Madras High Court
K.Subbulakshmi @ Pappayee vs C.V.Ramasamy Pillai(Died) on 5 February, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 MAD 551
Author: G.K.Ilanthiraiyan
Bench: G.K.Ilanthiraiyan
S.A.No.1834 of 1999
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on : 10.01.2020
Date of Verdict : 05.02.2020
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.K.ILANTHIRAIYAN
S.A.No.1834 of 1999
K.Subbulakshmi @ Pappayee ...Appellant
Vs.
1.C.V.Ramasamy Pillai(died)
2.Radhamani
3.Hemamalini Boominathan
4.V.Maragatham
5.Corporation Bank, rep. by its
Branch Manager, Chinnampalayam
Branch Manager, Chinnampalayam
Branch, No.26/1, Venkateswara
Hospital Road, Chinnampalayam,
Coimbatore 641 062 ...Respondents
(R1 – died, R2 – LR of the deceased R1,
Viz., C.V.Ramasamy Pillai, R3 brought on
record as LR of the deceased R1, viz.,
C.V.Ramasamy Pillai vide court order
dated 20.12.2018 made in CMP.No.
13399 of 2017 in SA.No.18348/1999)
(RR4 and 5 impleaded vide order of
court dated 26.04.2019 made in
CMP.No.6416 of 2019 in SA.No.
1834 of 1999(PRMJ))
Prayer :- This Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of Civil Procedure
Code against the judgment and decree dated 19.03.1999, in A.S.No.192 of
1998 on the file of the Principal District Judge of Coimbatore confirming the
decree and judgment dated 27.08.1998 in O.S.No.567 of 1992 on the file of
the II Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore.
http://www.judis.nic.in
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S.A.No.1834 of 1999
For Appellants : Mr.S.Subbiah,
Senior Counsel
for M/s.Elizabeth Ravi
For Respondents
R1 : Died
For R2 : Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan,
Senior Counsel
for Mr.B.Soundarapandian
For R3 : Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan,
Senior Counsel
for Mr.M.Habeeb Rahaman
For R4 : Mr.Edwin Prabhakar,
for Mr.M.Swarnam J.Rajagopalan
R5 : notice served
JUDGMENT
This second appeal is directed as against the judgment and decree dated 19.03.1999, in A.S.No.192 of 1998 on the file of the Principal District Judge of Coimbatore confirming the decree and judgment dated 27.08.1998 in O.S.No.567 of 1992 on the file of the II Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rankings in the trial Court.
3. The case of the plaintiff in brief is as follows :-
3.1. The suit is filed for partition. The plaintiff got married with one, R.Suresh Kumar on 13.11.1988. The defendants 1 and 2 are the father in http://www.judis.nic.in 2/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 law and the mother in law of the plaintiff and after marriage, the plaintiff and her husband were living together with the defendants 1 and 2 as hindu undivided family. The first defendant is the manager of the hindu undivided family. The plaintiff's husband died on 31.12.1991. The first defendant filed suit as against his brothers and subsequent purchaser for partition claiming his share in the family property in O.S.No.1440 of 1958, which was decreed in his favour. After compromise, final decree was passed, in which the first defendant was allotted a share and he sold out the western portion of his share, namely the property situated in old door No.11/36, new door No.17/35 comprised in TS.No.2/1139 at Easwarankoil Street, Coimbatore on 02.11.1961 in favour of one K.Krishnan Achari for the purpose of purchasing another house property. He also sold out the eastern portion of the said property to his own brother, B.Adhikesavapillai by registered sale deed dated 10.01.1963. Out of those sale proceeds, the first defendant purchased a building at No.9 in Ramalinga Nagar, II layout at Coimbatore by the registered sale deed dated 29.08.1966. Thereafter he also put up construction. Therefore, the house property, namely the suit schedule 'A' property which is purchased from the joint family nucleus and hence it is ancestral property available for partition between the plaintiff's husband and the first defendant.
3.2 In fact, during life time of her husband, he was owning an industry named Steel Tech and was provided funds to a tune of Rs.28,700/-
http://www.judis.nic.in 3/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 by pledging and selling his jewels. He also purchased household articles along with car and two wheeler from his earnings from the industry. She further submitted that her sister in law, i.e., the sister of her husband, got married and she used to stay in the schedule 'A' mentioned property very often. The defendants 1 and 2 have let the ground floor to the defendants 3 and 4 for monthly rent at Rs.1,300/- and Rs.950/- for two portions. The entire seedhana articles along with 35 sovereigns of gold jewels were pledged by her husband and he spent the entire money lavishly and also provided fund to purchase the suit schedule 'A' property. Therefore, the plaintiff demanded return of her seedhana articles, for which panchayat was held on various dates and so many persons participated in the panchayat on behalf of the plaintiff as well as the defendants 1 and 2. In the panchayat, the defendants 1 and 2 compelled the plaintiff to sign in the papers and blank stamp papers purporting to deprive off her legal right. When the plaintiff refused to do so, she was not given any share under the ancestral property, the self acquired property of her husband and also seedhana articles were not returned to the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff caused legal notice on 14.03.1992 calling upon the defendants 1 and 2 for partition and also return the seedhana articles. Though the defendants 1 and 2 replied by the reply notice dated 17.04.1992 with false and untenable allegations, they did not come forward to give her share. Hence, the suit.
