Central Administrative Tribunal - Lucknow
Prem Lal Gautam vs Income Tax Department on 2 July, 2025
CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors.
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
LUCKNOW BENCH LUCKNOW
ORIGINAL APPLICATION No. 51 of 2022
Order reserved on: 22.04.2025
Order pronounced on: 02.07.2025
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil Kumar Ojha, Member-Judicial
Hon'ble Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Member-Administrative
Prem Lal Gautam, aged about 50 years, son of Shri Ram Shankar,
resident of D-544, Rajajipuram, Lucknow-226017.
.....Applicant
By Advocate: Shri Mohd. Khalid
VERSUS
1. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Finance,
Government of India, North Block, New Delhi.
2. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1, Lucknow.
3. Disciplinary Authority, Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1,
Lucknow.
.....Respondents
By Advocate: Smt. Prayagmati Gupta
ORDER
Per Hon'ble Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Member-Administrative In this case relating to departmental proceedings, the applicant has sought the following reliefs:
"I. Issue an order or direction quashing/setting aside the memorandum/order dated 15.01.2021 (Annexure No. 1) and any consequential departmental inquiry/proceedings that may be conducted in pursuance of the memorandum/order dated 15.01.2021. II. Issue such other order or direction which this Hon'ble Tribunal deems just and proper protecting the rights and interest of the applicants in the circumstances of instant case.
III. Award costs of Original Application in favour of the applicant."
2.1 The facts of the case are that the applicant, while working as Stenographer under the respondents, was implicated in a criminal case Page 1 of 14 CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors. under section 7 and 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act, hereafter) and convicted by the Learned Special Judge vide order dated 30.09.2003 and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 5,000/- fine under section 7 and to two years' rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 5,000/- fine under section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the PC Act. On appeal, Hon'ble High Court was pleased to suspend the order dated 30.09.2003 vide order dated 14.10.2003 in Criminal Appeal No. 1610 of 2003. The respondents initiated departmental proceedings against the applicant with the issue of charge sheet dated 15.01.2021. Aggrieved, the applicant has preferred this OA.
2.2 The matter was heard on 02.05.2022 on interim relief which was granted by this Tribunal in the following terms:
"12. In the event therefore as per analysis above, the IR is upheld and in the interest of justice the memorandum/order dated 15.01.2021 and any consequential departmental inquiry/proceedings that may be conducted in pursuance of the memorandum/order dated 15.01.2021 are stayed till the pendency of this OA."
(emphasis supplied) 2.3 On 12.03.2024, the OA came to be dismissed for want of prosecution.
2.4 The enquiry report was submitted by the enquiry officer on 27.01.2025.
2.5 On 05.02.2025, the delay of nine months in filing the recall application was condoned, order dated 12.03.2024 was recalled and the OA was restored.
2.6 The applicant filed MA No. 640 of 2025 for further direction restraining the respondents from passing any further order or taking any action and the following order was passed by this Tribunal on 07.04.2025:
Page 2 of 14
CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors.
"Heard learned counsel for applicant, learned counsel for respondents and perused the records.
List the matter on 22.04.2025 at the top of the list for final hearing. In the meantime, no further action shall be taken against the applicant.
It is clarified that if adjournment application is moved by the applicant, interim order shall stand vacated automatically."
(emphasis supplied) 3.1 The applicant contends that the respondents have arbitrarily initiated departmental proceedings after a delay of more than 21 years against the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in UCO Bank vs Rajendra Shankar Shukla (2018) 14 SCC 92 and State of AP vs N Radhakrishnan (1998) 4 SCC 154. Further, no reasons have been recorded for initiating departmental proceedings violating principles of natural justice as laid down in Whirlpool Corporation vs Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai &Ors (1998) 8 SCC 1.
3.2 It is further contended that the documents, witnesses and charges in the departmental proceedings being exactly the same as in the criminal case, the departmental proceedings should be quashed as per the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Capt M Paul Anthony vs Bharat Gold Mines Ltd &Ors (1999) 3 SCC 679.
