Allahabad High Court
Nankau @ Gore Lal vs State Of U.P. on 15 January, 2015
Author: Vishnu Chandra Gupta
Bench: Vishnu Chandra Gupta
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH AFR Court No.21 Reserved on 09.12.2014 Delivered on 15.01.2015 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2032 OF 2009 Nankau @ Gore La, aged about 26 years Son of Shriram Singh, Resident of Amauti, Police Station Umari Begum Ganj, District Gonda ...... Appellant/Accused Versus State of U.P. ..... Opposite party Counsel for Appellant:- Sri R.P. Mishra Counsel for Opposite Party :- AGA Hon'ble Vishnu Chandra Gupta,J.
Judgement This criminal appeal has been filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (In short Cr.P.C.) against the judgment and order dated 17.08.2009 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/ FTC No.4, Gonda in Sessions Trial No.249 of 2007 (State Versus Nankau @ Gore Lal) arising out of Case Crime No.4 of 2005, Police Station Umari Begam Ganj, District Gonda convicting the sole appellant under Section 376 IPC and sentencing him with rigorous imprisonment of 10 years and fine of Rs.3000/- and in default of payment of fine three months additional rigorous imprisonment.
Brief facts for deciding this appeal are that Shiv Nath Singh (PW 1), who is the father of prosecutrix Preeti Singh (PW 2), lodged a first information report (Ext. Ka-5) against the appellant on 22.01.2005 at about 03:10 P.M. having case crime No.04 of 2005, under Sections 376, 511 IPC, Police Station Umari Begum Ganj, District Gonda, in respect of an incident which alleged to have taken place on 15.01.2005 at about 09:00 A.M. It has been alleged in the FIR that on 15.01.2005 at about 9:00 A.M., appellant Nankau @ Gore Lal taken away his daughter, namely, Preeti aged about seven years in the field of Lahi and tried to commit rape upon her. When she cried, the villagers, namely, Sukhram, Kaliprasad and Islam Ali hurriedly came and saw that Nankau was escaping away from the place of incident. That case was investigated by Ram Ajor Yadav, SI Thereafter, the Investigating Officer prepared the site plan (Ext. Ka-1) and started the investigation. The prosecutrix was medically examined on 24.01.2005. Thereafter the investigation was transferred to Police Station Tarab Ganj and after completing the investigation, the Investigating Officer Sharad Chandra Tripathi submitted charge-sheet (Ext. Ka-7) against the appellant under Section 376 IPC.
The medical examination of the prosecutrix was conducted by Dr. Arunima Srivastava and prepared the medico legal examination report (Ext. Ka-2). In general examination conducted on 24.01.2005 at 12:50 p.m., the prosecutrix was found fully conscious. At the time of examination, her height was 114 cm, weight 15 kgs, teeth 6/6-6/6, pubic and auxiliary hairs absent, breast and nipple infanted and not developed. No mark of injury anywhere on the external surface of the body was found.
In external examination, the doctor mentioned that the incident was occurred four days earlier. No mark of injury was found over vulva or vagina. Hymen was absent. Even the little finger could not be entered into vagina. There was no discharge or blood was seen.
The doctor prepared the vaginal smear and sent it to the pathologist for ascertaining the live or dead spermatozoa. The child was referred to Dental Surgeon for determination of her age.
After receipt of the report of pathologist and dental surgeon, supplementary report was prepared by the aforesaid doctor. In supplementary report, the doctor opined that no dead or alive spermatozoa were found in the vaginal smear. The dental surgeon found that first permanent mole on teeth was present and central incisor was also present. In the opinion of dental surgeon, the age of the prosecutrix at the time of examination was hardly in between 7-8 years. The prosecutrix was not habitual to sexual intercourse. There was no mark of injury in the internal part. No opinion about the rape could be given.
During trial, the prosecution examined as many as seven witnesses, namely, informant Shiv Nath Singh (PW 1), Prosecutrix Preeti (PW 2), Investigating Officer Ram Ajor Yadav (PW 3), Dr. Arunima Srivastava (PW 4), Head Constable Rama Pati Lal (PW 5), second Investigating Officer Sharad Chandra Tripathi (PW 6) and Chief Pharmacist Fateh Bahadur Singh (PW 7)who proved the report of dental surgeon (Ext. Ka-8).
The appellant was examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C. wherein he claimed his false implication on account of enmity. He did not adduce any defence evidence. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the record, material and evidence on record, the trial court convicted and sentence the appellant as mentioned here inabove.
Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record as well as the record of the trial court.
