Madras High Court
Secretary T.N.E.B. Accounts ... vs Tamil Nadu Electricity Board on 7 September, 1989
Equivalent citations: (1994)ILLJ1128MAD
JUDGMENT
Nainar Sundaram J.
1. The appellant raised an industrial dispute over the withdrawal by the first-respondent of the concession shown to the General Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Accounts Subordinates Union and the Joint Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Workers Federation in that they were fully exonerated of the obligations to attend to their normal work as employees of the first- respondent and were allowed to attend to full time union work. This concession was earlier granted by the proceedings of the first-respondent dated January 18, 1973, effective from September 30, 1972 afternoon. This was withdrawn after the end of March 31, 1976. The industrial dispute got referred for adjudication before the third respondent in I.D. No. 239 of 1977. The question that was referred for adjudication read as follows:
"Whether the action of management in having withdrawn the concession of the General Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Accounts Subordinates Union and the Joint Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Workers Federation being allowed to attend to full time union work from March 31, 1976 is justified and to what relief they would be entitled."
2. The third-respondent took the view that there was no legal right which had been acquired by workmen and what was granted to them was a simple concession by the first-respondent to exempt the office-bearers of the unions from regular duty to enable them to devote themselves to the union work fully and this was merely an act of benevolence on the part of the first-respondent rather than a conferment of any right on them and this could not be claimed as a customary concession or privilege and there was no change in the condition of service within the meaning of Section 9-A read with Schedule IV to the Industrial Disputes Act, 14 of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act. As the result, the third-respondent held that the withdrawal of the concession was justified and an Award was passed rejecting the reference. This gave room for the appellant to approach this Court by way of W.P. No. 5699 of 1979. The learned single Judge, who heard and disposed of the writ petition, found no warrant for interference with the Award of the third-respondent and the writ petition was dismissed. This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge.
3. The endeavour of Mr. G. Venkataraman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, was to demonstrate that absolving the office-bearers of the unions from the regular work under the first respondent fully was only with a view to allow them to devote their time for legitimate trade union activities; and when the trade unions could have recognition of carrying on of their activities through their office-bearers, permitting such office-bearers to devote their full time for such activities, even though it may amount to sacrificing their services to the first-respondent, must be held to be a customary concession or privilege and the withdrawal of the same, as done in the present case, without adhering to the statutory formalities contemplated under Section 9-A of the Act has got to be frowned upon and that right of the workmen of the first-respondent as office-bearers of the unions must be restored. Learned counsel for the appellant only wanted to bring the matter within the ambit of 'customary concession or privilege' within the meaning of Item 8 of Schedule IV to the Act. That item reads as follows:
"Withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege or change in usage." Section 9-A of the Act itself speaks about the change in the condition of service. The customary concession or privilege spoken to in item 8 of Schedule IV to the Act must have a nexus to the condition of service because that is the caption under which Schedule IV also enumerates the items. To say that a workman, on the simple ground that he happens to be an office-bearer of the union, must be totally absolved from the obligation to do any service to the employer throughout, while he happens to be such an office-bearer will certainly bring in an anomaly with regard to the concept of the condition of service and change in the condition of service. Any customary concession or privilege must be conceived and accepted only from the angle and axis of rendering of service, and not total absolving from service. The concept of 'privilege' is an advantage conferred over and above ordinary law. A privilege is some advantage to an individual or group of individuals. 'Privilege' is a 'right, advantage or immunity granted to or enjoyed by a person, or class of persons, beyond the common advantage of others'. Concession is a grant and here the statute speaks about a customary concession. That means, the concession must have the backing of a custom. It cannot be pleaded that absolving the office-bearers of the unions, though they are workmen, from the normal rendering of service to the employer is a customary concession. Such concepts would be anathema to the basic idea behind employer-employee relationship, which will take in the rendering of service by the employee and the honouring of corresponding obligations by the employer, like compensating for services rendered, etc. If a workman should do no service at all to the employer on the simple ground that he is an office bearer of the union, that would nullify the very concept of workman and further his condition of service. We do not think that we should subscribe our support to such a theory by annexing an unwieldy connotation to 'customary concession or privilege'. That would be totally unwarranted and would shatter the very basis of what has been the foundation behind the relevant provisions in the Act. It is one thing to say that the workmen should have the recognition of their trade union and another thing to say that the office-bearers of trade-unions though workmen must be totally absolved from doing their duty and service to the employer on the simple ground that they are office-bearers of the unions. As rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge it is not claimed by the appellants that the workmen who happened to function as office-bearers of the union were prevented or being prevented from carrying on their union activities. We are not able to persuade ourselves to bring what has happened in the present case as the withdrawal of any 'customary concession or privilege' within the meaning of item 8 of schedule IV to the Act, to which end alone was the endeavour made by Mr. G. Venkataraman, learned counsel for the appellant. Concurring with the decision of the learned single Judge, we dismiss the Writ Appeal. There will be no order as to costs.