Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
National Engineering Industries Ltd., ... vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 2 May, 1998
Equivalent citations: AIR1998RAJ229, 1999(1)WLC276
ORDER Arun Madan, J.
1. The Petitioner, National Engineering Industries (for short "the Company") by way of this Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has challenged the Order, dated 19-2-1994, issued by Respondent No. 4 viz. Sub-Divisional Officer, Jaipur directing the Petitioner-Company to remove its purported encroachment over Khasra Nos. 138/279 and 139/279 in Bassi Sitarampura by 25-2-1994 failing which coercive action for removal of the aforesaid encroachment was directed to be initiated at the instance of Respondent No. 4 against the Petitioner-Company vide impugned Notice. dated 9-4-1994. It is the said Notice which has been challenged by the Petitioner-Company on the ground of having been issued by Respondent No. 4 as being wholly arbitrary, unwarranted, without jurisdiction and on extraneous considerations and is also barred on the principle of promissory estoppel. Prior to initiation of land acquisition proceedings in pursuance of the expansion programme of the industrial unit of the Petitioner-Company, an application was moved by the Petitioner-Company (for short "NEI"). Department of Industries, Government of Rajasthan as on 19-4-1958 for allotment of 35 bighas 1.7 biswas of land lying between NEI's factory and Man Industrial Corporation. Thereafter land acquisition pro-
ceedings were initiated by the respondents for the purpose of acquisition of the aforesaid land falling under village Bassi Sitarampura, Chak Hasanpura and Sahjahpura were initiated by way of Notification, dated 20-3-1959. under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act. This Notification was gazetted on 30-4-1959.
2. Subsequently it transpired that out of the aforesaid land, 17 bighas 19 biswas of land was sawai chak, not within the purview of acquisition being a private land which intact, had already been acquired by Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur (for short "UIT"). This fact is also fortified from the letter, dated 10-11-1960 addressed by the Land Acquisition Officer to the Assistant Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur and which fact is borne out from the perusal of Annexure-2 on the record.
3. It has further been averred by the Petitioner-Company that as a result of present needs of the said Company for expansion of its factory at Jaipur, the Secretary, Industries vide his communication, dated 6-12-1962 had informed the Collector, Jaipur that it had been decided to allot 35 bighas 17 biswas of land in question falling in villages Bassi Sitarampura, Chak Hasanpura and Sahjahpura to NEI Ltd. and a direction was issued in this regard by the Secretary, Industries, Govt. of Rajasthan to the effect that aforesaid khasra numbers as specified be declared as industrial urea and handed over to the company. It was further stated that as regards the residue of the remaining land measuring 17 bighas 19 biswas it had been decided to compensate the UIT with the cost of acquisition of the land and a sum of Rs. 20,000/- had already been deposited by the NEI with the Industries Department for remittance to the UIT, Jaipur. This fact is borne out from the correspondence dated 6-12-1962 wherein it is categorically stated that the necessary lease deeds would be signed with NEI as soon as the land was declared as industrial area vide Annexure-3 on the record.
4. Before dealing with the merits of the case I deem it appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions of Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 particularly Section 88 as well as Section 102 of the said Act. Section 88 of the Act reads as under:--
"All roads etc. and all lands which are not the property of others belong to the State-- (1) All public roads, lanes, paths, bridges and ditches, all fences on or beside the same, all rivers, streams, nallas, lakes and tanks, all canals and watercourses, all standing and flowing water, and all lands wherever situated which are not the property of individuals or of bodies of persons legally capable of holding properly, are, except in so far as any rights of such persons or bodies may be established in or over the same and except as may be otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force and are hereby declared to be, with all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto, the property of the State, and it snail be lawful for the Collector subject to the order of the (Commissioner) to dispose them of in such manner as may be prescribed subject always to the rights of way and all other rights of the public or of individuals legally subsisting."
