Madras High Court
S.Ilanahai vs The State Of Mumbai on 13 January, 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS RESERVED ON : 11.12.2014 PRONOUNCED ON : 13.01.2015 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU Crl.O.P.No.22498 of 2014 and M.P.No.1 of 2014 S.Ilanahai .. Petitioner - Vs - 1. The State of Mumbai, Rep. by the Sr.Inspector of Police, Marine Drive Police Station, Mumbai 400 020. 2. The State of Tamil Nadu, Rep. by the Home Secretary, Fort St. George, Chennai. 3. KJMC Corporate Advisors (India) Ltd., Rep. by Legal Assistant and Authorised Rep. Mr.Raju Bhimarao Shinde, Office at 168, Atlanta, Nariman Point, Mumbai 400 021. 4. State Bank of India, Commercial Branch, Bombay Mutual Building, 232, N.S.C. Bose Road, Chennai 600 001. 5. Canbank Venture Capital Fund Ltd., 6th Floor, Naveen Complex, No.14, M.G.Road, Bangalore 560 001. .. Respondents Prayer:- Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to call for the records culminating in M.E.C.R.No.03/2014 on the file of the 1st Respondent and quash the same or in the alternative transfer the proceedings to any competent authority in Chennai where the alleged offence if any took place. For Petitioner : Mr.AR.L.Sunderesan, SC for Mr.J.Sivanandaraaj For Respondent 2: Mr.M.Maharaja Addl. Public Prosecutor For Respondent 3: Mr.V.Lakshminarayanan and Sumit Patni For Respondent 5: Mr.Vinod Kumar - - - - - O R D E R
"Does the inherent power of this Court, saved under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, extend beyond the territorial limits of this Court so as to quash an F.I.R. registered within the territorial limits of another High Court ? and "whether the civil law concept of cause of action could be imported to criminal law ?" Primarily these questions and incidentally, whether the writ jurisdiction could be invoked for the said purpose, have arisen for consideration in this petition.
2. The petitioner is the Managing Director of a company known as M/s.Cetex Petrochemicals Limited having its business place at Manali, Chennai. For the purpose of expansion plans of the said company, the petitioner was in need of funds to the tune of Rs.75,00,00,000/-. The petitioner approached the 4th respondent for funding and finally an understanding was reached between the 4th respondent and the petitioner. As per the understanding, the 4th respondent will provide Rs.50,00,00,000/- as loan on condition that the petitioner shall obtain investment of Rs.25,00,00,000/- through equity.
3. The 3rd respondent is yet another company having its registered office at 168, Atlanta, Nariman Point, Mumbai and one Mr.Raju Bhimrao Shinde was working as a legal assistant in the said company. The Chairman of the said company is one Mr.Inderchand Jain. The said company is mainly dealing with providing loans / share capital from the banks and financial institutions to the companies who need loans / share capital.
4. The petitioner company, after having entered into an agreement with the State Bank of India, the 4th respondent herein, as enumerated herein above, during the months of August and September 2011, approached the Chairman of the 3rd respondent company and apprised him about the proposed expansion of the company's activities to the tune of Rs.75,00,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy five crores) and the arrangement the petitioner had with the State Bank of India for loan of Rs.50,00,00,000/- (Rupees fifty crores). It is alleged that the petitioner requested the third respondent company to give them professional service to arrange for Rs.25,00,00,000/- (Rupees twenty five crores) by way of equity shares. That was agreed upon by the Managing Director and accordingly the petitioner was asked to give a detailed information of their company's list of directors, share holdings and bank balance sheets of the last five years. The third respondent told the petitioner that on fulfilment of the above requirements the third respondent will start the work for collecting share capital.
5. After the above discussions, again the petitioner visited the office of the third respondent in Mumbai on three or four occasions and submitted all the necessary papers for the purpose of getting professional service from the third respondent. Having been satisfied with the fulfilment of the papers, the third respondent executed a letter (agreement) on 06.09.2011. In the said agreement, it has been stated that the petitioner will have to pay 3% amount as the fees for the services. Having agreed with the said terms, the petitioner signed the agreement.