3.3 It is also contended that the order of this Tribunal dated 12.03.2024 dismissing the OA for want of prosecution was never communicated or served to the applicant as required under rule 22 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987. 3.4 The applicant finally contends that as per the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of cases the interim order is re- instated automatically once the recall/restoration application is allowed [Vareed Jacob vs Sosamma Geevarghese & Ors (2004) 6 SCC 378]. It is averred that, consequently, the interim relief granted by this Tribunal was never vacated. It is argued that the disciplinary authority Page 3 of 14 CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors. acted maliciously in issuing order dated 12.03.2025, i.e., after the restoration of this OA on 05.02.2025, stating that the enquiry report was submitted on 27.01.2025.
4.1 The respondents, vide their counter affidavit filed on 22.09.2022, state that the applicant's conviction vide order dated 30.09.2003 was suspended by Hon'ble High Court on 14.10.2003 and the Trial Court records were summoned. Due to non availability of material examined by the Trial Court, collection of evidence consumed time and the departmental proceedings could not be initiated earlier. 4.2 The respondents contend that it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in several cases that merely because criminal trial is pending, the departmental enquiry involving the same charges, as involved in the criminal proceedings, is not barred [State of Rajasthan vs B K Meena & Ors (1996) 6 SCC 417; Capt M Paul Anthony vs Bharat Gold Mines Ltd (1999) 3 SCC 679; Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan & Ors vs T Srinivas (2004) 6 SCALE 467; and Noida Entrepreneurs Association vs NOIDA JT (2007) 2 SC 620]. 4.3 The respondents aver that the applicant remained a silent spectator for about 9 months after dismissal of the OA on 12.03.2024 for want of prosecution and moved MA No. 3178 of 2024 and 3179 of 2024 only when the enquiry proceedings were near completion. The enquiry officer submitted the enquiry report on 27.01.2025 and the OA was restored on 05.02.2025.
4.4 It is contended that the interim order dated 02.05.2022 was operative while this OA was alive, and after the OA was dismissed in default on 12.03.2024 it could not have restrained the departmental proceedings in the interregnum till the OA's restoration.
5. We have heard both the parties.
Page 4 of 14CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors. 6.0 Delay 6.1 The first objection raised by the applicant is regarding the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. On the aspect of delay, it is advantageous to refer to the following observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. N. Radhakishan 1998 (4) SCC 154:
"19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations."
(emphasis supplied) 6.2 In addition to the above, in a recent judgment dated 01.04.2025 in Amresh Shrivastava vs The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors (Civil Appeal No. 10590 of 2024) involving belated issue of charge sheet to a Tehsildar for granting land settlement in favour of ineligible persons, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:
"17. As to the second question, regarding whether delay is a ground for stopping the departmental proceedings at the stage of the chargesheet Page 5 of 14 CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors.
itself, suffice it to say that this varies from case to case. However, in the instant case where there is unexplained inordinate delay in initiating departmental proceedings despite the alleged misconduct being within the knowledge of the department, but still no departmental proceedings are initiated, the answer must go in favour of the employee. However, there may be cases where the department was not even aware of such irregularities or the misconduct, which is of such a nature that it is indicative, based on material considerations of factors other than merit, such as extraneous influences and gratifications. In such cases, such a delay, by itself would not be a valid ground to scuttle the initiation of the process of departmental proceedings."
(emphasis supplied) 6.3 It follows from the above that unexplained inordinate delay can be fatal to the disciplinary proceedings if the nature of charges does not involve misconduct relating to extraneous influences and gratifications. 6.4 In the case at hand, while considering the matter for grant of interim relief on 02.05.2022, this Tribunal observed:
"11. In summum bonum, quite plainly the respondents do not have any explanation for the delayed initiation of DP or identicality of charges in charge memorandum and the criminal case..."
(emphasis supplied) It is relevant to note that at the time of passing the order dated 02.05.022 on the interim relief, the respondents had not filed their counter affidavit which eventually came to be filed on 22.09.2022 and in which the respondents provided the explanation for delay in initiating the departmental proceedings.