5. Section 102 of the Act empowers the State Government to allot the land for purposes other than agriculture, i.e., for the purposes of industry on conditions as it deems fit notwithstanding anything contrary under the Act. It reads as under:
"Section 102.-- Power of Government to allot land for purposes other than agricultural as well as on special terms-- Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the State Government shall have power to allot land for the purposes of an industry or for any purpose of public utility on such conditions as it deems fit."
6. It is staled by the Petitioner in the above context that the Stale Government was duly empowered by virtue of the Act of 1957 to allot the land in question measuring 35 bighas 17 biswas to the company for its industrial expansion. Thereafter the Petitioner's request with regard to the aforesaid land was reiterated by the Industries Department, Government of Rajasthan on its own level to the Collector, Jaipur for declaring the said land as industrial area expeditiously for the purposes of expansion of the Petitioner's Company over the same in accordance with Section 92 of the Act of 1957. This fact is borne out from Annexure-4 dated 4-1-1963 on the record.
7. During the course of hearing it was contended by learned counsel for the Petitioner that in spite of the aforesaid communications and the Petitioner's request made in this regard from time, to time and several reminders sent to the Respondents, the said exercise could not be earned out as a result of failure and lapse of the authorities by setting apart the said land notwithstanding its having been declared as land for industrial purposes and its user having been changed from agricultural to industrial. The factum of aforesaid khasra numbers 138/278 (sic) and 139/279 being utilised for setting up of Steel Foundry is borne out from its possession as existing on the record and which fact had not been disputed by the respondents and from other relevant documents on the record.
8. From the perusal of record it is apparent that even though the Steel Foundry and Thermal Power Plants were constructed on the land comprising 35 bighas 17 biswas after it formal regularisation for industrial use, the said exercise was deliberately not done by the Respondents with a view to avoid the execution of lease-deeds in favour of the Petitioner-Company.
9. As regards the Respondents' contention that the Petitioner had encroached upon the area of 5 bighas in khasra No. 74 in village Sahjahpura by constructing boundary wall therein. Notice under Section 91 read with Section 90-A of the Act of 1956, it has been contended that a Patwari had filed the report on which Notices Under Sections 90-A and 91 of the Act were issued and also interim injunction against the Petitioner-Company under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The Petitioner contested the same by filing his reply to the said Notices and it was finally found that the complaint filed against the Petitioner Company was false since the allotment had properly been done in accordance with law by the State Government to the Petitioner in terms of Order, dated 1-12-1962. Hence I am of the view that the Petitioner cannot be deemed to have encroached upon the land in question and the principle of promissory estoppel as envisaged under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act (Act No. 1 of 1872) is fully attracted against the respondents since they are bound by their own admissions on the record from taking a contrary view against the petitioner.
10. Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 for short "the Act" reads a under : --
"When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing."
11. The law which governs the principle of promissory estoppel is to the effect that it would be wholly inequitable and unjust that if one person by a representation made, or by conduct amounting to a representation, had induced another to act as he would not otherwise have acted or done, the person who made the representation should not be allowed to deny or repudiate the effect of his former statement, to the loss and injury of the person who acted on it. Before the above principle can be applied to the facts of the given case the following things are important:--
(a) declaration (b) act, or (c) omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person,
(i) to believe a thing to be true, and (ii) to act upon such belief, then neither he nor his representative shall be allowed to deny the truth of that thing in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative. To invoke the doctrine of estoppel three conditions must be satisfied: (1) representation by a person to another, (2) the other shall have acted upon the said representation, and (3) such action shall have been detrimental to the interests of the person to whom the representation has been made if acted upon the same and in all event the person on whose belief or benefit the second party as acted upon the said representation would be put to great loss and disadvantage if the former party is allowed to deny or repudiate the effect of his statement as it would be resulting in loss and injury to the latter who has acted upon the same. The representation which is basis for the applicability of the rule must be clear and unambiguous and not indefinite upon which the party relying on it is said to have, in good faith and in belief of the same acted. The principle is based on the doctrine propounded in the matter of Pickard v. Sears, (1837) 6 Ad and EI 469 at page 474, namely, that where a person "by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is precluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time." The doctrine embodied in this section is not a rule of equity, but is a rule of evidence formulated and applied by Courts of law. It precludes a person from denying the truth of some statement previously made by himself.