6. Thereafter, it is stated that the third respondent prepared a proposal and sent the same to various financial companies, made follow up action and for that the third respondent company's manpower, time, skill were all spent on the hope that the petitioner was surely going to raise Rs.50,00,00,000/- from the State Bank of India. Eventually, the third respondent managed to make arrangement with yet another company known as M/s.C.V.C. Fund Limited (the fifth respondent) who was prepared to give Rs.25,00,00,000/- share capital to the petitioner company. But unfortunately, at the end, the petitioner did not secure loan from the State Bank of India to the tune of Rs.50,00,00,000/-. As a matter of fact, the petitioner had not even entered into any hypothecation agreement with the bank. In those circumstances, the petitioner had to cancel the authority letter and thus he stopped all further transactions with the third respondent. So, the third respondent was forced to abruptly stop the proposal to get share capital from M/s.C.V.C. Fund Limited, the fifth respondent. In the meanwhile, out of the commission of 3% as already assured, the petitioner had paid Rs.7,00,000/-. Had the agreement been continued and honoured, the third respondent would have got Rs.75,00,000/- as commission for getting share capital of Rs.25,00,00,000/- from M/s.C.V.C. Fund Limited. Now the third respondent has suffered financial loss of Rs.68,00,000/-. This act of the petitioner, according to the third respondent, amounts to cheating.
7. With these allegations, Mr.Raju Bhimrao Shinde, the legal assistant of the third respondent company, made a private complaint to the 8th Court at Esplanade, in Mumbai, who in turn referred the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the first respondent police. On the said complaint, now the first respondent has registered a case in M.E.C.R.No.3 of 2014 under Section 420 of I.P.C. against the petitioner. Seeking to quash the said F.I.R., the petitioner is before this Court with this petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
8. I have heard the learned senior counsel Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan appearing for the petitioner, Mr.V.Lakshminarayanan and Mr.Sumit Patni, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent, Mr.M.Maharaja, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the second respondent and Mr.Vindo Kumar, learned counsel for the fifth respondent. No notice was ordered to the respondents 1 and 4. I have also perused the records carefully.
9. Mr.V.Lashminarayan, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent raised serious objections regarding the maintainability of this petition before this Court on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, in as much as, according to him, the offence leading to the registration of the case was committed only in Mumbai and the situs of the authority viz., the first respondent who has registered the case is in Mumbai and therefore, if at all the petitioner is entitled to approach any Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is only the Hon'ble Bombay High Court at Mumbai and not this Court.
10. But the learned senior counsel Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan appearing for the petitioner would submit that on facts, it is not correct to state that the entire cause of action has arisen only in Mumbai. He would submit that a part of cause of action has arisen in Chennai, where the petitioner has got his business place. According to him, when a part of cause of action has arisen within the State of Tamil Nadu, though the case has been registered by the first respondent in Maharashtra State, this Court has jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to entertain the petition.
11. Since the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this petition is at issue, let me, at the first, deal with the same. According to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, it is the cause of action, either in full or in part, which gives jurisdiction to this Court to entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not the situs of the authority who has registered the criminal case. In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Navinchandra N.Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640.
12. I have carefully gone through the said judgment. That was a case where the Hon'ble Supreme Court had to consider the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court for the purpose of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not for Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that case, the criminal case was registered by the police at Shillong and that was sought to be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the allegation that the entire cause of action for registration of the case had happened only in Mumbai and no part of cause of action had occurred in the State of Maharashtra. The Bombay High Court by judgment dated 23.03.1999, dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the quashing of the F.I.R. filed in Meghalaya by the Bombay High Court would be without jurisdiction.
13. When this conclusion of the Bombay High Court was examined by a two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was obviously concerned only with Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court gave emphasis to clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows:
Clause 2 of Article 226: .....The Power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
14. Having considered the above clause, the Hon'ble Supreme Court (Hon'ble Mr.Justice D.P.Mohapatra) in paragraph 17 had to say this:
17. From the provision in clause (2) of Article 226 it is clear that the maintainability or otherwise of the writ petition in the High Court depends on whether the cause of action for filing the same arose, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court.
15. Then the Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to examine the meaning of the expression cause of action and in paragraph 27 Hon'ble Mr.Justice D.P.Mohapatra has held as follows:
27. Tested in the light of the principles laid down in the cases noted above the judgment of the High Court under challenge is unsustainable. The High Court failed to consider all the relevant facts necessary to arrive at a proper decision on the question of maintainability of the writ petition, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Court based its decision on the sole consideration that the complainant had filed the complaint at Shillong in the State of Meghalaya and the petitioner had prayed for quashing the said complaint. The High Court did not also consider the alternative prayer made in the writ petition that a writ of mandamus be issued to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. The High Court also did not take note of the averments in the writ petition that filing of the complaint at Shillong was a mala fide move on the part of the complainant to harass and pressurise the petitioners to reverse the transaction for transfer of shares. The relief sought in the wirt petition may be one of the relevant criteria for consideration of the question but cannot be the sole consideration in the matter. On the averments made in the writ petition gist of which has been noted earlier it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action for filing the writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. (Emphasis added)
16. In his concurring judgment, Hon'ble Mr.Justice K.T.Thomas has, at the outset, identified the following issue:
Whether the High Court of Bombay has jurisdiction to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of any step taken or to be taken pursuant to the FIR registered by the Shillong Police in the State of Meghalaya ?
