Karnataka High Court
R. Rudrappa vs Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga ... on 4 November, 1998
Equivalent citations: ILR1999KAR2683, 2000(1)KARLJ523, 1999 A I H C 1783, (2000) 1 KANT LJ 523
Author: Mohamed Anwar
Bench: Mohamed Anwar
ORDER
1. Heard.
2. All these petitions are taken up together for disposal since the principal prayer therein is for:
"Declaration that the provisions of Limitation Act are applicable for making application for resumption of the land under Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978".
3. Certain undisputed facts in these petitions are that the lands in question were Government lands that were granted to respective grantees belonging either to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, and that these lands were granted to them under darkhast imposing a condition not to alienate them for a specified period. It is an admitted fact that these lands were alienated by the grantees or their Legal Representatives ('L.Rs' for short) in violation of the said condition. Therefore, respondent 2-Assistant Commissioner ('A.C.' in short) on applications made either by the grantees or the L.Rs passed the impugned orders under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 ('the PTCL Act' for short) holding that the alienations of the respective lands in favour of the alienees are null and void and, that, the applicants before him were entitled to restoration of those respective lands. The purchasers appeals filed against the said orders of A.C. before the Deputy Commissioner also came to be dismissed by the latter under his impugned orders.
4. The only material point that was canvassed vehemently by the learned Counsel for petitioners assailing the legality of the impugned orders was that since the said applications made to the A.C. either by the grantees or the L.Rs seeking restoration of the lands under Section 5 of the PTCL Act were obviously made long after expiry of the period of 3 years from the date of commencement of the Act they were all barred by limitation by virtue of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 and, as such, the A.C. had no jurisdiction to entertain those applications and pass the impugned orders. Therefore, the point of law which calls for decisions herein is whether, in the absence of any express provision in the PTCL Act providing the limitation period for any legal action to be taken thereunder, the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the proceedings under the PTCL Act, specially to the proceeding under Section 5 thereof?
5. As indicated, there is no express provision in the PTCL Act itself prescribing any period of limitation for making an application by any person before the A.C. seeking action under Section 5 seeking the relief of restoration of the transferred granted land from the transferee (purchaser). For that matter, we do not find any provision in the PTCL Act prescribing limitation period for any other proceedings contemplated thereunder. This Act is a special enactment. Its object as we find in its preamble is to provide for prohibition of alienation of certain lands granted to the members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe in the State. The Assistant Commissioner of the revenue division is constituted as the authority to enquire into the illegal alienations of the "granted lands" and to restore them to grantees of their L.Rs in accordance with the various provisions thereof. Rule 3 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Rules, 1979 ('the Rules' for short) framed under the Act lays down the procedure to be followed by the Assistant Commissioner in conducting enquiry under Section 5 thereof. Sub-rule (5) of this rule states that the Assistant Commissioner shall for the purpose of enquiry under Section 5 follow the procedure stipulated for a formal enquiry under Section 33 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. In view of this rule, it was contended by learned Counsel for petitioners Mr. S.P. Shankar that the Assistant Commissioner functions as a Revenue Court as envisaged under Section 25 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. Therefore, drawing upon this analogy he maintained that the Assistant Commissioner holding enquiry under Section 5 being a Revenue Court any application to him by a person seeking restoration of the granted land would attract applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act which is a residuary article and which prescribes the period of limitation of three years from the date when the right to apply accrues to make an application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in third division of the schedule to the Limitation Act. In support of this submission reliance was sought to be placed by him on a decision of Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v T.P. Kunhali-umma. Elaborating his contention Sri S.P. Shankar maintained that the PTCL Act having come into force on and with effect from 1-1-1979 the respondents-applicants should have made their said applications before the Assistant Commissioner before expiry of the period of three years from 1-1-1979; and that, admittedly, these applications having been made long after expiry of this period they were all barred by time, and, therefore, the A.C. had no jurisdiction in law to pass the impugned orders thereon, and that they were liable to be rejected as time-barred.
6. Learned Counsel representing respondents-applicants argued otherwise in support of the impugned orders of the Assistant Commissioner and of the Deputy Commissioner contending that the Limitation Act is not and cannot be made applicable to any proceeding under the PTCL Act, having regard to its object for attainment of which the Act was enacted.
7. I have bestowed my anxious consideration on the rival contentions put forward by both sides regarding applicability or otherwise of the Limitation Act to any proceedings under the PTCL Act.
8. On a careful consideration of the matter I find little substance in the contention of learned Counsel for petitioners. The Supreme Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board, supra, on a review of its earlier decision on the point, has held:
"The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a Civil Court".
(emphasis supplied) Thus the law on the point expounded by Supreme Court makes it clear that Limitation Act applies only to those petitions or applications which are given under any Act to a Civil Court alone. As a corollary, it, therefore, follows that Limitation Act will not be applicable to such petitions or applications made under any Act to any forum or authority other than a Civil Court. Indisputably, the Revenue Court is not and cannot be equated with the status of a regular Civil Court. Therefore, in the light of aforestated law laid down by Supreme Court the contention of Sri S.P. Shankar, learned Counsel for petitioners, does not carry any legal weight.