12. "Estoppel" is based on the maxim, "allegans contraria non est audiendus" (a person alleging contradictory facts should not be heard), and is that species of presumption juris et de jure, where the fact presumed is taken to be true, not as against all the world, but as against a particular party, and that only by reason of some act done; it is in truth a kind of argumentum and hominem. Hence it appears that "estoppel" must not be understood as synonymous with "conclusive evidence."-- the former being conclusions drawn by law against parties from particular facts, while by the latter is meant some piece or mass of evidence, sufficiently strong to generate conviction in the mind of a tribunal, or rendered conclusive on a party, either by common or statute law.
13. Estoppel depends on the existence of some duty and that is peculiarly so in the case of an omission. In order to succeed on a plea of estoppel it must be shown that there was a neglect of some duty owning to the person led into a particular belief, or to the general public of whom that person is one. and not merely neglect of what would be prudent in respect to the party prejudice, or even of some duly owing to third persons, with whom those seeking to set up estoppel are not privy. There is a breach of the duty if the party estopped has not used due precautions to avert the risk."
14. As regards the principle of promissory estoppel il is based on the doctrine that when one party had by his words or conduct made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to have the legal effect between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to their previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced.
15. The law on the subject has been so authoritatively well settled that the principle of promissory estoppel is equally attracted to the Government and its instrumentalities who are no longer immune from its applicability and the State agencies have to work within the framework of the legal system. As a matter of fact estoppel can be invoked to hold the Government and its instrumentalities bound by its promises and agreements whether they be of executive or administrative character. If this check is not maintained on the Government and its instrumentalities the result will be disastrous since they will be left scot-free to act arbitrarily in the matter and first of all enter into negotiations and agreements with the private parties and when once the private parties have been induced to change their position acting upon the promise made by the instrumentalities of the State, would be subjected to the great pecuniary loss and disadvantage if the Government or its agencies are not bound by the principle of promissory estoppel from not acting upon the same. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is comparatively of recent origin in the field of public law. The present development in this area is that of understanding administrative actions which are now governed by the principle of accountability as regards the decisions taken by the instrumentalities of State and in order to have binding effect, make their officers, servants and agents bound by their decisions as regards the private parties whose rights and interests equally deserve to be protected by the Courts of law if they have suffered or sustained any injury or loss as a result of their dealings with them. This will not only ensure fairness in administrative actions of the functionaries in public offices as regards their dealings with the people at large but will also repose confidence in them that they are quite safe and will not be subjected to any kind of exploitation. Hence the principle of promissory estoppel is no longer a principle available only as a shield and it can also be used as a weapon of offence.