17. After having considered various other judgments, in paragraph 43, the Hon'ble Mr.Justice K.T.Thomas has held as follows:
43. We make it clear that the mere fact that FIR was registered in a particular State is not the sole criterion to decide that no cause of action has arisen even partly within the territorial limits of jurisdiction of another State. Nor are we to be understood that any person can create a fake cause of action or even concoct one by simply jutting into the territorial limits of another State or by making a sojourn or even a permanent residence therein. The place of residence of a person moving a High Court is not the criterion to determine the contours of the cause of action in that particular writ petition. The High Court before which the writ petition is filed must ascertain whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. It depends upon the facts in each case.
18. From the above judgment, it is crystal clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the view that the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction a part of cause of action has arisen has also got jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition in view of Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, though the situs of the authority against whom the writ petition has been filed is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said High Court.
19. The said view in Navinchandra N.Majithia case (cited supra) has been reiterated subsequently by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Ramchandra Kavalekar Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2009) 11 SCC 286.
20. A close reading of these judgements would go to show that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, for the purpose of territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, took note of the cause of action for such a writ petition as has been dealt with in Clause (2) of Article 226 of The Constitution of India. At this juncture we need to know the jurisprudential history as to how clause (2) of Article 226 came into being.
21. Indisputably, as Article 226 originally stood enacted, clause (2) was not there in the Constitution. Article 226 then stood as follows:-
"Every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs ....." (Emphasis added)
22. Post-Constitution, when the question of territorial jurisdiction for issuing writ under Article 226 of the Constitution came up for consideration before various High Courts, many High Courts, including this High Court, took the view that the High Court can exercise power under Article 226 even in respect of the tribunals or the authorities situated outside the territorial limits of its jurisdiction, if such tribunal or authority exercises powers in such a manner as to affect the fundamental rights of the persons residing or authority carrying on the business within the jurisdiction of such High Court [vide M.K.Ranganathan and others v. The Madras Electric Tramways, AIR 1952 Mad 659]. The correctness of all these judgements was, later on, examined by a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210 wherein, the Constitution Bench disapproved the view taken by the High Courts in the following words:-
"The power of the High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the two-fold limitation that such writs cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court either by residence or location within the territories subject to its jurisdiction."
23. After the above authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was made manifest that the jurisdiction of the High Court, for the purpose of Article 226, can be tested on the basis of the residence or location of the person or authority. The Parliament took note of the difficulties experienced by the citizens on account of the above constitution bench judgement to have access to constitutional remedies under writ jurisdiction of the High Courts and, therefore, it decided to amend the Constitution of India. Accordingly, by means of 15th Amendment to the Constitution of India, clause (1A) was added to Article 226. The same has been reproduced and renumbered as clause (2) of Article 226 as per 42nd Amendment of the Constitution. Thus, clause (1A) of Article 226 was introduced to restore the view taken by various High Courts including the Madras High Court so as to confer power on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India based on the cause of action either wholly or in part. Thus, after the introduction of Clause (1A) {new Clause (2)} to Article 226 of the Constitution , it is clear that the High Court can issue a writ, though the person or authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction provided the cause of action either wholly or partly arises within its territorial jurisdiction.
24. The term "cause of action" has not , however been defined in the Constitution of India. Neither has it been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure as well, though the term cause of action has been employed in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. But, the said provision was interpreted consistently by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to say that the term "cause of action" means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to judgement of the court.
25. This interpretation of the term "cause of action" made for the purpose of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure was imported to clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of judgements. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 207, in para 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"The question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition a writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Court's jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual injury or threat thereof."
26. After having referred to the said judgement and few more judgements in Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 329, in para 16, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"Regard being had to the discussion made hereinabove, there cannot be any doubt that the question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the territorial limit of the Courts jurisdiction"
27. From the above settled position of law, it is crystal clear that for the purpose of entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in the light of clause (2) of Article 226, it is the cause of action, either in full or in part, which confers jurisdiction upon the High Court concerned and not merely the situs of the authority or the person.
