20.10.2010, executed between M/s Delhi Jayna Paper Mart, and Dr. Mrs. Naveen Virmani, in relation to the property situated at Ghazipur (see Ex. PW2/1 (OSR)). Therefore, the said property cannot be categorized as suitable alternate accommodation, since it has already been sold to a third party.

(ii) Unused godowns in the same property bearing no. 274­275, Kucha Mir Ashiq Chawri Bazar, Delhi­110006 (marked as Mark T­1 and Mark T­2 on the site plan Ex. PW1/R­7).

36. It has been averred that the petitioners have obtained the vacant DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by DEVANSHU SAJLAN RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.15/21 Date: 2026.02.24 15:13:54 +0530 peaceful physical possession of the unused godowns at ground floor in the same property bearing no. 274­275, Kucha Mir Ashiq Chawri Bazar, Delhi­110006, from a tenant, and the same are lying unused and vacant under the control and possession of the petitioners. The same are marked as Mark T­1 and Mark T­2 on the site plan Ex. PW1/R­7.

37. With respect to the available godowns on the ground floor of the aforesaid property, the petitioners have clarified in the replication and the evidence by way of the affidavit of PW­1 that separate eviction petitions were filed against Sh. Saran Dass and Sh. Suresh Kumar for different bona fide needs and requirement. It has been further mentioned therein that both the aforesaid matters were amicably settled, pursuant to which the aforesaid tenants vacated their respective godowns. It has been further mentioned that pursuant to the said eviction, the godown evicted by Sh. Ram Saran Dass is occupied by Sh. Naveen Kumar Jain for storing material related to his business, and the godown evicted by Sh. Suresh Kumar is now occupied by Sh. Praveen Kumar Jain for storing material related to his business.

38. PW­1 was duly cross­examined on this point and he deposed that portion Mark T­1 in the site plan, which was under the possession of M/s Suresh Trading Co., is now under his possession, and the portion Mark T­2 in the site plan, which was under the possession of Sh. Ram Saran Dass, is now under the possession of his brother Mr. Naveen Kumar Jain. Therefore, the version of the petitioners has remained consistent during cross­examination, and PW­1 has not been contradicted by the respondents in any manner. The respondents have not placed on record any material to show that the portion available on DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by DEVANSHU RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.16/21 SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:14:07 +0530 the ground floor of the concerned property is lying vacant. Therefore, the aforesaid portions Mark T­1 and Mark T­2 cannot be categorized as a suitable alternate accommodation, since the same are already being used by the petitioners for their business purpose.

(iii) Portion available on the ground floor in the same property bearing no. 274­275, Kucha Mir Ashiq Chawri Bazar, Delhi­ 110006 (marked as Mark G­1 and Mark G­2 on the site plan Ex. PW1/R­7).

39. With respect to the portion Mark G-1 and Mark G-2 in the site plan Ex. PW1/R-7, PW-1 deposed that the same are being used for water meter and water motor respectively. Again, the respondents have not furnished any material to dispute the same. Accordingly, the aforesaid portion Mark G­1 and Mark G­2 cannot be categorized as a suitable alternate accommodation.

(iv) Main entrance shop lying in the same property bearing no. 274­275, Kucha Mir Ashiq Chawri Bazar, Delhi­110006 (shown in Blue colour in the site plan Ex. PW1/R­7).

40. With respect to the aforesaid alleged shop shown in blue colour in Ex. PW1/R­7, it is pertinent to note that PW­1 has deposed in his evidence by way of the affidavit that the said portion is not a shop and is being used by the mother of the petitioners, namely Smt. Manju Jain, as a baithak, since she is an old aged lady who cannot keep going upstairs again and again. Despite a thorough cross­examination on multiple dates, Ld. Counsel for the respondent has not contradicted the PW­1 on this point. No suggestion was put to the PW­1 that the blue DEVANSHU coloured portion is not used as a baithak. It is a settled position of law SAJLAN Digitally signed by DEVANSHU RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.17/21 SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:14:13 +0530 that where the evidence of a witness is allowed to go unchallenged with regard to any particular point, it may safely accepted as true (see Srichand and Shivan Das v. State, 1985 SCC OnLine Del 2010). Therefore, the deposition of the PW­1 in relation to the blue coloured portion has gone unchallenged, and must be accepted to be true. In any case, the burden of proof was upon the respondents to show that the blue coloured portion is lying vacant. However, the respondents have failed to discharge the said burden, since no material has been placed on record to show that the said portion is lying vacant.

v) Property bearing No. 2499, Naiwada, Chawri Bazaar, Delhi­ 110006.

41. It is alleged that the petitioners have another property bearing No. 2499, Naiwada, Chawri Bazaar, Delhi­110006 under their control and possession from where the business under the name and style of M/s Arushi File Products is running.

42. However, during his cross­examination, PW­1 deposed that his brother is carrying on his business from the shop No. 2499. He further deposed that M/s Arushi File Products is under the proprietorship of his brother Sh. Naveen Kumar. On the other hand, the respondents have not furnished any material to show that the said property is owned by the petitioners and that any portion in the said shop is lying vacant. Therefore, the respondents have been unable to prove that the property in question is a suitable alternate accommodation.

vi) Property bearing No. 2433, Chipiwara, Delhi­110006.

