Kerala High Court
Abdul Azeez vs Sankaran on 8 November, 2001
JUDGMENT Cyriac Joseph, J.
1. In this Original Petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges Ext. P5 Order passed by the Rent Control Court, Koyilandy in I.A. No. 1140/2001 in R.C.P.No. 44/2000 directing joint trial of R.C.P. Nos. 44/2000 and 45/2000.
2. R.C.P.No. 44/2000 is filed by the first respondent-landlord for eviction of the petitioner-tenant under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Kerala Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') R.C.P. No. 45/2000 is filed by the first respondent-landlord for eviction of the second respondent-tenant under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act. The petitioner and respondent No. 2 are brothers and they have jointly constructed a new building in the same town and it has nine shop rooms on the ground floor.
3. According to the first respondent, since the petitioner and the second respondent have jointly constructed a new building in the same town and since the said building is sufficient for their requirements, they are liable to be evicted from the petition scheduled shop rooms under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act. The first respondent herein is the petitioner in both the R.C.Ps. The counter petitioners in the R.C.Ps. are the two brothers who jointly own the newly constructed building in the same town. The facts to be proved to substantiate the claim for eviction in both the cases are in respect of the very same building. hence the first respondent filed an application I.A. 1140 of 2001 before the Rent Control Court under Section 23(1) of the Act and Section 151 of the C.P.C. praying for joint trial of the abovementioned two R.C.Ps. The Rent Control held that the joint trial of the two cases would minimise the evidence and would be convenient for both the parties and directed joint trial. The said order of the Rent Control Court is under challenge in this Original Petition.
4. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Rent Control Court has no power under Section 23(1) of the Act to direct joint trial of the two R.C.Ps. According to the learned counsel, the Rent Control Court has the powers which are vested in a court under the code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit, only in respect of the matters mentioned in Clauses (a) to (k) of Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act and joint trial of cases is not among the matters mentioned in Section 23(1) and hence Section 23(1) does not empower the Rent Control Court to invoke the powers vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure and direct joint trial of cases. But learned counsel for respondent No. 1 contends that even if Section 23(1) of the Act does not confer power on the Rent Control Court to direct joint trial, the Rent Control Court can direct joint trial invoking the inherent power of the Court. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relies on the judgment of a Division Bench of this court in Ebrahim Ismail Kunju v. Phasila Beevi (1991 (1) KLT 861) wherein the court held as follows:
"The increasing importance of the Tribunal in the vast changing life of the community cannot be ignored by a modern court. A modern ostrich even in the distant deserts may not make such limited use of its eyes. Many valuable rights of the modern citizen are deeply involved with the adjudicator, processes of the Tribunals. Many areas hitherto occupied by courts, are now the domains of the Tribunals. A liberal approach towards their functioning and a larger view about the powers they need, are the requirements of the times. A Tribunal should be facilitated to do all that a court could do in similar situations; and much more than that. Greater speed and a total liberation from the tentacles of technicalities, give a better look and greater efficiency for effectively manned Tribunals. If there be no statutory prohibition, the Tribunal should therefore normally be in a position to ordain its affairs and modulate its procedures in such a manner as to best subserve the interest of the public, and in particular the litigant public. Looked that way, even in the absence of an enumerated head of statutory power on the conjoint reading of Section 23 and the enumerated provisions of the C.P.C. referred to in that section, would have permitted the Tribunal to pass an order which would better serve the interest of the litigant and of the Tribunal. However, the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority should be circumspect in the invocation of the power and in the issue of an order invoking such a jurisdiction."
We are in full agreement with the above view and we hold that the Rent Control Court has inherent power to direct joint trial of cases, if the joint trial will subserve the interest of the parties and is necessary in the interest of justice. Hence, we reject the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned Order is liable to be set aside on the ground that the Rent Control Court had no power to direct joint trial of the two R.C.Ps.
5. The only other contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in the fact and circumstances of this case there was no justification for directing joint trial and that the Rent Control Court did not consider the objections raised by the petitioner in that regard. We are not impressed by this contention also. As already pointed out, the petitioner in both the R.C.Ps. is the same and the counter petitioners in the R.C.Ps. are two brothers who have jointly constructed a new building in the same town and the said building, according to the petitioner in the R.C.Ps. is sufficient for the requirements of the counter petitioners. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the matters to be proved in support of the claim for eviction in both the cases are in respect of the very same building which has been newly constructed by the tenants in the same town. Hence, we are of the view that the Rent Control Court was justified in directing joint trial of the two R.C.Ps. and that there were valid and sufficient grounds for directing joint trial.
In the light of what has been stated above, there is no merit in the Original Petition and hence the Original Petition is dismissed.