28. Now, the question is, "whether the concept of "cause of action" has got relevance to the criminal law, more particularly, for the purpose of Section 482 of Cr.P.C.?"
29. The term "cause of action" is unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 177 of the Code speaks of ordinary place of inquiry and trial. It reads as follows:
"Section 177: Ordinary place of inquiry and trial:- Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed."
30. Thus, Section 177 confers jurisdiction on a Court based on the place of commission of the crime. Similar term is employed in the other provisions of the Chapter XIII of the Code also. Thus the jurisdiction of the Court is decided only on the basis of the place of commission of the crime. If the commission of the crime is partly within the local area of one Court and partly in another Court, as provided under Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it may be enquired or tried by any one of the Courts having jurisdiction over any such local area.
31. The term "The Court" as employed in Chapter XIII means any Criminal Court. Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with Classes of Criminal Courts. According to the said provision, the High Court itself is a Criminal Court. The term "High Court" has been defined under Section 2(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads as follows:
"Section 2(e) "High Court" means,-
(i) in relation to any State, the High Court for the State;
(ii) in relation to a Union Territory to which the jurisdiction of the High Court for a State has been extended by law, that High Court;
(iii) in relation to any other Union Territory, the highest Court of criminal appeal for that territory other than the Supreme Court of India;"
32. Under Section 26 of the Code, subject to the other provisions of the Code, any offence under the Indian Penal Code may be tried by the High Court. From this provision, it is manifestly clear that the High Court can try an offence under the Indian Penal Code if the same has been committed either in full or in part within the territorial limits of the Said High Court. So far as the power of the High Court to entertain an appeal, revision, reference or petition for transfer is concerned, the situs of the Subordinate Court / Magistrate whose proceedings or order which is under challenge gives the jurisdiction to the High Court. So far as the inherent power saved under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, it has not been either expressly or impliedly stated that the power can be exercised beyond the territorial limits of the High Court based on the cause of action.
33. In Navinchandra N.Majithia case (cited supra) the term "cause of action" has been referred to as though it has got relevance to the criminal law. The Division Bench in the said judgment has interchangeably used the term "cause of action" for the term "place of commission of the crime". In the said judgment, though Hon'ble Justice K.T.Thomas, has made reference to Section 2(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not specifically dealt with the question as to whether the term "cause of action" has got any relevance to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
34. Subsequently, a larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court consisting of three Judges in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2014) 9 SCC 129 had occasion to notice the said judgment of the earlier Division Bench in Navinchandra N.Majithia case (cited supra), where the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the territorial jurisdiction for filing a complaint for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
35. Interestingly, the term "cause of action" is employed in section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. For better understanding, let us have a look into Section 142, which reads as follows:
"Section 142. Cognizance of offences.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause -of- action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138;
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138."
36. On the said judgment while referring to Navinchandra N.Majithia case, in paragraph 13, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
"13. We are alive to the possible incongruities that are fraught in extrapolating decisions relating to civil law onto criminal law, which includes importing the civil law concept of "cause of action" to criminal law which essentially envisages the place where a crime has been committed empowers the Court at that place with jurisdiction. In Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 7 SCC 640 this Court had to consider the powers of High Courts under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Noting the presence of the phrase "cause of action" therein it was clarified that since some events central to the investigation of the alleged crime asseverated in the Complaint had taken place in Mumbai and especially because the fundamental grievance was the falsity of the Complaint filed in Shillong, the writ jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court was unquestionably available. The infusion of the concept of "cause of action" into the criminal dispensation has led to subsequent confusion countenanced in High Courts......" (Emphasis added)
37. Having said so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 16 categorically held that the civil law concept of "cause of action" is not applicable to criminal law at all in this country. In paragraphs 16(1) and 16(2) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"16(1) Unlike civil actions, where the Plaintiff has the burden of filing and proving its case, the responsibility of investigating a crime, marshalling evidence and witnesses, rests with the State. Therefore, while the convenience of the Defendant in a civil action may be relevant, the convenience of the so called complainant/victim has little or no role to play in criminal prosecution. Keeping in perspective the presence of the word "ordinarily" in Section 177 of CrPC, we hasten to adumbrate that the exceptions to it are contained in the CrPC itself, that is, in the contents of the succeeding Section 178. The CrPC also contains an explication of "complaint" as any allegation to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action in respect of the commission of an offence; not being a police report. Prosecution ensues from a Complaint or police report for the purpose of determining the culpability of a person accused of the commission of a crime; and unlike a civil action or suit is carried out (or "prosecuted") by the State or its nominated agency. The principal definition of "prosecution" imparted by Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition is "(a) criminal action; the proceeding instituted and carried on by due process of law, before a competent Tribunal, for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of a person charged with crime."