16. Applying the above principle to the instant case it is to be noticed that the petitioner-company had on the basis of relevant correspondence as referred to above, was induced to make part payment of the agreed consideration towards sale price to the respondent-U.I.T. as on 31-12-1962 and further payments on subsequent dates as agreed upon between the parties and the receipt of the same was duly acknowledged from time to lime by the officers and functionaries of the U.I.T. Thereafter al much later stage the respondents had raised a dispute on the basis of some motivated interest with a view to overcome the difficulty which was created as a result of some political vested interest so as to deprive the petitioner of the benefits of the agreement which was duly agreed and acted upon between the parties regarding the allotment of the land in question for industrial expansion of the petitioner-company as referred to above. Thus, in my view respondents were neither permitted nor should have been allowed to do so, since once having accepted the admitted position on the record by entering into an agreement with the petitioner and promising him to allot a piece of land for the purpose of his industrial expansion should not have acted arbitrarily in the matter in violation of agreement and having received part of the consideration, they should not have been permitted to change their decision resulting in great detriment and prejudice to the petitioner, since in my view this is obviously violative of principles of justice, equity and good conscience being devoid of fairness in administrative actions of the instrumentality of State and deserves to be dealt with strictly and decided on the principle of accountability and more particularly promissory estoppel as envisaged under Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
17. My aforesaid observations are also fortified from the payment of the consideration money of Rs. 20,000/- by the petitioner to UIT as on 23-11-1962 and further a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid by the petitioner as on 6-5-1970 to the respondents in pursuance of the decision taken in the meeting, dated 13-2-1970 of the Chief Secretary; Secretary, Town Planning and the Secretary, Industries in respect of 17 bighas 9 biswas of land as is borne out from relevant correspondence on the record. A dispute was raised by the respondents on the basis of some political motivated vested interest with regard to cremation ground in an area of 1 bigha 16 biswas of land in the aforesaid khasra numbers in Bassi Sitarampura which fact is contrary to the situation on the record, since no cremation ground whatsoever exists over the site in question and this was a false excuse adopted by the respondent with a view to delay the decision already arrived at in the aforesaid meeting of its own officials with a view to forestall and delay its implementation which proved prejudicial to the right and interest of the petitioner and in my view is wholly unwarranted being arbitrary and contrary to the own decision of the respondents and hence the respondents are not entitled to find any escape route from the same and is binding on the respondents. In order to satisfy myseff I had also raised a specific query to the learned counsel for the parties as regards the master-plan of Jaipur which was in force during the relevant period and what is the user of the land indicated in the said plan. The master-plan was perused in the Court which was summoned from the concerned department and from its perusal it is clearly borne out that the user of the land in question had been shown as industrial and for industrial purposes and in fact it is shown as industrial area in the master-plan itself vide Annexure-9 on the record.
18. In reply to the show cause notice the respondents have not disputed that the position of the land and its user as indicated in the aforesaid khasras and also in the master-plan of Jaipur wherein its user had been indicated as industrial. The respondents in para 8 of the reply have, however, contended that the petitioner-company is having physical possession over the said land but the said land had never been allotted to the petitioner-company and regarding the allotment the matter is still pending before the State Government because about 35 bighas 17 biswas of land in Khasra Nos. 138/279 and 139/279 situated in village Bassi Sitarampura had been registered as Sawai Chak Shamsan in the revenue records and the said land is being used till date for the purposes of Shamsan. It has further been contended that there is dispute between the local residence and the petitioner-company regarding use of the said land and because of this dispute the allotment of the said land has not yet been made in favour of the petitioner-company. It has further been contended that since the matter is still pending consideration before the State Government, it has not been in position to allot the said land to the petitioner in view of the dispute and agitation of the residents of the locality. As regards the notice, dated 9-2-1994 served on the petitioner-company and which is a subject-matter of challenge, it has been contended that the same was served on the petitioner in accordance with law and hence the petitioner-company is not entitled for any relief.
19. From the perusal of reply to show cause notice filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 viz. department of industries through its Secretary, Jaipur as well as the Collector, Jaipur and the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jaipur it is apparent that the possession of the petitioner-company over the land in dispute has been admitted while the respondents have taken a specific stand that the allotment of the land has not yet been done to the petitioner since the matter is still pending before the State Government for its decision in view of the fact that the land in dispute measuring 35 bighas 17 biswas in Khasra No. 138/279 situated in village Bassi has been registered as Sawai Chak Shamsan in the revenue record and has been used till date for the purpose of Shamsan. However, the respondents have stated that decision of the State Government shall be taken very soon and it has not been possible to allot the land to the petitioner in view of the dispute raised by the local residents.