4. The defendants resisted the plaintiff's case by filing written statement stating that the plaintiff is the daughter in law of the defendants 1 http://www.judis.nic.in 4/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 and 2 and it is false to state that after their marriage they lived along with the defendants 1 and 2 as members of the undivided family. The suit 'A' schedule property is a self acquired property and it is nothing to do with the family. It has been purchased and built up construction by his own earnings and he is the absolute owner of the suit property. In fact, he was a member of the Ramalingam Nagar Co-operative House Building Society and he paid instalments due to Society from his own earnings and borrowing funds. The plaintiff's husband never contributed any money either to purchase the suit property or for construction. No sale proceeds was utilised for purchase of the suit 'A' schedule property. In fact, the first defendant was a Sales Manager in Coimbatore Mills Stores and General Suppliers Company, Coimbatore and he earned considerable income. Therefore, the said property was purchased from his hard earned money and he was also a partner in Sriram Textiles, in which he earned money. The husband of the plaintiff never earned money and in fact, his industry was started from the loan obtained from Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation and it did not profitably functioned and as such he was not even able to pay the interest for the loan borrowed by him. Further submitted that no tenant was occupied in the suit schedule property and never drawing any rent as stated by the plaintiff. Insofar as the seedhana articles are concerned, it has been already handed over to the plaintiff. The entire sale proceeds from the property sold out in the year 1961 to 1963 was spent for the marriage of their daughter which took place in the year 1974. A huge amount was spent to educate the http://www.judis.nic.in 5/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 plaintiff's husband and to meet other family expenses. Therefore, the sale proceeds were never used to purchase 'A' schedule property. Hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek any relief as prayed for and sought for dismissal of the suit.
5. While pending this second appeal, the first defendant died and his daughter was impleaded as the third respondent in this second appeal. The wife of the first defendant is already party to the proceedings. The third defendant filed written statement and stated that the third defendant was not impleaded as party in the suit, though it was filed for partition and as such the suit itself is liable to be dismissed for non joinder of necessary parties. Further, she has been deprived of fair chance of participation in the trial of the suit. The suit property is the absolute property belongs to the first defendant and it was purchased by the first defendant on 20.08.1966 and he had paid monthly instalments and thereafter perfected title to the suit property. At the time of purchasing the suit property, the plaintiff's husband was 9 years old and as such he could not have contributed anything to purchase the suit property or for superstructure put up by the first defendant. The plaintiff got married on 13.11.1988 and as such she has no knowledge about the family affairs of the first defendant's earnings and properties. In fact, after purchase of the suit property, namely 22 years later, the plaintiff got married with the son of the first defendant. Therefore, the contribution of the plaintiff's husband a sum of Rs.28,700/- to the family is not possible. http://www.judis.nic.in 6/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 The first defendant was employed as a Sales Manager in Coimbatore Mills Stores and General Suppliers Company and he was earning well. Therefore, the entire contribution born out from the earnings of the first defendant and purchased the suit property.
5.1 The plaintiff also did not prove her case that the suit property was purchased only from the sale proceedings of the ancestral property and only on presumption and assumption, the suit has been filed and as such the courts below rightly dismissed the suit. Further contended that if this Court comes to conclusion that the suit property is a joint family property of the first defendant, the daughter, namely the third respondent also automatically becomes entitled for her share as per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which came into effect on 09.05.2005. Thus, in that event, it would become just and equitable for this Court to remand the matter to de-novo trial or the suit has to be dismissed for non joinder of necessary party.
6. In support of the plaintiff's case, P.W.1 and P.W.2 were examined and nine documents were marked as Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.9. On the side of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.10 were marked. On considering the oral and documentary evidences adduced by the respective parties and the submission made by the learned counsel, the trial Court dismissed the suit. Aggrieved over the judgment and decree of the trial http://www.judis.nic.in 7/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 Court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal suit in A.S.No.192 of 1998 before the Principal District Judge of Coimbatore. The first appellate Court on appreciating the materials placed on records, dismissed the appeal by confirming the judgement and decree passed by the trial Court. Challenging the same, the plaintiff has come forward with the present second appeal.
7. At the time of admission of the second appeal, the following substantial question of law was framed :-
“a) When the recital in a sale deed showed that the karta of the family sold the joint family property to enable him to purchase another property, is not the property so purchased, but in his name thereafter, by the karta be presumed to the joint family property?”
8. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff submitted that the first and second defendants are father in law and mother in law of the plaintiff and the plaintiff got married with their son, R.Suresh Kumar in the year 1988 and on 31.12.1991 he died. While pending the second appeal, the first defendant died and his daughter was impleaded as the third respondent as the legal heir of the first defendant. The suit 'A' schedule property was purchased by the respondents 4 and 5 herein. The plaintiff categorically proved that there was an immovable property allotted to the share of the first defendant in the final decree proceedings. When it is proved that http://www.judis.nic.in there was existence of joint family property and nucleus, when the onus 8/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 of proof that the properties standing in the name of karta of the family was a separate property of the karta and not was that of the joint family property is upon the karta of the family and as such the first defendant has to prove the same. The Ex.A.6 dated 02.11.1961 sale deed executed by the first defendant in favour of one, Krishnan Achari clearly describes that he was selling the property for purchase of another property and as such the entire sale proceeds was used to purchase the suit schedule property.
8.1 Again, the first defendant sold out another share of his ancestral property on 10.01.1963 which was marked as Ex.A.7 in favour of his own brother immediately before purchase of the suit property. Therefore, from both the sale, the sale proceeds had been spent to purchase the suit property and as such the entire sale proceeds of the joint family property had been used to purchase the suit schedule property. Unfortunately, both the courts below failed to consider the recitals of Ex.A.6 and A.7 from both the sale deeds totally Rs.11,500/-, whereas the consideration for the purchase of the suit property under Ex.B.10 was only Rs.5,628/-. Therefore, the evidence of DW1 is completely unbelievable one, since his daughter got married in the year 1974 and as such the entire sale proceeds could not have been spent for her marriage and education expenses of the plaintiff's husband. In fact, the husband of the plaintiff was born on 01.12.1957 and for his school studies, the first defendant could not have spent that much of amount for his education.
http://www.judis.nic.in In fact, after purchasing the suit schedule property, namely 9/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 Ex.B.10, the daughter of the first defendant got marriage in the year 1974. Further he submitted that in any cooperative housing society, first allotment would be made on the purchase of the shares and sale amount would be paid in advance and only after completing all the formalities, the sale deed would be executed and as such the entire sale proceeds of the Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7 was spent on the purchase of the suit schedule property by the first defendant. Immediately, after sold out the ancestral property under Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7, the first defendant became a member of the society in the year 1964 and after payment of the sale consideration from the sale proceeds to purchase the suit schedule property and thereafter the sale deed executed in favour of the first defendant by Ex.B.10.
