Allahabad High Court
Ram Narain Mehrotra And 4 Others. vs State Of U.P. on 2 April, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:23251
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 452 of 1998
Ram Narain Mehrotra And 4 Others.
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
H.D.Srivastava, Abhinav Srivastava, Abhishek Bhasin, Anurag Verma, Nadeem Murtaza, P Chakrawarti, Suresh Chandra Srivastava, Virendra K Shukla
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Govt. Advocate, A S Rakhra, Anurag Kumar Singh, S.B.Pandey
[A.F.R.] Court No. - 14
HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.
1. Heard Shri Abhinav Srivastava, the learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Anurag Kumar Singh, the learned counsel for the respondent- C.B.I.
2. The instant appeal was filed in the year 1998 by five appellants, namely, (i) Ram Narain Mehrotra, (ii) Jageshwar Prasad Mehrotra, (iii) Onkar Nath Mehrothra (iv) Nirankar Nath Mehrotra and (v) Smt. Neera Mehrotra, challenging the validity of a judgment and order dated 30.07.1998 passed by the Special Judge, Anti Corruption (West), U.P., Lucknow in Criminal Case No.02 of 1979, whereby the appellants have been convicted for the offence under Section 120-B I.P.C. read with Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay Rs.4,00,000/- as fine.
3. The appeal was admitted by means of an order dated 12.09.1998, the appellants were ordered to be released on bail and the payment of fine was also stayed pending disposal of the appeal.
4. During pendency of the appeal, appellant Nos.1, 2 and 4 have died and the appeal survives only in respect of the appellant Nos.3 and 5.
5. Briefly stated, the prosecution case arises out of alleged banking frauds committed by three firms during the year 1972 to 1975. One of the three firms- M/s Guru Prasad Ram Prasad, Kanpur, was reconstituted in the year 1965 and its partners were Ram Narain Mehrotra, Guru Prasad Mehrotra, Jageshwar Prasad Mehrotra and Nirankar Nath Mehrotra. The second firm- M/s MT and Company was constituted on 08.01.1972 and its active partners were Ram Narain Mehrotra and Anil Kumar Tandon, Onkar Nath Mehrotra was Manager of this firm. The third firm was M/s MT Agencies, Lucknow. Ram Narain Mehrotra, Anil Kumar Tandon, Smt. Prem Kumari Mehrotra and Smt. Neera Mehrotra were active partners of this firm and the aforesaid Onkar Nath Mehrotra was the Manager of this firm also.
6. Another accused B. N. Tandon was working as a Head Clerk in State Bank of India, Main Branch during the year 1973 to 1975. Yet another accused M. L. Agarwal was working as a Head Clerk in DDRR Section of the Main Branch, State Bank of India during the period October 1968 to January 1973 and thereafter he was promoted to the post of Officer Grade-II, but he continued to work on the same post till April 1973 and he also used to perform duties similar to that of co-accused B. N. Tandon.
7. Some fraudulent transactions came to light during an inspection of the bank made by an Officer on Special Duty, on the basis whereof three FIRs were lodged. During investigation, it came to light that out of 35 lost cheques, 8 cheques had been made to disappear by co-accused persons B. N. Tandon and M. L. Agarwal. 3 cheques related to firm M/s Guru Prasad Ram Prasad and M/s MT Agencies, 10 of the 25 lost cheques were received in branches of State Bank of India at Kanpur. It was alleged that co-accused B. N. Tandon had misplaced the cheques under conspiracy with other co-accused persons and B. N. Tandon had been seen going to meet Ram Narain Mehrotra in firm- M/s Guru Prasad Ram Prasad, Chowk, Kanpur.
8. The trial Court held that sanction for prosecution of co-accused M. L. Agarwal was valid but the sanction for prosecution of B. N. Tandon was not valid. Regarding the offence of criminal conspiracy alleged against the partners of the three firms, it was established that they had issued the cheques which establish that they were active partners of the firms. The amount for which the cheques had been issued were not available in the accounts of the firms. The accused persons made interpolations and forgery in the cheques and made them disappear from the bank by sending same to the other banks. By the time the cheques could return to the bank, enough time had elapsed.
9. Signature of the appellant no. 5 Smt. Neera Mehrotra have been proved by prosecution witness 12- S. N. Kakkar. This was done under the criminal Conspiracy with the accused persons- partners and Manager of the firms.