20. From the perusal of the aforesaid contention which have been reiterated by the learned counsel for the respondents during the course of hearing, I am of the considered view that the principle of promissory estoppel is wholly attracted to this case, since one having taken positive stand in favour of the petitioner by having accepted the consideration, i.e. sale price in lieu of the allotment of land in question lying in between the petitioners' factory and Man Industrial Corporation and which fact is also borne out from the relevant correspondence on the record, more particularly the letter of the Urban Improvement Trust now Jaipur Development Authority from which it is apparent that for the development of Kachchi Basti in Hasanpura a piece of land measuring 17 bighas 19 biswas which had been acquired by the U.I.T and the National Engineering Industry had taken the possession of the said land and has been in its use and occupation fulling in Khasra Nos. 138/280 and 138/282 has been specifically earmarked for its user for industrial purposes and the State Government was requested through its Collector, Jaipur to notify its user for industrial purposes. Thereafter there was repealed correspondence between the parties, i.e., the U.I.T. Jaipur and the NEI regarding its allotment to the petitioner and a demand was made by the UIT for which payment of sale consideration of Rupees 3,81,150.00 and in view of its non-payment within the stipulated time, the said demand was revised to payment of sale consideration of Rupees 5,71,023.26 besides Rs. 1,00,000.00 was also to be paid by the petitioner-company to the then UIT and only thereafter necessary steps for effecting transfer of the aforesaid land shall be undertaken by the UIT.
21. From the perusal of the letter, dated 9-4-1986 from the Collector, Jaipur to Deputy Secretary, Department of Revenue, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur which is on the summoned record, it is apparent that the user of the aforesaid land measuring 35 bighas 17 biswas in village Sahjahapura for industrial purposes has not been disputed and this fact is also borne out from the master-plan of the city of Jaipur where its user specifically has been shown as industrial. In this regard it has been stated in the said letter that the draft master-plan was also summoned by the said authority from which its user for industrial purposes by the petitioner-company has been established.
22. As regards the dispute raised by the local residents of the said area for Shamsan (cremation ground) it has been contended that a proposal was made to the Petitioner-Company that in case it was willing to shift the cremation ground to other alternative site in the near vicinity to the same has already been established by the petitioner rather the said company has already suggested that a piece of land measuring 1 bigha 16 biswas falling in Khasra No. 138/79 in village Bassi Sitarampura be utilized for cremation ground in lieu of the land in dispute which is presently being used as Shamsan by the local residents of the area. A resolution was also passed by the respondents in favour of the petitioner-company as regards its allotment and user for industrial purposes which is also borne out from the revenue record of the area in question and from the construction of Steel foundry by the petitioner-company over Khasra Nos. 138/278 (sic) and 138/279 and its plans submitted to the Municipal Council, Jaipur. The petitioner-company had also in its meeting with the Collector, Jaipur held on 20-4-1973 had agreed to set apart the area of 1 bigha 16 biswas in Khasra No. 138/79 of village Sahjahpura to be used as Shamsan by the residents of that area which was attended by various functionaries of the State Government such as Addl. Collector (Admn.), Deputy Town Planner, Jaipur in Bassi Sitarampura Chak, Hasanpura, Sahjahpura to NEI Ltd. and this fact is also fortified by the correspondence exchanged between the parties to declare the user of the said land as industrial area and be handed over to the petitioner-company. This fact is also fortified from the offer of the UIT made to the petitioner-company to pay the cost of acquisition of the land by compensating the UIT for the same consideration price as agreed to between the parties out of which part payment has already been made by the petitioner-company to the State Government and this fact is borne out from para 11 of the writ petition wherein it has been stated that UIT was paid Rs. 20,000/- as on 23-11-1962 and further a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- as on 6-5-1970 in pursuance of the decision taken in the meeting of the Chief Secretary; Secretary, Town Planning and the Secretary, Industries on 13-2-1970 in respect of the afore said piece of land. This fact has not been disputed by the respondents in their reply to show cause notice issued by this Court.
23. I am fortified in my aforesaid observations from the following judgments :
The Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 621 ; American Dry Fruit Stores v. Union of India, AIR 1990 Bom 376 and Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1985 Delhi 344.