8.2 He further submitted that normally in hindu undivided joint family, the duties of the father is to maintain his own children and wife and hence, he cannot take a shield that he spent the sale proceeds for educational expenses and for his minor children and it is against the hindu law and public policy. Further from the evidence of the first defendant, he is not the penniless person that he was forced to sell the joint family property under Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7, that too for maintaining his children and for also their education, since he was employed even at the time of sale of the property and he had good earning to maintain his family and children and as such the said contention is unbelievable one. Therefore when the presumption is against the first defendant, it was for him to rebut the same http://www.judis.nic.in 10/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 by adducing the best evidence for no portion of family income was utilised to acquire the said property. Further submitted that once it was found to be an existence of undivided hindu family, then any acquisition was only for the benefit of the family and moreso when the family of the first defendant was trading family, though the karta carried on the business in his own name, all the income derived from the business is deemed to be a joint family business.
8.3 To support his contention with regard to entitlement to sue for partition of the joint family property, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff relied upon the following judgments :-
(i) S.M.Sivaswami Vs. Nagammal and 5 others reported in 2011(1) CTC 337.
(ii) M.Yogendra and Others Vs. Leelamma N. and Others reported in (2009) 15 SCC 184.
(iii) M.Krishnamoorthy Vs. K.Pondeepankar & others reported in 2017-2-L.W.818
(iv) Achuthan Nair Vs. Chinnammu Amma and others reported in AIR 1966 SCC 411 (V53 C 85) 8.4 The learned Senior Counsel also cited the following judgments with regard to blending:
http://www.judis.nic.in 11/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999
(i) Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai and another Vs. Desai Mallappa alias Mallesappa and another reported in AIR 1961 SCC 1268
(ii) D.S.Lakshmaiah and Another Vs. L.Balasubramanyam and another reported in (2003) 10 SCC 310
(iii) S.Subramanian Vs. S.Ramasamy and others reported in (2019) 6 SCC 46
(iv) Binod Bihari Lal and others Vs. Rameshwar Prasad Sinha and others reported in AIR 1978 SCC 1201
(v) Malladi Venkata Sastry and Ors. Vs. Malladi Venkataramanayya and Anr. reported in MANU/TN/0413/1939.
(vi) The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras Vs. Shri S.Sivaprakasa Mudaliar, Cuddalore reported in 1983 (2) MLJ 419
(vii) P.N.Venkatasubrmania Iyer and others Vs. P.N.Easwrara Iyer and Others reported in AIR 1966 MADRAS 266(Vol.53, C.80)(1) Therefore, the findings of the courts below are perverse and prayed for decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff for partition.
http://www.judis.nic.in 12/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999
9. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 submitted that the suit is filed for partition and as such it is for the plaintiff to prove that the property obtained by the first defendant as per compromise decree is an ancestral property. The plaintiff failed to prove that the property which was allotted to the first defendant was ancestral one and as such she is not at all entitled to any decree for partition. Only on assumption and presumption filed the present suit for partition as if the said property was purchased by the first defendant from the sale proceeds of the ancestral property and as such the onus is on the appellant to prove through cogent evidence. Further, the case of the plaintiff is that only from the sale proceeds of the property obtained under the partition decree was used to purchase the suit property. In this regard, except Ex.A.6 there was no evidence to prove the said contention that only from the sale proceeds of the property derived by the first defendant, the suit property was purchased. Mere nexus between the date of the sale and the date of purchase is not sufficient to draw inference that the sale proceeds were used for purchase of the suit property by the first defendant. In fact, the suit property was purchased by the first defendant by paying monthly instalments to the housing society from the income of the first defendant. Therefore, the suit property was never purchased from the sale proceeds of Ex.A.6. In fact, the sale deed which was marked as Ex.A.6 of the year 1961 and the entire sale proceeds was spent for the family development and education purpose of the children.
http://www.judis.nic.in 13/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 9.1 He further submitted that at the time of the purchase of the suit property, the husband of the plaintiff was only 9 years old and as such he could not have contributed any money to purchase the suit property. Further he submitted that there is no pleading on blending of the property as joint family property and there is no evidence to prove the contention of the plaintiff in respect of blending. The concept of blending commences on the assertion that the self acquired property is voluntarily thrown in common hotch pot to be jointly owned by the co-parceners. There should have been voluntary abandonment by the first defendant. There is absolutely no pleading or evidence to prove the said contention by the plaintiff. The first defendant categorically proved that immediately after his completion of SSLC, he joined as Clerk in Coimbatore Mills Stores and General Suppliers Company, for the monthly salary of Rs.45/- and also was running a business as broker in cotton business. Therefore, only from his hard earned money, he purchased the suit property and not from the income of any joint family property. When the plaintiff failed to prove that the suit schedule property was purchased by the first defendant from the sale proceeds of the joint family property, there is no question of blending and also when the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence to prove the plea of blending, it cannot be raised here in the second appeal as such that too without pleading. In fact, the husband of the plaintiff was a drunkard and he spent money lavishly. Therefore, he also could not have spent any single paise to purchase the suit http://www.judis.nic.in 14/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 property. However now, the superstructure put up by the first defendant is demolished and the fourth respondent herein put up a dwelling house in the suit property and is living there for the past twenty years.