It has been submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that in this case, FIR has been lodged with inordinate delay of seven days without any plausible explanation. The prosecution as well as the witnesses tried to explain the delay but could not sufficiently explain the delay caused in lodging the FIR. Moreover, as per the statement of doctor, the incident is said to have occurred four days before from the date of examination as mentioned in the medical examination report on 24.01.2005. It has also been submitted that the informant PW 1 stated on oath that he lodged the first information report on the next day of incident whereas PW 2 the prosecutrix stated on oath that FIR had been lodged on the same day as she went along with his father to lodge the FIR. So, in the absence of proper explanation of delay in lodging the FIR, the prosecution story become doubtful.
PW 1 stated that prosecutrix was bleeding when the incident was occurred. The blood was coming out from her vagina through her thighs but her trousers was not stained with blood. On the contrary, the prosecutrix alleged that her trousers was stained with blood. Moreover there was no allegation in the first information report about blood stained on the trousers of the prosecutrix or coming out of the blood from vagina. PW 1 also stated that he shown the spot to the Investigating Officer where plants of Lahi were found broken by the Investigating Officer. He also shown the blood lying on the spot to the Investigating Officer but the Investigating Officer categorically stated that neither there was any blood nor he found any tilted plants of Lahi. It has also been stated that as per the version of the FIR, PW 1 along with other villagers reached at the place of occurrence after hearing cries of the prosecutrix and saw that Nankau was running away from the spot. On the contrary he deposed before the trial court that her daughter came before him when he was irrigating the field from the pumping set of Ismyel and stated that Nankau committed rape upon her. No witness of FIR has been examined in support of prosecution story. It has also been submitted by learned counsel that the appellant as well as informant were challaned under Sections 107/116, Cr.P.C. by the police as is evident from the Challani Report dated 19.01.2005. It has also been submitted that though PW 1 claimed himself to be the eyewitness of the incident but when he was examined before the trial court, he completely changed his version and stated that her daughter came along with trousers in her hand and blood was coming out from her vagina through thighs. Therefore, on the basis of statement given on oath before the court, he is not the eyewitness nor he saw the prosecutrix with appellant and whatever he stated, is the information given to him by the prosecutrix so his evidence is of no use. The prosecutrix was hardly seven years of age when the offence was committed and her statement was recorded after lapse of more than three years. The child of such a tender age is always subject to tutoring and more significant part of the evidence of the witnesses is that the trial court while considering the competence of giving evidence by the prosecutrix, the court did not ascertain before recording her statement whether she is capable of understanding the concept of oath. Therefore, her statement cannot be believed. The medical examination report did not support the prosecution story and on the basis of the aforesaid facts, the prosecution story is highly doubtful and the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt and is liable to be acquitted.
Learned counsel for the appellant relying upon the judgement of Apex Court in Bibhishan Vs. State of Maharashtra; 2007 (59) ACC 832 (SC) submitted that in this case, the Apex Court observed that the courts while deciding the cases of Section 376 IPC should bear in mind that false charges of rape are not uncommon and on the strength of this, he submitted that this appeal is liable to be allowed.
It has been submitted by learned A.G.A. that the findings recorded by the trial court are based on material and evidence on record and there is no illegality in the findings recorded by the trial court. It has also been submitted that it is the case of rape with a minor girl, who was less than 12 years of age at the time of offence, hence, the provisions of Section 114-A of the Evidence Act would be attracted as the case falls under Section 376 (2) (f) IPC and in view of above, the question of consent cannot be considered in this case. It has further been submitted that there is no reason to falsely implicate the appellant as nobody could involved his minor daughter in such a case. So far as the question of consent of the victim is concerned, the prosecutrix was aged about 7-8 years at the time of offence, hence such question become insignificant. On the basis of material available on record and evidence adduced by the prosecution, the necessary ingredients of Section 375 IPC are available hence, conviction was rightly recorded.
In view the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and submissions raised by learned counsel for the parties, following are the points require consideration in this appeal:
I. As to whether the prosecutrix is wholly reliable witness and conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix or not?
II. What would be the effect of delayed FIR?
III. As to whether medical evidence adduced by the prosecution out weighted the evidence of prosecutrix and informant?
Point No.1 In Lallu Manjhi Vs. State of Jharkhand; (2003) 2 SCC 401 the Hon'ble Supreme court has classified the oral testimony of witnesses into three categories:
(a). Wholly reliable
(b). Wholly unreliable, and
(c). neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
In the third category , the court has to be cautious and to see whether the statement of such witness is corroborated, either by the evidence of other witness or by some documentary or expert evidence. When evidence of a witness is wholly reliable then it does not require any further corroboration to act upon such evidence but if evidence of a witness is not wholly reliable then in that event, the conviction cannot be sustained on the evidence of such witness unless corroborated on material issues by other evidence and circumstances. Before acting upon the evidence of such a witness corroboration must be needed . It is also well established that Section 118 of Evidence Act does not provide any limitations regarding competency of a witness. However, it is the court, which has to satisfy whether the witness, who is going to depose, is competent to given evidence. Section 118 of the Evidence Act reads as under:-
"118. Who may testify - All persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind.