24. In the matter of Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies (AIR 1968 SC 718) (supra) in appeal from the judgment of P. and H. High Court to the Apex Court the question of law which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court in the context of interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 as to whether the Textiles Commissioner who had put a scheme called the Export Promotion Scheme providing incentives to the exporters of woollen garments as extended to the exporters to Afghanistan and the interested exporters were invited to get themselves registered with the Textiles Commissioner, it was represented that such exporters will be entitled to import raw materials of the total amount equal to 100% of the F.O.B. value of the exports. It was held by the Apex Court that it could not be assumed merely because the Import Trade Policy was general in terms, it was statutory in character and even though the case did not fall within the terms of Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, it was still open to a party who had acted on representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promises made by it, even though the promises were not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
25. In the matter of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (AIR 1979 SC 621) (supra) while analysing the scope and ambit of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the Apex Court while upholding the claim of the appellant to claim exemption from levy of sales-tax observed that the same could be sustained only on the doctrine of promissory estoppel which could not be said to be so well defined in its scope and ambit and so free from uncertainty in its application that the Court should be compelled to hold that the appellant must have had knowledge of its rights to claim exemption on the basis of promissory estoppel since there could be no presumption that every person knows the law and hence in absence of any material placed before the Court, it could not be assumed that the appellant had full knowledge of its rights to claim exemption. It was further observed as under (at Pp. 631 and 632) :--
'The true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the Courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defence."
26. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, examined their rival claims and contentions as well as the ratio of the law cited by the learned counsel and also perused the summoned record.
27. Consequently the writ petition is allowed. Applying the principle of promissory estoppel to the instant case, I am of the view that the petitioner-company deserves to be put to possession of the land which has been declared as Sawai Chak measuring 17 bighas 19 biswas falling in Khasra Nos. 138/280 and 138/282 (sic) in village Bassi Sitarampura, Hasanpura and Sahjahpura which has been declared as industrial area for the purpose of industrial expansion by the petitioner-company in terms of the powers of the State Government as per Section 102 of the Land Revenue Act, 1956 and since the petitioner-company has already been allotted the aforesaid land as early as in the year 1963-64, the State Government and it officers are directed to make the allotment of the aforesaid land to the petitioner-company subject to the payment of the appreciated price of the said land as of today to meet escalation cost less the amount already paid to the Stale Government. This direction is being given keeping in view the fact that the State exchequer should not be put to any loss of revenue and in case the petitioner is willing to pay the sale consideration to the respondent on the prevailing price of the similarly situated lands in the vicinity of the land in question then in that event an offer shall be made by the State Government to the petitioner-company within four weeks of the submission of certified copy of this order and in case any offer is made by the petitioner-company in lieu of the aforesaid offer to the State Government within a period of four weeks thereafter, the respondents are directed to execute a sale deed and other such relevant documents, execution of which may be necessary to put the petitioner-company in possession of the same subject to the payment of sale consideration in accordance with Rules. It is further, directed that keeping in view the fact that first offer on the basis of which the allotment of the land measuring 35 bighas 17 biswas was made to the petitioner way back on 6-12-1962 on the basis of which the said land after being declared industrial area was handed over to the petitioner-company, no interest shall be chargeable from the petitioner-company for the past period. The respondents are further directed to declare the aforesaid land measuring 17 bighas 19 biswas as industrial area within the aforesaid period by, issuing a proper Notification duly gazetted in accordance with law.
28. As regards the shifting of the cremation ground from the present site, the petitioner-company is directed to shift the same to another site in the near vicinity of the land in question so that the local residents of the aforesaid villages may not be put to any inconvenience and difficulty for the same and the petitioner-company is consequently directed to set apart the land measuring 1 bigha 16 biswas for the purposes of its utilization for cremation ground while the remaining 34 bighas 1 biswa of land should be declared as an industrial area by the respondents as so already notified in the master-plan of Jaipur City. There will be no order as to costs. The summoned record be sent back to the concerned department immediately.