9.2 He further contended that even for assuming the property is ancestral in nature, the third respondent, namely the daughter of the defendants 1 and 2 also will get separate share in the property. Her right is accrued by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. Since the daughter was alive, her father was alive and the property was not partitioned as on the date of amendment, the daughter is also entitled for her share in the ancestral property. Further he contended that the suit itself is liable to be dismissed for non joinder of necessary parties, since the third respondent was not made a party in the suit. Only in the year 2018, she has been impleaded as party as legal heir of the first defendant. Further the suit was filed in the year 1992 and the same was dismissed and it was confirmed by the first appellate court. Therefore, till today there is no partition is effected and as such the daughter has to be impleaded as necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC as co-parcener and as such de-novo trial has to be ordered. He further contended that the courts below had given concurrent finding on facts that the suit property is a self acquired of the first defendant. When the courts below concurrently held, this Court cannot set aside the findings of facts recorded by the courts below under Section 100 of CPC. http://www.judis.nic.in 15/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 9.3 To support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants relied upon the following judgments :-
(i) Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango Vs. Narayan Devji Kango and Others reported in AIR 1954 SC 379.
(ii) A.Ramachandra Pillai Vs. Valliammal (died) reported in 1983- 100-LW 486
(iii) Rajani Sivakumar and another Vs. Duraikannu and others in SA.No.563 of 2003 dated 25.01.2010
(iv) Meenambal and others Vs. Shantha and others in A.S.No.441 of 2002 dated 02.02.2016
(v) D.S.Lakshmaiah and another Vs. L.Balasubramanyam and another reported in (2003) 10 SCC 310
(vi) K.V.Narayanan Vs. K.V.Ranganandhan and Others reported in (1977) 1 SCC 244, and
(vii) S.Subramanian Vs. S.Ramasamy Etc. Etc. in Civil Appeal Nos.4536-4537 to 2019
10. Heard, Mr.S.Subbiah, Senior Counsel for the plaintiff, and Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan, Senior Counsel for the defendants 2 and 3. The principles of law outlined in the above said positions are taken into consideration and followed as applicable to the case on hand. http://www.judis.nic.in 16/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999
11. The suit is filed for partition and claiming ¼ share in the suit 'A' schedule property, ½ share in the suit 'B' schedule property, mandatory injunction directing the defendants 1 and 2 to return the seedhana articles mentioned in the item 1 and 2 in the suit 'C' schedule property and directing the first and second defendants to pay a sum of Rs.28,700/- shown in the suit 'C' schedule property along with mesne profit.
12. Both the courts below dismissed the suit in toto against the plaintiff. While pending the proceedings, the plaintiff received seedhana articles from the defendants 1 and 2. This Court has to see whether the substantial question of law formulated by this Court is involved in this second appeal or not. The substantial question of law is that whether the property purchased by the first defendant under Ex.B.10 is the joint family property. On perusal of Ex.B.10 dated 29.08.1966, the total consideration was fixed at Rs.5,628/- and deposited a sum of Rs.4,628/- with the vendor. Before purchasing the suit 'A' schedule property, the first defendant filed suit in O.S.No.1440 of 1958 for partition among his brothers, for which it was decreed by the judgment and decree dated 19.08.1959. Thereafter on compromise between them in the final decree application, final decree was passed by order dated 15.02.1960. In the said property, 1/3 share was alloted in his favour. Initially, the western portion of his share, the first defendant sold out under Ex.A.6 dated 02.11.1961 in favour of one, Krishnan Achari. The recital of the sale deed is extracted as follows:
http://www.judis.nic.in 17/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 “nfhaKj;J}h; nfhh;l;L O.S.No.1440 of 1958, I.A.No.1291 of 1959?y; Vw;gl;oUf;Fk; igdy; of;hpg;goa[k; fkp!;dh; gpshd;goa[k; vd;ghfj;jpw;F gphpe;J vdf;F rh;t Rje;jpukhf ghj;jpag;gl;l vd; mDgt RthjPdj;jpypUf;fpw fPHf; hQqk; tPL tifawuhtpy; ehd; FoapUf;f rt[fhpakpy;yhjjpdhy; mjpy; xU ghfj;ij kl;Lk; tpw;gid bra;Jtpl;L ntW tPL tifaw ehd; fpuaj;Jf;F th';fpf; bfhs;syhbkd;fpw vz;zj;jpdhy; fPHf; hQqk; tPL tifawhit ehsJ njjpapy; j';fSf;F U:/9.500-? F;F Rj;jf;fpuaKk; RthjPdKk; bra;J bfhLj;j ,e;j fpuaj;Jif U:gha; xd;gjpdhapuj;J IE}Wk; j';fshy; vdf;F bry;yhdjw;F tpguk;/”
13. From the above, it is clear that the first defendant sold out his share for the purpose of purchasing another house property. The first defendant also executed another sale deed for the remaining portion of his share by the sale deed dated 29.08.1966 in favour of his own brother. Under Ex.A.6, the first defendant received sale proceeds at Rs.9,500/- and immediately he became a member of Ramalingam Nagar Co-operative House Building Society. Therefore, after sold out the property, which was derived title by the first defendant in the partition suit between his brothers, he purchased the suit 'A' schedule property on 29.08.1966. In fact, the first defendant filed partition suit, in which he claimed his 1/3 share among his brothers and the said property is a joint family property. At the time of sale of the said property, the plaintiff's husband was born and he was four years old. Thereafter, the suit 'A' schedule property was purchased by the first defendant in the year 1966 and the plaintiff's husband was nine years old. http://www.judis.nic.in 18/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 Therefore, at the time of selling the property which was derived from partition by the first defendant, the husband's plaintiff was very much born and as such he became a co-parcener and he is also entitled for his share. It is also seen from the recital of the sale deed, which was marked as Ex.A.6, the said property was sold out only for the purpose of purchasing new property. Though the first defendant contended that the sale proceeds was spent by him for the welfare of the family and education of his children, at the time of selling the property, the plaintiff was only aged about four years. At that point of time, the educational expenses were very low and as such the contention of the first defendant cannot be accepted.