43. During cross-examination of PW-1, he was asked whether he owns the aforesaid property. He answered in the affirmative. He also DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by DEVANSHU SAJLAN RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.18/21 Date: 2026.02.24 15:14:19 +0530 deposed that he has not placed on record any document in relation to the said property. However, no question was asked as to whether the said property is residential or commercial. It has been submitted by Ld. Counsel for the petitioners that the said property is completely residential in nature, and is situated on the first floor. It has been submitted that the Ld. Counsel for the respondent deliberately did not ask any question regarding the status of the aforesaid property in order to create an impression that the said property could be used as an alternate accommodation. It has been submitted that the onus lied upon the respondents to show that the aforesaid property is commercial in nature and can be utilized for the business purpose of the son of the petitioner No. 1.

44. I agree with the said submission. The aforesaid property cannot be categorized as a suitable alternate accommodation merely on the basis that it is owned by the petitioners. No question was put to the PW-1 whether the said property is lying vacant. Further, no question was put regarding the nature of the said property i.e., whether it is residential or commercial in nature. In absence of these material particulars, the said property cannot be categorized as a suitable alternate accommodation. No adverse inference can be drawn against the petitioners for non-disclosure of the aforesaid property since they are only required to disclose vacant commercial alternate accommodations in their possession, and there is no material on record to suggest that the said property is vacant or commercial.

vii) Portion Mark X in the site plan Ex. PW1/1.

45. It has been submitted that the Petitioners have wrongly mentioned one shop in the site plan at point X in Ex. PW1/1, whereas DEVANSHU on the actual site of the property in question, there are two separate SAJLAN Digitally signed by DEVANSHU RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.19/21 SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:14:23 +0530 shops which are lying unused and vacant with the petitioners, as shown in photographs having brown and green colored door (see Ex. PW1/R­1). It has been submitted that the petitioners have deliberately shown the two shops as a single one in the site plan. On the other hand, PW­1 deposed in his evidence by way of the affidavit that the said room is being used now­a­days for keeping the respective goods of both the petitioners after raising a middle wall with mutual understanding. Despite a thorough cross­examination on multiple dates, Ld. Counsel for the respondent has not contradicted the PW­1 on this point. Therefore, it has been submitted that originally, there was only one room at the said portion Mark X in Ex. PW1/1, but subsequently, both the petitioners raised a middle wall in the said portion and they are using the same for storing their respective goods.

46. No suggestion was put to the PW­1 that the portion Mark X in Ex. PW1/1 is not used by both the petitioners for storing their respective goods. As noted above, it is a settled position of law that where the evidence of a witness is allowed to go unchallenged with regard to any particular point, it may safely accepted as true (see Srichand and Shivan Das v. State, 1985 SCC OnLine Del 2010). Therefore, the deposition of the PW­1 in relation to the portion mark X in Ex. PW1/1 has gone unchallenged, and must be accepted to be true. It is immaterial that there are two doors existing in the said portion since the PW­1 has deposed the same to be occupied for storage purpose (after raising the middle wall). As long as the concerned portion is occupied, the same cannot be categorized as a suitable alternate accommodation. The burden of proof was upon the respondents to show that the said portion is lying vacant. However, DEVANSHU SAJLAN Digitally signed by DEVANSHU RC ARC 245/2018 Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors. Page No.20/21 SAJLAN Date: 2026.02.24 15:14:28 +0530 the respondents have failed to discharge the said burden, since no material has been placed on record to show that the said portion is lying vacant.

47. Based on the aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that there is any property available with the petitioners which can constitute a reasonable alternate suitable accommodation for the requirement as disclosed in the eviction petition. On a scale of preponderance of probabilities, it stands established that no such reasonable suitable alternate accommodation is available with the petitioners.

CONCLUSION:

48. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the instant petition stands allowed in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents.

49. Accordingly, an eviction order is passed u/s 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents in respect of the tenanted premises i.e., one godown on the ground floor forming part of property bearing No. 274-275, Chawri Bazar, Delhi-110006. The tenanted premises is shown in Red colour in the site plan Ex. PW1/1 annexed with the petition. However, this order shall not be executable before the expiry of six months from the date of this order as provided u/s 14 (7) of the DRC Act. Parties to bear their own costs.

File be consigned to the record room after due compliance.

                                                                                    Digitally signed
Pronounced in open court:                                     DEVANSHU by DEVANSHU
24th day of February, 2026                                    SAJLAN
                                                                       SAJLAN
                                                                       Date: 2026.02.24
                                                                                    15:14:35 +0530
                                                               (Devanshu Sajlan)
                                                           CCJ-cum-ARC (Central)
                                                             THC/Delhi/24.02.2026


RC ARC 245/2018   Parveen Kumar Jainn & Anr. v. M/s Shamlal Shiv Shankar & Ors.   Page No.21/21