6.5 According to the respondents, the reason for delay is that the applicant's conviction vide order dated 30.09.2003 was suspended by Hon'ble High Court on 14.10.2003 and the Trial Court records were summoned. Due to non availability of material examined by the Trial Court, collection of evidence consumed time and the departmental proceedings could not be initiated earlier. Now, while there is no doubt that there has been considerable delay in issue of the charge sheet, it is also a fact that obtaining material relating to criminal case involving charges under the PC Act is more often than not a time consuming Page 6 of 14 CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors. exercise for the disciplinary authorities. In view of this position, the respondents' explanation for the delay cannot be given short shrift. 6.6 The other relevant aspect of the matter is the nature of the charge. A perusal of the impugned memorandumdated 15.01.2021 reveals that the charge against the applicant is that he demanded and accepted illegal gratification of Rs. 1,000/- from one Amrendra Mohan for handing over the Income Tax Clearance Certificate. It is observed that the nature of the charge against the applicant is grave as it pertains to bribery.
6.7 Coming to the cases cited by the applicant, it is noted that in N Radhakishan (supra), charges were framed in verbatim without particularizing the role played by each of the officers charged and there was no explanation whatsoever for delay in concluding the enquiry proceedings. The reference to Whirlpool Corporation (supra) is perplexing to us as the matter therein pertained to an entirely different area of trademark.In UCO Bank (supra) the main issue was that a fair opportunity was not afforded to the employee to defend himself by denying him financial resources. We find that the facts and circumstances of the cases cited by the applicant are materially different and are of no avail to the applicant's case. 6.8 In view of the availability of the explanation for the delay and the grave nature of the charge against the applicant, we are of the opinion that the disciplinary proceedings cannot be held to have been rendered void because of the delay.
7.0 Simultaneous Criminal and Departmental Proceedings 7.1 The difference between the departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings and whether departmental proceedings should be stayed pending criminal proceedings has been elucidated citing the case Page 7 of 14 CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors. law by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Noida Entrepreneurs Association (supra) in the following manner:
"... The conceptual difference between departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings have been highlighted by this Court in several cases. Reference may be made to Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others v. T. Srinivas [2004 (7) SCC 442], Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Others v. Sarvesh Berry [2005(10) SCC 471] and Uttaranchal Road Transport Corpn. v. Mansaram Nainwal [2006(6) SCC 366].
The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution is two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society, or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'). Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the department enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances.
A three-judge Bench of this Court in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Ors [1997 (2) SCC 699] analysed the legal position in great detail on the above lines.
The aforesaid position was also noted in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena and Ors [1996 (6) SCC 417].
There can be no straight jacket formula as to in which case the departmental proceedings are to be stayed. There may be cases where the trial of the case gets prolonged by the dilatory method adopted by delinquent official. He cannot be permitted to, on one hand, prolong criminal case and at the same time contend that the departmental Page 8 of 14 CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors.
proceedings should be stayed on the ground that the criminal case is pending.
In Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd [1999 (3) SCC 679], this Court indicated some of the fact situations which would govern the question whether departmental proceedings should be kept in abeyance during pendency of a criminal case. In paragraph 22 conclusions which are deducible from various decisions were summarised. They are as follows:
(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.
(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.
(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge- sheet.
(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.
(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest."
(emphasis supplied) 7.2 In the instant case, the criminal case was adjudicated by the Trial Court on 30.09.2003 resulting in the applicant's conviction and, therefore, there is no question of the departmental proceedings, which have been initiated much later, from prejudicing the applicant's defence in the criminal trial. As per our understanding, the appeal against conviction is pending final adjudication in Hon'ble High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1610 of 2003. Given these facts and circumstances and in light of the ratio decidendi in Noida Entrepreneurs Association Page 9 of 14 CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors. (supra) and Capt M Paul Anthony (supra) there is no bar in initiating departmental proceedings against the applicant, in our opinion. 8.0 Non-communication of Order dated 12.03.2024 8.1 The applicant contends that the order dated 12.03.2024 was never communicated or served to him as required under rule 22 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987. Rule 22 is reproduced below:
"22. Communication of order to parties.- (1) Every interim order, granting or refusing or modifying interim relief and final order shall be communicated to the applicant and to the concerned respondent or to their Counsels, either by hand delivery or by post free of cost.