14. Though the courts below concluded that the immovable property was allotted to the share of the first defendant in the final decree proceedings in a suit for partition and decided as joint family property, erred in holding that the plaintiff failed to prove the suit 'A' schedule property purchased by the first defendant only from the sale proceeds of those properties. It is very significant to note that the property was sold out by the first defendant by two sale deeds to two different persons by sale deed dated 02.01.1961 and 10.01.1963. The total sale proceeds is Rs.11,500/-. Those, days Rs.11,500/- was more value than today. However, the suit 'A' schedule property was purchased by the first defendant on 29.08.1966. Even assuming that the first defendant had spent some money for his family development, the sale consideration for the suit 'A' schedule property is only http://www.judis.nic.in 19/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 Rs.5,628/- only. Therefore, this Court can very well conclude that the suit 'A' schedule property was purchased only from the sale proceeds under Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7. It is also curious to note that the marriage of the third defendant, namely the daughter of the first defendant was held in the year 1974 and as such it could not be possible to spend the sale proceeds from the Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7 for the marriage of the third defendant after 11 years from the sale. It is also seen from the evidence of DW1, even after completion of his SSLC, he joined as Clerk in Coimbatore Mills Stores and General Suppliers Company and earned a sum of Rs.45/- per month. Thereafter he also run business of cotton and shareholder of Sriram Textiles. Therefore, the first defendant was never deprived of any financial crisis. The relevant portion of chief examination is as follows:
10k; tFg;g[ Koj;j gpwF jhd; rpW rpW ntiyfis ghh;jJ ;
te;njd;/ nfhaKj;J}h; kpy; !;nlhh;!; & brd;l;uy; rg;isah;!; vd;w epWtdj;jpy; ntiyf;Fr; nrh;e;njd;/ m';F Fkh!;jhthf ntiyf;Fr; nrh;e;njd;/ mg;nghJ vdf;F U:/45-? Rk;gskhf fpilj;jJ/ m';F Rkhh; 9 Mz;Lfs; gzpapy; ,Ue;njd;/ mjpy; tUk; tUkhdk; nghjtpy;iy vd;gjhy; brhe;jkhf g";R juF ntiy bra;J te;njd;/ ehd; nfhit kpy;!; rg;isah;!; b$duy; rg;isah;!; ,lk; rk;gsk;
bgw;W te;j rhd;W Ex.B1. 1963w;Fg; gpd; Cotton Business bra;njd;/ Kd;g[ _uhk; blf;!;ily;!;!py; g';Fjhuuhf ,Ue;njd;/ mjpy; vd;Dld; rz;KfRe;juk;. Rg;gpukzp g';Fjhuh;fs;/ rz;Kf Re;juk; ghh;l;dh; bfhLj;j rhd;W Ex.B2 Mfk;/ Licence th';fp Cotton Broker bjhHpy; bra;njd;/ oghh;l;bkz;l; of Handlooms vdf;Ff; bfhLj;j chpkk; Ex.B3. mJ jtpu ntW ve;jj; bjhHpiya[k; bra;atpy;iy/ uhjh http://www.judis.nic.in 20/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 fhh;gg; nuc&dpy; ehd; xU g';Fjhuh;/ vd;Dld; mth; ikj;JdUk;. MtuJ kidtpa[k; g';Fjhuh;fs;/ vd; bjhHpy; K:ykhf vdf;F tUkhdk; ey;ygoahfj; jhd; ,Ue;jJ/ “A” Schedule brhj;J th';fpl njitahd gzk; nkny brhd;d bjhHpypd; K:ykhff; fpilj;jJ/
15. Therefore, the sale proceeds under Ex.A6 and Ex.A.7 had been used to purchase the suit 'A' schedule property. Further, the DW1 deposed that he purchased 'A' schedule property through society by instalments. Though he had stated as if the suit schedule property purchased by instalments, it is seen from Ex.A.10 that he became a member by purchasing 110 shares for Rs.1,100/- and also had paid a sum of Rs.4628/- in the total consideration of Rs.5,628/-. He paid instalments in respect of the balance sale consideration of Rs.1,000/- only. Therefore, the entire sale proceeds have been utilized only to purchase the shares in the society and also paid substantial amount of sale consideration to purchase the suit 'A' schedule property. In support of this, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of S.M.Sivaswami Vs. Nagammal and 5 others reported in 2011(1) CTC 337, wherein it is held as follows:
11. All savings made out of ancestral property, and all purchases or profits made from the income or sale of ancestral property, would form part of the ancestral or coparcenary property. The burden of proving that a certain acquisition was http://www.judis.nic.in made from out of sale proceeds is upon the person who alleges.21/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999
This has to be done by establishing a nexus between the acquisition in question and the ancestral income/sale proceeds of ancestral property. When the Karta of Hindu joint family sold the ancestral property and thereafter he purchased the property in dispute, once nexus is established the property purchased would assume the character of Joint Hindu Family property.