Explanation - A lunatic is not incompetent to testify, unless he is prevented by his lunacy from understanding the questions put to him and giving rational answers to them."
The Apex Court in Dattu Ramrao Sakhare and others v. State of Maharashtra; (1997) 5 SCC 341 observed as under with regard to child witness:
"A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the Court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored".
The Apex Court in Golla Yelugu Govindu v. State of Andra Pradesh, AIR 2008 SC 1842 observed as under
"9. The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher Court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make beliefs. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the Court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness"
Admittedly in this case, learned trial judge did not satisfy himself nor put any question to the effect that whether prosecutrix was capable of understanding the veracity of oath. If the witness is capable of understanding the concept of oath, it is mandatory on the part of a Judge to administer the oath before recording her statement which has not been done in this case. Normally the statement of witness recorded without administering oath may not be relied upon. At the time of recording her statement she was hardly ten years of age, The prosecutrix in her statement categorically stated that before coming in court, she went on the seat of her private counsel engaged by her father. Therefore,considering the age of prosecutrix at the time of incident, at the time of evidence in trial court and other attending circumstances it could not be said that there is no likelihood of being tutored.
In the light of aforesaid facts and circumstances, it has to be judged whether the prosecutrix could be categorised as wholly reliable witness or not.
The prosecutrix in her deposition stated that about four years ago at about 9:00 A.M., she was taken away by appellant Nankau in the field of Lahi. His second name is Gore Lal. Nankau on the date of incident took her away for providing Ber. The field of Lahi was at a far distance from village. In the field of Lahi, Nankau put out her trousers and inserted his penis in her vagina and when she cried then Nankau leave her and run away from the place of incident. In cross-examination, she stated that height of Lahi crops was in between 5 to 5 ½ feet. Whose field it was, she could not tell. She was not aware with the directions of the field though she knew that sun rises in the East and sets in the West? She came along with his father to give evidence. His father did not tell her what has to be stated. She went along with his father on the seat of his private counsel. She cannot tell how much time she remained in the field of Lahi. Nankau laid her in the field and the plants of Lahi were broken. She was bleeding from her vagina and the blood was also fell down on the earth and stained her trousers. After disappearance of Nankau from the spot, she put her trousers and went to her father who was in another field. The Police Inspector took her trousers stained with blood. She reached to her father after half an hour. Her father took her to the house and not went to the field of Lahi. Her father went to police station along with her. She categorically stated that on the same day in the afternoon, her father lodged the report in the police station. On the same day, her father has taken away to Gonda Hospital for her medical examination. Her medical examination was conducted by a lady doctor. She came back on the same day to her father's house. She categorically stated that she was subjected to rape by Nankau alias Gore Lal and whatever she stated is not on account of tutoring by her parents. She also stated that she did not know about Panchayat election.
If her statement is taken into consideration in the light of other circumstances and the facts of the case, her statement is not find support with the date of lodging the first information report or her medical examination conducted by the doctor. Her statement does not find support from the spot inspection prepared by the Investigating Officer. No blood or tilted plants of Lahi were found on the spot by the Investigating Officer. No recovery memo has been prepared by the Investigating Officer for the blood stained trousers of prosecutrix which she was bearing at the time of commission of crime. The Investigating Officer categorically stated that neither any blood stained trousers has been given nor such trousers is in his possession. The prosecutrix stated that her medical examination was conducted on the same day but medical examination report itself shows that she was medically examined after four days from the date of incident but in the first information report, she alleged to have been raped by the accused appellant on 15.01.2005 i.e. nine days earlier from the date of medical examination. The doctor categorically opined that no sign of penetration was found on the private parts of the prosecutrix nor any sign of blood or any type of injury was found on outer or internal part of the body. The doctor categorically stated that even the little finger could not be inserted inside the vagina at the time of medical examination.
In view of above, the evidence of this witness is not in consonance with the story of the prosecution. If the statement of prosecutrix is taken to be true that she was raped and after penetration blood was coming out on the date when the first information report was lodged then in that evident, the doctor must have taken note of this fact and injury must have been caused to the internal part of the organs but no such injury was found by the doctor. It is also important to note here that neither any blood nor any tilted or broken plants of Lahi were found on the spot by the Investigating Officer. Therefore, the story narrated by the prosecutrix that she was laid down in the field of Lahi whereby the plants of Lahi were broken and blood felt down on the earth is not in accordance with the prosecution story. The prosecutrix also stated that after commission of rape she put her trousers in hand and thereafter come to her father after half hour when he was working in another field. This part of the story is also not in consonance with the version given in the first information report.