Provided that unless ordered otherwise by a Bench, a copy of the final order need not be sent to any respondent who has not entered appearance.
Provided further that when the petitioner or the respondent is represented by a Counsel, under a single Vakalatnama, only one copy shall be supplied to such Counsel as mentioned therein.
(2) If the applicant or the respondent to any proceeding requires a copy of any document or proceeding the same shall be supplied to him on such terms and conditions on payment of such fees as may be fixed by the Chairman by general or special order."
(emphasis supplied) 8.2 It is noted from the case records that none was present on behalf of the applicant to press the OA on 19.02.2024 whereupon, in the interest of justice, one opportunity was provided to the applicant to press the OA and the case was directed to be listed on 12.03.2024. However, on 12.03.2024 also, none was present on behalf of the applicant to press the OA, resulting in the dismissal of OA for want of prosecution, an order pronounced in the Tribunal, immediately after the hearing, in terms of rule 105 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Rules of Practice, 1993.
8.3 In regard to the communication of the order dated 12.03.2024 to the applicant, the Registry has furnished the following report:
"Registry is providing the copy of the interim order, granting or refusing or modifying interim relief and final order to the applicant and to the Page 10 of 14 CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors.
concerned respondent or to their counsel either by hand delivery or by post free of cost in terms of Rule 22 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987. The OA No. 51/2022 was dismissed for want of prosecution on 12.03.2024 and the same was uploaded in ACIS portal on the same day i.e. on 12.03.2024 and certified copy of the order was prepared on 15.03.2024 for providing to the concerned parties as per prevailing practice of CAT Lucknow Bench. The date of preparation of the certified copy is mentioned in the original order sheet. When certified copy of the order is provided to the concerned parties their receiving is taken on a register. During the shifting of CAT Lucknow Bench office from old building to new building receiving register of year 2024 was misplaced and this is being searched by the concerning staff. In the absence of receiving register supply of order dated 12.03.2024 to the applicant or his counsel cannot be confirmed. It has been confirmed from dispatch records that the order dated 12.03.2024 was not sent to the applicant or his counsel by post. However the orders are uploaded on the ACIS portal immediately after these are passed by the Hon'ble Court and these are available in public domain and can be seen on the official website of the CAT i.e. www.cgat.gov.in and concerned parties also may access the orders from official website of CAT. Availability of the Hon'ble Court orders on official website (public domain) also supplements the compliance of Rule 22 of CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987."
(emphasis supplied) It is evident from the above, that the communication of order dated 12.03.2024 to the applicant or his counsel either by hand delivery or by post free of cost in terms of rule 22 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987, cannot be confirmed. In such a scenario, the benefit of non communication of order dated 22.03.2024 must accrue to the applicant.
8.4 The benefit to the applicant has two aspects. One is the condonation of delay that might have been caused in filing the recall application due to non-communication of order dated 22.03.2024 in terms of rule 22. This aspect has lost its relevance with the condonation of delay and recall of the OA on 05.02.2025. The other aspect is the validity of action taken by the respondents to the disadvantage of the applicant in the period during which the OA stood dismissed for non- prosecution; this aspect is covered in the discussion in the following paragraph.
Page 11 of 14 CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors. 9.0 Revival of Interim Relief 9.1 The final contention of the applicant is that the interim order dated 02.05.2022 stood re-instated automatically in terms of Vareed Jacob (supra) when the application for recall of the OA (which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 12.03.2024) was allowed by this Tribunal on 05.02.2025 and so the interim relief granted by this Tribunal was never vacated. It is argued that in view of this position, the order dated 12.03.2025 of the disciplinary authority stating that the enquiry report was submitted on 27.01.2025 is not legally valid. 9.2 In Vareed Jacob (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a 2:1 majority judgment, observed as follows:
"The facts of the present case and the controversy in this case is covered by the provisions of Order 39 and not Order 38.