16. Properties acquired by the Karta of a joint family with the aid of joint family nucleus or from out of the income derived from the properties inherited from forefathers are to be treated as joint family properties. But the burden that properties are the ancestral properties is on the coparcener to establish the existence of nucleus or that the income was derived from the properties. 1st Plaintiff who is the wife of 1st Defendant has not chosen to examine herself. 3rd Plaintiff-Kavitha was aged 28 years in 2002 [born in 1974]. In 1970's when the ancestral property was sold and suit item No.3 ['C' schedule] was purchased, 3rd Plaintiff- Kavitha was just about four years old and much weight cannot be attached to her evidence.
16. He also relied upon the judgment in the case of M.Yogendra and Others Vs. Leelamma N. and Others reported in (2009) 15 SCC 184, wherein it is held as follows:
28.Mr. Bhat, however, would contend that the properties at the hands of K Doddananjundaiah which were allotted to him in partition which took place between him and his brother in the year http://www.judis.nic.in 22/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 1948 would constitute coparcenary properties at his hands, with respect we cannot persuade ourselves to agree with the said view which has been accepted by the courts below.
29.It is now well-settled in view of several decisions of this Court that the property in the hands of sole coparcener allotted to him in partition shall be his separate property for the same shall revive only when a son is born to him. It is one thing to say that the property remains a coparcenery property but it is another thing to say that it revives. The distinction between the two is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In the case of former any sale or alienation which has been done by the sole survivor coparcener shall be valid whereas in the case of a coparcener any alienation made by the karta would be valid.
30.This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur And Others v.
Chander Sen And Others (1986) 3 SCC 567. This Court upon noticing the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act opined as under:-
"It is clear that under the Hindu law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in the father's property and becomes part of the coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. Normally therefore whenever the father gets a property from whatever source from the grandfather or from any other source, be it separated property or not, his son should have a share in that and it will become part of the joint Hindu family of his son and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu family with him. But the question is: is the position affected by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and if so, how? The basic argument is that Section 8 indicates the heirs in respect of certain property and http://www.judis.nic.in 23/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 Class I of the heirs includes the son but not the grandson. It includes, however, the son of the predeceased son. It is this position which has mainly induced the Allahabad High court in the two judgments, we have noticed, to take the view that the income from the assets inherited by son from his father from whom he has separated by partition can be assessed as income of the son individually. Under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the property of the father who dies intestate devolves on his son in his individual capacity and not as karta of his own family. On the other hand, the Gujarat High Court has taken the contrary view."
17. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the first defendant was allotted his share in the partition suit in O.S.No.1440 of 1958 and in the final decree dated 15.02.1960, 1/3 of the property was allotted in his favour. The said property was sold out by the first defendant by two different sale deeds under Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7 in favour of Krishnan Achari and to his own brother.
18. As discussed above, the sale proceeds of those sale deeds were utilised to purchase the suit 'A' schedule property. Therefore, the sale proceeds from the ancestral property would form part of the ancestral or co-parcenery property. Therefore, the burden of proof that certain acquisition was made from out of sale proceeds is upon the person who alleges. This has to be done by establishing the nexus between the acquisition in question and the ancestral income / sale proceeds of ancestral property. When the Karta of Hindu joint family sold the ancestral property http://www.judis.nic.in 24/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 and thereafter he purchased the property in dispute, once nexus is established that the property purchased would assume the character of Joint Hindu Family property. Further the first defendant had obtained his share from his ancestral property by the final decree dated 15.02.1960. On that day, the husband's plaintiff was very much born, namely on 01.12.1957. Therefore, the property remains co-parcenery property. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. Normally therefore whenever the father gets a property from whatever source from the grandfather or from any other source, be it separate property or not, his son should have a share in that and it will become part of the joint Hindu family of his son and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu family with him. In view of the above, the plaintiff is entitled for partition of the property described in suit 'A' schedule property. The suit 'A' schedule property was allotted to the first defendant at a partition that took place in the year 1960. As a co-parcener of the joint hindu family and the husband of the plaintiff would essentially have a right by birth, after death of the son of the first defendant, the plaintiff is being the wife of the deceased son of the first defendant can very well seek partition.
19. Under Hindu law, when a property stands in the name of a member of the joint family, it is incumbent upon those asserting that it is a joint family property to establish it. When it is proved or admitted that the http://www.judis.nic.in 25/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 family possessed sufficient nucleus with the aid of which the member might have made the acquisition, the law raises a presumption that it is a joint family property and the onus is shifted to the individual member to establish that the property was acquired by him without the aid of the said nucleus. Therefore, the first defendant failed to prove that the suit 'A' schedule property was purchased from without the aid of the sale proceeds under Ex.A.6 and Ex.A.7.
20. The learned Senior Counsel also cited the following judgments in respect of blending by the first respondent to purchase the suit 'A' schedule property.
(i) Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai and another Vs. Desai Mallappa alias Mallesappa and another reported in AIR 1961 SCC 1268, wherein it is held as follows:
It is, we think, unnecessary to investigate whether any other text can be treated as the foundation of the said doctrine since the said doctrine has been recognised in several decisions and has now become a part of Hindu law. In Rajani Kanta Pal v. Jaga Mohan Pal (2) the Privy Council held that " Where a member of a joint Hindu family blends his self-acquired property with property of the joint family, either by bringing his self-acquired property into a joint family account, or by bringing joint family property into his separate account, the effect is that all the property so blended becomes a joint family property."
15.In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind that respondent 1 has not shown by any reliable evidence that the http://www.judis.nic.in 26/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 expenses for the said litigation were borne by him out of his pocket. It is true that both the courts have found that respondent 1 purchased certain properties for Rs. 600/- in 1925 (Ex. B-4). We do not know what the income of the said properties was; obviously it could not be of any significant order; but, in our opinion, there is no doubt that where a manager claims that any immovable property has been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of the joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, it is for him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchase money proceeded from his separate fund. The onus of proof must in such a case be placed on the manager and not on his coparceners. But,, apart from the question of onus, the evidence given by respondent 1 in this case has been disbelieved, and in the absence of any satisfactory material to show that respondent 1 had any means of his own it would be idle to contend that the expenses incurred for the litigation in question were not borne by the joint family income. Therefore, apart from the fact that Neelamma was consulted and agreed to join the adventure on behalf of her sons, it is clear that the expenses for the litigation were borne by the whole family from its own joint funds. This fact also shows that the property acquired by respondent 1 under the compromise decree was acquired by him as representing the family of which be was the manager. The result is that the view taken by the High Court in respect of the properties in Schedule C must be reversed and that of the trial court restored.