10. After a detailed analysis of the entire prosecution material, the trial court held that the appellants Nos.3 and 5 are guilty of entering into a criminal conspiracy for commission of offences under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and convicted them for the offence. The accused persons- appellants No.3 and 5 have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.
11. The learned counsel for the appellants has not assailed the correctness of the findings of guilt and conviction recorded by the trial court and he has only submitted that appellant No.3 is presently aged about 90 years and appellant No.5 is a woman aged about 88 years. Both appellants have no previous criminal history.
12. The learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that both the appellants are suffering from old age ailments and it would not be justified to keep them incarcerated at this stage of their life for an offence allegedly committed more than a half century ago. Therefore, they should be granted the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act.
13. Although the learned counsel for the respondent- CBI has advanced submissions in opposition of the appeal and supporting the order of conviction, he did not oppose the Court taking a lenient view, so far as sentencing is concerned, keeping in view the advanced age of the appellants.
14. Before proceeding to decide the request for granting the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, it would be appropriate to have a look at the relevant provisions of the Probation Act, which are being reproduced below: -
"4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.?(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.
(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1) is made, the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
(3) When an order under sub-section (1), the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order or impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender.
(4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender.
(5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned.
11. Courts competent to make order under the Act, appeal and revision and powers of courts in appeal and revision.?(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, an order under this Act may be made by any court empowered to try and sentence the offender to imprisonment and also by the High Court or any other court when the case comes before it on appeal or in revision.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, where an order under Section 3 or Section 4 is made by any court trying the offender (other than a High Court), an appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former court.
(3) In any case where any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence and the court by which he is found guilty declines to deal with him under Section 3 or Section 4, and passes against him any sentence of imprisonment with or without fine from which no appeal lies or is preferred, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former court may, either of its own motion or on an application made to it by the convicted person or the probation officer, call for the examine the record of the case and pass such order thereon as it thinks fit.
(4) When an order has been made under Section 3 or Section 4 in respect of an offender, the Appellate Court or the High Court in the exercise of its power of revision may set aside such order and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such offender according to law:
Provided that the Appellate Court or the High Court in revision shall not inflict a greater punishment than might have been inflicted by the court by which the offender was found guilty.
* * *
18. Saving of operation of certain enactments.?Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of Section 31 of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897 (8 of 1897), or sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947) 3[* * *] or of any law in force in any State relating to juvenile offenders or borstal schools.
15. As per Section 18, the benefit of the Probation Act would not be available to a person guilty of committing offences under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. However, the appellants have been convicted for the offence of criminal conspiracy for committing an offence under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and they have not been held guilty of committing the substantive offences under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The appellants are not public servants and they could not be held guilty of the offences under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Therefore, I am of the view that the bar contained in Section 18 of the Probation Act will not apply to the present case.
16. In Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2021) 2 SCC 763, the Hon'ble Supreme Court granted the benefit of the Probation Act to persons accused of offences under Section 307 IPC., on the following considerations: -
"17. The facts of the present case are that the appellants have not served out the minimum sentence of 7 years though they have served about half the sentences. They were aged under 19 and 21 years of age as on the date of offence but not on the date of sentence. The redeeming feature in their case is that the person who suffered, appears to have forgiven them, possibly with the passage of time. There is no adverse report against them about their conduct in jail otherwise the same would have been brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the State. Faced with the aforesaid legal position, this is a fit case that the benefit of probation can be extended to the appellants under the said Act in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the said Act on completion of half the sentence."
17. In Tarak Nath Keshari v. State of W.B.: (2024) 13 SCC 384, the Hon'ble Supreme Court followed the decision in the case of Lakhvir Singh (supra) and granted benefit of the Probation Act to the appellant, who was convicted of the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, which provides a minimum sentence for the offence, on consideration of the facts that the offence was committed more than 37 years back and it was not pointed out at the time of hearing that the appellant was involved in any other offence. Before all the courts below, the appellant remained on bail. While entertaining his appeal, even this Court had granted him exemption from surrendering.