In the case of Shiva v. Shamappa, reported in AIR (1968) Mysore 238, it has been held that the question whether the restoration of the suit revives ancillary orders passed before the dismissal of the suit depends upon the terms in which the order of dismissal is passed and the terms in which the suit is restored. If the Court dismisses the suit for default, without any reference to the ancillary orders passed earlier, then the interim order shall revive as and when the suit is restored. However, if the Court dismisses the suit specifically vacating the ancillary orders, then restoration will not revive such ancillary orders. This was a case under Order 39."
(emphasis supplied) The above judgment, no doubt, concludes that the interim order revives as and when the suit is restored provided that no reference was made to the ancillary orders passed earlier when the suit was dismissed in default, which is indeed the case in this OA. However, we are finally adjudicating the OA in this judgment and order. The question as to what happens to the interim order when the suit is finally decided is covered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment dated 25.02.2022 in The State of Uttar Pradesh vs Prem Chopra (Civil Appeal No. 2417 of 2022), relevant parts of which are extracted below: Page 12 of 14
CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors.
"19... this Court in Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. and Others v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Others (1997) 5 SCC 772, has held that an order of stay which is granted during the pendency of a writ petition/suit or other proceeding comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceedings and it is the duty of the court in such cases to put the parties in the same position that they would have been in but for the interim order of the court...
20. In Rajasthan Housing Board and Others v. Krishna Kumari (2005) 13 SCC 151, this Court observed that Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 provides for grant of temporary injunction at the risk and responsibility of the person who obtains it and, if ultimately case is decided against such person, he would be liable to pay interest on the arrears of any amount due which had been stayed by the injunction order. The legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that an act of the Court shall prejudice no man, becomes applicable in such a case.
21. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. V. State of M.P. and Others (2003) 8 SCC 648, the writ petitioner therein had argued that interest accrued due to nonpayment of enhanced amount of royalty was protected by a judicial order of an interim nature and, therefore, merely because the writ was finally dismissed, the writ petitioner should not be held liable for payment of interest so long as money was withheld under the protective umbrella of the injunction order.
This submission was rejected by this Court by holding as under:
"The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 CPC speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or modified but also includes an order on a par with a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so as to include therein almost all the kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree or order. The interim order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final decision going against the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the successful party at the end would be justified with all expediency in demanding compensation and being placed in the same situation in which it would have been if the interim order would not have been passed against it. The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim or der of the court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost; and it is the duty of the court to do so unless it feels that in the facts and on the circumstances of the case, the restitution far from meeting the ends of justice, would rather defeat the same. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to principles of restitution is an obligation of the party, who has gained by the interim order of the court, so as to wipe out the effect of the interim order passed which, in view of the reasoning adopted by the court at the stage of final decision, the court earlier would not or ought not to have passed. There is nothing wrong in an effort being made to restore the parties to the same position in which they would have been if the interim order would not have existed."
(emphasis supplied) Page 13 of 14 CAT,Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00051 of 2022 Prem Lal Gautam Vs. UOI & Ors. It emerges from the above that the applicant cannot enjoy the benefit of an interim order to the detriment of the interest of the respondents if he loses his case in the final decision. Applying the same reasoning, it can be said that the right of enjoying the benefit of interim order, notwithstanding any adverse action taken by the respondents, during the period from dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution up to its delayed recall owing to non-communication of the order dismissing the suit for non-prosecution to the applicant, cannot accrue to the applicant if the applicant loses the suit eventually. 9.3 In conclusion, the contentions of the applicant having been negated in the paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the applicant is not entitled to the benefit of the interim order dated 02.05.2022 as well, notwithstanding the non-communication of order dated 12.03.2024 dismissing the OA in default as per rule 22 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, in our view.
10.1 In view of the foregoing, the applicant is not entitled to any relief. This OA is dismissed accordingly.
10.2 Pending MAs, if any, are also disposed of.
10.3 The Parties shall bear their own costs.
(Pankaj Kumar) (Justice Anil Kumar Ojha)
Member (A) Member (J)
vidya
Vidya Ben Digitally signed by Vidya Ben
Waghela
Waghela Date: 2025.07.02 16:51:54 +05'30'
Page 14 of 14