(ii) D.S.Lakshmaiah and Another Vs. L.Balasubramanyam and another reported in (2003) 10 SCC 310, wherein it is held as follows:
13.In Surendra Kumar v. Phoolchand (dead) through LRs & Anr. [(1996) 2 SCC 491], this Court held that where it is http://www.judis.nic.in 27/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 established or admitted that the family which possessed joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed sufficient nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the presumption arises that it was the joint property and the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family funds.
14. We may now refer to three decisions whereupon reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the respondents.
In Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai & Anr. V. Desai Mallappa alias Mallesappa & Anr. [AIR 1961 SC 1268], this Court held that where a manager claims that any immovable property has been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of the joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, it is for him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchase money proceeded from his separate fund. The onus of proof in such a case has to be placed on the manager and not on his coparceners. It is difficult to comprehend how this decision lends any support to the contention of the respondents that in absence of leading any evidence, the claim of appellant No.1 of the property being self-acquired has to fail. In the cited decision, the manager was found to be in possession and in charge of joint family funds and, therefore, it was for him to prove that despite it he purchased the property from his separate funds. In the present case, admittedly, no evidence has been led by the respondents that the first appellant was in possession of any such joint family funds or as to value or income, if any, of Item No.2 property.
15.In Achuthan Nair v. Chinnammu Amma & Ors. [AIR 1966 SC 411], it was noticed that there were number of properties http://www.judis.nic.in 28/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 owned by joint family which were received at the time of separation under a decree passed in a partition suit. The claim of the defendants in the written statement was that the property in question had been purchased from the private funds of defendant No.1 and her son defendant No.4. In this decision too, it was reiterated that when it is proved or admitted that a family possessed sufficient nucleus with the aid of which the member might have made the acquisition, the law raises a presumption that it is a joint family property and the onus is shifted to the individual member to establish that the property was acquired by him without the aid of the said nucleus. After noticing this settled propositions, it was observed that if a property is acquired in the name of a karanvan, there is a strong presumption that it is a tarwad (joint Hindu family) property and the presumption must hold good unless and until it is rebutted by acceptable evidence. This Court did not hold that if a property is acquired in the name of karta, the law as to presumption or shifting of onus would be different. The question of presumption would depend upon the facts established in each case. In the present case, no evidence of nucleus having been led, onus remained on the respondents and, therefore, there could be no question of presumption about the property being joint family property.
19.Another contention urged for the respondents was that assuming Item No.1 property to be self-acquired property of appellant No.1, he blended the said property with the joint family property and, therefore, it has become the joint family property. Assuming the respondents can be permitted to raise such a plea without evidence in support thereof, the law on the aspect of blending is well settled that property separate or self- acquired of a member of joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into http://www.judis.nic.in 29/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein but to establish such abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be established. From the mere fact that other members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of the separate property was utilized out of generosity to support persons whom the holder was not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity or kindness will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation {see Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddy v. Lakkireddi Lakshamama [1964 (2) SCR 172] and K.V. Narayanan v. K.V. Ranganadhan & Ors. [(1977) 1 SCC 244]}.
(iii) S.Subramanian Vs. S.Ramasamy and others reported in (2019) 6 SCC 46, wherein it is held as follows:
9.Even the reasons given by the High Court that as the loans were taken on the suit properties for borewell, crop loan, electric motor pump set loan, jewel loan by all the three joint family members, namely Sengoda Gounder, Ramasamy and Subramanian and, therefore, there was a blending of the suit properties into join family properties also, cannot be accepted. As all the three were residing together and some loans might have been taken by the family members residing together, by that itself, it cannot be said that there was a blending of the suit properties into joint family properties. The law on the aspect of blending is well settled that property separate or selfacquired of a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein; but to establish such abandonment a clear intention to waive separate http://www.judis.nic.in 30/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 rights must be established. Clear intention to abandon the separate rights in the property must be proved. Even abandonment cannot be inferred from mere allowing other family members also to use the property or utilisation of income of the separate property out of generosity to support the family members
21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that the law on the aspect of blending is well settled that the property separate or self acquired of a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein; but to establish that abandonment a clear intention to waive separate right must be established. Therefore, having appreciated evidences on record, this Court concluded the plea that the 'A' schedule property is the joint family property and as such the plaintiff is entitled for her share.
22. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants 2 and 3 vehemently contended that if this Court concludes that the suit 'A' schedule property is ancestral in nature and not self acquired by the first defendant, the third defendant also will get a separate share in the suit 'A' schedule property since her right is crystallised through Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. Since the daughter was alive, her father was also alive and the property was not partitioned on the date of amendment, the daughter is also entitled for share in the ancestral property. He further http://www.judis.nic.in 31/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 contended that the suit is liable to be dismissed for non joinder of necessary party, since the third defendant was not made as party in the main suit for partition filed by the plaintiff. In this regard, he also cited the judgment of this Court in the case of Meenambal Vs. Shantha in S.A.No.1460 of 2006 dated 02.02.2016, wherein it is held as follows:
46. After hearing the submissions of the learned counsel on either side, the matter was adjourned to 27.01.2016 for the production of the certified copy of the final decree application. At this stage, the 1st respondent has filed the application for impleading the Trust as a party to the proceedings. The filing of the petition by the 1st respondent/plaintiff is only to get over the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants with regard to non-joinder of necessary party. That apart, the 1st respondent/plaintiff has not given any reason for not impleading the Trust at the earliest point of time in the affidavit, filed in support of the petition.