9. Apart from above, the non-applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act to any proceeding under the PTCL Act is discernable from the very contents of the material provisions of the Act. Section 4 of the Act provides for prohibition of transfer of granted lands. It runs:
"4. Prohibition of transfer of granted lands.---(1) Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract, or instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of this Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant, or sub-section (2), shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be conveyed nor be deemed ever to be conveyed by such transfer.
(2) No person shall after the commencement of this Act transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government.
(3) The provision of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a Civil Court or of an award or order of any other authority".
10. The relevant provision of sub-section (1) of Section 5 is as extracted below:
"Resumption and restitution of granted lands.---(1) Where on application by any interested person or on information given in writing by any person or suo motu, and after such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under sub-section (1) of Section 4, he may.---
(a) by order take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard;
(b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir such land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free from all encumbrances. The Government may grant such land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to grant of lands".
On a combined reading of the aforesaid relevant provisions of the Act it becomes crystal clear that under no circumstance after the Act came into force, the alienation of the granted lands is permitted except with the previous permission of the Government as envisaged in sub-section (2) of Section 4. Furthermore, under Section 5 of the Act, a duty is cast on the Assistant Commissioner to also initiate action suo motu for taking possession of the alienated granted lands from the alienee/unauthorised occupants thereof whether or not any application in that behalf is given to him by any person whomsoever. Thus, when the PTCL Act has created a legal duty for the functionary under it to suo motu resume or take delivery of possession of all the illegally transferred granted lands, it logically follows that by virtue of its aforesaid provisions the applicability of the Limitation Act gets automatically supplanted and the provisions thereof would not be attracted to any of the proceedings taken under the PTCL Act by the concerned authorities. Mr. S.P. Shankar sought to countenance this inference by citing the decision of Supreme Court in Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v Thakoredas and Others, where upsetting the view of this Court, the Supreme Court has held that in the absence of an express provision under the Land Acquisition Act prescribing a period of limitation for a claimant to make his application under Section 18(3)(b) thereof to the Civil Court for a direction to the L.A.O. to make a reference of his case for the purpose of adjudicating his claim to enhanced compensation, the residuary Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted and in that view of the legal position the claimant seeking such a direction will have to make his application within the period of three years from the date of accrual of cause of action which accrues on the expiry of period of 90 days prescribed by Section 18(3)(a) for a claimant to make his application to the L.A.O. Intending to rely heavily on this legal proposition enunciated by Supreme Court Sri S.P. Shankar submitted that, likewise, in the instant case also, in the absence of any provision under the PTCL Act prescribing period of limitation for any interested person to make an application under Section 5 of the Act, the residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act come into play and, therefore, applications made before him by the applicants admittedly being long after the commencement of the expiry of period of three years from the date of commencement of the Act were clearly barred by time. I do not find much legal force in this contention of Sri S.P. Shankar for the simple reason already stated that in the light of proposition enunciated by Supreme Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board, supra, Article 137 of the Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to Civil Court only and that Revenue Court or Revenue Authority under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act or PTCL Act is not a Civil Court. That apart, the very contents of the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act also reveal that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 will not be applicable to the proceedings under the PTCL Act since the Assistant Commissioner is duty bound to take action for recovery of possession of the illegally alienated granted land suo motu without there being any application from any person made for the purpose.
11. Normally, the discharge of statutory duty by a statutory authority in attainment of the objectives of and enactment cannot be whittled down or frustrated by prescription of period of limitation thereof. Moreover in Manchegowda and Others v State of Karnataka and Others, the Supreme Court has spelt out the purpose and object sought to be achieved by the enactment of the PTCL Act as follows:
"The present Act seeks to introduce a change in the legal position. The prohibition on transfer of granted land had been imposed by law, rules or regulations governing such grant or by the terms of the grant. The relevant provisions imposing such prohibition by rules, regulations and laws have been referred to in the judgment of the High Court. It is quite clear that the condition regarding prohibition of transfer of granted land had been introduced in the interest of the grantees for the purposes of upkeep of the grants and for preventing the economically dominant sections of the community from depriving the grantees who belong to the weaker sections of the people of their enjoyment and possession of these lands and for safeguarding their interests against any exploitation by the richer sections in regard to the enjoyment and possession of these lands granted essentially for their benefit. As the statement of objects and reasons indicates, this prohibition on transfer of granted land has not proved to be a sufficiently strong safeguard in the matter of preserving grants in the hands of the grantees belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and, in violation of the prohibition on transfer of the granted land, transfers of such lands on a large scale to the serious detriment of the interests of these poorer sections of the people belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes had taken place. In view of this unfortunate experience the Legislature in its wisdom and in pursuance of its declared policy of safeguarding, protecting and improving the conditions of these weaker sections of the community, thought it fit to bring about this change in the legal position by providing that any such transfer except in terms of the provisions of the Act will be null and void and not merely voidable".
The aforesaid objectives of the Act disclose that the legislative intent in framing of this Act and the Land Acquisition Act operate altogether in different fields with different objectives. Therefore, the contention of Mr. S.P. Shankar is unacceptable.
12. There being no other valid ground canvassed for my consideration on behalf of the petitioners, I find that all the petitions are liable to be dismissed.
13. Hence, the petitions are dismissed.