18. In Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 984, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -
"28. Before passing the sentence on a convict, after rendering conviction, the Judge shall consider the feasibility of proceeding in accordance with the provisions of Section 360 of the CrPC, 1973 which speaks of releasing a convict on probation of good conduct or after admonition. Being a beneficial provision dealing with a reformative aspect, it is the bounden duty of the Judge to consider the application of this provision before proceeding to hear the accused on sentence. While doing so, the Judge has to hear the accused and the prosecution. Similarly, the Court has to apply the salient provisions contained under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1958"). If an offence is considered as an act against the society, the resultant action cannot be retributive alone, as equal importance is required, if not more, to be given to the reformative part. The ultimate goal is to bring the accused back on the rails, to once again be a part of society. Any attempt to ignore either Section 360 of the CrPC, 1973 or the provisions as mandated in the Act, 1958 would make their purpose redundant. It looks as if these laudable provisions have been lost sight of while rendering a sentence. The ultimate objective is to prevent the commission of such offences in future. It can never be done by a retributive measure alone, as a change of heart at the behest of the accused is the best way to prevent an act of crime. Therefore, we have absolute clarity in our mind, that a trial court is duty bound to comply with the mandate of Section 360 of the CrPC, 1973 read with Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Act, 1958 before embarking into the question of sentence. In this connection, we may note that sub-section (10) of Section 360 of the CrPC, 1973 makes a conscious effort to remind the Judge of the rigour of the beneficial provisions contained in the Act, 1958.
29. Hearing the accused on sentence is a valuable right conferred on the accused. The real importance lies only with the sentence, as against the conviction. Unfortunately, we do not have a clear policy or legislation when it comes to sentencing. Over the years, it has become judge-centric and there are admitted disparities in awarding a sentence.
30. In a country like ours, sentencing accused persons pursuant to a conviction, on a uniform pattern, would also be prejudicial. When it comes to sentencing, there are various factors such as age, sex, education, home life, social background, emotional and mental conditions, caste, religion and community that constitute aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
31. There is a distinction between knowledge and character. Knowledge is acquired, while character is formed. The formation of a person's character depends upon various factors. More often than not, a convict does not have control over the formation of his character. This leads to certain groups of people inheriting crime. In this connection, we can draw an analogy from nature itself. Before falling on the ground, rainwater remains the same. It is the soil which changes the character of the water. Rainwater partakes in the character of the soil, over which it does not have any control. The issues are extremely complex.
32. A decision of a Judge in sentencing, would vary from person to person. This will also vary from stage to stage. It is controlled by the mind. The environment and the upbringing of a Judge would become the ultimate arbiter in deciding the sentence. A Judge from an affluent background might have a different mindset as against a Judge from a humble one. A female Judge might look at it differently, when compared to her male counterpart. An Appellate Court might tinker with the sentence due to its experience, and the external factors like institutional constraints might come into play. Certainly, there is a crying need for a clear sentencing policy, which should never be judge-centric as the society has to know the basis of a sentence.
33. Sentencing shall not be a mere lottery. It shall also not be an outcome of a knee-jerk reaction. This is a very important part of the Fundamental Rights conferred under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Any unwarranted disparity would be against the very concept of a fair trial and, therefore, against justice.
34. Various elements such as deterrence, incapacitation and reformation should form part of sentencing. There is a compelling need for a studied scrutiny of sentencing, to address in particular the reformative aspect, while maintaining equality between different groups. Perhaps, much study is also required on the occurence of repeat offences, which could be attributable to certain groups. The nexus between particular types of offences and the offenders forming their own groups has to be taken note of and addressed.
35. The concept of intuitive sentencing is against the rule of law. A Judge can never have unrestrictive and unbridled discretion, based upon his conscience formed through his understanding of the society, without there being any guidelines in awarding a sentence. The need for adequate guidelines for exercising sentencing discretion, avoiding unwanted disparity, is of utmost importance."
19. In Chellammal v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 870, it has been held that: -
"28. Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record the reasons therefor.
29. For the foregoing reasons and in the light of the factual matrix, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the Sessions Judge and the High Court by omitting to consider whether the appellants were entitled to the benefit of probation, occasioned a failure of justice. Consequently, there was no worthy consideration as to whether the appellants could be extended the benefit of probation."
20. In light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments noted above, no purpose will be achieved by placing the appellant Nos.3 and 5 aged 90 years and 88 years respectively, under incarceration and recovery of fine at this stage after expiry of more than half a century since commission of the offence. It will neither be reformative, nor preventive, nor deterrent to place them in custody.
21. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed off by upholding the conviction of the appellant No. 3 and 5 and granting them the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. As a period of almost four decades stands elapsed since the appellants were sentenced during which the appellants have not said to have committed any other offence, there is no need to place them under probation for any further period.
(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.) April 2, 2026
-Amit K-