In view of above, the testimony of the prosecutrix is not in consonance with the prosecution story. Moreover her statement has not been recorded on oath. Before giving evidence against the appellant in the trial court, she was taken to the seat of her private counsel. The statement of the prosecutrix is contrary to the statement given by her father and is also in conflict to the version mentioned in the FIR.
In view of above attending circumstances available in this case, I am of the firm view that the prosecutrix is not wholly reliable witness and her evidence cannot be acted upon unless corroborated on material points with other evidence and circumstances. The conviction,thus, could not be sustain on sole testimony of prosecutrix.
Point No.2 In this case, the FIR was lodged on 22.01.2005 whereas the incident was said to have occurred on 15.01.2005. Admittedly no explanation has been given in the first information report with regard to delay in lodging the FIR. PW 1, when examined before the trial court stated that on the date of incident, he went to the police station but FIR was not lodged and thereafter, on the next date, he approached the SP, Gonda with the same request and only after the orders of SP, Gonda FIR was lodged. PW 1 also stated that medical examination of the prosecutrix was also conducted on the second day of incident and categorically denied that medical examination was conducted after 9-10 days from the date of incident.
It is important to mention here that the doctor in her medical examination report stated that she was informed that incident was occurred four days earlier from today. If, it is so, the commission of offence was must be on 20.01.2005 and not on 15.01.2005. Even if, the statement of doctor is taken to be correct then in that event the first information report was not lodged on the second day of the incident but actually on the third day of the incident.
In view of above, I am of the firm view that in this case, the delay in lodging the first information report has not been explained properly which caused serious doubt on the prosecution story.
Point No.3 PW 1 is not the witness of fact as according to his deposition in court that her daughter came with trousers in her hand to him where he was working. She was weeping. Her daughter was seven years old at that time. She told that Nankau has committed rape upon her in the field of Lahi. He also stated that when she was drinking water on the hand pipe available at Kali Mandir, Nankau came and took her on the pretext of giving Ber. He also stated that the blood was coming out from her vagina through her thighs. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that his report was lodged by Munshi and report was dictated by SO Ram Nagina. The report was not read over to him. The cross-examination of PW 1 was again recorded on 18.07.2009 after recalling him wherein he stated that he lodged the first information report on 21.01.2005 on the basis of written report which is available on the file as Paper No.4/2. He verified his signature thereon and then the same was marked as Ext. Ka-9. The statement dated 18.07.2009 is contrary to the statement given in earlier examination-in-chief on 04.08.2008. His statement is also contrary to his own version mentioned in the written report wherein he stated that he reached on the spot along with other after hearing the cries of her daughter and saw that Nankau ran away from the spot. The statement given by PW 1 on oath is completely changed from the version of the FIR and the previous statement given by him. In view of his statement on oath given before trial Court PW 1 could not be an eyewitness of latter part of the alleged incident. He stated on oath on the basis of the information given by the prosecutrix.
The story of blood also does not find support from the site plan prepared on the spot nor from the statement given by the Investigating Officer who prepared the inspection note on the pointing out of the PW 1 and the prosecutrix. The doctor also opined that no blood was coming out from the vagina nor there was any mark of injury on the outer or inner part of the body of the prosecutrix. Similarly the statement given by the prosecutrix also does not found support from the medical evidence.
Now the question arises whether the evidence given by the doctor can be excluded or the evidence of the doctor given in the court out weighted the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses before the trial court.
The statements given by the witnesses before the trial court is not in consonance with the prosecution story narrated in the FIR. The story of coming out the blood from vagina of the prosecutrix is also not mentioned in the FIR. The FIR contains an offence of attempt to commit rape by the appellant upon the prosecutrix. The doctor categorically stated that she was informed that incident took place about four days ago whereas PW 1 stated that FIR had been lodged on the second day of the incident and PW 2 prosecutrix stated that FIR was lodged on the same day. In any case whether FIR was lodged on the same day of the incident or a date after the incident, if the prosecutrix was bleeding on account of penetration, the sign of injury caused by penetration on the internal part of the body must have existed but the doctor has not found the same at the time of examination. The prosecution story was not that prosecutrix was bearing any trousers when she reached to the father in another field. On the contrary, PW 2 categorically stated that she put her trousers after commission of rape.