47. The ratios laid down by the Division Bench of this Court reported in 1972 (2) MLJ 590(T. Panchapakesan (died) and others vs Peria Thambi Naicker (died) and others) and by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in Vol.100 Law Weekly 486 (A. Ramachandra Pillai vs Valliammal (died), squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
Following the said judgments of the Division Bench of this Court, the petition filed by the 1st respondent/plaintiff deserves to be dismissed.
23. Further he contended that when the third defendant is also entitled for her share in the suit 'A' schedule property, de-novo trial has to be http://www.judis.nic.in 32/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 ordered, since her opportunity to take part in the proceedings should be given and he also cited the judgment in the case of Danamma @ Suman Surpur Vs. Amar reported in (2018) 3 SCC 343, wherein it is held as follows:
27) In the present case, no doubt, suit for partition was filed in the year 2002. However, during the pendency of this suit, Section 6 of the Act was amended as the decree was passed by the trial court only in the year 2007. Thus, the rights of the appellants got crystallised in the year 2005 and this event should have been kept in mind by the trial court as well as by the High Court. This Court in Ganduri Koteshwaramma & Anr. v. Chakiri Yanadi & Anr.8 held that the rights of daughters in coparcenary property as per the amended S. 6 are not lost merely because a preliminary decree has been passed in a partition suit. So far as partition suits are concerned, the partition becomes final only on the passing of a final decree. Where such situation arises, the preliminary decree would have to be amended taking into account the change in the law by the amendment of 2005.
24. Admittedly, the suit was filed in the year 1992 as against the defendants 1 and 2, who are none other than the father in law and mother in law of the plaintiff. The husband of the plaintiff is the son of the defendants 1 and 2 and after his demise, the present suit was initiated by the plaintiff being the daughter in law of the defendants 1 and 2. At that time, the female legal heir is not entitled for her share in the co-parcener joint family property. The amendment act is not applicable retrospectively and is applicable only prospectively. Therefore, the third defendant is not entitled for http://www.judis.nic.in any share in the suit 'A' schedule property and she is also not entitled for 33/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 denovo trial.Therefore, the plaintiff rightly filed the suit as against the father in law and mother in law alone as such there is no question of non joinder of necessary party in the case on hand. Further, the third defendant has been impleaded as party only on the death of the first defendant, namely her father. Therefore, the suit is very much maintainable without impleading the third defendant and she is not entitled for any share. Therefore, no question of de-novo trial arises and the judgments cited by the learned Senior Counsel are not applicable to the case on hand.
25. He further contended that when the courts below had given concurrent finding on facts that the suit property is a self acquired property of the first defendant, it is not permissible by this Court to set aside the findings and facts recorded by the courts below under Section 100 of C.P.C. In this regard, he also cited the judgment in the case of S.Subramanian Vs. S.Ramasamy reported in (2019) 6 SCC 46, wherein it is held as follows:
7.4 Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per catena of decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100 of the CPC, the Second Appeal would be maintainable only on substantial question of law. The Second Appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. The existence of ‘a substantial question of law’ is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (Supra), in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court http://www.judis.nic.in 34/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being:
(i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law;
OR
(ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; OR
(iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence.It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in Second Appeal.”...
8.5 As observed hereinabove, while passing the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has reappreciated the entire evidence on record as if the High Court was deciding the first appeal. By the impugned Judgment and Order, while exercising the powers under Section 100 of the CPC and on re appreciation of entire evidence on record, the High Court has set aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below on blending of the suit properties with the joint family properties. The same is wholly impermissible. So far as the facts are concerned, the First Appellate Court is the final court and unless and until the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below are found to be manifestly perverse and/or contrary to the evidence on record, the High Court would not be justified in setting aside the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below which were on appreciation of evidence on http://www.judis.nic.in 35/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 record. It is not permissible for the High Court to reappreciate the entire evidence on record and come to its own finding when the findings recorded by the Courts below, more particularly, the First Appellate Court are on appreciation of evidence. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the High Court while deciding the Second Appeals, is beyond the scope and ambit of exercise of its powers under Section 100 of the CPC.
26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that the second appeals would be maintainable under Section 100 C.P.C. only on substantial questions of law and do not lie on question of facts or of law. In the case on hand, the courts below concluded the evidence on record and the conclusion of the courts below are perverse and against the evidence on record. Therefore, necessarily this court has to interfere with the findings of the courts below by substantial question of law involved in this case and as such this Court has to necessarily answer for substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission. Therefore, this Court has exercised its discretion in judicial manner and the above judgment is also not helpful to the defendants.
27. In the light of the above discussion, the substantial question of law formulated by this Court in this second appeal is accordingly answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Accordingly, the second appeal is allowed with costs and the judgment and decree of the courts below http://www.judis.nic.in are set aside and consequently the suit filed by the plaintiff is decreed 36/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 insofar as prayer (a) and (d) alone, since in respect of the other prayers, the seedhana articles were already returned by the defendants to the plaintiff.
05.02.2020 Index : Yes/No Internet : Yes/No Speaking order/Non-speaking order lok http://www.judis.nic.in 37/38 S.A.No.1834 of 1999 G.K.ILANTHIRAIYAN, J.
lok To
1. The Principal District Judge of Coimbatore
2.The II Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore.
3. The Section Officer, V.R. Section, Madras High Court, Chennai.
S.A.No.1834 of 1999
05.02.2020 http://www.judis.nic.in 38/38