These reflections are necessary because Section 142(b) of the NI Act contains the words, "the cause of action arises under the proviso to Section 138", resulting arguably, but in our opinion irrelevantly, to the blind borrowing of essentially civil law attributes onto criminal proceedings.
16(2) We reiterate that Section 178 admits of no debate that in criminal prosecution, the concept of "cause of action", being the bundle of facts required to be proved in a suit and accordingly also being relevant for the place of suing, is not pertinent or germane for determining territorial jurisdiction of criminal Trials. Section 178, CrPC explicitly states that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Section 179 is of similar tenor. We are also unable to locate any provision of the NI Act which indicates or enumerates the extraordinary circumstances which would justify a departure from the stipulation that the place where the offence is committed is where the prosecution has to be conducted. In fact, since cognizance of the offence is subject to the five Bhaskaran components or concomitants the concatenation of which ripens the already committed offence under Section 138 NI Act into a prosecutable offence, the employment of the phrase "cause of action" in Section 142 of the NI Act is apposite for taking cognizance, but inappropriate and irrelevant for determining commission of the subject offence. There are myriad examples of the commission of a crime the prosecution of which is dependent on extraneous contingencies such as obtainment of sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. Similar situation is statutorily created by Section 19 of the Environmental Protection Act 1986, Section 11 of the Central Sales Tax Act 1956, Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, Sections 132 and 308, CrPC, Section 137 of the Customs Act etc. It would be idle to contend that the offence comes into existence only on the grant of permission for prosecution, or that this permission constitutes an integral part of the offence itself. It would also be futile to argue that the place where the permission is granted would provide the venue for the trial. If sanction is not granted the offence does not vanish. Equally, if sanction is granted from a place other than where the crime is committed, it is the latter which will remain the place for its prosecution."
38. From the above judgment of the larger Bench, now it is crystal clear that what is relevant for the High Court to entertain a petition under Section 482, is not the cause of action as the term "cause of action" is foreign to criminal law. In Navinchandra N.Majithia case the Hon'ble Supreme Court had not dealt with the question as to whether the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised beyond the territorial limits of the High Court. As I have already pointed out, the Court only held that writ jurisdiction could be exercised beyond the territorial limits provided either the cause of action in full or in part has occurred outside the jurisdiction of the High Court concerned.
39. As we have already noticed, before the introduction of Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as per the Constitution Bench judgment in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, reported in AIR 1953 SC 210 the jurisdiction was based only on the situs of the person or authority concerned against whom writ or order is to be issued. The jurisdiction was extended beyond the territorial limits by the introduction of Clause 2 to Article 226 of the Constitution of India based on the cause of action. So far as the territorial jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, it is akin to Article 226 of the Constitution of India as it stood prior to the introduction of Clause 2 of Article 226. When Parliament thought it fit, after the above Constitution Bench judgment, to extend the writ jurisdiction of the High Court beyond the territorial limits of the said High Court, it did not think it appropriate, similarly to amend Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure so as to add provision like Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India extending the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure beyond the territorial limits of the said High Court based on the fact that the part of offence is committed outside the territorial limits of the said High Court.
40. Thus, in my considered opinion, so far as the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purpose of quashing the F.I.R. is concerned, the only criteria is the situs of the authority who has registered the case and not the place of commission of the crime either in full or in part. Similarly, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash a criminal case also does not extend beyond the territorial limits of the said High Court if the case is pending on the file of an authority who is located outside the territorial limits of the said High Court. This conclusion is inescapable, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod case (cited supra) wherein the Court has held that the concept of "cause of action" which is relevant to Civil Law cannot be imported to Criminal Law.
41. In view of the said settled position, I hold that in the instant case, though it may be true that a part of offence has been committed within the State of Tamil Nadu, since the situs of the authority who has registered the crime falls outside the territorial limits of this Court, this petition is not at all maintainable before this Court.
42. In the result, this petition is dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
13.01.2015 Index: Yes kk S.NAGAMUTHU,J.
kk To
1. The Sr. Inspector of Police, Marine Drive Police Station, Mumbai 400 020.
2. The Home Secretary, Government of Tamilnadu, Fort St. George, Chennai.
3. The Public Prosecutor, Madras High Court.
PRE DELIVERY ORDER IN Crl.O.P.No.22498 of 2014 and M.P.No.1 of 2014 RESERVED ON : 11.12.2014 PRONOUNCED ON : 13.01.2015