All these circumstances, if taken into consideration then on one hand, the evidence of prosecutrix and her father is there whereas on the other hand, the evidence of doctor, who is an independent person and has no reason to give false evidence, the preference should be given to the medical evidence over the oral evidence of PW 1 and PW 2.
One more thing is required to be considered, which has already been noticed by the trial court, that the Challani report of accused appellant under section 107,116,151 CR.P.C is on record as Paper No.7/46. The perusal of the same reveals that the appellant and the informant are Pattidar, which means they are relating to same ancestral. It is also mentioned that there was dispute of land in between them since long and on 19th January, 2005, there was scuffling on account of old enmity. The police mentioned that if they would not be arrested some serious cognizable offence may be committed. Hence to prevent such commission of crime both were arrested. The learned trial court taken it from a different angle and stated that it gives a reason to explain the delay in lodging the FIR because he was arrest and when he was released on bail, he went to lodge the first information report.
In my opinion this angle of consideration of Challani report is wholly unwarranted because there is nothing on record to establish that from 15 to 19 January, 2005 or prior to his arrest, the informant was in police custody, therefore, I am of the view that this circumstance is also gave reason to falsely implicate the appellant.
In Raju v. State of Madhya Pradesh; (2008) 15 SCC 133, the Supreme Court after taking into consideration the several authorities of it own consider the amendment in statute relating to sexual offences and the effect of false implication in para 10, 11and 12 at page 141 observed as follows:
"10. The aforesaid judgements lay down the basic principle that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the same time they cannot be universally and mechanically applied to the facts of every case of sexual assault which comes before the court.
11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.
12.Reference has been made in State of Punjab v.Gurmit Singh case ((1996) 2 SCC 384) to the amendments in 1983 to Sections 375 and 376 of the Penal Code making the penal provisions relating to rape more stringent, and also to Section 114-A of the Evidence Act with respect to a presumption to be raised with regard to allegations of consensual sex in a case of alleged rape. It is however significant that Sections 113-A and 113-B too were inserted in the Evidence Act by the same amendment by which certain presumptions in cases of abatement of suicide and dowry death have been raised against the accused. These two sections, thus, raise a clear presumption in favour of the prosecution but no similar presumption with respect to rape is visualised as the presumption under Section 114-A is extremely restricted in its applicability. This clearly shows that insofar as allegations of rape are concerned, the evidence of a prosecutrix must be examined as that of an injured witness whose presence at the spot is probable but it can never be presumed that her statement should, without exception, be taken as the gospel truth. Additionally, her statement can, at best, be adjudged on the principle that ordinarily no injured witness would tell a lie or implicate a person falsely. We believe that it is under these principles that this case, and others such as this one, need to be examined."
In Lalliram v. State of Madhya Pradesh; (2008) 10 SCC 69, their Lordships of Hon,ble Supreme Court observed with regard to absence of injuries on the person and private parts of the prosecutrix in paras 11 at page 71:
"11. It is true that injury is not a sine qua non for deciding whether rape has been committed. But it has to be decided on the factual matrix of each case. As was observed by this Court in Pratap Misra v. State of Orissa (1977)3 SCC 41, where allegation is of rape by many persons and several times but no injury is noticed that certainly is an important factor and if the prosecutrix's version is credible, then no corroboration is necessary. But if the prosecutrix's version is not credible then there would be need for corroboration. (See Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana (2004) 4 SCC 379)"
In Narayan Alias Naran vs. State of Rajasthan; (2007) 6 SCC 465 their Lordships' of Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that when the evidence of prosecutrix is full of contradictions and is so artificial that it cannot be accepted, it was held, though evidence of prosecutrix can alone sustain conviction of the accused without corroboration from any other evidence, on fact conviction cannot be allowed to sustain.
Apex Court in Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr Vs. Naz Foundation & others; (2014) 1 SCC 1 what amount of agony a person face after charge of rape cannot be imagine nor expressed in words. He virtually lost everything in the society. He suffered a great stroke in his reputation and status in the society and amongst his family members and friends.
Having considered all these facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the prosecution has utterly failed to establish his case beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant, who is in jail, is entitled for the benefit of doubt. The appeal deserves to be allowed and the conviction and sentence is liable to be set aside.
Resultantly, the appeal is allowed. The appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him under Section 376 IPC. The appellant is in jail. He be released forthwith if he is not wanted in any other case. His bail bonds are cancelled. Sureties are discharged.
Copy of this judgement be sent to trial Court along with record of lower court for compliance.
Senior Registrar of this Court shall also ensure the compliance of this order so that the appellant may be released forthwith without any further delay.
Dated:15.01.2015 akverma